CWE-915
AllowedImproperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.
348 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GGC6-38JQ-Q957
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:32Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.1.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.1.17.",
"id": "GHSA-ggc6-38jq-q957",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T21:32:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-038"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMJW-49P4-PCFM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-12 22:44 – Updated: 2021-03-12 16:57Impact
The issue is as follows: when msgpack5 decodes a map containing a
key "__proto__", it assigns the decoded value to __proto__. As you
are no doubt aware, Object.prototype.__proto__ is an accessor
property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to
the key __proto__ decodes to an object or null, msgpack5 sets
the decoded object's prototype to that value.
An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can
use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have
unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length,
numeric properties, and push et al if __proto__'s value decodes to
an Array); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for
example if the __proto__ value decodes to a Map or Date). Other
unexpected behavior might be produced for other types.
There is no effect on the global prototype.
An example:
const msgpack5 = require('msgpack5')();
const payload = {};
Object.defineProperty(payload, '__proto__', {
value: new Map().set(1, 2),
enumerable: true
});
const encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload);
console.log(encoded); // <Buffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02>
const decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded);
// decoded's prototype has been overwritten
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 => 2 }
console.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get]
// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map
console.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true
console.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map]
console.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map]
console.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map
// decoded is not, however, a Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false
// using decoded as though it were a Map throws
try {
decoded.get(1);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called
// on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
try {
decoded.size;
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
// re-encoding the decoded value throws
try {
msgpack5.encode(decoded);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a
prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is
affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5 values (though if the
victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5
value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype
pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code).
Patches
Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.
Workarounds
Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in example link to repo * Email us at example email address
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-12T16:57:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-12T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe issue is as follows: when `msgpack5` decodes a map containing a \nkey `\"__proto__\"`, it assigns the decoded value to `__proto__`. As you \nare no doubt aware, `Object.prototype.__proto__` is an accessor \nproperty for the receiver\u0027s prototype. If the value corresponding to \nthe key `__proto__` decodes to an object or `null`, `msgpack5` sets \nthe decoded object\u0027s prototype to that value. \n\nAn attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can \nuse this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have \nunexpected prototype properties and methods (for example `length`, \nnumeric properties, and `push` et al if `__proto__`\u0027s value decodes to \nan `Array`); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for \nexample if the `__proto__` value decodes to a `Map` or `Date`). Other \nunexpected behavior might be produced for other types. \n\nThere is no effect on the global prototype.\n\nAn example: \n\n```js \nconst msgpack5 = require(\u0027msgpack5\u0027)(); \n\nconst payload = {}; \nObject.defineProperty(payload, \u0027__proto__\u0027, { \nvalue: new Map().set(1, 2), \nenumerable: true \n}); \n\nconst encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload); \nconsole.log(encoded); // \u003cBuffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02\u003e \n\nconst decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded); \n\n// decoded\u0027s prototype has been overwritten \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 =\u003e 2 } \nconsole.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get] \n\n// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map \nconsole.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true \nconsole.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map] \nconsole.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map] \nconsole.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map \n\n// decoded is not, however, a Map \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false \n\n// using decoded as though it were a Map throws \ntry { \ndecoded.get(1); \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called \n// on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \ntry { \ndecoded.size; \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size \n// called on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \n\n// re-encoding the decoded value throws \ntry { \nmsgpack5.encode(decoded); \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries \n// called on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \n``` \n\nThis \"prototype poisoning\" is sort of a very limited inversion of a \nprototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value\u0027s prototype is \naffected, and it can only be set to `msgpack5` values (though if the \nvictim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a `msgpack5` \nvalue). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype \npollution (absent other bugs in the consumer\u0027s code). \n\n### Patches\n\nVersions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAlways validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [example link to repo](http://example.com)\n* Email us at [example email address](mailto:example@example.com)",
"id": "GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm",
"modified": "2021-03-12T16:57:44Z",
"published": "2021-03-12T22:44:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/security/advisories/GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/commit/d4e6cb956ae51c8bb2828e71c7c1107c340cf1e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v4.5.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v5.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/msgpack5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype poisoning"
}
GHSA-GR58-J5WH-M333
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-06 17:29 – Updated: 2021-05-05 21:33All versions of package nis-utils up to and including 0.6.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setValue function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nis-utils"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-05T21:33:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-17T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "All versions of package nis-utils up to and including 0.6.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setValue function.",
"id": "GHSA-gr58-j5wh-m333",
"modified": "2021-05-05T21:33:21Z",
"published": "2021-05-06T17:29:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-NISUTILS-598799"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype Pollution in nis-utils"
}
GHSA-GR6Q-5P85-FQ4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-13 18:30Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Plotly.js Graphing allows Object Injection. This issue affects Plotly.js Graphing versions: from 0.0.0 to 3.0.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Plotly.js Graphing allows Object Injection. This issue affects Plotly.js Graphing versions: from 0.0.0 to 3.0.2.",
"id": "GHSA-gr6q-5p85-fq4q",
"modified": "2026-07-13T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-11T00:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GVF2-2F4G-JQF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-10 00:31 – Updated: 2025-06-04 00:50Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability that (if combined with another exploit) could lead to Remote Code Execution. It is not directly exploitable.
This issue is mitigated by the fact that in order for it to be exploitable, a separate vulnerability must be present to allow an attacker to pass unsafe input to unserialize(). There are no such known exploits in Drupal core.
To help protect against this potential vulnerability, some additional checks have been added to Drupal core's database code. If you use a third-party database driver, check the release notes for additional configuration steps that may be required in certain cases.
This issue affects Drupal Core: from 7.0 before 7.102, from 8.0.0 before 10.2.11, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.9.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-10T19:09:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-10T00:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability that (if combined with another exploit) could lead to Remote Code Execution. It is not directly exploitable.\n\nThis issue is mitigated by the fact that in order for it to be exploitable, a separate vulnerability must be present to allow an attacker to pass unsafe input to `unserialize()`. There are no such known exploits in Drupal core.\n\nTo help protect against this potential vulnerability, some additional checks have been added to Drupal core\u0027s database code. If you use a third-party database driver, check the release notes for additional configuration steps that may be required in certain cases. \n\nThis issue affects Drupal Core: from 7.0 before 7.102, from 8.0.0 before 10.2.11, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.9.",
"id": "GHSA-gvf2-2f4g-jqf4",
"modified": "2025-06-04T00:50:20Z",
"published": "2024-12-10T00:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55638"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/drupal/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2024-008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability"
}
GHSA-GX83-3VF8-GH7J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 20:44 – Updated: 2026-09-28 20:44Summary
DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to Serializable, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated Comparable-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable.
Details
Affected file: src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java
private final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {
private final Set<String> UNSAFE = new HashSet<>();
{
UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]
UNSAFE.add("java.util.logging.Handler");
UNSAFE.add("javax.naming.Referenceable");
UNSAFE.add("javax.sql.DataSource");
// java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here
}
}
protected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,
JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {
return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE
}
The class's own JavaDoc acknowledges the design ("Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like java.lang.Object a custom implementation... is needed"), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that Comparable has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class does restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice — consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (Runnable was added recently for issue #5014).
This is specific to the default, unconfigured validator reached via bare @JsonTypeInfo usage. Global "Default Typing" via activateDefaultTyping() is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument — a correctly-configured BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator rejects the same payload under activateDefaultTyping().
PoC
Built entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, javac, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):
1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):
static class SafeThing implements Comparable<SafeThing> {
public String name;
public SafeThing() {}
public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }
}
static class Holder {
@JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
public Comparable<?> value;
}
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV
String json = "{\"value\":{\"@class\":\"...SafeThing\",\"name\":\"hello\"}}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing
2. Real JDK class substitution:
String json = "{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
3. Negative control — Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:
PolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
.allowIfSubType("PtvGapTest4").build();
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
.activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();
// same java.io.File payload
// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: "...denied resolution"
Observed output:
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3 Trying: {"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]} ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4 Trying malicious substitution: ["PtvGapTest4$Holder",{"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]}] REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id 'java.io.File' as a subtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution
Impact
Any application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. Concrete impact is demonstrated via java.io.File: an attacker can cause construction of a File object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive.
Suggested remediation:
1. Add java.lang.Comparable to UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE.
2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (java.lang.Iterable, java.util.EventListener) for the same gap.
3. Consider a narrower default for isSafeSubType() for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional true.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator` \u2014 the `PolymorphicTypeValidator` used automatically whenever `@JsonTypeInfo` is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator \u2014 denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific \"unsafe base types\" (`Object`, `Serializable`, `Closeable`, `AutoCloseable`, `Cloneable`, `Runnable`, `java.util.logging.Handler`, `javax.naming.Referenceable`, `javax.sql.DataSource`). Its `isSafeSubType()` returns `true` unconditionally for every other base type. `java.lang.Comparable` is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes \u2014 comparable in breadth to `Serializable`, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an `@JsonTypeInfo`-annotated `Comparable`-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing `Comparable`.\n\n### Details\n**Affected file:** `src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java`\n\n```java\nprivate final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {\n private final Set\u003cString\u003e UNSAFE = new HashSet\u003c\u003e();\n {\n UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]\n UNSAFE.add(\"java.util.logging.Handler\");\n UNSAFE.add(\"javax.naming.Referenceable\");\n UNSAFE.add(\"javax.sql.DataSource\");\n // java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here\n }\n}\n\nprotected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,\n JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {\n return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE\n}\n```\n\nThe class\u0027s own JavaDoc acknowledges the design (*\"Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like `java.lang.Object` a custom implementation... is needed\"*), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that `Comparable` has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class *does* restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice \u2014 consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (`Runnable` was added recently for issue #5014).\n\nThis is specific to the **default, unconfigured validator** reached via bare `@JsonTypeInfo` usage. Global \"Default Typing\" via `activateDefaultTyping()` is **not** affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit `PolymorphicTypeValidator` argument \u2014 a correctly-configured `BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator` rejects the same payload under `activateDefaultTyping()`.\n\n### PoC\nBuilt entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, `javac`, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):\n\n**1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):**\n```java\nstatic class SafeThing implements Comparable\u003cSafeThing\u003e {\n public String name;\n public SafeThing() {}\n public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }\n}\nstatic class Holder {\n @JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)\n public Comparable\u003c?\u003e value;\n}\n\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV\nString json = \"{\\\"value\\\":{\\\"@class\\\":\\\"...SafeThing\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"hello\\\"}}\";\nHolder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);\n// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing\n```\n\n**2. Real JDK class substitution:**\n```java\nString json = \"{\\\"value\\\":[\\\"java.io.File\\\",\\\"/etc/passwd\\\"]}\";\nHolder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);\n// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd\n```\n\n**3. Negative control \u2014 Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:**\n```java\nPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()\n .allowIfSubType(\"PtvGapTest4\").build();\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()\n .activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();\n// same java.io.File payload\n// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: \"...denied resolution\"\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n\n\n\n\n$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3\nTrying: {\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}\nACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd\n\n$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4\nTrying malicious substitution: [\"PtvGapTest4$Holder\",{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}]\nREJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id \u0027java.io.File\u0027 as a\nsubtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution\n\n\n\n\n### Impact\nAny application declaring an `@JsonTypeInfo`-annotated property or class with `Comparable` as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive `PolymorphicTypeValidator`, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing `Comparable`. Concrete impact is demonstrated via `java.io.File`: an attacker can cause construction of a `File` object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive. \n\n**Suggested remediation:**\n1. Add `java.lang.Comparable` to `UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE`.\n2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (`java.lang.Iterable`, `java.util.EventListener`) for the same gap.\n3. Consider a narrower default for `isSafeSubType()` for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional `true`.",
"id": "GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j",
"modified": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/6156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/eb3b7fc0f9c0d27f471550ac3316b17d1987388f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator\u0027s unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)"
}
GHSA-H4RQ-P45C-642R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:32rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63102"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T16:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-h4rq-p45c-642r",
"modified": "2026-07-20T18:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T18:32:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/pull/325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/commit/84822f4051ed97d651b1b4d191c6da2aa8c3c037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/releases/tag/core-8.2.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rconfig-privilege-escalation-via-users-api-role-field"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H68Q-55JF-X68W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-10 18:47 – Updated: 2021-04-20 17:46This affects the package chart.js before 2.9.4. The options parameter is not properly sanitized when it is processed. When the options are processed, the existing options (or the defaults options) are deeply merged with provided options. However, during this operation, the keys of the object being set are not checked, leading to a prototype pollution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "chart.js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7746"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-20T17:46:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-29T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This affects the package chart.js before 2.9.4. The options parameter is not properly sanitized when it is processed. When the options are processed, the existing options (or the defaults options) are deeply merged with provided options. However, during this operation, the keys of the object being set are not checked, leading to a prototype pollution.",
"id": "GHSA-h68q-55jf-x68w",
"modified": "2021-04-20T17:46:27Z",
"published": "2021-05-10T18:47:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chartjs/Chart.js/pull/7920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSBOWER-1019375"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSBOWERGITHUBCHARTJS-1019376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSNPM-1019374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CHARTJS-1018716"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype pollution in chart.js"
}
GHSA-HM82-QR45-H7MW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 17:22 – Updated: 2023-09-08 22:51Prototype pollution vulnerability in 'field' versions 0.0.1 through 1.0.1 allows attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "field"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.1"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-28269"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-26T18:23:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-11-12T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Prototype pollution vulnerability in \u0027field\u0027 versions 0.0.1 through 1.0.1 allows attacker to cause a denial of service and may lead to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-hm82-qr45-h7mw",
"modified": "2023-09-08T22:51:04Z",
"published": "2021-12-10T17:22:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jprichardson/field/blob/2a3811dfc4cdd13833977477d2533534fc61ce06/lib/field.js#L39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.whitesourcesoftware.com/vulnerability-database/CVE-2020-28269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.whitesourcesoftware.com/vulnerability-database/CVE-2020-28269,"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype Pollution in field"
}
GHSA-HP26-Q66V-Q2W7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 14:57 – Updated: 2026-06-09 13:10Summary
A Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the assistant update endpoint of FlowiseAI.
The endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating an assistant resource.
Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign assistants to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.
Details
The endpoint responsible for updating assistants:
PUT /api/v1/assistants/{assistantId}
accepts a JSON request body containing assistant metadata.
However, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.
Server-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:
- workspaceId
- createdDate
- updatedDate
These fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity without strict DTO whitelisting or authorization checks.
For example, the following request body was accepted:
{
"details": "",
"credential": "11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249",
"iconSrc": null,
"type": "CUSTOM",
"createdDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z",
"updatedDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
This indicates that internal, server-controlled properties can be modified by an authenticated user.
PoC
- Authenticate to the Flowise interface.
- Capture the request used to update an assistant:
PUT /api/v1/assistants/<ASSISTANT_ID>
Content-Type: application/json
Modify the request body by injecting server-controlled fields:
{
"details": "",
"credential": "11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249",
"iconSrc": null,
"type": "CUSTOM",
"createdDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z",
"updatedDate": "2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z",
"workspaceId": "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"
}
3.Send the request.
Observe that the response accepts and persists the attacker-controlled workspaceId and metadata fields.
Impact
This vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of assistant resources.
Confirmed impacts include:
- Cross-workspace reassignment of assistants (workspaceId)
- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)
In multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move assistants between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T14:57:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T16:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA Mass Assignment vulnerability exists in the assistant update endpoint of FlowiseAI.\n\nThe endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating an assistant resource.\n\nDue to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign assistants to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint responsible for updating assistants:\n\n**PUT /api/v1/assistants/{assistantId}**\n\naccepts a JSON request body containing assistant metadata.\n\nHowever, the server does not restrict which properties may be modified by the client. As a result, user-controlled request bodies can include additional fields that should normally be controlled only by the backend.\n\nServer-controlled fields that can be manipulated include:\n\n1. workspaceId\n2. createdDate\n3. updatedDate\n\nThese fields appear to be directly mapped to the underlying database entity without strict DTO whitelisting or authorization checks.\n\nFor example, the following request body was accepted:\n\n```json\n{\n \"details\": \"\",\n \"credential\": \"11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249\",\n \"iconSrc\": null,\n \"type\": \"CUSTOM\",\n \"createdDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z\",\n \"updatedDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z\",\n \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n```\n\nThis indicates that internal, server-controlled properties can be modified by an authenticated user.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Authenticate to the Flowise interface.\n2. Capture the request used to update an assistant:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/assistants/\u003cASSISTANT_ID\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\nModify the request body by injecting server-controlled fields:\n\n{\n \"details\": \"\",\n \"credential\": \"11ca7fef-c9b1-4c87-aa54-e547aed8a249\",\n \"iconSrc\": null,\n \"type\": \"CUSTOM\",\n \"createdDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:04.000Z\",\n \"updatedDate\": \"2026-03-06T17:31:55.000Z\",\n \"workspaceId\": \"11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555\"\n}\n\n```\n3.Send the request.\n\nObserve that the response accepts and persists the attacker-controlled workspaceId and metadata fields.\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows authenticated users to manipulate internal attributes of assistant resources.\n\nConfirmed impacts include:\n\n- Cross-workspace reassignment of assistants (workspaceId)\n- Unauthorized modification of metadata (createdDate, updatedDate)\n\nIn multi-tenant deployments, this may allow an attacker to move assistants between workspaces without authorization, breaking tenant isolation boundaries.",
"id": "GHSA-hp26-q66v-q2w7",
"modified": "2026-06-09T13:10:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T14:57:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-hp26-q66v-q2w7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46441"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FlowiseAI has Mass Assignment in Assistant Update Endpoint that Allows Cross-Workspace Resource Reassignment"
}
Mitigation
- If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists.
- For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
Mitigation
If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Refactoring
Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.