CWE-863
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
8380 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W39F-H553-H2MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:51 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:51Summary
The task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: TaskPosition.CanUpdate delegates to Task.CanUpdate (write access to the task's own project) and the request body's project_view_id is never validated to belong to the task's project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist (task_id, project_view_id, position) rows into any other tenant's project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below MinPositionSpacing, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but RecalculateTaskPositions aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes — only the plain row insert (position ≥ 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0.
Details
Affected endpoints (both verified):
- v1:
POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position - v2:
PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position
Root cause in pkg/models/task_position.go:
CanUpdate(lines 61-64) checks onlyTask.CanUpdate— i.e. the caller's write access to the task's own project.updateTaskPosition(lines 174-232) upserts(task_id, project_view_id, position)directly; there is no check that the view belongs to the task's project and no access check on the view's project.ProjectViewIDis body-bindable (json:"project_view_id", no readOnly/param restriction, line 42).
Contrast with the fixed sibling: the bucket-move endpoint (POST /projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks, pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:53-68) validates both the bucket and the task after the GHSA-5pg6/GHSA-569v family fixes — the position endpoint was never given the equivalent view-side check.
Observed behavior (two independent verification runs): an attacker with zero access to the victim project receives 200 {"task_id": ..., "project_view_id": <victim view>, "position": ...} on both v1 and v2, and the row is persisted (verified directly in the task_positions table: rows for the victim view went 0 to 1). Positioning the victim's own task is correctly refused with 403, isolating the missing view-side check. The victim's listings do not surface the foreign task (no confidentiality impact demonstrated), and a low-position (< 0.01) injection enters the recalculation branch but RecalculateTaskPositions returns 403 (getRelevantProjectsFromCollection → CanRead on the victim project) before any recalculation runs, rolling the whole request back — so the low-position variant persists nothing and never rewrites the victim's ordering.
PoC
Steps use the owner of the victim project (token $OWNER) and an attacker with only their own project (token $ATTACKER). All requests were executed against a local Vikunja 2.5.0 instance.
- Owner creates a private project (default views included) and lists its views to obtain a victim view ID:
curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v1/projects" -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"title":"victim"}'
# -> {"id":200,...}
curl "$BASE/api/v1/projects/200/views" -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER"
# -> [{"id":771,"view_kind":"kanban",...}, ...] # remember VIEW=771
- Attacker creates their own project and a task in it:
curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v1/projects" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"title":"attacker"}'
# -> {"id":201,...}
curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v1/projects/201/tasks" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"title":"evil"}'
# -> {"id":105,...}
- Baseline — attacker positions their task in their own view (succeeds, expected):
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": <OWN_VIEW>, "position": 100}'
# -> 200
- Mutation — attacker writes their task's position into the victim's view (no access to it whatsoever):
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": 771, "position": 100}'
# -> 200 {"task_id":105,"project_view_id":771,"position":100}
curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v2/tasks/105/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": 771, "position": 101}'
# -> 200 (v2 twin behaves identically)
- Control — attacker positioning the victim's own task is correctly refused (the task-level gate works; only the view side is missing):
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tasks/<VICTIM_TASK>/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": 771, "position": 1}'
# -> 403 Forbidden
- Persistence proof — the cross-tenant row exists in the database:
docker exec <db> psql -U vikunja -d vikunja -t -A -c \
"SELECT task_id, position FROM task_positions WHERE project_view_id=771 AND task_id=105;"
# -> 105|100 (row for the attacker's task inside the victim's view namespace)
Observed result: steps 4 and 6 succeed — a task_positions row (attacker_task, victim_view) is created and persisted; step 5 is refused with 403. Note: "position": 1 is above MinPositionSpacing (0.01), so it never enters the recalculation branch — it is a plain upsert. A position < 0.01 does enter the branch but is refused with 403 and rolled back (see Impact).
Impact
Impact summary: a genuine broken-object-level-authorization defect (CWE-639) with no demonstrated confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact. The injected rows are invisible to the victim (view listings filter by project), order-preserving (any position collision is respaced between the same neighbours), and self-healing (any legitimate recalculation of the view deletes and rebuilds all its position rows). No read access, no privilege gain, no data destruction, and no usable DoS. Rated low — the fix is defense-in-depth, and its main value is preventing this wrong-object authorization from becoming a real cross-tenant leak should any future read path join task_positions without re-checking task-project access.
Broken object-level authorization on the write side (CWE-639, CWE-863: the authorization decision uses one resource dimension — the task — while the write targets another — the view). Any authenticated user holding a single writable task can persist rows into any other tenant's view state instance-wide (view IDs sequential and enumerable). The recalculation/lock path is not usable cross-tenant: a low position (< 0.01) enters the branch but RecalculateTaskPositions fails its own project read-access check and rolls back before recalculating (on MySQL/PostgreSQL a FOR UPDATE lock on the view row is taken one statement earlier in the same transaction, but released immediately on that rollback; SQLite takes no lock), so there is no meaningful availability angle. No confidentiality breach was demonstrated (victim listings filter by project), and the pollution is recoverable. Suggested fix: in CanUpdate or before the upsert, load the view by tp.ProjectViewID and require view.ProjectID == task.ProjectID (and/or caller access to the view's project), mirroring the bucket-side fix for GHSA-569v.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91984"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: `TaskPosition.CanUpdate` delegates to `Task.CanUpdate` (write access to the task\u0027s own project) and the request body\u0027s `project_view_id` is never validated to belong to the task\u0027s project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` rows into any other tenant\u0027s project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below `MinPositionSpacing`, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but `RecalculateTaskPositions` aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes \u2014 only the plain row insert (position \u2265 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0.\n\n## Details\n\nAffected endpoints (both verified):\n\n- v1: `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position`\n- v2: `PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position`\n\nRoot cause in `pkg/models/task_position.go`:\n\n- `CanUpdate` (lines 61-64) checks only `Task.CanUpdate` \u2014 i.e. the caller\u0027s write access to the task\u0027s own project.\n- `updateTaskPosition` (lines 174-232) upserts `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` directly; there is no check that the view belongs to the task\u0027s project and no access check on the view\u0027s project.\n- `ProjectViewID` is body-bindable (`json:\"project_view_id\"`, no readOnly/param restriction, line 42).\n\nContrast with the fixed sibling: the bucket-move endpoint (`POST /projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks`, `pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:53-68`) validates both the bucket and the task after the GHSA-5pg6/GHSA-569v family fixes \u2014 the position endpoint was never given the equivalent view-side check.\n\nObserved behavior (two independent verification runs): an attacker with zero access to the victim project receives `200 {\"task_id\": ..., \"project_view_id\": \u003cvictim view\u003e, \"position\": ...}` on both v1 and v2, and the row is persisted (verified directly in the `task_positions` table: rows for the victim view went 0 to 1). Positioning the victim\u0027s own task is correctly refused with 403, isolating the missing view-side check. The victim\u0027s listings do not surface the foreign task (no confidentiality impact demonstrated), and a low-position (\u003c 0.01) injection enters the recalculation branch but `RecalculateTaskPositions` returns 403 (`getRelevantProjectsFromCollection` \u2192 `CanRead` on the victim project) before any recalculation runs, rolling the whole request back \u2014 so the low-position variant persists nothing and never rewrites the victim\u0027s ordering.\n\n## PoC\n\nSteps use the owner of the victim project (token `$OWNER`) and an attacker with only their own project (token `$ATTACKER`). All requests were executed against a local Vikunja 2.5.0 instance.\n\n1. Owner creates a private project (default views included) and lists its views to obtain a victim view ID:\n\n```\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v1/projects\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $OWNER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"title\":\"victim\"}\u0027\n# -\u003e {\"id\":200,...}\n\ncurl \"$BASE/api/v1/projects/200/views\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $OWNER\"\n# -\u003e [{\"id\":771,\"view_kind\":\"kanban\",...}, ...] # remember VIEW=771\n```\n\n2. Attacker creates their own project and a task in it:\n\n```\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v1/projects\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"title\":\"attacker\"}\u0027\n# -\u003e {\"id\":201,...}\n\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v1/projects/201/tasks\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"title\":\"evil\"}\u0027\n# -\u003e {\"id\":105,...}\n```\n\n3. Baseline \u2014 attacker positions their task in their own view (succeeds, expected):\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": \u003cOWN_VIEW\u003e, \"position\": 100}\u0027\n# -\u003e 200\n```\n\n4. Mutation \u2014 attacker writes their task\u0027s position into the victim\u0027s view (no access to it whatsoever):\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": 771, \"position\": 100}\u0027\n# -\u003e 200 {\"task_id\":105,\"project_view_id\":771,\"position\":100}\n\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v2/tasks/105/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": 771, \"position\": 101}\u0027\n# -\u003e 200 (v2 twin behaves identically)\n```\n\n5. Control \u2014 attacker positioning the victim\u0027s own task is correctly refused (the task-level gate works; only the view side is missing):\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"$BASE/api/v1/tasks/\u003cVICTIM_TASK\u003e/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": 771, \"position\": 1}\u0027\n# -\u003e 403 Forbidden\n```\n\n6. Persistence proof \u2014 the cross-tenant row exists in the database:\n\n```\ndocker exec \u003cdb\u003e psql -U vikunja -d vikunja -t -A -c \\\n \"SELECT task_id, position FROM task_positions WHERE project_view_id=771 AND task_id=105;\"\n# -\u003e 105|100 (row for the attacker\u0027s task inside the victim\u0027s view namespace)\n```\n\nObserved result: steps 4 and 6 succeed \u2014 a `task_positions` row `(attacker_task, victim_view)` is created and persisted; step 5 is refused with 403. Note: `\"position\": 1` is above `MinPositionSpacing` (0.01), so it never enters the recalculation branch \u2014 it is a plain upsert. A position \u003c 0.01 does enter the branch but is refused with 403 and rolled back (see Impact).\n\n## Impact\n\n**Impact summary:** a genuine broken-object-level-authorization defect (CWE-639) with no demonstrated confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact. The injected rows are invisible to the victim (view listings filter by project), order-preserving (any position collision is respaced between the same neighbours), and self-healing (any legitimate recalculation of the view deletes and rebuilds all its position rows). No read access, no privilege gain, no data destruction, and no usable DoS. Rated **low** \u2014 the fix is defense-in-depth, and its main value is preventing this wrong-object authorization from becoming a real cross-tenant leak should any future read path join `task_positions` without re-checking task-project access.\n\nBroken object-level authorization on the write side (CWE-639, CWE-863: the authorization decision uses one resource dimension \u2014 the task \u2014 while the write targets another \u2014 the view). Any authenticated user holding a single writable task can persist rows into any other tenant\u0027s view state instance-wide (view IDs sequential and enumerable). The recalculation/lock path is not usable cross-tenant: a low position (\u003c 0.01) enters the branch but `RecalculateTaskPositions` fails its own project read-access check and rolls back before recalculating (on MySQL/PostgreSQL a `FOR UPDATE` lock on the view row is taken one statement earlier in the same transaction, but released immediately on that rollback; SQLite takes no lock), so there is no meaningful availability angle. No confidentiality breach was demonstrated (victim listings filter by project), and the pollution is recoverable. Suggested fix: in `CanUpdate` or before the upsert, load the view by `tp.ProjectViewID` and require `view.ProjectID == task.ProjectID` (and/or caller access to the view\u0027s project), mirroring the bucket-side fix for GHSA-569v.",
"id": "GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
"modified": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/077dc4de79ce6f1ab59215a2c7bf9b30423685f2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-broken-object-level-authorization-via-task-position"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vikunja: Cross-tenant task-position rows can be injected into arbitrary project views via the unvalidated project_view_id in the task position endpoint (v1 and v2)"
}
GHSA-W39P-VH2G-G8G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-21 15:03Summary
langgraph-sdk constructs HTTP request paths for resource operations by interpolating caller-supplied identifier values into URL templates. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method's call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user's authorization scope.
This issue is most consequential in deployments that:
- forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and
- rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call's intended path rather than on the final delivered request path.
There have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild. This change is intended to reduce the surface available when caller-supplied identifier values originate from untrusted sources.
Affected users / systems
You may be affected if you:
- use
langgraph-sdk(Python) to address resources by identifier, and - pass identifier values into SDK methods that originate from end-user input, untrusted third-party callers, or any source that does not validate identifier format before the SDK call.
Applications that validate identifier values (for example, by parsing them as UUIDs and rejecting anything that does not parse) before passing them to SDK methods are not affected. Validated UUIDs round-trip through the SDK request path unchanged.
Impact
- Potential unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources via SDK methods called for a different resource type, when caller-supplied identifier values are not validated.
- In deployments with prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer, the authorization decision and the final delivered request path may diverge.
- Confidentiality: disclosure of resource content beyond the authorization scope of the calling user.
- Integrity: modification or deletion of resources beyond the authorization scope of the calling user.
Patches / mitigation
The SDK now applies path-segment encoding to identifier values before they are interpolated into request URL templates. After this change, identifier values that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths are transmitted as encoded byte sequences and routed to the resource the SDK method's call site indicates.
Compatibility
Identifier values that match the standard UUID format, or any other format that contains only characters safe to transmit unencoded in URL path segments, round-trip through the SDK request path unchanged. Applications that already validate identifier inputs see no behavioral change.
Operational guidance
- Validate identifier values (typically as UUIDs) at the boundary where untrusted input enters the application, before passing them to SDK methods.
- For deployments relying on URL-prefix-based authorization upstream of LangGraph, prefer authorization at the LangGraph server layer or on parsed-and-validated request paths rather than on raw URL prefixes.
LangSmith / hosted deployments note
This issue affects the SDK that runs in caller applications. The LangGraph server runtime, including LangSmith-hosted deployments, receives ordinary HTTP requests on documented routes and is not itself affected by this issue. Applications that consume LangSmith-hosted services via langgraph-sdk and pass untrusted identifier values to SDK methods should upgrade.
First reported by: pucagit (CyStack).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "langgraph-sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48776"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:32:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T10:55:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`langgraph-sdk` constructs HTTP request paths for resource operations by interpolating caller-supplied identifier values into URL templates. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method\u0027s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user\u0027s authorization scope.\n\nThis issue is most consequential in deployments that:\n\n- forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and\n- rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call\u0027s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path.\n\nThere have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild. This change is intended to reduce the surface available when caller-supplied identifier values originate from untrusted sources.\n\n## Affected users / systems\n\nYou may be affected if you:\n\n- use `langgraph-sdk` (Python) to address resources by identifier, and\n- pass identifier values into SDK methods that originate from end-user input, untrusted third-party callers, or any source that does not validate identifier format before the SDK call.\n\nApplications that validate identifier values (for example, by parsing them as UUIDs and rejecting anything that does not parse) before passing them to SDK methods are not affected. Validated UUIDs round-trip through the SDK request path unchanged.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Potential **unintended access, modification, or deletion** of resources via SDK methods called for a different resource type, when caller-supplied identifier values are not validated.\n- In deployments with prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer, the authorization decision and the final delivered request path may diverge.\n- Confidentiality: disclosure of resource content beyond the authorization scope of the calling user.\n- Integrity: modification or deletion of resources beyond the authorization scope of the calling user.\n\n## Patches / mitigation\n\nThe SDK now applies path-segment encoding to identifier values before they are interpolated into request URL templates. After this change, identifier values that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths are transmitted as encoded byte sequences and routed to the resource the SDK method\u0027s call site indicates.\n\n## Compatibility\n\nIdentifier values that match the standard UUID format, or any other format that contains only characters safe to transmit unencoded in URL path segments, round-trip through the SDK request path unchanged. Applications that already validate identifier inputs see no behavioral change.\n\n## Operational guidance\n\n- Validate identifier values (typically as UUIDs) at the boundary where untrusted input enters the application, before passing them to SDK methods.\n- For deployments relying on URL-prefix-based authorization upstream of LangGraph, prefer authorization at the LangGraph server layer or on parsed-and-validated request paths rather than on raw URL prefixes.\n\n## LangSmith / hosted deployments note\n\nThis issue affects the SDK that runs in caller applications. The LangGraph server runtime, including LangSmith-hosted deployments, receives ordinary HTTP requests on documented routes and is not itself affected by this issue. Applications that consume LangSmith-hosted services via `langgraph-sdk` and pass untrusted identifier values to SDK methods should upgrade.\n\nFirst reported by: pucagit (CyStack).",
"id": "GHSA-w39p-vh2g-g8g5",
"modified": "2026-07-21T15:03:08Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:32:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-w39p-vh2g-g8g5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48776"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w39p-vh2g-g8g5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/releases/tag/sdk%3D%3D0.3.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langgraph-sdk/PYSEC-2026-2575.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langgraph/PYSEC-2026-2194.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/langgraph-sdk"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LangGraph SDK has unsafe URL path construction"
}
GHSA-W3CW-FH5G-GHVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-12 00:00 – Updated: 2024-11-14 21:31Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol Security Feature Bypass.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-21913"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-11T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol Security Feature Bypass.",
"id": "GHSA-w3cw-fh5g-ghvr",
"modified": "2024-11-14T21:31:54Z",
"published": "2022-01-12T00:00:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2022-21913"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3F7-2QFW-348X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:18 – Updated: 2022-11-22 19:47An improper authorization vulnerability exists in Jenkins HipChat Plugin 2.2.0 and earlier in HipChatNotifier.java that allows attackers with Overall/Read access to send test notifications to an attacker-specified HipChat server with attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins. As of version 2.2.1, this form validation method requires POST requests and Overall/Administer permissions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jvnet.hudson.plugins:hipchat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-1000418"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-11-22T19:47:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-01-09T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An improper authorization vulnerability exists in Jenkins HipChat Plugin 2.2.0 and earlier in HipChatNotifier.java that allows attackers with Overall/Read access to send test notifications to an attacker-specified HipChat server with attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins. As of version 2.2.1, this form validation method requires POST requests and Overall/Administer permissions.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-w3f7-2qfw-348x",
"modified": "2022-11-22T19:47:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:18:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2018-09-25/#SECURITY-984%20(1)"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106532"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins HipChat Plugin allows credential capture due to incorrect authorization"
}
GHSA-W3FF-RJV9-M452
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 15:32stigmem versions before 0.9.0a12 contain a broken object level authorization vulnerability in the decay sweep endpoint that allows authenticated attackers with write credentials for one tenant to execute decay operations affecting all tenants. Attackers can submit POST requests to the decay sweep endpoint with ttl_seconds=0 to expire facts across all tenants, or use dry_run to obtain cross-tenant fact counts and existence information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76238"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T14:17:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "stigmem versions before 0.9.0a12 contain a broken object level authorization vulnerability in the decay sweep endpoint that allows authenticated attackers with write credentials for one tenant to execute decay operations affecting all tenants. Attackers can submit POST requests to the decay sweep endpoint with ttl_seconds=0 to expire facts across all tenants, or use dry_run to obtain cross-tenant fact counts and existence information.",
"id": "GHSA-w3ff-rjv9-m452",
"modified": "2026-08-19T15:32:36Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T15:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-6gqw-jqv7-v88m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/stigmem-before-0a12-cross-tenant-bola-via-decay-sweep"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3H4-66F2-WVX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32Windows SmartScreen Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-24880"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-14T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Windows SmartScreen Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-w3h4-66f2-wvx7",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:43Z",
"published": "2023-03-14T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-24880"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-24880"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3VM-XCFJ-P7GR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-06 18:30 – Updated: 2024-03-06 18:30In JetBrains TeamCity before 2023.11.4 presigned URL generation requests in S3 Artifact Storage plugin were authorized improperly
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-06T17:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In JetBrains TeamCity before 2023.11.4 presigned URL generation requests in S3 Artifact Storage plugin were authorized improperly",
"id": "GHSA-w3vm-xcfj-p7gr",
"modified": "2024-03-06T18:30:39Z",
"published": "2024-03-06T18:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W46P-W7W2-FR9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-22 17:54Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
n8n versions before 2.30.1 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the AI Agents feature where the node-execution tool lacks proper authorization checks. A Project Viewer user can escalate privileges by chatting with an agent that has node tools enabled, executing arbitrary nodes and accessing credential secrets without proper authorization verification.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2.29.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T17:54:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-22T12:18:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nn8n versions before 2.30.1 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability in the AI Agents feature where the node-execution tool lacks proper authorization checks. A Project Viewer user can escalate privileges by chatting with an agent that has node tools enabled, executing arbitrary nodes and accessing credential secrets without proper authorization verification.",
"id": "GHSA-w46p-w7w2-fr9g",
"modified": "2026-07-22T17:54:31Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T12:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-x5vx-c2c8-m3w9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-privilege-escalation-via-run-node-tool"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: AI Agents Project Viewer Privilege Escalation via run_node_tool",
"withdrawn": "2026-07-22T17:54:31Z"
}
GHSA-W46R-GXFJ-9733
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:32Improper authorization in Windows FTP Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-118137"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T19:19:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper authorization in Windows FTP Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-w46r-gxfj-9733",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:32:59Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:32:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-118137"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W47G-MPRG-82V2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-13 18:31 – Updated: 2024-03-13 18:31The GenerateBlocks plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.8.2 via Query Loop. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor access and above, to see contents of posts and pages in draft or private status as well as those with scheduled publication dates.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1452"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-13T16:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The GenerateBlocks plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.8.2 via Query Loop. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor access and above, to see contents of posts and pages in draft or private status as well as those with scheduled publication dates.",
"id": "GHSA-w47g-mprg-82v2",
"modified": "2024-03-13T18:31:33Z",
"published": "2024-03-13T18:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/generateblocks/trunk/includes/class-query-loop.php#L140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/generateblocks/trunk/includes/class-query-loop.php#L70"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3041431%40generateblocks%2Ftrunk\u0026old=2995923%40generateblocks%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=#file2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/62f19301-2311-4989-a5f2-9f845b72dd54?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.