Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-73

Allowed

External Control of File Name or Path

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

1263 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JHR7-3VCM-F87V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 15:36
VLAI
Details

The WPvivid — Backup, Migration & Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.134 does not validate a user supplied path before using it in a file deletion routine, allowing administrators to delete arbitrary files on the server, including files outside the web root.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T07:17:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WPvivid \u2014 Backup, Migration \u0026 Staging WordPress plugin before 0.9.134 does not validate a user supplied path before using it in a file deletion routine, allowing administrators to delete arbitrary files on the server, including files outside the web root.",
  "id": "GHSA-jhr7-3vcm-f87v",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T15:36:07Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T09:31:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/bb68f7ae-e380-4154-bd77-8511d8f949d3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JJ3X-PH33-PJC6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 21:30 – Updated: 2026-07-08 21:30
VLAI
Details

Composio SDK before 0.2.32-beta.283 contains a path validation bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to read and exfiltrate sensitive files by exploiting a missing assertSafeFileUploadPath check in the readFileFromDisk function within tool-file-uploads.ts. Attackers can exploit prompt injection to manipulate file_uploadable parameters to reference sensitive paths such as SSH private keys, causing the CLI to upload credential files to attacker-controlled storage.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59807"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T20:16:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Composio SDK before 0.2.32-beta.283 contains a path validation bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to read and exfiltrate sensitive files by exploiting a missing assertSafeFileUploadPath check in the readFileFromDisk function within tool-file-uploads.ts. Attackers can exploit prompt injection to manipulate file_uploadable parameters to reference sensitive paths such as SSH private keys, causing the CLI to upload credential files to attacker-controlled storage.",
  "id": "GHSA-jj3x-ph33-pjc6",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-07-08T21:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/issues/3746"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/pull/3763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/commit/fc17c37bf95b7ece5c038cb7e2ab7e3e4a064e3a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/releases/tag/%40composio%2Fcli%400.2.32-beta.283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/composio-sdk-beta-283-sensitive-file-upload-via-tool-file-uploads-ts"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JJ4C-9QX7-H4PC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-16 21:30 – Updated: 2025-04-17 15:32
VLAI
Details

SourceCodester Company Website CMS 1.0 contains a file upload vulnerability via the "Create Services" file /dashboard/Services.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29708"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-16T21:15:47Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SourceCodester Company Website CMS 1.0 contains a file upload vulnerability via the \"Create Services\" file /dashboard/Services.",
  "id": "GHSA-jj4c-9qx7-h4pc",
  "modified": "2025-04-17T15:32:34Z",
  "published": "2025-04-16T21:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29708"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fupanc-w1n/fupanc/blob/main/php/CVE-2025-29708.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fupanc-w1n/fupanc/blob/main/php/Company%20Website%20CMS1.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JJHP-8CRJ-MPPQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 14:43 – Updated: 2026-09-22 14:43
VLAI
Summary
@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory
Details

Summary

The vault_batch MCP tool (and the equivalent POST /batch-to-vault HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied vault_dir path that was passed directly to path.resolve() + fs.mkdir() with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write .md / .json answer files anywhere the server process can write.

The slug_prefix parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing / or .. could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.

Impact

File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.

The vulnerability exists from v1.6.0 (when the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the batch_to_vault MCP tool) through v2.0.2.

Patch

Fixed in v2.0.3:

  • Opt-in containment via NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT env var. When set, vault_dir is resolved relative to that root and realpath-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or .. segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error.
  • slug_prefix is always sanitized. Path separators (/, \), .. sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whether NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT is set.
  • 15 unit tests in src/__tests__/vault-writer.test.ts cover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks, .. traversal, NUL/separator stripping).

Workarounds for users who cannot upgrade

  • Run the MCP server under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access only to the intended vault directory.
  • Do not expose the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint beyond localhost.
  • If using an LLM that ingests untrusted content, validate any vault_dir arguments before forwarding them to the MCP.

Configuration requirement after upgrade (important)

v2.0.3 preserves the legacy unrestricted behaviour when NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT is unset, to keep existing single-user local setups working. To enable containment, set NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT in the server environment to a directory that should bound all vault writes.

Credit

Reported by @mcfly-zzh — thanks for the careful diagnosis and follow-up verification.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61647"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T14:43:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T21:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `vault_batch` MCP tool (and the equivalent `POST /batch-to-vault` HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied `vault_dir` path that was passed directly to `path.resolve()` + `fs.mkdir()` with no containment check. A caller \u2014 or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP \u2014 could therefore create directories and write `.md` / `.json` answer files anywhere the server process can write.\n\nThe `slug_prefix` parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing `/` or `..` could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.\n\n## Impact\n\nFile write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context \u2014 or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) \u2014 this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.\n\nThe vulnerability exists from **v1.6.0** (when the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the `batch_to_vault` MCP tool) through **v2.0.2**.\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in **v2.0.3**:\n\n- **Opt-in containment via `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` env var.** When set, `vault_dir` is resolved relative to that root and `realpath`-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or `..` segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error.\n- **`slug_prefix` is always sanitized.** Path separators (`/`, `\\`), `..` sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whether `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is set.\n- 15 unit tests in `src/__tests__/vault-writer.test.ts` cover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks, `..` traversal, NUL/separator stripping).\n\n## Workarounds for users who cannot upgrade\n\n- Run the MCP server under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access only to the intended vault directory.\n- Do not expose the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint beyond localhost.\n- If using an LLM that ingests untrusted content, validate any `vault_dir` arguments before forwarding them to the MCP.\n\n## Configuration requirement after upgrade (important)\n\nv2.0.3 preserves the legacy unrestricted behaviour when `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is **unset**, to keep existing single-user local setups working. **To enable containment, set `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` in the server environment** to a directory that should bound all vault writes.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @mcfly-zzh \u2014 thanks for the careful diagnosis and follow-up verification.",
  "id": "GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T14:43:26Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T14:43:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61647"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/issues/15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/commit/13828d9ff3933839ce14c1797d3b20a6bb7694a6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp/releases/tag/v2.0.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory"
}

GHSA-JM2P-2R65-7M5C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

An issue in Halo 2.25.4 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the run.halo.app.migration.impl.MigrationServiceImpl.restoreWorkdir(), and org.springframework.util.FileSystemUtils.copyRecursively() components

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67920"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T18:19:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in Halo 2.25.4 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the run.halo.app.migration.impl.MigrationServiceImpl.restoreWorkdir(), and org.springframework.util.FileSystemUtils.copyRecursively() components",
  "id": "GHSA-jm2p-2r65-7m5c",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T18:30:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T18:32:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67920"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/halo-dev/halo/pull/4206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/unpredictable21/f05d4b57867a2e83a5f991ff542215b2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/halo-dev/halo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JM48-M3RR-9HGG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 21:05 – Updated: 2026-08-24 21:05
VLAI
Summary
3X-UI Vulnerable to Authenticated Arbitrary File Write via Database Import and Xray Log Path Manipulation
Details

Summary

An authenticated administrator can abuse the database import functionality to achieve arbitrary file write on the host by modifying Xray configuration values stored in the database. This can be leveraged to obtain code execution and persistent access as the user running Xray (including root when Xray is running as root).

Details

The database import functionality trusts attacker-controlled configuration values without sufficient validation.

An authenticated administrator can export the SQLite database, modify xrayTemplateConfig.log.access to point to an arbitrary file, and import the modified database back into the panel. The attacker can then inject controlled content into an inbound client's email field. When a connection is processed, Xray writes the attacker-controlled content to the configured access log path.

Because the log path is fully attacker-controlled, this behavior results in arbitrary file write as the user running Xray. Depending on the target file and service privileges, this can be used to obtain code execution and persistent host access.

PoC

  1. Authenticate as a panel administrator.
  2. Export the panel database.
  3. Modify xrayTemplateConfig.log.access to point to a writable target file (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys).
  4. Inject an attacker-controlled SSH public key into an inbound client's email field.
  5. Import the modified database.
  6. Trigger a connection through the modified inbound.
  7. Xray writes the attacker-controlled content to the specified file, allowing SSH access as the user running Xray.

A complete PoC is available and can be provided privately.

Impact

Type: Authenticated Arbitrary File Write -> Privilege Escalation / Code Execution

Any authenticated 3X-UI administrator can write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary files accessible by the Xray process. This allows compromise of the account running Xray and may lead to full host compromise depending on deployment configuration and service privileges.

In environments where Xray runs as root, successful exploitation results in persistent root access.

Patches

Fixed in v3.3.1.

resolveXrayLogPaths (internal/web/service/xray.go) now confines the Xray log.access and log.error paths to the panel's log folder: any configured value is reduced to its base filename under config.GetLogFolder(). Absolute paths (such as /etc/cron.d/... or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys) and .. traversal can no longer make Xray write outside the log folder, while "" and "none" continue to disable logging. The confinement is applied during Xray configuration generation, so it covers every way the template can be set — the database import and the built-in raw Xray configuration editor alike.

Workarounds

None other than upgrading. Until you can update to v3.3.1, restrict panel administrator access to fully trusted operators.

Notes

The underlying issue is the unrestricted log path rather than the database import alone: an administrator can set the same xrayTemplateConfig.log.access / log.error value directly through the built-in raw Xray configuration editor, which is why the fix hardens the value at configuration-generation time to cover every vector. The client email field is also independently validated (control characters, spaces, and slashes are rejected), which constrains what can be written into a log line; the reliable primitive is therefore arbitrary file write (creation, append, or corruption) at an attacker-chosen path, with code execution dependent on a suitable writable target and the privileges of the Xray process.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55477"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-24T21:05:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T16:16:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Summary\n\nAn authenticated administrator can abuse the database import functionality to achieve arbitrary file write on the host by modifying Xray configuration values stored in the database. This can be leveraged to obtain code execution and persistent access as the user running Xray (including root when Xray is running as root).\n\n# Details\n\nThe database import functionality trusts attacker-controlled configuration values without sufficient validation.\n\nAn authenticated administrator can export the SQLite database, modify `xrayTemplateConfig.log.access` to point to an arbitrary file, and import the modified database back into the panel. The attacker can then inject controlled content into an inbound client\u0027s `email` field. When a connection is processed, Xray writes the attacker-controlled content to the configured access log path.\n\nBecause the log path is fully attacker-controlled, this behavior results in arbitrary file write as the user running Xray. Depending on the target file and service privileges, this can be used to obtain code execution and persistent host access.\n\n# PoC\n\n1. Authenticate as a panel administrator.\n2. Export the panel database.\n3. Modify `xrayTemplateConfig.log.access` to point to a writable target file (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`).\n4. Inject an attacker-controlled SSH public key into an inbound client\u0027s `email` field.\n5. Import the modified database.\n6. Trigger a connection through the modified inbound.\n7. Xray writes the attacker-controlled content to the specified file, allowing SSH access as the user running Xray.\n\nA complete PoC is available and can be provided privately.\n\n# Impact\n\nType: Authenticated Arbitrary File Write -\u003e Privilege Escalation / Code Execution\n\nAny authenticated 3X-UI administrator can write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary files accessible by the Xray process. This allows compromise of the account running Xray and may lead to full host compromise depending on deployment configuration and service privileges.\n\nIn environments where Xray runs as root, successful exploitation results in persistent root access.\n\n# Patches\n\nFixed in **v3.3.1**.\n\n`resolveXrayLogPaths` (`internal/web/service/xray.go`) now confines the Xray `log.access` and `log.error` paths to the panel\u0027s log folder: any configured value is reduced to its base filename under `config.GetLogFolder()`. Absolute paths (such as `/etc/cron.d/...` or `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`) and `..` traversal can no longer make Xray write outside the log folder, while `\"\"` and `\"none\"` continue to disable logging. The confinement is applied during Xray configuration generation, so it covers every way the template can be set \u2014 the database import and the built-in raw Xray configuration editor alike.\n\n# Workarounds\n\nNone other than upgrading. Until you can update to v3.3.1, restrict panel administrator access to fully trusted operators.\n\n# Notes\n\nThe underlying issue is the unrestricted log path rather than the database import alone: an administrator can set the same `xrayTemplateConfig.log.access` / `log.error` value directly through the built-in raw Xray configuration editor, which is why the fix hardens the value at configuration-generation time to cover every vector. The client `email` field is also independently validated (control characters, spaces, and slashes are rejected), which constrains what can be written into a log line; the reliable primitive is therefore arbitrary file write (creation, append, or corruption) at an attacker-chosen path, with code execution dependent on a suitable writable target and the privileges of the Xray process.",
  "id": "GHSA-jm48-m3rr-9hgg",
  "modified": "2026-08-24T21:05:14Z",
  "published": "2026-08-24T21:05:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-jm48-m3rr-9hgg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/commit/80e168787ed608e83a065033ee94c8bfc3025ce7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui/releases/tag/v3.3.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "3X-UI Vulnerable to Authenticated Arbitrary File Write via Database Import and Xray Log Path Manipulation"
}

GHSA-JMCH-6H6H-G3P5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-22 15:32
VLAI
Details

NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause external control of a file name or path. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, and denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T15:17:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "NVIDIA Infrastructure Controller for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause external control of a file name or path. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, data tampering, and denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-jmch-6h6h-g3p5",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T15:32:39Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T15:32:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5879"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65125"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JMFX-96G9-5G4F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:31
VLAI
Details

PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain an unauthenticated physical memory disclosure in DirectIo64.sys, reachable by unprivileged local users through a single IOCTL with no caller-identity check. The handler writes a crash-dump-format (PAGEDU64) image of all physical memory to a caller-supplied file path in the SYSTEM context, allowing a standard user to create files in locations they cannot otherwise write and to recover memory belonging to processes of other users. The image is preceded by a header that exposes the kernel loaded-module list, active-process list and PFN database pointers, defeating KASLR. The same handler also dereferences the return value of an internal kernel-structure locator without a NULL check; that locator returns NULL on three distinct failure paths, and a kernel crash results on builds where any of those paths is taken.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80118"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T19:17:28Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "PassMark PerformanceTest before 11.1 build 1012, BurnInTest before 11.1 build 1000, and OSForensics before 11.1 build 1016 contain an unauthenticated physical memory disclosure in DirectIo64.sys, reachable by unprivileged local users through a single IOCTL with no caller-identity check. The handler writes a crash-dump-format (PAGEDU64) image of all physical memory to a caller-supplied file path in the SYSTEM context, allowing a standard user to create files in locations they cannot otherwise write and to recover memory belonging to processes of other users. The image is preceded by a header that exposes the kernel loaded-module list, active-process list and PFN database pointers, defeating KASLR. The same handler also dereferences the return value of an internal kernel-structure locator without a NULL check; that locator returns NULL on three distinct failure paths, and a kernel crash results on builds where any of those paths is taken.",
  "id": "GHSA-jmfx-96g9-5g4f",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T21:31:50Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T21:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80118"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dkom.dev/posts/directio64-disclosure"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/floppywiggler/directio64-disclosure"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.osforensics.com/whats-new.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.passmark.com/products/burnintest/history.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.passmark.com/products/performancetest/history.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/passmark-performancetest-burnintest-and-osforensics-kernel-null-pointer-dereference-via-directio64-sys-ioctl"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JPMX-QVRQ-8C62

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-31 09:30 – Updated: 2025-03-31 09:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Legrand SMS PowerView 1.x. Affected is an unknown function. The manipulation of the argument redirect leads to file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-2982"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T08:15:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Legrand SMS PowerView 1.x. Affected is an unknown function. The manipulation of the argument redirect leads to file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-jpmx-qvrq-8c62",
  "modified": "2025-03-31T09:30:33Z",
  "published": "2025-03-31T09:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2982"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.302034"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.302034"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRHV-8GFH-55W6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

The Order Export & Order Import for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the admin_log_page() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to delete arbitrary log files on the server.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-13922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T12:15:13Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The Order Export \u0026 Order Import for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the admin_log_page() function in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to delete arbitrary log files on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrhv-8gfh-55w6",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:53Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/order-import-export-for-woocommerce/trunk/admin/modules/history/history.php#L248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3258567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/product-import-export-for-woo/#developers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4eb8f85f-656a-4e5a-a57d-7289da2cd951?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Operation
  • Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
  • Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Implementation

Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).

Mitigation
Installation Operation

Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.

Mitigation
Operation Implementation

If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Mitigation
Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.