CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1266 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HMP8-WRW4-R24C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 15:33 – Updated: 2026-06-19 15:33In JetBrains GoLand before 2026.1.3 remote code execution was possible via untrusted project configuration
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53915"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T13:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In JetBrains GoLand before 2026.1.3 remote code execution was possible via untrusted project configuration",
"id": "GHSA-hmp8-wrw4-r24c",
"modified": "2026-06-19T15:33:15Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T15:33:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HMQ2-W58F-27JC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 15:45 – Updated: 2026-09-08 20:55Summary
GitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (.git/modules/<name>) from the submodule's .gitmodules section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. ../../../../home/victim/.something) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (submodule_update(init=True) / sm.update(init=True)), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check.
Details
src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py sm_name() strips the submodule " / " wrapper from a .gitmodules [submodule "..."] header and returns the result unchecked. Submodule.iter_items() in src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py reads this via sm_name(sms) and assigns it to sm._name; unlike the submodule path, name is never used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. Submodule._module_abspath() then builds osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name) - os.path.join does not normalize ../ sequences. Submodule._clone_repo() passes this value straight to os.makedirs() and to git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>, creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config) at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for.
PoC
- Environment: Docker image built
FROM python:3.11-slim, withgitinstalled viaapt-get install -y git(Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory as "git 2.x"; the host-side verification separately used system git2.34.1, but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image). GitPython is installed inside the container viapip install /src/GitPythonfrom this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to the officially releasedGitPython==3.1.57andgitdb==4.0.12. - Configuration / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (
repo.submodules+sm.update(init=True), equivalent togit submodule update --init). - Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's "Confirmed test run" section):
$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc .
$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc
(Per the Dockerfile, docker run executes /work/run_all.sh, which in turn runs build_attacker_repo.sh, then poc_gitpython.py, then poc_control_realgit.sh.)
4. Full source of the PoC script (GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py), verbatim:
"""GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side.
Clones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent of
`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git
repository was created outside the clone directory.
"""
import os
import shutil
import git
CLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'
ESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'
def main():
shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True)
print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}')
repo = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR)
print('Cloned into:', repo.working_tree_dir)
sms = list(repo.submodules)
for sm in sms:
print(' submodule name:', repr(sm.name))
print(' submodule path:', repr(sm.path))
print('escape_target exists before update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))
for sm in sms:
try:
sm.update(init=True)
except Exception as e:
print('sm.update raised:', repr(e))
exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)
print('escape_target exists after update:', exists)
if exists:
print('escape_target contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))
print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE' if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
- Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's "Confirmed test run (Docker, released package)" section):
=== GitPython PoC (vulnerable path) ===
GitPython version: 3.1.57
Cloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo
submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'
submodule path: 'legit_dir'
escape_target exists before update: False
escape_target exists after update: True
escape_target contents: ['modules_dir']
POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE
=== Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===
warning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir
warning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir
fatal: No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules
CONTROL_RESULT=SAFE (real git correctly refused)
- Payload: the attacker rewrites the
.gitmodulessection header from[submodule "legit_dir"]to[submodule "../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir"](built bybuild_attacker_repo.sh, part of the harness inGHSA/testing/). The malicious part is the../../../../../../traversal sequence embedded in the submodule name (not the tree-validatedpath), which becomes the on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory. - Expected vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real
gitCLI control run) rejects the submodule name with "ignoring suspicious submodule name" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git repository at/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir, confirmed byescape_target exists after update: Trueand its listed contents. - Security impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended clone directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule's own (also attacker-controlled)
url.
Impact
Path traversal (CWE-22) / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine, often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management tooling.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.57"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "GitPython"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76222"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T15:45:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule\u0027s separate Git directory (`.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e`) from the submodule\u0027s `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython\u0027s independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check.\n\n### Details\n`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py` `sm_name()` strips the `submodule \"` / `\"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules` `[submodule \"...\"]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()` in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)` and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()` then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)` - `os.path.join` does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=\u003cmodule_abspath\u003e`, creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config) at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for.\n\n### PoC\n1. Environment: Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory as \"git 2.x\"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`, but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image). GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython` from this repository\u0027s own source, which the advisory states resolved to the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.\n2. Configuration / preconditions: None beyond what\u0027s described - the victim must clone the attacker\u0027s repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules` + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).\n3. Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory\u0027s \"Confirmed test run\" section):\n```bash\n$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc .\n$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc\n```\n(Per the Dockerfile, `docker run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`, then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)\n4. Full source of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim:\n```python\n\"\"\"GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side.\n\nClones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent of\n`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git\nrepository was created outside the clone directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport shutil\n\nimport git\n\nCLONE_DIR = \u0027/work/victim_clone/repo\u0027\nESCAPE_TARGET = \u0027/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root\u0027\n\n\ndef main():\n shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)\n shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)\n os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True)\n\n print(f\u0027GitPython version: {git.__version__}\u0027)\n repo = git.Repo.clone_from(\u0027/work/attacker_repo\u0027, CLONE_DIR)\n print(\u0027Cloned into:\u0027, repo.working_tree_dir)\n\n sms = list(repo.submodules)\n for sm in sms:\n print(\u0027 submodule name:\u0027, repr(sm.name))\n print(\u0027 submodule path:\u0027, repr(sm.path))\n\n print(\u0027escape_target exists before update:\u0027, os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n for sm in sms:\n try:\n sm.update(init=True)\n except Exception as e:\n print(\u0027sm.update raised:\u0027, repr(e))\n\n exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)\n print(\u0027escape_target exists after update:\u0027, exists)\n if exists:\n print(\u0027escape_target contents:\u0027, os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n print(\u0027POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\u0027 if exists else \u0027POC_RESULT=SAFE\u0027)\n\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n main()\n```\n5. Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory\u0027s \"Confirmed test run (Docker, released package)\" section):\n```\n=== GitPython PoC (vulnerable path) ===\nGitPython version: 3.1.57\nCloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo\n submodule name: \u0027../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\u0027\n submodule path: \u0027legit_dir\u0027\nescape_target exists before update: False\nescape_target exists after update: True\nescape_target contents: [\u0027modules_dir\u0027]\nPOC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\n\n=== Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===\nwarning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nwarning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nfatal: No url found for submodule path \u0027legit_dir\u0027 in .gitmodules\nCONTROL_RESULT=SAFE (real git correctly refused)\n```\n6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the `.gitmodules` section header from `[submodule \"legit_dir\"]` to `[submodule \"../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\"]` (built by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`). The malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded in the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the on-disk target for the submodule\u0027s separate git directory.\n7. Expected vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI control run) rejects the submodule name with \"ignoring suspicious submodule name\" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`, confirmed by `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.\n8. Security impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim\u0027s intended clone directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule\u0027s own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.\n\n### Impact\nPath traversal (CWE-22) / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine, often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management tooling.",
"id": "GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc",
"modified": "2026-09-08T20:55:34Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T15:45:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3784.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-path-traversal-via-gitmodules-submodule-name"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython"
}
GHSA-HP54-6WCP-9MV5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-01 09:30 – Updated: 2025-03-01 09:30The Simple Download Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 2.0 via the 'simple_download_counter_download_handler'. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to extract sensitive data including any local file on the server, such as wp-config.php or /etc/passwd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1730"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-01T07:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Simple Download Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 2.0 via the \u0027simple_download_counter_download_handler\u0027. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to extract sensitive data including any local file on the server, such as wp-config.php or /etc/passwd.",
"id": "GHSA-hp54-6wcp-9mv5",
"modified": "2025-03-01T09:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-03-01T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-download-counter/tags/2.0/inc/functions-core.php#L328"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-download-counter/tags/2.0/inc/functions-core.php#L354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3247987"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d0eafb20-4ef2-448b-9da7-ad8aa9e45215?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HQJ7-PHWP-C3FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:34Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:34:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T17:21:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nNLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-hqj7-phwp-c3fp",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:34:27Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T18:32:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-through-3.10.3-path-traversal-via-model-artifact-apis"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots",
"withdrawn": "2026-09-02T14:34:27Z"
}
GHSA-HRVQ-X7JP-36XV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 23:28 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:28Summary
nx migrate reads each target package's nx-migrations.migrations value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose migrations field contains .. segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package — or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package's packageGroup — can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration planning, before the user reviews the migration list and before --run-migrations, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything.
Most workspaces need no action. By default nx migrate does not run the nx installed in your workspace — it installs nx@latest into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default nx migrate run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, when that hand-off is bypassed — see Remediation.
Severity
Exploitable when the victim runs nx migrate against a package the attacker controls, directly or through a trusted package's packageGroup. The primary impact is a file write with attacker-controlled content and no path confinement; overwriting an auto-loaded file (a shell rc, a git hook, a CI script) escalates that write to code execution. There is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild.
Affected & Patched Versions
| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |
|---|---|---|
nx |
>= 13.10.0, < 22.7.10; >= 23.0.0, < 23.2.1 |
22.7.10, 23.2.1 |
Every version in the ranges above is affected. The lower bound is 13.10.0, the first release where nx migrate extracted a package's migrations file from its tarball; earlier versions resolved migrations without that extraction.
[!IMPORTANT]
nx migratenormally fetches and runsnx@latestrather than the nx installed in your workspace. The ranges above therefore say where the vulnerable code ships, not who is exposed — it only runs when that hand-off is bypassed.
Remediation
If you run nx migrate normally, there is nothing to do. It resolves and runs the latest nx, which is patched, so your workspace's own nx version does not matter for this flaw.
Upgrade only if you bypass that hand-off and run the workspace's nx instead — that is, if you set NX_USE_LOCAL or NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL, pin NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION to an affected version, resume an existing run with --run-id, or run where the temporary install fails and nx migrate falls back to the local nx. In those cases upgrade to 22.7.10 (22.x line) or 23.2.1 (23.x line) or later:
nx migrate 23.2.1
The fix is a drop-in — no configuration changes are required, and no legitimate migrations value is affected (real packages reference ./migrations.json or another path within their own directory, all of which remain valid). Either way, do not run nx migrate against packages, or packageGroup members, that you do not trust.
Details
While planning an upgrade, nx migrate extracts each target package's migrations file to a destination built by joining the package's own nx-migrations.migrations value onto a temporary directory. That value is read from the manifest without validation, and it is handled asymmetrically: the name Nx matches against the archive entries is normalized (so its .. segments collapse), while the destination path it writes to is a raw join that keeps the .. segments and resolves outside the temporary directory. Because the attacker controls the tarball, they name their entry to equal the normalized form; the match then succeeds and the bytes are written to the un-normalized, escaping destination. The normalization is not a defence — it only dictates what the attacker must name their entry.
The same value also seeds the directory used for prompt-file extraction, which has the same shape, so both writes are steerable from the one field.
Two distinct primitives fall out of this:
- Truncation — the destination write stream is opened, and truncates, before any tar entry is inspected. So a package that points
migrationsat an existing file empties that file even when no tar entry matches — no crafted archive required. - Controlled write — when a tar entry's name matches, its bytes are written to the escaping destination. The extractor performs no path containment of its own.
Credits
- Arkadiusz Marta (RE:SOURCE) — Reporter
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.7.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "23.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "23.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104853"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:28:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T17:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`nx migrate` reads each target package\u0027s `nx-migrations.migrations` value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose `migrations` field contains `..` segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package \u2014 or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package\u0027s `packageGroup` \u2014 can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration *planning*, before the user reviews the migration list and before `--run-migrations`, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything.\n\n**Most workspaces need no action.** By default `nx migrate` does not run the nx installed in your workspace \u2014 it installs `nx@latest` into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default `nx migrate` run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, when that hand-off is bypassed \u2014 see Remediation.\n\n## Severity\n\nExploitable when the victim runs `nx migrate` against a package the attacker controls, directly or through a trusted package\u0027s `packageGroup`. The primary impact is a file write with attacker-controlled content and no path confinement; overwriting an auto-loaded file (a shell rc, a git hook, a CI script) escalates that write to code execution. There is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild.\n\n## Affected \u0026 Patched Versions\n\n| Package | Vulnerable | Patched |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `nx` | `\u003e= 13.10.0, \u003c 22.7.10`; `\u003e= 23.0.0, \u003c 23.2.1` | `22.7.10`, `23.2.1` |\n\nEvery version in the ranges above is affected. The lower bound is 13.10.0, the first release where `nx migrate` extracted a package\u0027s migrations file from its tarball; earlier versions resolved migrations without that extraction.\n\n\u003e [!IMPORTANT]\n\u003e `nx migrate` normally fetches and runs `nx@latest` rather than the nx installed in your workspace. The ranges above therefore say where the vulnerable code ships, not who is exposed \u2014 it only runs when that hand-off is bypassed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n**If you run `nx migrate` normally, there is nothing to do.** It resolves and runs the latest nx, which is patched, so your workspace\u0027s own nx version does not matter for this flaw.\n\nUpgrade only if you bypass that hand-off and run the workspace\u0027s nx instead \u2014 that is, if you set `NX_USE_LOCAL` or `NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL`, pin `NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION` to an affected version, resume an existing run with `--run-id`, or run where the temporary install fails and `nx migrate` falls back to the local nx. In those cases upgrade to **22.7.10** (22.x line) or **23.2.1** (23.x line) or later:\n\n```\nnx migrate 23.2.1\n```\n\nThe fix is a drop-in \u2014 no configuration changes are required, and no legitimate `migrations` value is affected (real packages reference `./migrations.json` or another path within their own directory, all of which remain valid). Either way, do not run `nx migrate` against packages, or `packageGroup` members, that you do not trust.\n\n## Details\n\nWhile planning an upgrade, `nx migrate` extracts each target package\u0027s migrations file to a destination built by joining the package\u0027s own `nx-migrations.migrations` value onto a temporary directory. That value is read from the manifest without validation, and it is handled asymmetrically: the name Nx matches against the archive entries is normalized (so its `..` segments collapse), while the destination path it writes to is a raw join that keeps the `..` segments and resolves outside the temporary directory. Because the attacker controls the tarball, they name their entry to equal the normalized form; the match then succeeds and the bytes are written to the un-normalized, escaping destination. The normalization is not a defence \u2014 it only dictates what the attacker must name their entry.\n\nThe same value also seeds the directory used for prompt-file extraction, which has the same shape, so both writes are steerable from the one field.\n\nTwo distinct primitives fall out of this:\n\n- **Truncation** \u2014 the destination write stream is opened, and truncates, before any tar entry is inspected. So a package that points `migrations` at an existing file empties that file even when no tar entry matches \u2014 no crafted archive required.\n- **Controlled write** \u2014 when a tar entry\u0027s name matches, its bytes are written to the escaping destination. The extractor performs no path containment of its own.\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Arkadiusz Marta** (RE:SOURCE) \u2014 Reporter",
"id": "GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv",
"modified": "2026-10-05T23:28:35Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T23:28:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104853"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36887"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/38cd82a0c05e8212e538bdb87ccb198d6504e58f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/95474ab457e8e1dbdbefad29040c166105a8fb90"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/de37c5ebd1852fac700d70726326236ac398af3f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/22.7.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/23.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nx: Path traversal in nx migrate package-migrations extraction"
}
GHSA-HW9G-6Q6H-X6RM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-05 18:31 – Updated: 2025-12-05 18:31ReQuest Serious Play Media Player 3.0 contains an unauthenticated file disclosure vulnerability when input passed through the 'file' parameter in and script is not properly verified before being used to read web log files. Attackers can exploit this to disclose contents of files from local resources.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36878"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-05T18:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ReQuest Serious Play Media Player 3.0 contains an unauthenticated file disclosure vulnerability when input passed through the \u0027file\u0027 parameter in and script is not properly verified before being used to read web log files. Attackers can exploit this to disclose contents of files from local resources.",
"id": "GHSA-hw9g-6q6h-x6rm",
"modified": "2025-12-05T18:31:12Z",
"published": "2025-12-05T18:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36878"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/request-serious-play-f-media-player-directory-traversal-file-disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2020-5599.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HX22-9FX3-XG77
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-14 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-21 15:31GD versions before 2.86 for Perl allow OS command injection and file overwrite via a 2-arg open() of filename arguments in _make_filehandle.
GD::Image::_make_filehandle opens a filename argument with Perl's 2-arg open(), so a filename that begins or ends with a pipe ("| cmd", "cmd |") or begins with a redirect ("> path", ">> path") is run as a command or redirect rather than opened as a file. _make_filehandle is the single open path behind every filename-accepting constructor (new, newFromPng, newFromJpeg, and the rest); the in-memory *Data variants do not open a path and are unaffected.
Any caller that forwards untrusted input to one of these constructors as a pathname can run an arbitrary command or truncate a file under the process UID.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-14T12:16:22Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "GD versions before 2.86 for Perl allow OS command injection and file overwrite via a 2-arg open() of filename arguments in _make_filehandle.\n\nGD::Image::_make_filehandle opens a filename argument with Perl\u0027s 2-arg open(), so a filename that begins or ends with a pipe (\"| cmd\", \"cmd |\") or begins with a redirect (\"\u003e path\", \"\u003e\u003e path\") is run as a command or redirect rather than opened as a file. _make_filehandle is the single open path behind every filename-accepting constructor (new, newFromPng, newFromJpeg, and the rest); the in-memory *Data variants do not open a path and are unaffected.\n\nAny caller that forwards untrusted input to one of these constructors as a pathname can run an arbitrary command or truncate a file under the process UID.",
"id": "GHSA-hx22-9fx3-xg77",
"modified": "2026-06-21T15:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-14T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lstein/Perl-GD/commit/67b163713c6c78dfeb693da0978ae934e5cd8210.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/06/msg00027.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RURBAN/GD-2.86/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/14/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HXRR-X32W-CG8G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-09 17:47 – Updated: 2025-06-09 21:44Summary
An authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the HAXCMS saveOutline endpoint allows a low-privileged user to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating the location field written into site.json. This enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive system files such as /etc/passwd, application secrets, or configuration files accessible to the web server (www-data).
Details
The vulnerability stems from the way the HAXCMS backend handles the location field in the site's outline. When a user sends a POST request to /system/api/saveOutline, the backend stores the provided location value directly into the site.json file associated with the site, without validating or sanitizing the input.
Later the location parameter is interpreted by the CMS like in HAXCMSSite.php line 1248 to resolve and load the content for a given node. If the location field contains a relative path like ../../../etc/passwd, the application will attempt to read and render that file.
PoC
-
Authenticate to the CMS and retrieve the JWT and CSRF token.
-
Issue a POST request to /system/api/saveOutline with the path traversal injection via the location parameter :
- Curl the website root to see the file contents.
Impact
This is an authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability, via the location parameter the attacker can read any file on the filesystem that is accessible by the www-data user.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "elmsln/haxcms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-49138"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-09T17:47:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-09T21:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in the HAXCMS saveOutline endpoint allows a low-privileged user to read arbitrary files on the server by manipulating the location field written into site.json. This enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive system files such as /etc/passwd, application secrets, or configuration files accessible to the web server (www-data).\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability stems from the way the HAXCMS backend handles the location field in the site\u0027s outline. When a user sends a POST request to /system/api/saveOutline, the backend stores the provided location value directly into the site.json file associated with the site, without validating or sanitizing the input.\n\nLater the location parameter is interpreted by the CMS like in[ HAXCMSSite.php line 1248](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/HAXCMSSite.php#L1248) to resolve and load the content for a given node. If the location field contains a relative path like ../../../etc/passwd, the application will attempt to read and render that file.\n\n### PoC\n1. Authenticate to the CMS and retrieve the JWT and CSRF token.\n\n2. Issue a POST request to /system/api/saveOutline with the path traversal injection via the location parameter :\n\n\u003cimg width=\"839\" alt=\"LFI\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/91b1bb7f-9248-40d2-81fc-f839beb4d39c\" /\u003e\n\n3. Curl the website root to see the file contents.\n\n\n\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability, via the location parameter the attacker can read any file on the filesystem that is accessible by the www-data user.",
"id": "GHSA-hxrr-x32w-cg8g",
"modified": "2025-06-09T21:44:03Z",
"published": "2025-06-09T17:47:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues/security/advisories/GHSA-hxrr-x32w-cg8g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-php/blob/b158d8ba1f9602af92ab084fd03b418f953079fd/system/backend/php/lib/HAXCMSSite.php#L1248"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "HAX CMS vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via saveOutline API Location Parameter"
}
GHSA-J33V-WHM5-3FWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 06:30 – Updated: 2025-09-17 06:30The WP Import – Ultimate CSV XML Importer for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the upload_function() function in all versions up to, and including, 7.27. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10058"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T06:15:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WP Import \u2013 Ultimate CSV XML Importer for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the upload_function() function in all versions up to, and including, 7.27. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-j33v-whm5-3fwm",
"modified": "2025-09-17T06:30:23Z",
"published": "2025-09-17T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-ultimate-csv-importer/tags/7.26/uploadModules/FtpUpload.php#L200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3357936/wp-ultimate-csv-importer/trunk/uploadModules/FtpUpload.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3360611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5a6bcfa6-7a40-4566-b4d2-62b696ded2d6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J4H9-PM27-4RFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 18:03 – Updated: 2026-08-21 18:28Impact
OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.7 as well as 2.0.0rc1 and 2.0.0rc2 contain a vulnerability that allows an attacker with the FILE_UPLOAD permission to exfiltrate files from the host that OctoPrint has read access to, by moving them into the upload folder where they then can be downloaded from. This vulnerability was already reported as GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2/CVE-2025-48067 but the fix provided in OctoPrint 1.11.2 turned out to be incomplete.
The primary risk lies in the potential exfiltration of secrets stored inside OctoPrint's config, or further system files. By removing important runtime files, this could also be used to impact the availability of the host after an attempted server restart. Given that the attacker requires a user account with file upload permissions, the actual impact of this should however hopefully be minimal in most cases.
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3.
Details
OctoPrint's web application is implemented in Flask, but uploads are first intercepted by a custom upload handler built on Tornado that sits in front of it. The handler streams the upload to a temporary file on disk - so files larger than the available memory can be uploaded - and rewrites the request, adding internal form fields that tell Flask where to find that temporary file.
These fields are reserved and meant to be set only by the upload handler, never by the client. The previous fix from GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2/CVE-2025-48067 stripped them from the request received from the client when they were sent as multipart form fields, yet they could still reach Flask through other channels: as plain query parameters, or - since the Tornado handler and Flask did not parse requests identically - smuggled in via several "parser differentials" that looked harmless to the handler while Flask still saw the injected fields. Any of these let an attacker make OctoPrint treat an arbitrary file on the host as a freshly uploaded one and move it into the upload folder.
The following endpoints in OctoPrint are affected:
/api/files/{local|sdcard}/api/languages/plugin/backup/restore/plugin/pluginmanager/upload_file
Further upload endpoints in third party plugins might be affected too.
The fix rejects requests carrying any of the reserved fields, aligns the Tornado handler's request parsing with Flask's (Werkzeug) to avoid any differential parsing, and re-validates the request rewritten by Tornado before forwarding it to Flask.
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Koh Jun Sheng and Jacopo Tediosi.
Timeline
2026-06-04: Report received 2026-06-04: Report acknowledged 2026-06-08: Report verified 2026-06-17: Fix ready for 1.11.x 2026-06-22: Fix ported to 2.0.0 2026-06-23: Fix released with 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.11.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "OctoPrint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.0rc2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "OctoPrint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0rc3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54134"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T18:03:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nOctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.7 as well as 2.0.0rc1 and 2.0.0rc2 contain a vulnerability that allows an attacker with the `FILE_UPLOAD` permission to exfiltrate files from the host that OctoPrint has read access to, by moving them into the upload folder where they then can be downloaded from. This vulnerability was already reported as [GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2/CVE-2025-48067](https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/security/advisories/GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2) but the fix provided in OctoPrint 1.11.2 turned out to be incomplete.\n\nThe primary risk lies in the potential exfiltration of secrets stored inside OctoPrint\u0027s config, or further system files. By removing important runtime files, this could also be used to impact the availability of the host after an attempted server restart. Given that the attacker requires a user account with file upload permissions, the actual impact of this should however hopefully be minimal in most cases.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3.\n\n### Details\n\nOctoPrint\u0027s web application is implemented in Flask, but uploads are first intercepted by a custom upload handler built on Tornado that sits in front of it. The handler streams the upload to a temporary file on disk - so files larger than the available memory can be uploaded - and rewrites the request, adding internal form fields that tell Flask where to find that temporary file.\n\nThese fields are reserved and meant to be set only by the upload handler, never by the client. The previous fix from [GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2/CVE-2025-48067](https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/security/advisories/GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2) stripped them from the request received from the client when they were sent as multipart form fields, yet they could still reach Flask through other channels: as plain query parameters, or - since the Tornado handler and Flask did not parse requests identically - smuggled in via several \"parser differentials\" that looked harmless to the handler while Flask still saw the injected fields. Any of these let an attacker make OctoPrint treat an arbitrary file on the host as a freshly uploaded one and move it into the upload folder.\n\nThe following endpoints in OctoPrint are affected:\n\n- `/api/files/{local|sdcard}`\n- `/api/languages`\n- `/plugin/backup/restore`\n- `/plugin/pluginmanager/upload_file`\n\nFurther upload endpoints in third party plugins might be affected too.\n\nThe fix rejects requests carrying any of the reserved fields, aligns the Tornado handler\u0027s request parsing with Flask\u0027s (Werkzeug) to avoid any differential parsing, and re-validates the request rewritten by Tornado before forwarding it to Flask.\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Koh Jun Sheng and Jacopo Tediosi.\n\n### Timeline\n\n2026-06-04: Report received\n2026-06-04: Report acknowledged\n2026-06-08: Report verified\n2026-06-17: Fix ready for 1.11.x\n2026-06-22: Fix ported to 2.0.0\n2026-06-23: Fix released with 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3",
"id": "GHSA-j4h9-pm27-4rfw",
"modified": "2026-08-21T18:28:35Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T18:03:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/security/advisories/GHSA-j4h9-pm27-4rfw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54134"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/octoprint/PYSEC-2026-2687.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OctoPrint has possible file exfiltration via query parameters on upload endpoints"
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.