CWE-674
Allowed-with-ReviewUncontrolled Recursion
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.
1032 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QRCQ-HR7G-X7GM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-04 00:00The comment function in YzmCMS v6.3 was discovered as being able to be operated concurrently, allowing attackers to create an unusually large number of comments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23889"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The comment function in YzmCMS v6.3 was discovered as being able to be operated concurrently, allowing attackers to create an unusually large number of comments.",
"id": "GHSA-qrcq-hr7g-x7gm",
"modified": "2022-02-04T00:00:37Z",
"published": "2022-01-29T00:00:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23889"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/61"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QV48-PW56-MWC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-18 15:31SurrealDB versions before 1.1.0 fail to enforce recursion depth limits when parsing nested SurrealQL statements including IF, RELATE, and attribute access idioms. Authorized attackers can submit queries with excessive nesting depth to cause stack overflow and crash the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-58370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-18T14:17:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SurrealDB versions before 1.1.0 fail to enforce recursion depth limits when parsing nested SurrealQL statements including IF, RELATE, and attribute access idioms. Authorized attackers can submit queries with excessive nesting depth to cause stack overflow and crash the server.",
"id": "GHSA-qv48-pw56-mwc4",
"modified": "2026-07-18T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-18T15:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-6r8p-hpg7-825g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-uncontrolled-recursion-denial-of-service"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QVXG-WJXC-R4GG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-07 16:11 – Updated: 2023-06-07 16:11Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder.
Impact
When using automatic content decoding, e.g.
app.post("foo") { request -> String in
let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self)
return "\(foo)"
}
An attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request:
curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n '[_0][0][array]'; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo
The issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow.
Patches
Fixed in 4.61.1
Workarounds
If you don't need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the ContentConfiguration so it won't be used. E.g. in configure.swift
var contentConfig = ContentConfiguration()
contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)
contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)
contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)
contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)
ContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Vapor repo * Ask in Vapor Discord
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
"name": "github.com/vapor/vapor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.61.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31019"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-121",
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-09T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder.\n\n### Impact\nWhen using automatic content decoding, e.g. \n\n```swift\napp.post(\"foo\") { request -\u003e String in\n let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self)\n return \"\\(foo)\"\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request:\n\n```\ncurl -d \"array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n \u0027[_0][0][array]\u0027; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world\" http://localhost:8080/foo\n```\n\nThe issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 4.61.1\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you don\u0027t need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the `ContentConfiguration` so it won\u0027t be used. E.g. in **configure.swift**\n\n```swift\nvar contentConfig = ContentConfiguration()\ncontentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)\ncontentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)\ncontentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)\ncontentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)\nContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig\n```\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the Vapor repo](https://github.com/vapor/vapor)\n* Ask in [Vapor Discord](http://vapor.team)",
"id": "GHSA-qvxg-wjxc-r4gg",
"modified": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
"published": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor/security/advisories/GHSA-qvxg-wjxc-r4gg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31019"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor/commit/6c63226a4ab82ce53730eb1afb9ca63866fcf033"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vapor vulnerable to denial of service in URLEncodedFormDecoder"
}
GHSA-QW5H-7F53-XRP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-21 14:28 – Updated: 2024-11-13 16:26Impact
The implementation of ParseAttrValue can be tricked into stack overflow due to recursion by giving in a specially crafted input.
Patches
We have patched the issue in GitHub commit e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1.
The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.
For more information
Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-cpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-cpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-cpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-cpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "tensorflow-gpu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-29615"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-17T21:22:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-14T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe implementation of [`ParseAttrValue`](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/c22d88d6ff33031aa113e48aa3fc9aa74ed79595/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc#L397-L453) can be tricked into stack overflow due to recursion by giving in a specially crafted input.\n\n### Patches\nWe have patched the issue in GitHub commit [e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1).\n\nThe fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\n### For more information\nPlease consult [our security guide](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/SECURITY.md) for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.",
"id": "GHSA-qw5h-7f53-xrp6",
"modified": "2024-11-13T16:26:55Z",
"published": "2021-05-21T14:28:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qw5h-7f53-xrp6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-cpu/PYSEC-2021-543.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-gpu/PYSEC-2021-741.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow/PYSEC-2021-252.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Stack overflow in `ParseAttrValue` with nested tensors"
}
GHSA-QWM2-W9F2-J6CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet through 1.0.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67552"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T07:16:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet through 1.0.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue",
"id": "GHSA-qwm2-w9f2-j6cg",
"modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:08Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T09:31:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67552"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/4dyg0gycrv55ox4oywqght61b053g8xj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/04/23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R292-9MHP-454M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:26 – Updated: 2026-08-21 19:08Summary
node-tar (npm tar) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal mapHas helper used by filesFilter. When a consumer calls tar.t(...) or tar.x(...) with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive mapHas (src/list.ts:33-44). mapHas walks an entry path upward one path.dirname() call per recursion with no segment cap. A single crafted tar with a GNU-L (or PAX-x) long-path header can deliver a path of tens of thousands of /-separated segments (up to maxMetaEntrySize = 1 MiB). The recursion overflows the call stack, throwing an uncatchable RangeError that terminates the Node process on async/streaming consumers.
Root Cause
filesFilter (src/list.ts:27-51) is installed whenever a caller passes a member-selection list (src/list.ts:119-122, src/extract.ts:55-57). Its filter is invoked at src/parse.ts:253 (entry.ignore = entry.ignore || !this.filter(entry.path, entry)) inside Parser[CONSUMEHEADER] — and crucially outside the only try/catch in that method (which wraps new Header at src/parse.ts:179-183). mapHas recurses once per path segment with no depth limit. The Unpack maxDepth guard (src/unpack.ts:342, in [CHECKPATH]) only runs on the 'entry' event, which fires after CONSUMEHEADER has already invoked the filter — so the stack overflows before any depth guard executes. tar.t (list) has no maxDepth at all.
Impact
Unauthenticated, remotely-triggerable denial of service: a ~188-byte gzip (≈26 KB tar) crashes any service that lists or extracts selected members from an untrusted archive (package registries, CI artifact/cache restore, upload processors). On async (await tar.t(...)/tar.x(...)) and streaming/pipe consumers the RangeError escapes the promise as an uncaughtException and terminates the process — standard defensive try/catch around the async call does NOT prevent it. (The synchronous API is catchable; the async/stream paths — the dominant server pattern — are not.)
Proof of Concept
// Build a tar whose single entry has a GNU-L long path of ~12,000 "a/" segments (~26 KB),
// gzip it (≈188 bytes), then have a consumer list/extract with member selection:
const tar = require('tar');
await tar.t({ file: 'evil.tar.gz', gzip: true }, ['some-member']); // -> RangeError, process exit
Empirically reproduced on Node v24.18.0 against built dist/commonjs of node-tar 7.5.20: 188-byte gzip → 26,112-byte tar (12,000 segments) → uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded → process exit. A control run with no member-selection list (filter not installed) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating mapHas as the sole cause.
Attack Chain
- Entry. Attacker crafts a tar with a GNU
L(or PAXx) long-path header whose body is"a/"×~12000 (~26 KB), followed by a normal file entry. - Guard:
maxMetaEntrySizecaps the meta body at 1 MiB (src/parse.ts:241). - Bypass proof: 26 KB ≪ 1 MiB → accepted (verified: 26 KB archive parsed up to the filter).
- Trigger. Victim service calls
tar.t({file},[sel])ortar.x({file,cwd},[sel])(member selection — a documented, common API). - Guard:
Unpack.maxDepth(default 1024) atsrc/unpack.ts:342; decompression-ratio guard. - Bypass proof:
maxDepthlives in[CHECKPATH]on the'entry'event, which fires afterCONSUMEHEADER's filter call — the crash occurs before it (extract exits 1 with default maxDepth).tar.thas no maxDepth. Ratio is ~139× (trivial); no total-bytes cap applies to the uncompressed meta body. - Sink.
this.filter(entry.path)→mapHasrecurses once per/segment (src/list.ts:39). - Guard: try/catch in
CONSUMEHEADER. - Bypass proof: the only try/catch wraps
new Header(src/parse.ts:179-183); thethis.filter(...)call atsrc/parse.ts:253is outside it. TheRangeErrorpropagates out of the stream write/'data'path → uncaught exception (verified:process.on('uncaughtException')fires; asyncawait+try/catchdoes NOT intercept). - Impact. Node process termination; a 188-byte gzip crashes any consumer that lists/extracts selected members from untrusted archives.
Bypass Evidence
mapHasrecursion is member-name-independent: the crash fires even when the requested members do not match the malicious entry path — the attacker only needs the consumer to use member selection.- Standalone
mapHasoverflows at 20k–30k segments; on the real streaming path (atopwrite → CONSUMECHUNK → CONSUMEHEADER → filter) it crashes at ≤8k segments (finder's ~12k estimate is accurate for the reachable path). - Control (no member list → no filter) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating
mapHas.
Affected Versions
<= 7.5.20 (npm tar). mapHas present verbatim on tag v7.5.20 (latest GitHub release and npm dist-tag latest); no segment/depth cap in src/list.ts or the CONSUMEHEADER filter path; HEAD == 7.5.20, no unreleased fix.
Suggested Fix
Rewrite mapHas iteratively (walk dirname in a while loop with a segment/visited cap), or enforce a hard path-segment limit in Header/Parser independent of maxMetaEntrySize, applied before any per-entry filter runs.
Dedup Note
Distinct from CVE-2024-28863 / GHSA-f5x3-32g6-qm9j "lack of folders depth validation" (that bounds mkdir recursion during extraction via maxDepth in Unpack[CHECKPATH] on the 'entry' event — a different sink, code path, and fix; runs after the filter and does not apply to tar.t). Also distinct from the PAX NUL/numeric-path crash advisories (improper-input-to-fs / type confusion, not recursion) and the gzip-bomb advisory (resource exhaustion on disk writes). None touch list.ts/filesFilter/mapHas or require member selection.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.5.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73566"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:26:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T18:18:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n`node-tar` (npm `tar`) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal `mapHas` helper used by `filesFilter`. When a consumer calls `tar.t(...)` or `tar.x(...)` with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive `mapHas` (`src/list.ts:33-44`). `mapHas` walks an entry path upward one `path.dirname()` call per recursion **with no segment cap**. A single crafted tar with a GNU-`L` (or PAX-`x`) long-path header can deliver a path of tens of thousands of `/`-separated segments (up to `maxMetaEntrySize` = 1 MiB). The recursion overflows the call stack, throwing an uncatchable `RangeError` that terminates the Node process on async/streaming consumers.\n\n## Root Cause\n`filesFilter` (`src/list.ts:27-51`) is installed whenever a caller passes a member-selection list (`src/list.ts:119-122`, `src/extract.ts:55-57`). Its filter is invoked at `src/parse.ts:253` (`entry.ignore = entry.ignore || !this.filter(entry.path, entry)`) inside `Parser[CONSUMEHEADER]` \u2014 and crucially **outside** the only try/catch in that method (which wraps `new Header` at `src/parse.ts:179-183`). `mapHas` recurses once per path segment with no depth limit. The `Unpack` `maxDepth` guard (`src/unpack.ts:342`, in `[CHECKPATH]`) only runs on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event, which fires *after* `CONSUMEHEADER` has already invoked the filter \u2014 so the stack overflows before any depth guard executes. `tar.t` (list) has no `maxDepth` at all.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated, remotely-triggerable denial of service: a ~188-byte gzip (\u224826 KB tar) crashes any service that lists or extracts *selected members* from an untrusted archive (package registries, CI artifact/cache restore, upload processors). On async (`await tar.t(...)`/`tar.x(...)`) and streaming/`pipe` consumers the `RangeError` escapes the promise as an `uncaughtException` and terminates the process \u2014 standard defensive `try/catch` around the async call does NOT prevent it. (The synchronous API is catchable; the async/stream paths \u2014 the dominant server pattern \u2014 are not.)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\n// Build a tar whose single entry has a GNU-L long path of ~12,000 \"a/\" segments (~26 KB),\n// gzip it (\u2248188 bytes), then have a consumer list/extract with member selection:\nconst tar = require(\u0027tar\u0027);\nawait tar.t({ file: \u0027evil.tar.gz\u0027, gzip: true }, [\u0027some-member\u0027]); // -\u003e RangeError, process exit\n```\nEmpirically reproduced on Node v24.18.0 against built `dist/commonjs` of node-tar 7.5.20: 188-byte gzip \u2192 26,112-byte tar (12,000 segments) \u2192 uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` \u2192 process exit. A control run with no member-selection list (filter not installed) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating `mapHas` as the sole cause.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry.** Attacker crafts a tar with a GNU `L` (or PAX `x`) long-path header whose body is `\"a/\"`\u00d7~12000 (~26 KB), followed by a normal file entry.\n - **Guard:** `maxMetaEntrySize` caps the meta body at 1 MiB (`src/parse.ts:241`).\n - **Bypass proof:** 26 KB \u226a 1 MiB \u2192 accepted (verified: 26 KB archive parsed up to the filter).\n2. **Trigger.** Victim service calls `tar.t({file},[sel])` or `tar.x({file,cwd},[sel])` (member selection \u2014 a documented, common API).\n - **Guard:** `Unpack.maxDepth` (default 1024) at `src/unpack.ts:342`; decompression-ratio guard.\n - **Bypass proof:** `maxDepth` lives in `[CHECKPATH]` on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event, which fires *after* `CONSUMEHEADER`\u0027s filter call \u2014 the crash occurs before it (extract exits 1 with default maxDepth). `tar.t` has no maxDepth. Ratio is ~139\u00d7 (trivial); no total-bytes cap applies to the uncompressed meta body.\n3. **Sink.** `this.filter(entry.path)` \u2192 `mapHas` recurses once per `/` segment (`src/list.ts:39`).\n - **Guard:** try/catch in `CONSUMEHEADER`.\n - **Bypass proof:** the only try/catch wraps `new Header` (`src/parse.ts:179-183`); the `this.filter(...)` call at `src/parse.ts:253` is outside it. The `RangeError` propagates out of the stream write/`\u0027data\u0027` path \u2192 uncaught exception (verified: `process.on(\u0027uncaughtException\u0027)` fires; async `await`+`try/catch` does NOT intercept).\n4. **Impact.** Node process termination; a 188-byte gzip crashes any consumer that lists/extracts selected members from untrusted archives.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- `mapHas` recursion is member-name-independent: the crash fires even when the requested members do not match the malicious entry path \u2014 the attacker only needs the consumer to *use* member selection.\n- Standalone `mapHas` overflows at 20k\u201330k segments; on the real streaming path (atop `write \u2192 CONSUMECHUNK \u2192 CONSUMEHEADER \u2192 filter`) it crashes at \u22648k segments (finder\u0027s ~12k estimate is accurate for the reachable path).\n- Control (no member list \u2192 no filter) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating `mapHas`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 7.5.20` (npm `tar`). `mapHas` present verbatim on tag `v7.5.20` (latest GitHub release and npm `dist-tag latest`); no segment/depth cap in `src/list.ts` or the `CONSUMEHEADER` filter path; HEAD == 7.5.20, no unreleased fix.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nRewrite `mapHas` iteratively (walk `dirname` in a `while` loop with a segment/visited cap), or enforce a hard path-segment limit in `Header`/`Parser` independent of `maxMetaEntrySize`, applied before any per-entry filter runs.\n\n## Dedup Note\nDistinct from CVE-2024-28863 / GHSA-f5x3-32g6-qm9j \"lack of folders depth validation\" (that bounds `mkdir` recursion during *extraction* via `maxDepth` in `Unpack[CHECKPATH]` on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event \u2014 a different sink, code path, and fix; runs after the filter and does not apply to `tar.t`). Also distinct from the PAX NUL/numeric-path crash advisories (improper-input-to-fs / type confusion, not recursion) and the gzip-bomb advisory (resource exhaustion on disk writes). None touch `list.ts`/`filesFilter`/`mapHas` or require member selection.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
"id": "GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m",
"modified": "2026-08-21T19:08:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T16:26:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/631ae59121bf8fc8a22bbae35f074cb9b789cd4a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/releases/tag/v7.5.21"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "node-tar: Uncontrolled recursion in mapHas/filesFilter allows uncatchable stack-overflow DoS via crafted long-path tar with member selection"
}
GHSA-R369-45GR-Q63M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 18:32Axigen Mail Server before 10.5.69, 10.6.x before 10.6.40, and 10.7.x before 10.7.2 contains an unauthenticated denial of service vulnerability caused by unbounded nesting depth when parsing SOAP/XML and JSON request bodies before authentication. Attackers can send a single deeply nested request to WebMail, WebAdmin, or WebMail Proxy listeners to exhaust the stack and crash SMTP, IMAP, POP3, and web services repeatedly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119762"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T18:17:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Axigen Mail Server before 10.5.69, 10.6.x before 10.6.40, and 10.7.x before 10.7.2 contains an unauthenticated denial of service vulnerability caused by unbounded nesting depth when parsing SOAP/XML and JSON request bodies before authentication. Attackers can send a single deeply nested request to WebMail, WebAdmin, or WebMail Proxy listeners to exhaust the stack and crash SMTP, IMAP, POP3, and web services repeatedly.",
"id": "GHSA-r369-45gr-q63m",
"modified": "2026-10-30T18:32:44Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T18:32:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axigen.com/kb/show/412"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axigen.com/updates/axigen-10.6.40"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axigen.com/updates/axigen-10.7.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/axigen-mail-server-before-10.5.69-10.6.40-and-10.7.2-unauthenticated-dos-via-nested-requests"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-R3X5-R85C-GRP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-02 00:30 – Updated: 2023-02-09 21:30In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, it is possible to call the TempResource multiple times, each time requesting the dotCMS server to download a large file. If done repeatedly, this will result in Tomcat request-thread exhaustion and ultimately a denial of any other requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-37034"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, it is possible to call the TempResource multiple times, each time requesting the dotCMS server to download a large file. If done repeatedly, this will result in Tomcat request-thread exhaustion and ultimately a denial of any other requests.",
"id": "GHSA-r3x5-r85c-grp5",
"modified": "2023-02-09T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-02-02T00:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dotcms.com/security/SI-65"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R5FR-9GMV-JGGH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 23:38 – Updated: 2026-06-29 15:30Summary
A single unauthenticated GET to any /scim/v1/... endpoint with a ?filter= query string of a few thousand nested parentheses (≈ 4–12 KB) drives the recursive-descent PEG parser past the worker thread's stack guard page. Rust responds to stack overflow with std::process::abort() — the entire kanidmd process exits. The parse runs inside axum's Query<ScimEntryGetQuery> extractor, before any handler body and therefore before any ACL check.
Details
The SCIM filter grammar recurses on ( and not ( with no depth bound.
proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:263-433 — peg::parser! { grammar scimfilter() ... }:
// line 281
"not" separator()+ "(" e:parse() ")" { ScimFilter::Not(Box::new(e)) }
// line 293
"(" e:parse() ")" { e }
Both rules re-enter parse() without a depth counter.
proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:442-447 — impl FromStr for ScimFilter calls scimfilter::parse(input) directly on the raw string with no length or depth pre-check.
proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:80-81 — ScimEntryGetQuery.filter is #[serde_as(as = "Option<DisplayFromStr>")], so deserialising the query struct invokes ScimFilter::from_str on attacker bytes.
Unauthenticated reachability — nine handlers in server/core/src/https/v1_scim.rs (route table at lines 865-1029) take Query<ScimEntryGetQuery> as an argument: /scim/v1/Entry, /scim/v1/Entry/{id}, /scim/v1/Person/{id}, /scim/v1/Application, /scim/v1/Application/{id}, /scim/v1/Class, /scim/v1/Attribute, /scim/v1/Message, /scim/v1/Message/{id}. The SCIM router is merged unconditionally for every server role (server/core/src/https/mod.rs:312).
Axum extracts handler arguments before the handler body runs. The preceding VerifiedClientInformation extractor (server/core/src/https/extractors/mod.rs:16-91) always returns Ok (line 89) regardless of credentials; authorization is deferred to the handler body, which is never reached.
The existing semantic depth limit (DEFAULT_LIMIT_FILTER_DEPTH_MAX = 12, server/lib/src/constants/mod.rs:212) is enforced in Filter::from_scim_ro (server/lib/src/filter.rs:786) after the PEG parse has already produced an AST, so it cannot prevent the parser itself from blowing the stack.
The production daemon (server/daemon/src/main.rs:735-744) uses new_multi_thread() with default 2 MiB worker stacks; hyper's max_buf_size (~400 KiB) is not lowered (server/core/src/https/mod.rs:708-727), so a 12 KB URI is accepted.
An identical unbounded grammar exists in libs/scim_proto/src/filter.rs:112-276 (not network-reachable, but should be fixed in the same patch).
PoC
curl -sk "https://idm.example.com/scim/v1/Application?filter=$(python3 -c 'print("("*3000+"a+pr"+")"*3000)')"
# → curl: (52) Empty reply from server
# → server journal: "fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting", SIGABRT
Release-build threshold measured at ~2 000 nesting levels / ~4 KB:
$ cargo test --release -p kanidm_proto --test scim_filter_depth -- --nocapture
parens depth=1500 len=3004
-> survived
parens depth=2000 len=4004
thread 'audit_scim_filter_nested_parens' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
(signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)
End-to-end against an in-process server via kanidmd_testkit (no authentication performed):
Testkit server setup complete - http://localhost:18080/
audit_scim_dos: sending unauthenticated GET, url len = 12056
thread '...' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
(signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)
Impact
Process-wide availability loss; no confidentiality or integrity impact.
- Unauthenticated, default install, no feature flag required.
- Process abort, not task panic. Stack overflow triggers libstd's guard-page handler, which calls
std::process::abort(). tokio's per-taskcatch_unwindisolation does not apply to aborts. All in-flight HTTP requests, OAuth2/OIDC sessions, LDAP binds, and the web UI are terminated. - Repeatable. One ~12 KB GET per crash; a
while true; do curl ...; doneloop holds the service down indefinitely across supervisor restarts. - The 6 011-byte variant (
depth=3000) fits under the nginx defaultlarge_client_header_bufferslimit of 8 KB, so a typical reverse proxy does not mitigate.
Affected: v1.7.0 through master @ edf50b9da.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "scim_proto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "kanidm_proto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:38:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T22:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA single unauthenticated `GET` to any `/scim/v1/...` endpoint with a `?filter=` query string of a few thousand nested parentheses (\u2248 4\u201312 KB) drives the recursive-descent PEG parser past the worker thread\u0027s stack guard page. Rust responds to stack overflow with `std::process::abort()` \u2014 the entire `kanidmd` process exits. The parse runs inside axum\u0027s `Query\u003cScimEntryGetQuery\u003e` extractor, before any handler body and therefore before any ACL check.\n\n### Details\n\nThe SCIM filter grammar recurses on `(` and `not (` with no depth bound.\n\n**`proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:263-433`** \u2014 `peg::parser! { grammar scimfilter() ... }`:\n\n```rust\n// line 281\n\"not\" separator()+ \"(\" e:parse() \")\" { ScimFilter::Not(Box::new(e)) }\n// line 293\n\"(\" e:parse() \")\" { e }\n```\n\nBoth rules re-enter `parse()` without a depth counter.\n\n**`proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:442-447`** \u2014 `impl FromStr for ScimFilter` calls `scimfilter::parse(input)` directly on the raw string with no length or depth pre-check.\n\n**`proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:80-81`** \u2014 `ScimEntryGetQuery.filter` is `#[serde_as(as = \"Option\u003cDisplayFromStr\u003e\")]`, so deserialising the query struct invokes `ScimFilter::from_str` on attacker bytes.\n\n**Unauthenticated reachability** \u2014 nine handlers in `server/core/src/https/v1_scim.rs` (route table at lines 865-1029) take `Query\u003cScimEntryGetQuery\u003e` as an argument: `/scim/v1/Entry`, `/scim/v1/Entry/{id}`, `/scim/v1/Person/{id}`, `/scim/v1/Application`, `/scim/v1/Application/{id}`, `/scim/v1/Class`, `/scim/v1/Attribute`, `/scim/v1/Message`, `/scim/v1/Message/{id}`. The SCIM router is merged unconditionally for every server role (`server/core/src/https/mod.rs:312`).\n\nAxum extracts handler arguments before the handler body runs. The preceding `VerifiedClientInformation` extractor (`server/core/src/https/extractors/mod.rs:16-91`) always returns `Ok` (line 89) regardless of credentials; authorization is deferred to the handler body, which is never reached.\n\nThe existing semantic depth limit (`DEFAULT_LIMIT_FILTER_DEPTH_MAX = 12`, `server/lib/src/constants/mod.rs:212`) is enforced in `Filter::from_scim_ro` (`server/lib/src/filter.rs:786`) **after** the PEG parse has already produced an AST, so it cannot prevent the parser itself from blowing the stack.\n\nThe production daemon (`server/daemon/src/main.rs:735-744`) uses `new_multi_thread()` with default 2 MiB worker stacks; hyper\u0027s `max_buf_size` (~400 KiB) is not lowered (`server/core/src/https/mod.rs:708-727`), so a 12 KB URI is accepted.\n\nAn identical unbounded grammar exists in `libs/scim_proto/src/filter.rs:112-276` (not network-reachable, but should be fixed in the same patch).\n\n### PoC\n\n```sh\ncurl -sk \"https://idm.example.com/scim/v1/Application?filter=$(python3 -c \u0027print(\"(\"*3000+\"a+pr\"+\")\"*3000)\u0027)\"\n# \u2192 curl: (52) Empty reply from server\n# \u2192 server journal: \"fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting\", SIGABRT\n```\n\nRelease-build threshold measured at ~2 000 nesting levels / ~4 KB:\n\n```\n$ cargo test --release -p kanidm_proto --test scim_filter_depth -- --nocapture\nparens depth=1500 len=3004\n -\u003e survived\nparens depth=2000 len=4004\n\nthread \u0027audit_scim_filter_nested_parens\u0027 has overflowed its stack\nfatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting\n (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)\n```\n\nEnd-to-end against an in-process server via `kanidmd_testkit` (no authentication performed):\n\n```\nTestkit server setup complete - http://localhost:18080/\naudit_scim_dos: sending unauthenticated GET, url len = 12056\n\nthread \u0027...\u0027 has overflowed its stack\nfatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting\n (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nProcess-wide availability loss; no confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\n- **Unauthenticated**, default install, no feature flag required.\n- **Process abort, not task panic.** Stack overflow triggers libstd\u0027s guard-page handler, which calls `std::process::abort()`. tokio\u0027s per-task `catch_unwind` isolation does not apply to aborts. All in-flight HTTP requests, OAuth2/OIDC sessions, LDAP binds, and the web UI are terminated.\n- **Repeatable.** One ~12 KB GET per crash; a `while true; do curl ...; done` loop holds the service down indefinitely across supervisor restarts.\n- The 6 011-byte variant (`depth=3000`) fits under the nginx default `large_client_header_buffers` limit of 8 KB, so a typical reverse proxy does not mitigate.\n\n**Affected**: v1.7.0 through `master` @ edf50b9da.",
"id": "GHSA-r5fr-9gmv-jggh",
"modified": "2026-06-29T15:30:20Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T23:38:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm/security/advisories/GHSA-r5fr-9gmv-jggh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46689"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "scim_proto and kanidm_proto have an authenticated process abort via SCIM filter stack exhaustion"
}
GHSA-R5PQ-6CHH-J3XP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 19:14 – Updated: 2026-08-21 19:14Summary
An unauthenticated POST to any OpenAPI-validated endpoint, including the anonymous POST /edge/validate and POST /edge/issue-token, crashes the entire Unleash server with one request body of deeply-nested JSON.
When request-body validation fails, Unleash builds the error message by calling JSON.stringify on the raw offending value taken from the request body. A value nested a few thousand levels deep makes JSON.stringify recurse past the V8 call-stack limit and throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded.
The throw is synchronous inside an Express error-handling middleware that has no try/catch, and the process registers no uncaughtException handler (only unhandledRejection). Node terminates the process with exit(1).
The body parser sets no JSON nesting-depth limit, the payload (about 10 KB at depth 5000) stays far under the 100 KB body-size limit, and the same error formatter serves every API route, so the trigger is route-independent.
Result: a remote attacker with no account, token, or cookie takes the whole server offline with a single 10 KB request, and keeps it offline by replaying it.
Affected
Unleash OSS server, confirmed live-exploitable on v8.0.0 (unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0).
Vulnerable code is the shared request-validation error path (src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts genericErrorMessage), present on current main.
Reachable on a stock install: no feature flag, no setting, no authentication, no CSRF token, and no cookie required.
The 100 KB request-body size limit does not mitigate it; the crashing payload is about 10 KB.
Root cause
On validation failure the error formatter serializes the raw offending request value with an unguarded const youSent = JSON.stringify(propertyValue) (src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts:75), where propertyValue is read straight from the request body via lodash.get (bad-data-error.ts:123). A deeply-nested array or object makes JSON.stringify recurse once per level and throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded. fromOpenApiValidationErrors (bad-data-error.ts:158) runs from the Express error middleware openAPIValidationMiddleware (src/lib/routes/controller.ts:68), which calls it with no try/catch (controller.ts:70), while the controller's own try/catch (controller.ts:103) wraps only the route handler. The process registers only process.on('unhandledRejection') (src/lib/server-impl.ts:274) and no uncaughtException handler, so the synchronous throw terminates Node with exit(1). The same unguarded pattern exists at fromJoiError (bad-data-error.ts:175) and at handleErrors (src/lib/routes/util.ts:42), whose own comment records that JSON.stringify(finalError.details) "also hangs" (util.ts:63).
Reproduction
unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0 started from the repository docker-compose.yml, default config, no credentials, server at http://localhost:4242.
- A shallow body returns a normal 400 and the server stays up.
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4242/edge/validate \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"tokens":[[]]}'
# HTTP 400 BadDataError: "The `/body/tokens/0` property must be string. You sent []."
- A single anonymous body nested 5000 levels deep (10013 bytes) crashes the process.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST http://localhost:4242/edge/validate \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary "$(python3 -c 'd=5000;print("{\"tokens\":["+"["*d+"]"*d+"]}")')"
# 000 (connection dropped mid-response; Node exited)
- The server is gone and does not recover on its own.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://localhost:4242/health
# 000
docker inspect repo-web-1 --format '{{.State.Status}} restarts={{.RestartCount}}'
# exited restarts=0
Live-verified: one anonymous 10013-byte request to /edge/validate drove /health from 200 to 000; the container logs showed the RangeError stack through bad-data-error and openAPIValidationMiddleware, and the process did not restart. The crash threshold is about 4000 to 4500 nesting levels; depth 5000 crashes reliably. The same crash reproduces on POST /edge/issue-token with a nested object, confirming route and shape independence.
Impact
- Single 10 KB request with no account, token, or cookie takes the entire server offline.
- Replaying the request (kilobits per restart interval) sustains a near-total outage; with no restart policy the first request is a permanent kill.
- Feature-flag evaluation sits on the request path of dependent applications, so the outage propagates to them.
- Every OpenAPI-validated endpoint is a trigger, including anonymous ones.
Credit
Jan Kahmen, turingpoint (jan@turingpoint.de)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "unleash-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "unleash-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.6.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "unleash-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63462"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-21T19:14:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated `POST` to any OpenAPI-validated endpoint, including the anonymous `POST /edge/validate` and `POST /edge/issue-token`, crashes the entire Unleash server with one request body of deeply-nested JSON.\n\nWhen request-body validation fails, Unleash builds the error message by calling `JSON.stringify` on the raw offending value taken from the request body. A value nested a few thousand levels deep makes `JSON.stringify` recurse past the V8 call-stack limit and throw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`.\n\nThe throw is synchronous inside an Express error-handling middleware that has no try/catch, and the process registers no `uncaughtException` handler (only `unhandledRejection`). Node terminates the process with `exit(1)`.\n\nThe body parser sets no JSON nesting-depth limit, the payload (about 10 KB at depth 5000) stays far under the 100 KB body-size limit, and the same error formatter serves every API route, so the trigger is route-independent.\n\nResult: a remote attacker with no account, token, or cookie takes the whole server offline with a single 10 KB request, and keeps it offline by replaying it.\n\n## Affected\n\nUnleash OSS server, confirmed live-exploitable on v8.0.0 (`unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0`).\nVulnerable code is the shared request-validation error path (`src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts` `genericErrorMessage`), present on current `main`.\nReachable on a stock install: no feature flag, no setting, no authentication, no CSRF token, and no cookie required.\nThe 100 KB request-body size limit does not mitigate it; the crashing payload is about 10 KB.\n\n## Root cause\n\nOn validation failure the error formatter serializes the raw offending request value with an unguarded `const youSent = JSON.stringify(propertyValue)` (`src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts:75`), where `propertyValue` is read straight from the request body via `lodash.get` (`bad-data-error.ts:123`). A deeply-nested array or object makes `JSON.stringify` recurse once per level and throw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`. `fromOpenApiValidationErrors` (`bad-data-error.ts:158`) runs from the Express error middleware `openAPIValidationMiddleware` (`src/lib/routes/controller.ts:68`), which calls it with no try/catch (`controller.ts:70`), while the controller\u0027s own try/catch (`controller.ts:103`) wraps only the route handler. The process registers only `process.on(\u0027unhandledRejection\u0027)` (`src/lib/server-impl.ts:274`) and no `uncaughtException` handler, so the synchronous throw terminates Node with `exit(1)`. The same unguarded pattern exists at `fromJoiError` (`bad-data-error.ts:175`) and at `handleErrors` (`src/lib/routes/util.ts:42`), whose own comment records that `JSON.stringify(finalError.details)` \"also hangs\" (`util.ts:63`).\n\n## Reproduction\n\n`unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0` started from the repository `docker-compose.yml`, default config, no credentials, server at `http://localhost:4242`.\n\n1. A shallow body returns a normal 400 and the server stays up.\n\n```\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:4242/edge/validate \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"tokens\":[[]]}\u0027\n# HTTP 400 BadDataError: \"The `/body/tokens/0` property must be string. You sent [].\"\n```\n\n2. A single anonymous body nested 5000 levels deep (10013 bytes) crashes the process.\n\n```\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 -X POST http://localhost:4242/edge/validate \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data-binary \"$(python3 -c \u0027d=5000;print(\"{\\\"tokens\\\":[\"+\"[\"*d+\"]\"*d+\"]}\")\u0027)\"\n# 000 (connection dropped mid-response; Node exited)\n```\n\n3. The server is gone and does not recover on its own.\n\n```\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\\n\u0027 http://localhost:4242/health\n# 000\ndocker inspect repo-web-1 --format \u0027{{.State.Status}} restarts={{.RestartCount}}\u0027\n# exited restarts=0\n```\n\nLive-verified: one anonymous 10013-byte request to `/edge/validate` drove `/health` from 200 to 000; the container logs showed the `RangeError` stack through `bad-data-error` and `openAPIValidationMiddleware`, and the process did not restart. The crash threshold is about 4000 to 4500 nesting levels; depth 5000 crashes reliably. The same crash reproduces on `POST /edge/issue-token` with a nested object, confirming route and shape independence.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Single 10 KB request with no account, token, or cookie takes the entire server offline.\n- Replaying the request (kilobits per restart interval) sustains a near-total outage; with no restart policy the first request is a permanent kill.\n- Feature-flag evaluation sits on the request path of dependent applications, so the outage propagates to them.\n- Every OpenAPI-validated endpoint is a trigger, including anonymous ones.\n\n## Credit\n\nJan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://www.turingpoint.de) (jan@turingpoint.de)",
"id": "GHSA-r5pq-6chh-j3xp",
"modified": "2026-08-21T19:14:37Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T19:14:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/security/advisories/GHSA-r5pq-6chh-j3xp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/b0e4da63249a9403bc209e0581db223326cb8dcf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/d45f99df924c0d24747b3e45e46fcda7dcd3c1c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/d862562a5ab8f2d1e40f6519c64cf0b4fdaf806d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v7.5.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v7.6.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v8.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unleash: Unauthenticated single-request DoS via OpenAPI validation error formatter"
}
Mitigation
Ensure that an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include checking against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action.
Mitigation
Increase the stack size.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.