Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-674

Allowed-with-Review

Uncontrolled Recursion

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.

848 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-QQJX-QV79-G2Q3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:42 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:42
VLAI
Details

There is a stack consumption vulnerability in the lex function in parser.hpp (as used in sassc) in LibSass 3.4.5. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-11554"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-07-23T03:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is a stack consumption vulnerability in the lex function in parser.hpp (as used in sassc) in LibSass 3.4.5. A crafted input will lead to a remote denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqjx-qv79-g2q3",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:42:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:42:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11554"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sass/libsass/issues/2445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1471780"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QR3M-XW4C-JQW3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:09 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:51
VLAI
Summary
ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents
Details

Impact

Hot Chocolate's Utf8GraphQLParser is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a StackOverflowException on payloads as small as 40 KB.

Because StackOverflowException is uncatchable in .NET (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background IHostedService tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.

This occurs before any validation rules run — MaxExecutionDepth, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom IDocumentValidatorRule implementations cannot intercept the crash because Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse is invoked before validation. The existing MaxAllowedFields=2048 limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.

Severity: Critical (9.1) — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Patches

  • v12 line: Fixed in 12.22.7
  • v13 line: Fixed in 13.9.16
  • v14 line: Fixed in 14.3.1
  • v15 line: Fixed in 15.1.14

The fix adds a MaxAllowedRecursionDepth option to ParserOptions with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (ParseSelectionSet, ParseValueLiteral, ParseObject, ParseList, ParseTypeReference, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable SyntaxException is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.

Workarounds

There is no application-level workaround. StackOverflowException cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.

Operators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).

References

  • Fix for v15: https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.22.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.9.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "HotChocolate.Language"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "15.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "15.1.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:09:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-18T00:16:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nHot Chocolate\u0027s `Utf8GraphQLParser` is a recursive descent parser with no recursion depth limit. A crafted GraphQL document with deeply nested selection sets, object values, list values, or list types can trigger a `StackOverflowException` on payloads as small as **40 KB**.\n\nBecause `StackOverflowException` is **uncatchable in .NET** (since .NET 2.0), the entire worker process is terminated immediately. All in-flight HTTP requests, background `IHostedService` tasks, and open WebSocket subscriptions on that worker are dropped. The orchestrator (Kubernetes, IIS, etc.) must restart the process.\n\nThis occurs **before any validation rules run** \u2014 `MaxExecutionDepth`, complexity analyzers, persisted query allow-lists, and custom `IDocumentValidatorRule` implementations cannot intercept the crash because `Utf8GraphQLParser.Parse` is invoked before validation. The existing `MaxAllowedFields=2048` limit does not help because the crashing payloads contain very few fields.\n\n**Severity:** Critical (9.1) \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n### Patches\n\n- **v12 line:** Fixed in `12.22.7`\n- **v13 line:** Fixed in `13.9.16`\n- **v14 line:** Fixed in `14.3.1`\n- **v15 line:** Fixed in `15.1.14`\n\nThe fix adds a `MaxAllowedRecursionDepth` option to `ParserOptions` with a safe default, and enforces it across all recursive parser methods (`ParseSelectionSet`, `ParseValueLiteral`, `ParseObject`, `ParseList`, `ParseTypeReference`, etc.). When the limit is exceeded, a catchable `SyntaxException` is thrown instead of overflowing the stack.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no application-level workaround. `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught in .NET. The only mitigation is to upgrade to a patched version.\n\nOperators can reduce (but not eliminate) risk by limiting HTTP request body size at the reverse proxy or load balancer layer, though the smallest crashing payload (40 KB) is well below most default body size limits and is highly compressible (~few hundred bytes via gzip).\n\n### References\n\n- Fix for v15: https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528",
  "id": "GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:51:04Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T21:09:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-qr3m-xw4c-jqw3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9530"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/pull/9531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/08c0caa42ca33c121bbed49d2db892e5bf6fb541"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/4cbaf67d366f800fc1e484bc5c06dfcf27b45023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/b185eb276c9ee227bd44616ff113be7f01a66c69"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/commit/b9271e6a500484c002fd528dcd34d1a9b445480f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/12.22.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/13.9.16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/14.3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChilliCream/graphql-platform/releases/tag/15.1.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ChilliCream GraphQL Platform: Utf8GraphQLParser Stack Overflow via Deeply Nested GraphQL Documents"
}

GHSA-QRCQ-HR7G-X7GM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-04 00:00
VLAI
Details

The comment function in YzmCMS v6.3 was discovered as being able to be operated concurrently, allowing attackers to create an unusually large number of comments.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-28T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The comment function in YzmCMS v6.3 was discovered as being able to be operated concurrently, allowing attackers to create an unusually large number of comments.",
  "id": "GHSA-qrcq-hr7g-x7gm",
  "modified": "2022-02-04T00:00:37Z",
  "published": "2022-01-29T00:00:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yzmcms/yzmcms/issues/61"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-QV48-PW56-MWC4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-18 15:31
VLAI
Details

SurrealDB versions before 1.1.0 fail to enforce recursion depth limits when parsing nested SurrealQL statements including IF, RELATE, and attribute access idioms. Authorized attackers can submit queries with excessive nesting depth to cause stack overflow and crash the server.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-58370"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-18T14:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SurrealDB versions before 1.1.0 fail to enforce recursion depth limits when parsing nested SurrealQL statements including IF, RELATE, and attribute access idioms. Authorized attackers can submit queries with excessive nesting depth to cause stack overflow and crash the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-qv48-pw56-mwc4",
  "modified": "2026-07-18T15:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-07-18T15:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-6r8p-hpg7-825g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-uncontrolled-recursion-denial-of-service"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QVXG-WJXC-R4GG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-07 16:11 – Updated: 2023-06-07 16:11
VLAI
Summary
Vapor vulnerable to denial of service in URLEncodedFormDecoder
Details

Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder.

Impact

When using automatic content decoding, e.g. 

app.post("foo") { request -> String in
  let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self)
  return "\(foo)"
}

An attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request:

curl -d "array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n '[_0][0][array]'; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world" http://localhost:8080/foo

The issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow.

Patches

Fixed in 4.61.1

Workarounds

If you don't need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the ContentConfiguration so it won't be used. E.g. in configure.swift

var contentConfig = ContentConfiguration()
contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)
contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)
contentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)
contentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)
ContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Vapor repo * Ask in Vapor Discord

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
        "name": "github.com/vapor/vapor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.61.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31019"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120",
      "CWE-121",
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-09T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vapor is an HTTP web framework for Swift. Vapor versions earlier than 4.61.1 are vulnerable to a denial of service in the URLEncodedFormDecoder.\n\n### Impact\nWhen using automatic content decoding, e.g. \n\n```swift\napp.post(\"foo\") { request -\u003e String in\n  let foo = try request.content.decode(Foo.self)\n  return \"\\(foo)\"\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker can craft a request body that can make the server crash with the following request:\n\n```\ncurl -d \"array[_0][0][array][_0][0][array]$(for f in $(seq 1100); do echo -n \u0027[_0][0][array]\u0027; done)[string][_0]=hello%20world\" http://localhost:8080/foo\n```\n\nThe issue is unbounded, attacker controlled stack growth which will at some point lead to a stack overflow.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 4.61.1\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you don\u0027t need to decode Form URL Encoded data, you can disable the `ContentConfiguration` so it won\u0027t be used. E.g. in **configure.swift**\n\n```swift\nvar contentConfig = ContentConfiguration()\ncontentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)\ncontentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .json)\ncontentConfig.use(encoder: JSONEncoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)\ncontentConfig.use(decoder: JSONDecoder.custom(dates: .iso8601), for: .jsonAPI)\nContentConfiguration.global = contentConfig\n```\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the Vapor repo](https://github.com/vapor/vapor)\n* Ask in [Vapor Discord](http://vapor.team)",
  "id": "GHSA-qvxg-wjxc-r4gg",
  "modified": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
  "published": "2023-06-07T16:11:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor/security/advisories/GHSA-qvxg-wjxc-r4gg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31019"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor/commit/6c63226a4ab82ce53730eb1afb9ca63866fcf033"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vapor/vapor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vapor vulnerable to denial of service in URLEncodedFormDecoder"
}

GHSA-QW5H-7F53-XRP6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-21 14:28 – Updated: 2024-11-13 16:26
VLAI
Summary
Stack overflow in `ParseAttrValue` with nested tensors
Details

Impact

The implementation of ParseAttrValue can be tricked into stack overflow due to recursion by giving in a specially crafted input.

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Severity
2.5 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
2.0 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-29615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-17T21:22:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-05-14T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe implementation of [`ParseAttrValue`](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/c22d88d6ff33031aa113e48aa3fc9aa74ed79595/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc#L397-L453) can be tricked into stack overflow due to recursion by giving in a specially crafted input.\n\n### Patches\nWe have patched the issue in GitHub commit [e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1).\n\nThe fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\n### For more information\nPlease consult [our security guide](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/SECURITY.md) for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.",
  "id": "GHSA-qw5h-7f53-xrp6",
  "modified": "2024-11-13T16:26:55Z",
  "published": "2021-05-21T14:28:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qw5h-7f53-xrp6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-cpu/PYSEC-2021-543.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow-gpu/PYSEC-2021-741.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/tensorflow/PYSEC-2021-252.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Stack overflow in `ParseAttrValue` with nested tensors"
}

GHSA-QWM2-W9F2-J6CG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31
VLAI
Details

A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.

This issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet through 1.0.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67552"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T07:16:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A pre-authentication attacker could leverage type nesting to cause a StackOverflowError potentially leading to denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Qpid Proton-Dotnet through 1.0.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0, which fixes the issue",
  "id": "GHSA-qwm2-w9f2-j6cg",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:08Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T09:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67552"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/4dyg0gycrv55ox4oywqght61b053g8xj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/04/23"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R292-9MHP-454M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:26 – Updated: 2026-08-21 19:08
VLAI
Summary
node-tar: Uncontrolled recursion in mapHas/filesFilter allows uncatchable stack-overflow DoS via crafted long-path tar with member selection
Details

Summary

node-tar (npm tar) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal mapHas helper used by filesFilter. When a consumer calls tar.t(...) or tar.x(...) with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive mapHas (src/list.ts:33-44). mapHas walks an entry path upward one path.dirname() call per recursion with no segment cap. A single crafted tar with a GNU-L (or PAX-x) long-path header can deliver a path of tens of thousands of /-separated segments (up to maxMetaEntrySize = 1 MiB). The recursion overflows the call stack, throwing an uncatchable RangeError that terminates the Node process on async/streaming consumers.

Root Cause

filesFilter (src/list.ts:27-51) is installed whenever a caller passes a member-selection list (src/list.ts:119-122, src/extract.ts:55-57). Its filter is invoked at src/parse.ts:253 (entry.ignore = entry.ignore || !this.filter(entry.path, entry)) inside Parser[CONSUMEHEADER] — and crucially outside the only try/catch in that method (which wraps new Header at src/parse.ts:179-183). mapHas recurses once per path segment with no depth limit. The Unpack maxDepth guard (src/unpack.ts:342, in [CHECKPATH]) only runs on the 'entry' event, which fires after CONSUMEHEADER has already invoked the filter — so the stack overflows before any depth guard executes. tar.t (list) has no maxDepth at all.

Impact

Unauthenticated, remotely-triggerable denial of service: a ~188-byte gzip (≈26 KB tar) crashes any service that lists or extracts selected members from an untrusted archive (package registries, CI artifact/cache restore, upload processors). On async (await tar.t(...)/tar.x(...)) and streaming/pipe consumers the RangeError escapes the promise as an uncaughtException and terminates the process — standard defensive try/catch around the async call does NOT prevent it. (The synchronous API is catchable; the async/stream paths — the dominant server pattern — are not.)

Proof of Concept

// Build a tar whose single entry has a GNU-L long path of ~12,000 "a/" segments (~26 KB),
// gzip it (≈188 bytes), then have a consumer list/extract with member selection:
const tar = require('tar');
await tar.t({ file: 'evil.tar.gz', gzip: true }, ['some-member']); // -> RangeError, process exit

Empirically reproduced on Node v24.18.0 against built dist/commonjs of node-tar 7.5.20: 188-byte gzip → 26,112-byte tar (12,000 segments) → uncaught RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded → process exit. A control run with no member-selection list (filter not installed) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating mapHas as the sole cause.

Attack Chain

  1. Entry. Attacker crafts a tar with a GNU L (or PAX x) long-path header whose body is "a/"×~12000 (~26 KB), followed by a normal file entry.
  2. Guard: maxMetaEntrySize caps the meta body at 1 MiB (src/parse.ts:241).
  3. Bypass proof: 26 KB ≪ 1 MiB → accepted (verified: 26 KB archive parsed up to the filter).
  4. Trigger. Victim service calls tar.t({file},[sel]) or tar.x({file,cwd},[sel]) (member selection — a documented, common API).
  5. Guard: Unpack.maxDepth (default 1024) at src/unpack.ts:342; decompression-ratio guard.
  6. Bypass proof: maxDepth lives in [CHECKPATH] on the 'entry' event, which fires after CONSUMEHEADER's filter call — the crash occurs before it (extract exits 1 with default maxDepth). tar.t has no maxDepth. Ratio is ~139× (trivial); no total-bytes cap applies to the uncompressed meta body.
  7. Sink. this.filter(entry.path) → mapHas recurses once per / segment (src/list.ts:39).
  8. Guard: try/catch in CONSUMEHEADER.
  9. Bypass proof: the only try/catch wraps new Header (src/parse.ts:179-183); the this.filter(...) call at src/parse.ts:253 is outside it. The RangeError propagates out of the stream write/'data' path → uncaught exception (verified: process.on('uncaughtException') fires; async await+try/catch does NOT intercept).
  10. Impact. Node process termination; a 188-byte gzip crashes any consumer that lists/extracts selected members from untrusted archives.

Bypass Evidence

  • mapHas recursion is member-name-independent: the crash fires even when the requested members do not match the malicious entry path — the attacker only needs the consumer to use member selection.
  • Standalone mapHas overflows at 20k–30k segments; on the real streaming path (atop write → CONSUMECHUNK → CONSUMEHEADER → filter) it crashes at ≤8k segments (finder's ~12k estimate is accurate for the reachable path).
  • Control (no member list → no filter) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating mapHas.

Affected Versions

<= 7.5.20 (npm tar). mapHas present verbatim on tag v7.5.20 (latest GitHub release and npm dist-tag latest); no segment/depth cap in src/list.ts or the CONSUMEHEADER filter path; HEAD == 7.5.20, no unreleased fix.

Suggested Fix

Rewrite mapHas iteratively (walk dirname in a while loop with a segment/visited cap), or enforce a hard path-segment limit in Header/Parser independent of maxMetaEntrySize, applied before any per-entry filter runs.

Dedup Note

Distinct from CVE-2024-28863 / GHSA-f5x3-32g6-qm9j "lack of folders depth validation" (that bounds mkdir recursion during extraction via maxDepth in Unpack[CHECKPATH] on the 'entry' event — a different sink, code path, and fix; runs after the filter and does not apply to tar.t). Also distinct from the PAX NUL/numeric-path crash advisories (improper-input-to-fs / type confusion, not recursion) and the gzip-bomb advisory (resource exhaustion on disk writes). None touch list.ts/filesFilter/mapHas or require member selection.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.20"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73566"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:26:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T18:18:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n`node-tar` (npm `tar`) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal `mapHas` helper used by `filesFilter`. When a consumer calls `tar.t(...)` or `tar.x(...)` with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive `mapHas` (`src/list.ts:33-44`). `mapHas` walks an entry path upward one `path.dirname()` call per recursion **with no segment cap**. A single crafted tar with a GNU-`L` (or PAX-`x`) long-path header can deliver a path of tens of thousands of `/`-separated segments (up to `maxMetaEntrySize` = 1 MiB). The recursion overflows the call stack, throwing an uncatchable `RangeError` that terminates the Node process on async/streaming consumers.\n\n## Root Cause\n`filesFilter` (`src/list.ts:27-51`) is installed whenever a caller passes a member-selection list (`src/list.ts:119-122`, `src/extract.ts:55-57`). Its filter is invoked at `src/parse.ts:253` (`entry.ignore = entry.ignore || !this.filter(entry.path, entry)`) inside `Parser[CONSUMEHEADER]` \u2014 and crucially **outside** the only try/catch in that method (which wraps `new Header` at `src/parse.ts:179-183`). `mapHas` recurses once per path segment with no depth limit. The `Unpack` `maxDepth` guard (`src/unpack.ts:342`, in `[CHECKPATH]`) only runs on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event, which fires *after* `CONSUMEHEADER` has already invoked the filter \u2014 so the stack overflows before any depth guard executes. `tar.t` (list) has no `maxDepth` at all.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated, remotely-triggerable denial of service: a ~188-byte gzip (\u224826 KB tar) crashes any service that lists or extracts *selected members* from an untrusted archive (package registries, CI artifact/cache restore, upload processors). On async (`await tar.t(...)`/`tar.x(...)`) and streaming/`pipe` consumers the `RangeError` escapes the promise as an `uncaughtException` and terminates the process \u2014 standard defensive `try/catch` around the async call does NOT prevent it. (The synchronous API is catchable; the async/stream paths \u2014 the dominant server pattern \u2014 are not.)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```js\n// Build a tar whose single entry has a GNU-L long path of ~12,000 \"a/\" segments (~26 KB),\n// gzip it (\u2248188 bytes), then have a consumer list/extract with member selection:\nconst tar = require(\u0027tar\u0027);\nawait tar.t({ file: \u0027evil.tar.gz\u0027, gzip: true }, [\u0027some-member\u0027]); // -\u003e RangeError, process exit\n```\nEmpirically reproduced on Node v24.18.0 against built `dist/commonjs` of node-tar 7.5.20: 188-byte gzip \u2192 26,112-byte tar (12,000 segments) \u2192 uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` \u2192 process exit. A control run with no member-selection list (filter not installed) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating `mapHas` as the sole cause.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. **Entry.** Attacker crafts a tar with a GNU `L` (or PAX `x`) long-path header whose body is `\"a/\"`\u00d7~12000 (~26 KB), followed by a normal file entry.\n   - **Guard:** `maxMetaEntrySize` caps the meta body at 1 MiB (`src/parse.ts:241`).\n   - **Bypass proof:** 26 KB \u226a 1 MiB \u2192 accepted (verified: 26 KB archive parsed up to the filter).\n2. **Trigger.** Victim service calls `tar.t({file},[sel])` or `tar.x({file,cwd},[sel])` (member selection \u2014 a documented, common API).\n   - **Guard:** `Unpack.maxDepth` (default 1024) at `src/unpack.ts:342`; decompression-ratio guard.\n   - **Bypass proof:** `maxDepth` lives in `[CHECKPATH]` on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event, which fires *after* `CONSUMEHEADER`\u0027s filter call \u2014 the crash occurs before it (extract exits 1 with default maxDepth). `tar.t` has no maxDepth. Ratio is ~139\u00d7 (trivial); no total-bytes cap applies to the uncompressed meta body.\n3. **Sink.** `this.filter(entry.path)` \u2192 `mapHas` recurses once per `/` segment (`src/list.ts:39`).\n   - **Guard:** try/catch in `CONSUMEHEADER`.\n   - **Bypass proof:** the only try/catch wraps `new Header` (`src/parse.ts:179-183`); the `this.filter(...)` call at `src/parse.ts:253` is outside it. The `RangeError` propagates out of the stream write/`\u0027data\u0027` path \u2192 uncaught exception (verified: `process.on(\u0027uncaughtException\u0027)` fires; async `await`+`try/catch` does NOT intercept).\n4. **Impact.** Node process termination; a 188-byte gzip crashes any consumer that lists/extracts selected members from untrusted archives.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- `mapHas` recursion is member-name-independent: the crash fires even when the requested members do not match the malicious entry path \u2014 the attacker only needs the consumer to *use* member selection.\n- Standalone `mapHas` overflows at 20k\u201330k segments; on the real streaming path (atop `write \u2192 CONSUMECHUNK \u2192 CONSUMEHEADER \u2192 filter`) it crashes at \u22648k segments (finder\u0027s ~12k estimate is accurate for the reachable path).\n- Control (no member list \u2192 no filter) parses cleanly (exit 0), isolating `mapHas`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 7.5.20` (npm `tar`). `mapHas` present verbatim on tag `v7.5.20` (latest GitHub release and npm `dist-tag latest`); no segment/depth cap in `src/list.ts` or the `CONSUMEHEADER` filter path; HEAD == 7.5.20, no unreleased fix.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nRewrite `mapHas` iteratively (walk `dirname` in a `while` loop with a segment/visited cap), or enforce a hard path-segment limit in `Header`/`Parser` independent of `maxMetaEntrySize`, applied before any per-entry filter runs.\n\n## Dedup Note\nDistinct from CVE-2024-28863 / GHSA-f5x3-32g6-qm9j \"lack of folders depth validation\" (that bounds `mkdir` recursion during *extraction* via `maxDepth` in `Unpack[CHECKPATH]` on the `\u0027entry\u0027` event \u2014 a different sink, code path, and fix; runs after the filter and does not apply to `tar.t`). Also distinct from the PAX NUL/numeric-path crash advisories (improper-input-to-fs / type confusion, not recursion) and the gzip-bomb advisory (resource exhaustion on disk writes). None touch `list.ts`/`filesFilter`/`mapHas` or require member selection.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
  "id": "GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T19:08:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:26:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-r292-9mhp-454m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73566"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/631ae59121bf8fc8a22bbae35f074cb9b789cd4a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/releases/tag/v7.5.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "node-tar: Uncontrolled recursion in mapHas/filesFilter allows uncatchable stack-overflow DoS via crafted long-path tar with member selection"
}

GHSA-R3X5-R85C-GRP5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-02 00:30 – Updated: 2023-02-09 21:30
VLAI
Details

In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, it is possible to call the TempResource multiple times, each time requesting the dotCMS server to download a large file. If done repeatedly, this will result in Tomcat request-thread exhaustion and ultimately a denial of any other requests.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37034"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In dotCMS 5.x-22.06, it is possible to call the TempResource multiple times, each time requesting the dotCMS server to download a large file. If done repeatedly, this will result in Tomcat request-thread exhaustion and ultimately a denial of any other requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-r3x5-r85c-grp5",
  "modified": "2023-02-09T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2023-02-02T00:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37034"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dotcms.com/security/SI-65"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R5FR-9GMV-JGGH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 23:38 – Updated: 2026-06-29 15:30
VLAI
Summary
scim_proto and kanidm_proto have an authenticated process abort via SCIM filter stack exhaustion
Details

Summary

A single unauthenticated GET to any /scim/v1/... endpoint with a ?filter= query string of a few thousand nested parentheses (≈ 4–12 KB) drives the recursive-descent PEG parser past the worker thread's stack guard page. Rust responds to stack overflow with std::process::abort() — the entire kanidmd process exits. The parse runs inside axum's Query<ScimEntryGetQuery> extractor, before any handler body and therefore before any ACL check.

Details

The SCIM filter grammar recurses on ( and not ( with no depth bound.

proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:263-433 — peg::parser! { grammar scimfilter() ... }:

// line 281
"not" separator()+ "(" e:parse() ")" { ScimFilter::Not(Box::new(e)) }
// line 293
"(" e:parse() ")" { e }

Both rules re-enter parse() without a depth counter.

proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:442-447 — impl FromStr for ScimFilter calls scimfilter::parse(input) directly on the raw string with no length or depth pre-check.

proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:80-81 — ScimEntryGetQuery.filter is #[serde_as(as = "Option<DisplayFromStr>")], so deserialising the query struct invokes ScimFilter::from_str on attacker bytes.

Unauthenticated reachability — nine handlers in server/core/src/https/v1_scim.rs (route table at lines 865-1029) take Query<ScimEntryGetQuery> as an argument: /scim/v1/Entry, /scim/v1/Entry/{id}, /scim/v1/Person/{id}, /scim/v1/Application, /scim/v1/Application/{id}, /scim/v1/Class, /scim/v1/Attribute, /scim/v1/Message, /scim/v1/Message/{id}. The SCIM router is merged unconditionally for every server role (server/core/src/https/mod.rs:312).

Axum extracts handler arguments before the handler body runs. The preceding VerifiedClientInformation extractor (server/core/src/https/extractors/mod.rs:16-91) always returns Ok (line 89) regardless of credentials; authorization is deferred to the handler body, which is never reached.

The existing semantic depth limit (DEFAULT_LIMIT_FILTER_DEPTH_MAX = 12, server/lib/src/constants/mod.rs:212) is enforced in Filter::from_scim_ro (server/lib/src/filter.rs:786) after the PEG parse has already produced an AST, so it cannot prevent the parser itself from blowing the stack.

The production daemon (server/daemon/src/main.rs:735-744) uses new_multi_thread() with default 2 MiB worker stacks; hyper's max_buf_size (~400 KiB) is not lowered (server/core/src/https/mod.rs:708-727), so a 12 KB URI is accepted.

An identical unbounded grammar exists in libs/scim_proto/src/filter.rs:112-276 (not network-reachable, but should be fixed in the same patch).

PoC

curl -sk "https://idm.example.com/scim/v1/Application?filter=$(python3 -c 'print("("*3000+"a+pr"+")"*3000)')"
# → curl: (52) Empty reply from server
# → server journal: "fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting", SIGABRT

Release-build threshold measured at ~2 000 nesting levels / ~4 KB:

$ cargo test --release -p kanidm_proto --test scim_filter_depth -- --nocapture
parens depth=1500 len=3004
  -> survived
parens depth=2000 len=4004

thread 'audit_scim_filter_nested_parens' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
  (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)

End-to-end against an in-process server via kanidmd_testkit (no authentication performed):

Testkit server setup complete - http://localhost:18080/
audit_scim_dos: sending unauthenticated GET, url len = 12056

thread '...' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
  (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)

Impact

Process-wide availability loss; no confidentiality or integrity impact.

  • Unauthenticated, default install, no feature flag required.
  • Process abort, not task panic. Stack overflow triggers libstd's guard-page handler, which calls std::process::abort(). tokio's per-task catch_unwind isolation does not apply to aborts. All in-flight HTTP requests, OAuth2/OIDC sessions, LDAP binds, and the web UI are terminated.
  • Repeatable. One ~12 KB GET per crash; a while true; do curl ...; done loop holds the service down indefinitely across supervisor restarts.
  • The 6 011-byte variant (depth=3000) fits under the nginx default large_client_header_buffers limit of 8 KB, so a typical reverse proxy does not mitigate.

Affected: v1.7.0 through master @ edf50b9da.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "scim_proto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "kanidm_proto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46689"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:38:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T22:17:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA single unauthenticated `GET` to any `/scim/v1/...` endpoint with a `?filter=` query string of a few thousand nested parentheses (\u2248 4\u201312 KB) drives the recursive-descent PEG parser past the worker thread\u0027s stack guard page. Rust responds to stack overflow with `std::process::abort()` \u2014 the entire `kanidmd` process exits. The parse runs inside axum\u0027s `Query\u003cScimEntryGetQuery\u003e` extractor, before any handler body and therefore before any ACL check.\n\n### Details\n\nThe SCIM filter grammar recurses on `(` and `not (` with no depth bound.\n\n**`proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:263-433`** \u2014 `peg::parser! { grammar scimfilter() ... }`:\n\n```rust\n// line 281\n\"not\" separator()+ \"(\" e:parse() \")\" { ScimFilter::Not(Box::new(e)) }\n// line 293\n\"(\" e:parse() \")\" { e }\n```\n\nBoth rules re-enter `parse()` without a depth counter.\n\n**`proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:442-447`** \u2014 `impl FromStr for ScimFilter` calls `scimfilter::parse(input)` directly on the raw string with no length or depth pre-check.\n\n**`proto/src/scim_v1/mod.rs:80-81`** \u2014 `ScimEntryGetQuery.filter` is `#[serde_as(as = \"Option\u003cDisplayFromStr\u003e\")]`, so deserialising the query struct invokes `ScimFilter::from_str` on attacker bytes.\n\n**Unauthenticated reachability** \u2014 nine handlers in `server/core/src/https/v1_scim.rs` (route table at lines 865-1029) take `Query\u003cScimEntryGetQuery\u003e` as an argument: `/scim/v1/Entry`, `/scim/v1/Entry/{id}`, `/scim/v1/Person/{id}`, `/scim/v1/Application`, `/scim/v1/Application/{id}`, `/scim/v1/Class`, `/scim/v1/Attribute`, `/scim/v1/Message`, `/scim/v1/Message/{id}`. The SCIM router is merged unconditionally for every server role (`server/core/src/https/mod.rs:312`).\n\nAxum extracts handler arguments before the handler body runs. The preceding `VerifiedClientInformation` extractor (`server/core/src/https/extractors/mod.rs:16-91`) always returns `Ok` (line 89) regardless of credentials; authorization is deferred to the handler body, which is never reached.\n\nThe existing semantic depth limit (`DEFAULT_LIMIT_FILTER_DEPTH_MAX = 12`, `server/lib/src/constants/mod.rs:212`) is enforced in `Filter::from_scim_ro` (`server/lib/src/filter.rs:786`) **after** the PEG parse has already produced an AST, so it cannot prevent the parser itself from blowing the stack.\n\nThe production daemon (`server/daemon/src/main.rs:735-744`) uses `new_multi_thread()` with default 2 MiB worker stacks; hyper\u0027s `max_buf_size` (~400 KiB) is not lowered (`server/core/src/https/mod.rs:708-727`), so a 12 KB URI is accepted.\n\nAn identical unbounded grammar exists in `libs/scim_proto/src/filter.rs:112-276` (not network-reachable, but should be fixed in the same patch).\n\n### PoC\n\n```sh\ncurl -sk \"https://idm.example.com/scim/v1/Application?filter=$(python3 -c \u0027print(\"(\"*3000+\"a+pr\"+\")\"*3000)\u0027)\"\n# \u2192 curl: (52) Empty reply from server\n# \u2192 server journal: \"fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting\", SIGABRT\n```\n\nRelease-build threshold measured at ~2 000 nesting levels / ~4 KB:\n\n```\n$ cargo test --release -p kanidm_proto --test scim_filter_depth -- --nocapture\nparens depth=1500 len=3004\n  -\u003e survived\nparens depth=2000 len=4004\n\nthread \u0027audit_scim_filter_nested_parens\u0027 has overflowed its stack\nfatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting\n  (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)\n```\n\nEnd-to-end against an in-process server via `kanidmd_testkit` (no authentication performed):\n\n```\nTestkit server setup complete - http://localhost:18080/\naudit_scim_dos: sending unauthenticated GET, url len = 12056\n\nthread \u0027...\u0027 has overflowed its stack\nfatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting\n  (signal: 6, SIGABRT: process abort signal)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nProcess-wide availability loss; no confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\n- **Unauthenticated**, default install, no feature flag required.\n- **Process abort, not task panic.** Stack overflow triggers libstd\u0027s guard-page handler, which calls `std::process::abort()`. tokio\u0027s per-task `catch_unwind` isolation does not apply to aborts. All in-flight HTTP requests, OAuth2/OIDC sessions, LDAP binds, and the web UI are terminated.\n- **Repeatable.** One ~12 KB GET per crash; a `while true; do curl ...; done` loop holds the service down indefinitely across supervisor restarts.\n- The 6 011-byte variant (`depth=3000`) fits under the nginx default `large_client_header_buffers` limit of 8 KB, so a typical reverse proxy does not mitigate.\n\n**Affected**: v1.7.0 through `master` @ edf50b9da.",
  "id": "GHSA-r5fr-9gmv-jggh",
  "modified": "2026-06-29T15:30:20Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T23:38:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm/security/advisories/GHSA-r5fr-9gmv-jggh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46689"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "scim_proto and kanidm_proto have an authenticated process abort via SCIM filter stack exhaustion"
}
Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include checking against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action.

Mitigation
Implementation

Increase the stack size.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

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