Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-674

Allowed-with-Review

Uncontrolled Recursion

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack.

1032 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-WFJV-JM8J-274F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:51 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:31
VLAI
Details

A crafted self-referential DOS partition table will cause all Das U-Boot versions through 2019.07-rc4 to infinitely recurse, causing the stack to grow infinitely and eventually either crash or overwrite other data.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-13103"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-29T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A crafted self-referential DOS partition table will cause all Das U-Boot versions through 2019.07-rc4 to infinitely recurse, causing the stack to grow infinitely and eventually either crash or overwrite other data.",
  "id": "GHSA-wfjv-jm8j-274f",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T12:31:26Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:51:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13103"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-577017.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-618620.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-618620.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/deephooloovoo/d91b81a1674b4750e662dfae93804d75"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commits/master"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-July/375512.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WFR3-XJ75-PFWH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 21:22 – Updated: 2026-06-25 21:22
VLAI
Summary
MessagePack-CSharp: DynamicUnionResolver-generated deserializers miss depth enforcement
Details

Summary

Runtime-generated union deserializers emitted by DynamicUnionResolver do not call MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader) and do not decrement reader.Depth around recursive deserialization and skip paths.

This means union deserialization does not consistently participate in the maximum object graph depth enforcement that protects other recursive formatter paths. For unknown union keys, the emitted deserializer calls reader.Skip() on attacker-controlled data without an enclosing depth step.

Impact

Applications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into object graphs containing [Union]-decorated interfaces or abstract classes handled by DynamicUnionResolver.

An attacker can provide a union payload with an unknown key and a deeply nested value. Because the generated union formatter does not enter the depth accounting scope before skipping or recursively processing the value, configured depth limits can be bypassed. In combination with recursive skip behavior, this can terminate the process with an uncatchable StackOverflowException.

This issue is narrower than the general TrySkip() recursion issue because it specifically concerns a formatter-generation path that fails to count union nesting. It remains independently fixable because the emitted IL should mirror the depth-step behavior used by source-generated union formatters and dynamic object formatters.

Affected components

  • Package: MessagePack
  • API: DynamicUnionResolver.BuildDeserialize
  • Data types: [Union]-decorated interface and abstract class hierarchies handled by the dynamic resolver
  • Finding ID: MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-070

Patches

Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.

Upgrade guidance:

  1. Upgrade MessagePack to the patched version for your release line.
  2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.

The fix should emit DepthStep and matching reader.Depth-- cleanup in dynamic union deserializers, consistent with other recursive formatter implementations.

Workarounds

Patching is recommended.

Until a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted payloads into dynamically resolved [Union] types. Prefer source-generated formatters that include depth checks, where applicable, and enforce outer message-size and schema constraints.

Resources

  • MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-070: dynamic union deserializer missing depth-step enforcement
  • CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.301"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48513"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T21:22:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nRuntime-generated union deserializers emitted by `DynamicUnionResolver` do not call `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)` and do not decrement `reader.Depth` around recursive deserialization and skip paths.\n\nThis means union deserialization does not consistently participate in the maximum object graph depth enforcement that protects other recursive formatter paths. For unknown union keys, the emitted deserializer calls `reader.Skip()` on attacker-controlled data without an enclosing depth step.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into object graphs containing `[Union]`-decorated interfaces or abstract classes handled by `DynamicUnionResolver`.\n\nAn attacker can provide a union payload with an unknown key and a deeply nested value. Because the generated union formatter does not enter the depth accounting scope before skipping or recursively processing the value, configured depth limits can be bypassed. In combination with recursive skip behavior, this can terminate the process with an uncatchable `StackOverflowException`.\n\nThis issue is narrower than the general `TrySkip()` recursion issue because it specifically concerns a formatter-generation path that fails to count union nesting. It remains independently fixable because the emitted IL should mirror the depth-step behavior used by source-generated union formatters and dynamic object formatters.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- API: `DynamicUnionResolver.BuildDeserialize`\n- Data types: `[Union]`-decorated interface and abstract class hierarchies handled by the dynamic resolver\n- Finding ID: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-070`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should emit `DepthStep` and matching `reader.Depth--` cleanup in dynamic union deserializers, consistent with other recursive formatter implementations.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted payloads into dynamically resolved `[Union]` types. Prefer source-generated formatters that include depth checks, where applicable, and enforce outer message-size and schema constraints.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-070`: dynamic union deserializer missing depth-step enforcement\n- CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion",
  "id": "GHSA-wfr3-xj75-pfwh",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T21:22:52Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T21:22:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-wfr3-xj75-pfwh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48513"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: DynamicUnionResolver-generated deserializers miss depth enforcement"
}

GHSA-WGH7-7M3C-FX25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 21:30 – Updated: 2026-07-06 13:06
VLAI
Summary
Scriban has Uncontrolled Recursion in Parser Leads to Stack Overflow and Process Crash (Denial of Service)
Details

Scriban is vulnerable to an uncontrolled process crash resulting in a Denial of Service. Because the recursive-descent parser does not enforce a default limit on expression depth, an attacker who controls template input can craft a heavily nested template that triggers a StackOverflowException. In .NET, a StackOverflowException cannot be caught by standard try-catch blocks, resulting in the immediate and ungraceful termination of the entire hosting process.

Scriban utilizes a recursive-descent parser to process template expressions. While the library exposes an ExpressionDepthLimit property in its ParserOptions, this property defaults to null (disabled).

If an application accepts user-supplied templates (or dynamically constructs templates from untrusted input), an attacker can supply thousands of nested parentheses or blocks. As the parser recursively evaluates each nested layer, it consumes thread stack space until it exceeds the limits of the host OS, triggering a fatal crash.

Impact

An attacker can supply crafted input that triggers a StackOverflowException, causing immediate termination of the hosting process and resulting in a Denial of Service. In applications that process untrusted or user-controlled templates (e.g., web applications or APIs), this can be exploited remotely without authentication. The failure is not recoverable, requiring a full process restart and leading to service disruption.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following C# code demonstrates the vulnerability. Executing this code will immediately terminate the application process.

using Scriban;

// Creates a deeply nested expression: (((( ... (1) ... ))))
string nested = new string('(', 10000) + "1" + new string(')', 10000);

try {
  // This will crash the entire process immediately
  Scriban.Template.Parse("{{ " + nested + " }}");
} catch (Exception ex) {
  // This catch block will never execute because StackOverflowException
  Console.WriteLine("Caught exception: " + ex.Message);
}

Suggested Remediation

Update the ParserOptions constructor (or the internal parser initialization) to set a default value for ExpressionDepthLimit. A limit of 1000 (or even lower, such as 250 or 500) is generally more than enough for legitimate templates while safely preventing stack exhaustion.

public int? ExpressionDepthLimit { get; set; } = 250; 

Alternatively, document the risk heavily and warn developers to manually set ExpressionDepthLimit if evaluating untrusted templates, though a secure-by-default approach is strongly preferred.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.5.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "scriban"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.5.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Scriban.Signed"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T21:30:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Scriban is vulnerable to an uncontrolled process crash resulting in a Denial of Service. Because the recursive-descent parser does not enforce a default limit on expression depth, an attacker who controls template input can craft a heavily nested template that triggers a `StackOverflowException`. In .NET, a `StackOverflowException` cannot be caught by standard `try-catch` blocks, resulting in the immediate and ungraceful termination of the entire hosting process. \n\nScriban utilizes a recursive-descent parser to process template expressions. While the library exposes an `ExpressionDepthLimit` property in its `ParserOptions`, this property defaults to `null` (disabled). \n\nIf an application accepts user-supplied templates (or dynamically constructs templates from untrusted input), an attacker can supply thousands of nested parentheses or blocks. As the parser recursively evaluates each nested layer, it consumes thread stack space until it exceeds the limits of the host OS, triggering a fatal crash.\n\n#### Impact\n\nAn attacker can supply crafted input that triggers a `StackOverflowException`, causing immediate termination of the hosting process and resulting in a Denial of Service. In applications that process untrusted or user-controlled templates (e.g., web applications or APIs), this can be exploited remotely without authentication. The failure is not recoverable, requiring a full process restart and leading to service disruption.\n\n#### Proof of Concept (PoC)\nThe following C# code demonstrates the vulnerability. Executing this code will immediately terminate the application process.\n\n```csharp\nusing Scriban;\n\n// Creates a deeply nested expression: (((( ... (1) ... ))))\nstring nested = new string(\u0027(\u0027, 10000) + \"1\" + new string(\u0027)\u0027, 10000);\n\ntry {\n  // This will crash the entire process immediately\n  Scriban.Template.Parse(\"{{ \" + nested + \" }}\");\n} catch (Exception ex) {\n  // This catch block will never execute because StackOverflowException\n  Console.WriteLine(\"Caught exception: \" + ex.Message);\n}\n```\n\n#### Suggested Remediation\n\nUpdate the `ParserOptions` constructor (or the internal parser initialization) to set a default value for `ExpressionDepthLimit`. A limit of `1000` (or even lower, such as `250` or `500`) is generally more than enough for legitimate templates while safely preventing stack exhaustion.\n\n```csharp\npublic int? ExpressionDepthLimit { get; set; } = 250; \n```\nAlternatively, document the risk heavily and warn developers to manually set `ExpressionDepthLimit` if evaluating untrusted templates, though a secure-by-default approach is strongly preferred.",
  "id": "GHSA-wgh7-7m3c-fx25",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T13:06:02Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T21:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban/security/advisories/GHSA-wgh7-7m3c-fx25"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban/commit/a6fe6074199e5c04f4d29dc8d8e652b24d33e3e4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban/commit/b5ac4bf30459fdc76964e3f751e16f7e96079ea7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Scriban has Uncontrolled Recursion in Parser Leads to Stack Overflow and Process Crash (Denial of Service)"
}

GHSA-WJM4-HW2R-M766

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-17 03:30 – Updated: 2025-04-17 03:30
VLAI
Details

VisiCut 2.1 allows stack consumption via an XML document with nested set elements, as demonstrated by a java.util.HashMap StackOverflowError when reference='../../../set/set[2]' is used, aka an "insecure deserialization" issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-43708"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-17T01:15:46Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "VisiCut 2.1 allows stack consumption via an XML document with nested set elements, as demonstrated by a java.util.HashMap StackOverflowError when reference=\u0027../../../set/set[2]\u0027 is used, aka an \"insecure deserialization\" issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-wjm4-hw2r-m766",
  "modified": "2025-04-17T03:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-04-17T03:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43708"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Gelcon/PoC-of-VisiCut2_1-Stack-Overflow-Vul"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/t-oster/VisiCut"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://visicut.org"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WJWR-9F4Q-Q8H8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:56 – Updated: 2022-05-24 16:56
VLAI
Details

In Eclipse Mosquitto 1.5.0 to 1.6.5 inclusive, if a malicious MQTT client sends a SUBSCRIBE packet containing a topic that consists of approximately 65400 or more '/' characters, i.e. the topic hierarchy separator, then a stack overflow will occur.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-11779"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-09-19T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Eclipse Mosquitto 1.5.0 to 1.6.5 inclusive, if a malicious MQTT client sends a SUBSCRIBE packet containing a topic that consists of approximately 65400 or more \u0027/\u0027 characters, i.e. the topic hierarchy separator, then a stack overflow will occur.",
  "id": "GHSA-wjwr-9f4q-q8h8",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T16:56:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:56:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11779"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=551160"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/10/msg00035.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/D4WMHIM64Q35NGTR6R3ILZUL4MA4ANB5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HFWQBNFTAVHPUYNGYO2TCPF5PCSWC2Z7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/JWNVTFA2CKXERXRYPYE2YFTZP4GNBGYY"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Nov/25"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4137-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4570"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-09/msg00077.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-10/msg00008.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-WMFM-V59W-H9QP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-11-12 18:31
VLAI
Details

In Progress® Telerik® UI for ASP.NET Core versions 2015.1.318 through 2026.3.1015, the server-side FilterParser processes nested expressions in untrusted filter parameters through recursive parsing without a recursion-depth limit, while FilterLexer does not enforce an input-length limit. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this if the application exposes an endpoint using DataSourceRequest model binding that is reachable without authentication. Deeply nested filters can trigger parsing errors during model binding or cause StackOverflowException. This issue is fixed in version 2026.4.1111.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-106154"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-12T18:17:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Progress\u00ae Telerik\u00ae UI for ASP.NET Core versions `2015.1.318` through `2026.3.1015`, the server-side FilterParser processes nested expressions in untrusted filter parameters through recursive parsing without a recursion-depth limit, while FilterLexer does not enforce an input-length limit. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this if the application exposes an endpoint using DataSourceRequest model binding that is reachable without authentication. Deeply nested filters can trigger parsing errors during model binding or cause `StackOverflowException`. This issue is fixed in version `2026.4.1111`.",
  "id": "GHSA-wmfm-v59w-h9qp",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T18:31:48Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T18:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.telerik.com/aspnet-core-ui/documentation/knowledge-base/kb-security-uncontrolled-recursion-cve-2026-106154"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WMHF-FQC8-VXHH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 20:10 – Updated: 2026-07-06 22:53
VLAI
Summary
SQLFluff: Recursive Stack Overflow in Parser
Details

Impact

In deployments where untrusted users can provide SQL queries to be linted, an untrusted user can submit a malicious query with deliberate excessive nesting to any application using the parser to trigger a Denial of Service through resource exhaustion.

Patches

Versions 4.1.0 and up contain a configurable recursion limit, which is enabled by default, to prevent this manner of exploit.

Credit

Ori Nakar from Imperva Threat Research Team.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "sqlfluff"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46373"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T20:10:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T23:16:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIn deployments where untrusted users can provide SQL queries to be linted, an untrusted user can submit a malicious query with deliberate excessive nesting to any application using the parser to trigger a Denial of Service through resource exhaustion.\n\n### Patches\n\nVersions 4.1.0 and up contain a configurable recursion limit, which is enabled by default, to prevent this manner of exploit.\n\n### Credit\n\nOri Nakar from Imperva Threat Research Team.",
  "id": "GHSA-wmhf-fqc8-vxhh",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T22:53:18Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T20:10:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sqlfluff/sqlfluff/security/advisories/GHSA-wmhf-fqc8-vxhh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/sqlfluff/PYSEC-2026-209.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sqlfluff/sqlfluff"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SQLFluff: Recursive Stack Overflow in Parser"
}

GHSA-WP2G-VPJJ-G53R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 16:31 – Updated: 2026-10-08 16:31
VLAI
Summary
Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow
Details

Summary

ANCHORARRAY (calc.go:15137 on current master) evaluates each cell of the referenced spill range by calling the exported CalcCellValue, which unconditionally constructs a fresh calcContext — fresh entry marker, fresh iterations map, full MaxCalcIterations budget (calc.go:896-900). The circular-reference control only exists within one context: the entry-exclusion marker and per-ref iteration budget are fields of that single context, and completion-based caching (formulaArgCache/calcRawCache) only ever stores results of evaluations that finish.

During a pure cycle no nested evaluation ever finishes, so nothing is ever cached to break the recursion, and each hop re-arms the entire budget. Two ordinary, Excel-legal constructs in an attacker-supplied workbook are enough:

  • A1 (dynamic array formula, ref A1:A1): _xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($B$1)
  • B1 (dynamic array formula, ref B1:B1): _xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($A$1)

→ CalcCellValue → calcCellValue → evalInfixExp → parseReference → cellResolver → … → ANCHORARRAY → CalcCellValue → … forever, ending in a fatal, unrecoverable Go runtime error: runtime: goroutine stack exceeds …-byte limit / fatal error: stack overflow. Go stack overflows cannot be recovered — the whole process aborts.

Details

  • The terminating edge the iterations gate is supposed to provide does not exist across contexts: there is no in-flight tracking shared between nested CalcCellValue calls.
  • Both formulas are ordinary Excel-legal constructs; no exotic XML is required.
  • Excelize's own APIs reach formula evaluation on untrusted cells implicitly (e.g. pivotTable.go:538, picture.go:985/1141, col.go:892), so a service that merely adds a pivot table or a picture over such a workbook dies.
  • No option value prevents it: MaxCalcIterations is irrelevant because every hop gets a fresh budget.
  • Measured: a 64 MB stack budget is exhausted in ~0.09 s; the ~1 GB default in ~1–2 s.

PoC

A standalone program (public API only) was provided to the maintainer by email (4-anchorarray-recursion): NewFile + SetCellFormula with FormulaOpts{Type: array, Ref: A1:A1 / B1:B1}, then CalcCellValue("Sheet1","A1"). On master ecd99d761fe0 (2026-09-08) the process aborts with fatal error: stack overflow; with the proposed patch the cycle terminates normally (CYCLE_TERMINATED) and existing calc tests pass.

Impact

An attacker ships a workbook containing the two formulas; any service that evaluates a formula over those cells — directly via CalcCellValue, or implicitly via AddPivotTable / AddPicture / auto-fit — aborts. Remote, unauthenticated, process-fatal, no configuration prevents it.

Proposed fix

Evaluate spill-range cells through the current calculation context — fn.f.cellResolver(fn.ctx, …) instead of the exported CalcCellValue — so the entry check and iterations gate of the running calculation apply. cellResolver returns the typed value directly (dropping a string round-trip); an ArgEmpty → "" shim preserves the existing ToNumber behavior for empty spill cells, and a fresh-context fallback covers the legacy nil-ctx test paths. A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.1-0.20260911060113-ea12859e43c6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107216"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T16:31:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T18:17:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`ANCHORARRAY` (calc.go:15137 on current master) evaluates each cell of the referenced spill range by calling the **exported** `CalcCellValue`, which unconditionally constructs a fresh `calcContext` \u2014 fresh entry marker, fresh iterations map, full `MaxCalcIterations` budget (calc.go:896-900). The circular-reference control only exists **within one context**: the entry-exclusion marker and per-ref iteration budget are fields of that single context, and completion-based caching (`formulaArgCache`/`calcRawCache`) only ever stores results of evaluations that *finish*.\n\nDuring a pure cycle no nested evaluation ever finishes, so nothing is ever cached to break the recursion, and each hop re-arms the entire budget. Two ordinary, Excel-legal constructs in an attacker-supplied workbook are enough:\n\n- `A1` (dynamic array formula, ref `A1:A1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($B$1)`\n- `B1` (dynamic array formula, ref `B1:B1`): `_xlfn.ANCHORARRAY($A$1)`\n\n\u2192 `CalcCellValue \u2192 calcCellValue \u2192 evalInfixExp \u2192 parseReference \u2192 cellResolver \u2192 \u2026 \u2192 ANCHORARRAY \u2192 CalcCellValue \u2192 \u2026` forever, ending in a **fatal, unrecoverable** Go runtime error: `runtime: goroutine stack exceeds \u2026-byte limit / fatal error: stack overflow`. Go stack overflows cannot be recovered \u2014 the whole process aborts.\n\n### Details\n\n- The terminating edge the iterations gate is supposed to provide does not exist across contexts: there is no in-flight tracking shared between nested `CalcCellValue` calls.\n- Both formulas are ordinary Excel-legal constructs; no exotic XML is required.\n- Excelize\u0027s own APIs reach formula evaluation on untrusted cells implicitly (e.g. `pivotTable.go:538`, `picture.go:985/1141`, `col.go:892`), so a service that merely adds a pivot table or a picture over such a workbook dies.\n- No option value prevents it: `MaxCalcIterations` is irrelevant because every hop gets a fresh budget.\n- Measured: a 64 MB stack budget is exhausted in ~0.09 s; the ~1 GB default in ~1\u20132 s.\n\n### PoC\n\nA standalone program (public API only) was provided to the maintainer by email (`4-anchorarray-recursion`): `NewFile` + `SetCellFormula` with `FormulaOpts{Type: array, Ref: A1:A1 / B1:B1}`, then `CalcCellValue(\"Sheet1\",\"A1\")`. On master `ecd99d761fe0` (2026-09-08) the process aborts with `fatal error: stack overflow`; with the proposed patch the cycle terminates normally (`CYCLE_TERMINATED`) and existing calc tests pass.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker ships a workbook containing the two formulas; any service that evaluates a formula over those cells \u2014 directly via `CalcCellValue`, or implicitly via `AddPivotTable` / `AddPicture` / auto-fit \u2014 aborts. Remote, unauthenticated, process-fatal, no configuration prevents it.\n\n### Proposed fix\n\nEvaluate spill-range cells through the **current** calculation context \u2014 `fn.f.cellResolver(fn.ctx, \u2026)` instead of the exported `CalcCellValue` \u2014 so the entry check and iterations gate of the running calculation apply. `cellResolver` returns the typed value directly (dropping a string round-trip); an `ArgEmpty \u2192 \"\"` shim preserves the existing `ToNumber` behavior for empty spill cells, and a fresh-context fallback covers the legacy nil-ctx test paths. A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T16:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T16:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-wp2g-vpjj-g53r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107216"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/ea12859e43c64d498ecf839263c5f917391f3316"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Excelize ANCHORARRAY: mutually-referencing array formulas recurse unboundedly via re-entrant CalcCellValue, causing a fatal stack overflow"
}

GHSA-WQH3-2WQG-RQ54

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:08 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:08
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in lib\cdt\dttree.c in libcdt.a in graphviz 2.40.1. Stack consumption occurs because of recursive agclose calls in lib\cgraph\graph.c in libcgraph.a, related to agfstsubg in lib\cgraph\subg.c.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9904"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-03-21T18:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in lib\\cdt\\dttree.c in libcdt.a in graphviz 2.40.1. Stack consumption occurs because of recursive agclose calls in lib\\cgraph\\graph.c in libcgraph.a, related to agfstsubg in lib\\cgraph\\subg.c.",
  "id": "GHSA-wqh3-2wqg-rq54",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:08:56Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:08:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9904"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/graphviz/graphviz/issues/1512"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://research.loginsoft.com/bugs/stack-buffer-overflow-in-function-agclose-graphviz"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-04"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WQRM-3WJH-XJ38

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-08 15:32
VLAI
Details

Uncontrolled recursion in DcmDicomDir::moveRecordToTree() in dcmdata/libsrc/dcdicdir.cc of OFFIS DCMTK 3.7.0 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (stack exhaustion and process crash) via a crafted DICOMDIR file with a deeply chained sequence of directory records linked through the Offset of Referenced Lower-Level Directory Entity attribute. Any application that opens the DICOMDIR is affected, including dcmgpdir and media viewers built on DCMTK. The issue is fixed in commit ca761f7f3dcaaddaa95be87cf5d736138d7c3a9f.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44035"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-08T13:17:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Uncontrolled recursion in DcmDicomDir::moveRecordToTree() in dcmdata/libsrc/dcdicdir.cc of OFFIS DCMTK 3.7.0 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (stack exhaustion and process crash) via a crafted DICOMDIR file with a deeply chained sequence of directory records linked through the Offset of Referenced Lower-Level Directory Entity attribute. Any application that opens the DICOMDIR is affected, including dcmgpdir and media viewers built on DCMTK. The issue is fixed in commit ca761f7f3dcaaddaa95be87cf5d736138d7c3a9f.",
  "id": "GHSA-wqrm-3wjh-xj38",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T15:32:58Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T15:32:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44035"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DCMTK/dcmtk/commit/ca761f7f3dcaaddaa95be87cf5d736138d7c3a9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.dcmtk.org/redmine/issues/1215"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that an end condition will be reached under all logic conditions. The end condition may include checking against the depth of recursion and exiting with an error if the recursion goes too deep. The complexity of the end condition contributes to the effectiveness of this action.

Mitigation
Implementation

Increase the stack size.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.