CWE-290
AllowedAuthentication Bypass by Spoofing
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
1199 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-995C-QWW8-64FJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-20 18:31 – Updated: 2024-12-20 19:40Oqtane Framework 6.0.0 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. By manipulating the entityid parameter, attackers can bypass passcode validation and successfully log into the application or access restricted data without proper authorization. The lack of server-side validation exacerbates the issue, as the application relies on client-side information for authentication.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Oqtane.Framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Oqtane.Server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55470"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-20T19:40:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-20T16:15:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Oqtane Framework 6.0.0 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. By manipulating the entityid parameter, attackers can bypass passcode validation and successfully log into the application or access restricted data without proper authorization. The lack of server-side validation exacerbates the issue, as the application relies on client-side information for authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-995c-qww8-64fj",
"modified": "2024-12-20T19:40:51Z",
"published": "2024-12-20T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oqtane/oqtane.framework/pull/4878/files"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Kaushikjoshi/2d8ad350ba5e72030fcee2536498cfe4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oqtane/oqtane.framework"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Oqtane Framework Incorrect Access Control vulnerability"
}
GHSA-995J-3CJ2-3P49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:31A lack of rate limiting in the 'Forgot Password' feature of PHPJabbers Cleaning Business Software v1.0 allows attackers to send an excessive amount of email for a legitimate user, leading to a possible Denial of Service (DoS) via a large amount of generated e-mail messages.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-51327"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-20T16:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A lack of rate limiting in the \u0027Forgot Password\u0027 feature of PHPJabbers Cleaning Business Software v1.0 allows attackers to send an excessive amount of email for a legitimate user, leading to a possible Denial of Service (DoS) via a large amount of generated e-mail messages.",
"id": "GHSA-995j-3cj2-3p49",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:31:30Z",
"published": "2025-02-20T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/176506"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.phpjabbers.com/cleaning-business-software/#sectionDemo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176506/PHPJabbers-Cleaning-Business-Software-1.0-Missing-Rate-Limiting.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-99M3-849W-RG54
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-10 21:31 – Updated: 2024-09-10 21:31An incorrectly implemented authentication scheme that is subjected to a spoofing attack in the management console of Ivanti Workspace Control version 10.18.0.0 and below allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44104"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-10T21:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An incorrectly implemented authentication scheme that is subjected to a spoofing attack in the management console of Ivanti Workspace Control version 10.18.0.0 and below allows a local authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-99m3-849w-rg54",
"modified": "2024-09-10T21:31:40Z",
"published": "2024-09-10T21:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Workspace-Control-IWC"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9F4W-C8MJ-53R3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:04 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:04If exploited, this vulnerability allows an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication. Roon Labs has already fixed this vulnerability in the following versions: Roon Server 2021-05-18 and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-28810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-08T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "If exploited, this vulnerability allows an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication. Roon Labs has already fixed this vulnerability in the following versions: Roon Server 2021-05-18 and later",
"id": "GHSA-9f4w-c8mj-53r3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:04:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:04:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-28810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/qsa-21-17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9F74-XW28-QC4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 12:30 – Updated: 2024-05-17 12:30Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in RafflePress Giveaways and Contests allows Functionality Bypass.This issue affects Giveaways and Contests: from n/a through 1.12.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-32827"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T10:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in RafflePress Giveaways and Contests allows Functionality Bypass.This issue affects Giveaways and Contests: from n/a through 1.12.7.",
"id": "GHSA-9f74-xw28-qc4r",
"modified": "2024-05-17T12:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-05-17T12:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/rafflepress/wordpress-giveaways-and-contests-by-rafflepress-plugin-1-12-7-ip-restriction-bypass-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9GFQ-FQG4-F89Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-17 12:30 – Updated: 2025-04-17 12:30There is a whitelist mechanism bypass in GameCenter ,successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality and integrity.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-2188"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-17T10:15:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "There is a whitelist mechanism bypass in GameCenter ,successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality and integrity.",
"id": "GHSA-9gfq-fqg4-f89q",
"modified": "2025-04-17T12:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-04-17T12:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.honor.com/global/security/cve-2025-2188"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HV9-FHRR-M92V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 15:31 – Updated: 2026-03-26 21:31In N2W before 4.3.2 and 4.4.0 before 4.4.1, improper validation of API request parameters enables remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59706"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T15:16:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In N2W before 4.3.2 and 4.4.0 before 4.4.1, improper validation of API request parameters enables remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-9hv9-fhrr-m92v",
"modified": "2026-03-26T21:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T15:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59706"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://n2ws.com/blog/security-advisory-update"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://n2ws.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/29817965452701-Release-notes-for-N2W-V4-3-2-August-2025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.n2ws.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9HV9-J7P5-6W36
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-01 18:30 – Updated: 2023-11-01 18:30Multiple Cisco products are affected by a vulnerability in Snort access control policies that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass the configured policies on an affected system. This vulnerability is due to a logic error that occurs when the access control policies are being populated. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by establishing a connection to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured access control rules on the affected system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-01T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple Cisco products are affected by a vulnerability in Snort access control policies that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass the configured policies on an affected system. This vulnerability is due to a logic error that occurs when the access control policies are being populated. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by establishing a connection to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured access control rules on the affected system.",
"id": "GHSA-9hv9-j7p5-6w36",
"modified": "2023-11-01T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2023-11-01T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ftd-snort3acp-bypass-3bdR2BEh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9M63-33Q3-XQ5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-10 22:24 – Updated: 2025-03-14 20:02Impact
Users with an enabled repository with access to repo level CI secrets in Vela are vulnerable to the exploit.
Any user with access to the CI instance and the linked source control manager can perform the exploit.
Method
By spoofing a webhook payload with a specific set of headers and body data, an attacker could transfer ownership of a repository and its repo level secrets to a separate repository.
These secrets could be exfiltrated by follow up builds to the repository.
Patches
v0.26.3 — Image: target/vela-server:v0.26.3
v0.25.3 — Image: target/vela-server:v0.25.3
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There are no workarounds to the issue.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
Please see linked CWEs (common weakness enumerators) for more information.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-vela/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.25.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.26.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-vela/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27616"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-10T22:24:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-10T19:15:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nUsers with an enabled repository with access to repo level CI secrets in Vela are vulnerable to the exploit. \n\nAny user with access to the CI instance and the linked source control manager can perform the exploit.\n\n### Method\nBy spoofing a webhook payload with a specific set of headers and body data, an attacker could transfer ownership of a repository and its repo level secrets to a separate repository. \n\nThese secrets could be exfiltrated by follow up builds to the repository.\n\n### Patches\n`v0.26.3` \u2014 Image: `target/vela-server:v0.26.3`\n`v0.25.3` \u2014 Image: `target/vela-server:v0.25.3`\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere are no workarounds to the issue.\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\nPlease see linked CWEs (common weakness enumerators) for more information.",
"id": "GHSA-9m63-33q3-xq5x",
"modified": "2025-03-14T20:02:47Z",
"published": "2025-03-10T22:24:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/server/security/advisories/GHSA-9m63-33q3-xq5x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27616"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/server/commit/257886e5a3eea518548387885894e239668584f5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/server/commit/67c1892e2464dc54b8d2588815dfb7819222500b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/server/releases/tag/v0.25.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vela/server/releases/tag/v0.26.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3509"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vela Server Has Insufficient Webhook Payload Data Verification"
}
GHSA-9Q47-3CM2-2RP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 17:09 – Updated: 2026-10-09 17:09Summary
pyLoad determines the "client IP" used for its rate-limiting decorator and for its
security/audit logging by reading the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For (XFF) HTTP header and
taking the leftmost value. No trusted-proxy configuration exists (the Cheroot WSGI server faces
clients directly, and there is no ProxyFix middleware). Because any client can freely set this
header, an attacker can (1) completely bypass rate limiting by rotating the header on each request,
and (2) forge the source IP recorded in security logs for login and API-key authentication
failures, defeating IP-based blocking (e.g. fail2ban) and poisoning attribution.
Severity
Medium — CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L (~5.3)
- CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
- CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
- CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source
Affected Version
pyLoad 0.5.0b3 (built from the develop branch). Confirmed still present and exploitable in the
later pyload-develop-2 snapshot (the affected files are byte-identical between the two; the
develop-2 changes only touched the unrelated API-key cache).
Affected Component
Web UI request handling — client-IP derivation used by rate limiting and security logging.
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:446— inside therate_limit()decorator; derives the per-IP bucket key.src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:357— API-key authentication success/failure logging.src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py:81— web login success/failure logging.src/pyload/webui/webserver_thread.py— Cheroot serves the Flask app directly; no reverse-proxy trust boundary orProxyFix.- Consumer:
src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py:25applies@rate_limit(count=100, period=60)to the/api/<func>RPC endpoint.
Description:
All three locations derive the client IP with the identical expression:
client_ip = flask.request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "").split(",")[0].strip() or flask.request.remote_addr
X-Forwarded-For is an HTTP request header fully controlled by the client. The code takes
split(",")[0] — the leftmost token — which is always the value supplied by the original client
(a proxy appends its own value to the right). Only when the header is entirely absent does the code
fall back to request.remote_addr (the real TCP peer). There is no configured trusted-proxy count,
and pyLoad's server (Cheroot) terminates client connections directly, so remote_addr is the true
peer and the XFF value is untrusted attacker input.
Two security decisions are made on this untrusted value:
- Rate limiting (
rate_limit()): the decorator keepsrequest_history[client_ip]and enforcescountrequests perperiodperclient_ip. Sinceclient_ipis attacker-controlled, sending a distinct value each request creates a distinct bucket, so the counter never accumulates and the limit never triggers. - Audit logging: login-failure and API-auth-failure log lines embed
[CLIENT: {client_ip}]using the same spoofable value, so the recorded source address is chosen by the attacker.
Notably, the codebase is internally inconsistent: is_loopback_request() (helpers.py:288) treats
the presence of X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP / Forwarded as a reason to distrust an
apparent loopback source, while the rate-limit and logging paths naively trust the same header —
indicating the trust here is unintended.
Proof of Concept
The rate_limit() decorator's actual source (bytes read from
pyload-develop-2/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py, lines 416–514) was executed under a real Flask
test client. Rate limit set to 5/60s for brevity (identical logic to the production 100/min):
import ast, math, time
from functools import wraps
import flask
HELPERS = ".../pyload-develop-2/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py"
src = open(HELPERS).read()
node = next(n for n in ast.parse(src).body
if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef) and n.name == "rate_limit")
ns = {"flask": flask, "time": time, "math": math, "wraps": wraps}
exec(compile(ast.get_source_segment(src, node), HELPERS, "exec"), ns)
rate_limit = ns["rate_limit"]
def build_app():
app = flask.Flask(__name__)
@app.route("/api/ping")
@rate_limit(count=5, period=60)
def ping():
return flask.json.jsonify({"ok": True})
return app
def run(hdr):
app = build_app()
with app.test_client() as c:
return [c.get("/api/ping", headers=hdr(i)).status_code for i in range(8)]
print("FIXED XFF:", run(lambda i: {"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.9"}))
print("ROTATE XFF:", run(lambda i: {"X-Forwarded-For": f"10.0.0.{i}"}))
Output:
FIXED XFF: [200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 429, 429, 429] # limit enforced
ROTATE XFF: [200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200] # 0x 429 -> limit bypassed
# server log during FIXED run:
# WARNING in helpers: Rate limit exceeded for IP 203.0.113.9: 5 requests in 60 (limit: 5/60)
Derivation check (XFF present, real peer is loopback):
# request with header X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8 and REMOTE_ADDR 127.0.0.1
client_ip = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For","").split(",")[0].strip() or request.remote_addr
# -> client_ip == "8.8.8.8" (the spoofed value wins over the real remote_addr)
Equivalent against a live instance:
# Rate limit never trips regardless of volume:
for i in $(seq 1 500); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -H "X-API-Key: pl_1<valid-key>" \
-H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$((RANDOM%255))" \
http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/get_server_version
done # no HTTP 429 is ever returned
# Forged source IP in the audit log:
curl -s -o /dev/null -H "X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8" \
--data 'username=admin&password=wrong' http://127.0.0.1:8000/login
# server log: Login failed for user 'admin' using Web Client [CLIENT: 8.8.8.8]
Steps To Reproduce
- Start a pyLoad instance directly exposed (no reverse proxy), as in a default deployment.
- Obtain any valid API key (or use the login endpoint) so requests reach the rate-limited / logged code paths.
- Send more than the configured limit of requests to a
@rate_limit-protected endpoint (e.g./api/get_server_version) while setting a differentX-Forwarded-Forvalue on each request. Observe that no429 Too Many Requestsis ever returned. - Control: repeat step 3 with a fixed
X-Forwarded-Forvalue; observe429after the limit, proving the bucket is keyed on the header value. - Send a failed login (or failed API-key request) with
X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8and inspect the server log; the failure is attributed to8.8.8.8rather than the real client address.
Impact
- Rate limiting on the authenticated API (
/api/<func>, 100/min) and any other@rate_limit-protected endpoint provides no protection against a single attacker, who can issue unlimited requests — enabling resource abuse and unthrottled brute-forcing of anything reachable through those endpoints. - Security/audit logs cannot be trusted for source attribution. An attacker can stamp every malicious request with an arbitrary or innocent third-party IP, evading IP-based blocklists / fail2ban and misdirecting incident response.
- Amplifies other authentication weaknesses (e.g. the absence of throttling on
/login), since even the throttling that does exist elsewhere is defeated and the attacker's IP is unlogged.
Root Causes
- A client-controlled HTTP header (
X-Forwarded-For) is used directly in security decisions (rate-limit bucketing and audit attribution) without any trusted-proxy validation (CWE-807). - The leftmost XFF token is selected, which is always the value supplied by the original client; this is spoofable both in direct-exposure and behind-a-proxy deployments (CWE-348).
- No
ProxyFix/ trusted-proxy-hop configuration exists, and the server terminates client connections directly, so there is no basis for trusting forwarded headers at all. - Inconsistent handling across the codebase (loopback checks distrust these headers while rate-limit/logging trust them) indicates the trust is accidental rather than designed.
Suggested Fix
- By default, use
request.remote_addr(the real TCP peer) for rate limiting and logging; do not trustX-Forwarded-Forunless a proxy is explicitly configured. - Add an explicit, operator-configured trusted-proxy count (default 0 = trust none). When set,
apply Werkzeug's
ProxyFix(app.wsgi_app, x_for=N)and read the correct hop (the value inserted by the trusted proxy — typically the Nth-from-right token — not the leftmost client-supplied token). - Derive the trusted client IP once in a single helper and use it consistently for rate limiting, logging, and the loopback checks, removing the duplicated inline expressions.
- Consider defense-in-depth: cap the number of distinct rate-limit buckets and/or additionally
rate-limit on
remote_addrso a spoofed header cannot create unbounded buckets.
Invariant to restore: security decisions and audit attribution must be based on a connection-level or trusted-proxy-validated address, never on a raw client-supplied header.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng"
},
"versions": [
"0.5.0b3.dev101"
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:09:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\npyLoad determines the \"client IP\" used for its rate-limiting decorator and for its\nsecurity/audit logging by reading the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-For` (XFF) HTTP header and\ntaking the leftmost value. No trusted-proxy configuration exists (the Cheroot WSGI server faces\nclients directly, and there is no `ProxyFix` middleware). Because any client can freely set this\nheader, an attacker can (1) completely bypass rate limiting by rotating the header on each request,\nand (2) forge the source IP recorded in security logs for login and API-key authentication\nfailures, defeating IP-based blocking (e.g. fail2ban) and poisoning attribution.\n\n\n## Severity\n\nMedium \u2014 CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` (~5.3)\n\n- CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision\n- CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing\n- CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source\n\n\n## Affected Version\n\npyLoad 0.5.0b3 (built from the `develop` branch). Confirmed still present and exploitable in the\nlater `pyload-develop-2` snapshot (the affected files are byte-identical between the two; the\n`develop-2` changes only touched the unrelated API-key cache).\n\n\n## Affected Component\n\nWeb UI request handling \u2014 client-IP derivation used by rate limiting and security logging.\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:446` \u2014 inside the `rate_limit()` decorator; derives the per-IP\n bucket key.\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:357` \u2014 API-key authentication success/failure logging.\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py:81` \u2014 web login success/failure logging.\n- `src/pyload/webui/webserver_thread.py` \u2014 Cheroot serves the Flask app directly; no reverse-proxy\n trust boundary or `ProxyFix`.\n- Consumer: `src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py:25` applies\n `@rate_limit(count=100, period=60)` to the `/api/\u003cfunc\u003e` RPC endpoint.\n\n\n## Description:\n\nAll three locations derive the client IP with the identical expression:\n\n```python\nclient_ip = flask.request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-For\", \"\").split(\",\")[0].strip() or flask.request.remote_addr\n```\n\n`X-Forwarded-For` is an HTTP request header fully controlled by the client. The code takes\n`split(\",\")[0]` \u2014 the leftmost token \u2014 which is always the value supplied by the *original client*\n(a proxy appends its own value to the right). Only when the header is entirely absent does the code\nfall back to `request.remote_addr` (the real TCP peer). There is no configured trusted-proxy count,\nand pyLoad\u0027s server (Cheroot) terminates client connections directly, so `remote_addr` is the true\npeer and the XFF value is untrusted attacker input.\n\nTwo security decisions are made on this untrusted value:\n\n1. Rate limiting (`rate_limit()`): the decorator keeps `request_history[client_ip]` and enforces\n `count` requests per `period` per `client_ip`. Since `client_ip` is attacker-controlled, sending\n a distinct value each request creates a distinct bucket, so the counter never accumulates and\n the limit never triggers.\n2. Audit logging: login-failure and API-auth-failure log lines embed `[CLIENT: {client_ip}]` using\n the same spoofable value, so the recorded source address is chosen by the attacker.\n\nNotably, the codebase is internally inconsistent: `is_loopback_request()` (helpers.py:288) treats\nthe *presence* of `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Real-IP` / `Forwarded` as a reason to *distrust* an\napparent loopback source, while the rate-limit and logging paths naively trust the same header \u2014\nindicating the trust here is unintended.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nThe `rate_limit()` decorator\u0027s actual source (bytes read from\n`pyload-develop-2/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py`, lines 416\u2013514) was executed under a real Flask\ntest client. Rate limit set to 5/60s for brevity (identical logic to the production 100/min):\n\n```python\nimport ast, math, time\nfrom functools import wraps\nimport flask\n\nHELPERS = \".../pyload-develop-2/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\"\nsrc = open(HELPERS).read()\nnode = next(n for n in ast.parse(src).body\n if isinstance(n, ast.FunctionDef) and n.name == \"rate_limit\")\nns = {\"flask\": flask, \"time\": time, \"math\": math, \"wraps\": wraps}\nexec(compile(ast.get_source_segment(src, node), HELPERS, \"exec\"), ns)\nrate_limit = ns[\"rate_limit\"]\n\ndef build_app():\n app = flask.Flask(__name__)\n @app.route(\"/api/ping\")\n @rate_limit(count=5, period=60)\n def ping():\n return flask.json.jsonify({\"ok\": True})\n return app\n\ndef run(hdr):\n app = build_app()\n with app.test_client() as c:\n return [c.get(\"/api/ping\", headers=hdr(i)).status_code for i in range(8)]\n\nprint(\"FIXED XFF:\", run(lambda i: {\"X-Forwarded-For\": \"203.0.113.9\"}))\nprint(\"ROTATE XFF:\", run(lambda i: {\"X-Forwarded-For\": f\"10.0.0.{i}\"}))\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nFIXED XFF: [200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 429, 429, 429] # limit enforced\nROTATE XFF: [200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200] # 0x 429 -\u003e limit bypassed\n# server log during FIXED run:\n# WARNING in helpers: Rate limit exceeded for IP 203.0.113.9: 5 requests in 60 (limit: 5/60)\n```\n\nDerivation check (XFF present, real peer is loopback):\n\n```python\n# request with header X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8 and REMOTE_ADDR 127.0.0.1\nclient_ip = request.headers.get(\"X-Forwarded-For\",\"\").split(\",\")[0].strip() or request.remote_addr\n# -\u003e client_ip == \"8.8.8.8\" (the spoofed value wins over the real remote_addr)\n```\n\nEquivalent against a live instance:\n\n```bash\n# Rate limit never trips regardless of volume:\nfor i in $(seq 1 500); do\n curl -s -o /dev/null -H \"X-API-Key: pl_1\u003cvalid-key\u003e\" \\\n -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$((RANDOM%255))\" \\\n http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/get_server_version\ndone # no HTTP 429 is ever returned\n\n# Forged source IP in the audit log:\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8\" \\\n --data \u0027username=admin\u0026password=wrong\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:8000/login\n# server log: Login failed for user \u0027admin\u0027 using Web Client [CLIENT: 8.8.8.8]\n```\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Start a pyLoad instance directly exposed (no reverse proxy), as in a default deployment.\n2. Obtain any valid API key (or use the login endpoint) so requests reach the rate-limited /\n logged code paths.\n3. Send more than the configured limit of requests to a `@rate_limit`-protected endpoint (e.g.\n `/api/get_server_version`) while setting a **different** `X-Forwarded-For` value on each request.\n Observe that no `429 Too Many Requests` is ever returned.\n4. Control: repeat step 3 with a **fixed** `X-Forwarded-For` value; observe `429` after the limit,\n proving the bucket is keyed on the header value.\n5. Send a failed login (or failed API-key request) with `X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8` and inspect the\n server log; the failure is attributed to `8.8.8.8` rather than the real client address.\n\n\n## Impact\n\n- Rate limiting on the authenticated API (`/api/\u003cfunc\u003e`, 100/min) and any other\n `@rate_limit`-protected endpoint provides no protection against a single attacker, who can issue\n unlimited requests \u2014 enabling resource abuse and unthrottled brute-forcing of anything reachable\n through those endpoints.\n- Security/audit logs cannot be trusted for source attribution. An attacker can stamp every\n malicious request with an arbitrary or innocent third-party IP, evading IP-based blocklists /\n fail2ban and misdirecting incident response.\n- Amplifies other authentication weaknesses (e.g. the absence of throttling on `/login`), since\n even the throttling that does exist elsewhere is defeated and the attacker\u0027s IP is unlogged.\n\n\n## Root Causes\n\n1. A client-controlled HTTP header (`X-Forwarded-For`) is used directly in security decisions\n (rate-limit bucketing and audit attribution) without any trusted-proxy validation (CWE-807).\n2. The leftmost XFF token is selected, which is always the value supplied by the original client;\n this is spoofable both in direct-exposure and behind-a-proxy deployments (CWE-348).\n3. No `ProxyFix` / trusted-proxy-hop configuration exists, and the server terminates client\n connections directly, so there is no basis for trusting forwarded headers at all.\n4. Inconsistent handling across the codebase (loopback checks distrust these headers while\n rate-limit/logging trust them) indicates the trust is accidental rather than designed.\n\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n1. By default, use `request.remote_addr` (the real TCP peer) for rate limiting and logging; do not\n trust `X-Forwarded-For` unless a proxy is explicitly configured.\n2. Add an explicit, operator-configured trusted-proxy count (default 0 = trust none). When set,\n apply Werkzeug\u0027s `ProxyFix(app.wsgi_app, x_for=N)` and read the correct hop (the value inserted\n by the trusted proxy \u2014 typically the Nth-from-right token \u2014 not the leftmost client-supplied\n token).\n3. Derive the trusted client IP once in a single helper and use it consistently for rate limiting,\n logging, and the loopback checks, removing the duplicated inline expressions.\n4. Consider defense-in-depth: cap the number of distinct rate-limit buckets and/or additionally\n rate-limit on `remote_addr` so a spoofed header cannot create unbounded buckets.\n\nInvariant to restore: security decisions and audit attribution must be based on a connection-level\nor trusted-proxy-validated address, never on a raw client-supplied header.",
"id": "GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8",
"modified": "2026-10-09T17:09:12Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T17:09:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/5dc6b628e2d8b9f42dde82f396e5b7a2b513f6d1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
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CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
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CAPEC-461: Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness
An adversary utilizes a hash function extension/padding weakness, to modify the parameters passed to the web service requesting authentication by generating their own call in order to generate a legitimate signature hash (as described in the notes), without knowledge of the secret token sometimes provided by the web service.
CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
CAPEC-476: Signature Spoofing by Misrepresentation
An attacker exploits a weakness in the parsing or display code of the recipient software to generate a data blob containing a supposedly valid signature, but the signer's identity is falsely represented, which can lead to the attacker manipulating the recipient software or its victim user to perform compromising actions.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-667: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)
An adversary disguises the MAC address of their Bluetooth enabled device to one for which there exists an active and trusted connection and authenticates successfully. The adversary can then perform malicious actions on the target Bluetooth device depending on the target’s capabilities.
CAPEC-94: Adversary in the Middle (AiTM)
An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.