Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-290
AllowedAuthentication Bypass by Spoofing
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
1147 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
CVE-2026-94416 (GCVE-0-2026-94416)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-24 12:25 – Updated: 2026-09-24 14:59
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Aap-gateway: aap-gateway: authorization bypass via workload identity token forgery
Summary
An authorization bypass was found in the Ansible Automation Platform (AAP) gateway. The gateway API allows an authenticated administrator to create a new service key for the Controller service cluster. Because service-key creation is not restricted to the installer-provisioned provisioning path, an administrator-issued key is cryptographically indistinguishable from a legitimate one and can be used to forge a service-authentication token that impersonates the Controller service. Combined with the gateway OIDC workload-identity endpoint (enabled via FEATURE_OIDC_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ENABLED), the attacker can drive the gateway to sign Workload Identity Tokens (WITs) for arbitrary Controller workloads. A downstream resource server such as HashiCorp Vault that trusts the gateway OIDC key will accept the forged WIT and return the AAP credentials bound to that workload, disclosing secrets beyond the attacker's authorization boundary.
Severity
6.8 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-24 13:58 UTC
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-94416 | vdb-entryx_refsource_REDHAT |
| https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2537465 | issue-trackingx_refsource_REDHAT |
| https://github.com/ansible/ansible.platform/pull/254 | |
| https://github.com/ansible/jewel/pull/235 |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 |
cpe:/a:redhat:ansible_automation_platform:2
|
Date Public
2026-09-18 00:00
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CVE-2026-93538 (GCVE-0-2026-93538)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-28 14:10 – Updated: 2026-09-28 16:22
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Cross-tenant BundleDeployment and Secret disclosure via spoofed cluster labels during agent-initiated registration in Fleet
Summary
A cross-tenant authorization issue was discovered in SUSE Rancher Fleet. During agent-initiated cluster registration, cluster labels supplied by the registering agent, including labels in the reserved management.cattle.io/ namespace such as the cluster display name label, were applied to the resulting upstream Cluster object. Because Fleet resolves GitRepo and Bundle targets from those cluster labels, a party able to register a cluster into a Fleet workspace namespace shared with other tenants could cause its own cluster to satisfy targeting rules that administrators intended for a different cluster.
This affects SUSE Rancher Fleet 0.16 before 0.16.1, 0.15 before 0.15.6, 0.14 before 0.14.10, 0.13 before 0.13.15, 0.12 before 0.12.19 and older versions.
Severity
7.1 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-28 15:46 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/rancher/fleet/security/advisor… | vendor-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| SUSE | Rancher |
Affected:
0.16.0 , < 0.16.1
(semver)
Affected: 0.15.0 , < 0.15.6 (semver) Affected: 0.14.0 , < 0.14.10 (semver) Affected: 0.13.0 , < 0.13.15 (semver) Affected: 0.12.0 , < 0.12.19 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-09-28 14:05
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CVE-2026-92929 (GCVE-0-2026-92929)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-22 23:10 – Updated: 2026-09-23 14:59
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
OpenEye Apex Network Video Recorder (NVR) firmware 3.2.9.376 trusts an X-Forwarded-For header supplied by an arbitrary client when determining the request source address. An unauthenticated remote attacker can spoof a loopback address to bypass local-connection-only security controls exposed on the affected non-TLS web interfaces and disclose configuration information. The underlying design has been present since at least firmware 2.2.3.4.
Upgrade to version 3.5.4.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 14:58 UTC
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenEye | Apex Network Video Recorder (NVR) |
Affected:
3.2.9.376
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CVE-2026-92395 (GCVE-0-2026-92395)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 14:35 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:39
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
@fastify/proxy-addr vulnerable to IP spoofing via IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet
Summary
@fastify/proxy-addr is a Fastify plugin that determines a request's client address behind trusted reverse proxies, and it backs Fastify request.ip and request.ips. In versions 3.0.0 through 5.1.0, a trust subnet written in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation with an IPv4-sized prefix, such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 instead of the correct ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, is accepted without error but trusts every IPv4 address on the internet rather than the block it names. Because the socket peer then becomes trusted at hop 0, any unauthenticated client can supply an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header and control the address the application reads, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. The plugin inherited this defect from the upstream proxy-addr module (CVE-2026-90711). The issue is fixed in @fastify/proxy-addr 5.1.1, and users should upgrade to 5.1.1 or later. As a workaround, ensure any IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet uses a prefix length of at least 97, or express the range in plain IPv4 notation.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 18:38 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| @fastify/proxy-addr | @fastify/proxy-addr |
Affected:
3.0.0 , < 5.1.1
(semver)
Unaffected: 5.1.1 (semver) |
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CVE-2026-91039 (GCVE-0-2026-91039)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 15:19 – Updated: 2026-09-17 19:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection.
The strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as "<name>/<connection_id>", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil. OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 19:40 UTC
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authenticatio… | relatedvendor-advisory |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-91039.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-91039 | related |
| https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authenticatio… | related |
| https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authenticatio… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
5.0.0-rc.10 , < 5.0.0-rc.14
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7 , < 73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-90711 (GCVE-0-2026-90711)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 06:19 – Updated: 2026-09-15 14:48
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
proxy-addr vulnerable to IP spoofing via IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet
Summary
proxy-addr is a Node.js module that determines a request's client address behind trusted reverse proxies, and it backs Express req.ip and req.ips. In versions 1.1.0 through 2.0.7, a trust subnet written in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation with an IPv4-sized prefix, such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 instead of the correct ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, is accepted without error but trusts every IPv4 address on the internet rather than the block it names. Because the socket peer then becomes trusted at hop 0, any unauthenticated client can supply an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header and control the address the application reads, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. This is a fail-open regression introduced in version 1.1.0. The issue is fixed in proxy-addr 2.0.8, and users should upgrade to 2.0.8 or later. As a workaround, ensure any IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet uses a prefix length of at least 97, or express the range in plain IPv4 notation.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-15 14:46 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| proxy-addr | proxy-addr |
Affected:
1.1.0 , < 2.0.8
(semver)
Unaffected: 2.0.8 (semver) |
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CVE-2026-90447 (GCVE-0-2026-90447)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-11 21:48 – Updated: 2026-09-14 16:14
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
A routing rule selects between two different authentication mechanisms for the same downstream service based on the value of a client-supplied request header, rather than on any property the client cannot control. An authenticated user in possession of a shared service credential can set this header to route around the primary role-based authorization check and reach the alternate path's fixed, elevated role instead. This allows a low-privileged authenticated attacker who knows the shared credential to perform actions reserved for a higher-privileged role.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-14 16:14 UTC
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication bypass by spoofing
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/de… | government-resourcevendor-advisory |
Impacted products
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CVE-2026-89022 (GCVE-0-2026-89022)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 16:11 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:21 X_Open Source
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
BookStack < 26.05.5 Authentication Bypass via Social Login Provider Confusion
Summary
BookStack before 26.05.5 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its social login implementation that allows unauthenticated attackers to sign in as arbitrary users by authenticating through a different social provider sharing the same driver_id namespace. Attackers can authenticate at one enabled social provider using a user ID that matches an account linked to a different social provider, bypassing credential verification entirely because the SocialAuthService::handleLoginCallback query ignores the driver column when retrieving linked account records.
Severity
7.4 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-15 19:04 UTC
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.bookstackapp.com/blog/bookstack-relea… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/bookstack-au… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| bookstackapp | bookstack |
Affected:
0 , < 26.05.5
(custom)
cpe:2.3:a:bookstackapp:bookstack:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-09-14 00:00
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CVE-2026-88879 (GCVE-0-2026-88879)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-10 13:05 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Traefik before v2.11.56 Identity Spoofing via Header Alias
Summary
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. In Traefik v1.x, v2.x through v2.11.55, and v3.0.0 through v3.7.11, header names are canonicalized only on dashes, so X-Auth-User, X_Auth_User and X.Auth.User are treated as three distinct headers by Traefik, while backends that derive variable names from header names (CGI, WSGI, PHP, NGINX and others) collapse them into a single variable. A client can therefore smuggle a dot-form alias of a header that Traefik manages past the middleware managing it — for example supplying X.Authenticated.User alongside the canonical X-Authenticated-User written by the ForwardAuth middleware — causing such a backend to read the client-supplied value instead of the identity Traefik asserted. In the tested configuration (PHP 8.2 built-in SAPI over an HTTP/1 backend path), Go's lexical header ordering makes the attacker-supplied value win deterministically, so a client that ForwardAuth admits as a low-privilege identity can be treated by the backend as a different user or role. Any header Traefik sets is affected, not only ForwardAuth's. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5, which blocked only the underscore form. Fixed in v2.11.56 and v3.7.12, which add the aliasHeadersStrategy entry-point option; because it defaults to 'keep' for backwards compatibility, it must be explicitly set to 'delete' or 'reject' for the fix to take effect. Unmaintained release lines will not receive a patch.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-10 15:03 UTC
CWE
- CWE-290 - Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advis… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-befo… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-08-27 00:00
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CVE-2026-88819 (GCVE-0-2026-88819)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-14 19:23
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
In Siglet current and past versions the refresh token handler do not enforce proof of possession of the issuer DID.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-14 19:12 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | Eclipse Data Plane Core |
Affected:
a6f7d4cc0093931287c349e1e546ad2932c08e8d , < 882fe22db42bc67abfd0304c4cdb141b762c35d1
(git)
Affected: 0.1.0 , ≤ 0.1.3 (semver) |
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No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
CAPEC-461: Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness
An adversary utilizes a hash function extension/padding weakness, to modify the parameters passed to the web service requesting authentication by generating their own call in order to generate a legitimate signature hash (as described in the notes), without knowledge of the secret token sometimes provided by the web service.
CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
CAPEC-476: Signature Spoofing by Misrepresentation
An attacker exploits a weakness in the parsing or display code of the recipient software to generate a data blob containing a supposedly valid signature, but the signer's identity is falsely represented, which can lead to the attacker manipulating the recipient software or its victim user to perform compromising actions.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-667: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)
An adversary disguises the MAC address of their Bluetooth enabled device to one for which there exists an active and trusted connection and authenticates successfully. The adversary can then perform malicious actions on the target Bluetooth device depending on the target’s capabilities.
CAPEC-94: Adversary in the Middle (AiTM)
An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.