CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
15153 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-J7G5-JMW3-F9G3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-12 09:30 – Updated: 2025-12-12 09:30The Simple CSV Table plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1 via the href parameter in the [csv] shortcode. This is due to insufficient path validation before concatenating user-supplied input to a base directory path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information such as database credentials and authentication keys.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12960"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-12T09:15:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Simple CSV Table plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1 via the `href` parameter in the `[csv]` shortcode. This is due to insufficient path validation before concatenating user-supplied input to a base directory path. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information such as database credentials and authentication keys.",
"id": "GHSA-j7g5-jmw3-f9g3",
"modified": "2025-12-12T09:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-12-12T09:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12960"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-csv-table/tags/1.0.1/simple-csv-table.php#L71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3403210%40simple-csv-table\u0026new=3403210%40simple-csv-table\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4ff9abb4-2b25-4bbb-86b4-fb1ba37e122f?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J7GF-6GV8-P76H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:15 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:15An issue was discovered in Concrete CMS through 8.5.5. Path Traversal leading to RCE via external form by adding a regular expression.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-40098"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-27T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Concrete CMS through 8.5.5. Path Traversal leading to RCE via external form by adding a regular expression.",
"id": "GHSA-j7gf-6gv8-p76h",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:15:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:15:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40098"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1102080"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.concretecms.org/developers/introduction/version-history/856-release-notes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-J7GH-88XH-VGHC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:02 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:02Directory traversal vulnerability in core/lib/router.php in LotusCMS Fraise 3.0, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via the system parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-0518"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-01-20T19:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in core/lib/router.php in LotusCMS Fraise 3.0, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via the system parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-j7gh-88xh-vghc",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:02:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:02:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0518"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/64736"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/70409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/42835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/15964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0073"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-J7H9-2JH7-G967
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 21:45 – Updated: 2026-05-07 21:45Summary
mcp-ssh-tool has released version 2.1.1 with security hardening for transfer path authorization and HTTP bearer authentication.
The release addresses:
- insufficient local path policy enforcement in transfer-related filesystem handling
- incomplete canonicalization and segment-boundary handling for deny-prefix path policy checks
- non-constant-time HTTP bearer token comparison
Impact
Affected versions may allow policy bypass in transfer path handling under specific configurations, and may expose a timing side channel in bearer-token comparison for HTTP deployments.
Patched Version
Upgrade to mcp-ssh-tool >= 2.1.1.
npm install -g mcp-ssh-tool@latest
Workarounds
For deployments that cannot immediately upgrade:
- avoid exposing HTTP transport beyond loopback
- use strict filesystem policy configuration
- avoid granting MCP clients access to sensitive local transfer paths
- monitor audit logs for unexpected transfer operations
Credits
Reported by dodge1218.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mcp-ssh-tool"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T21:45:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`mcp-ssh-tool` has released version `2.1.1` with security hardening for transfer path authorization and HTTP bearer authentication.\n\nThe release addresses:\n\n- insufficient local path policy enforcement in transfer-related filesystem handling\n- incomplete canonicalization and segment-boundary handling for deny-prefix path policy checks\n- non-constant-time HTTP bearer token comparison\n\n## Impact\n\nAffected versions may allow policy bypass in transfer path handling under specific configurations, and may expose a timing side channel in bearer-token comparison for HTTP deployments.\n\n## Patched Version\n\nUpgrade to `mcp-ssh-tool \u003e= 2.1.1`.\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g mcp-ssh-tool@latest\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nFor deployments that cannot immediately upgrade:\n\n- avoid exposing HTTP transport beyond loopback\n- use strict filesystem policy configuration\n- avoid granting MCP clients access to sensitive local transfer paths\n- monitor audit logs for unexpected transfer operations\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by `dodge1218`.",
"id": "GHSA-j7h9-2jh7-g967",
"modified": "2026-05-07T21:45:17Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T21:45:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oaslananka/mcp-ssh-tool/security/advisories/GHSA-j7h9-2jh7-g967"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oaslananka/mcp-ssh-tool"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "mcp-ssh-tool has file transfer path policy bypass and bearer token comparison hardening"
}
GHSA-J7JV-X682-58FV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 21:30 – Updated: 2024-12-28 21:30An issue was discovered in Kurmi Provisioning Suite before 7.9.0.35 and 7.10.x through 7.10.0.18. A Directory Traversal and Local File Inclusion vulnerability in the logsSys.do page allows remote attackers (authenticated as administrators) to trigger the display of unintended files. Any file accessible to the Kurmi user account could be displayed, e.g., configuration files with information such as the database password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54452"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T20:15:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Kurmi Provisioning Suite before 7.9.0.35 and 7.10.x through 7.10.0.18. A Directory Traversal and Local File Inclusion vulnerability in the logsSys.do page allows remote attackers (authenticated as administrators) to trigger the display of unintended files. Any file accessible to the Kurmi user account could be displayed, e.g., configuration files with information such as the database password.",
"id": "GHSA-j7jv-x682-58fv",
"modified": "2024-12-28T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T21:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kurmi-software.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kurmi-software.com/cve/cve-2024-54452"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J7MJ-2MR3-62XH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-27 15:33IBM InfoSphere Optim Test Data Fabrication 1.0.0, 1.0.0.1, 1.0.0.2, 1.0.2, 1.0.2.2, 1.0.2.3, 1.0.2.4, 1.0.2.5, 1.0.2.6, 1.0.2.7 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T14:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM InfoSphere Optim Test Data Fabrication 1.0.0, 1.0.0.1, 1.0.0.2, 1.0.2, 1.0.2.2, 1.0.2.3, 1.0.2.4, 1.0.2.5, 1.0.2.6, 1.0.2.7 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing \"dot dot\" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system",
"id": "GHSA-j7mj-2mr3-62xh",
"modified": "2026-05-27T15:33:12Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T15:33:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7272653"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J7MR-2HM3-VG2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-04 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-13 00:01In aee daemon, there is a possible information disclosure due to a path traversal. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS06419017; Issue ID: ALPS06270870.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20101"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-03T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In aee daemon, there is a possible information disclosure due to a path traversal. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS06419017; Issue ID: ALPS06270870.",
"id": "GHSA-j7mr-2hm3-vg2q",
"modified": "2022-05-13T00:01:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-04T00:00:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20101"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/May-2022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J7MV-9WFH-PHVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-16 12:32 – Updated: 2024-08-16 12:32The JetTabs for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.3 via the 'switcher_preset' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-16T11:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The JetTabs for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.3 via the \u0027switcher_preset\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
"id": "GHSA-j7mv-9wfh-phvx",
"modified": "2024-08-16T12:32:17Z",
"published": "2024-08-16T12:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crocoblock.com/plugins/jettabs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a401a2dd-9b31-47d9-b841-f2e7042b8333?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J7P5-9JV3-VQ8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:57 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:49Absolute path traversal vulnerability in proxy.php in the google currency lookup in the Paypal Currency Converter Basic For WooCommerce plugin before 1.4 for WordPress allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a full pathname in the requrl parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-5065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-06-24T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Absolute path traversal vulnerability in proxy.php in the google currency lookup in the Paypal Currency Converter Basic For WooCommerce plugin before 1.4 for WordPress allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a full pathname in the requrl parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-j7p5-9jv3-vq8j",
"modified": "2025-04-12T12:49:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T00:57:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/1179092/paypal-currency-converter-basic-for-woocommerce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/paypal-currency-converter-basic-for-woocommerce/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/132278/WordPress-Paypal-Currency-Converter-Basic-For-Woocommerce-1.3-File-Read.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/75416"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-J7QX-P75M-WP7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:23PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
Summary
PraisonAI's Dynamic Context Discovery feature exposes artifact helper tools
through ctx.get_tools():
ctx = setup_dynamic_context()
agent = Agent(
instructions="You are a data analyst.",
tools=ctx.get_tools(),
hooks=[ctx.get_middleware()],
)
The official documentation describes these helpers as a way for the agent to explore large tool-output artifacts that were queued by the middleware:
- large tool outputs are saved as artifacts;
- the agent receives compact artifact references; and
- the agent uses
artifact_tailandartifact_grepto explore that data.
The implemented artifact tools do not enforce that the supplied
artifact_path is an artifact created by the configured store or that it lives
under the configured artifact base directory. Instead, artifact_head,
artifact_tail, artifact_grep, and artifact_chunk wrap the caller-supplied
path directly into an ArtifactRef and then read it from the host filesystem.
As a result, any prompt/user/tool-caller that can influence those tool
arguments can read files readable by the PraisonAI process, such as project
.env files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, source files, or other local data.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Ecosystem:
pip - Package:
praisonai - Component: Dynamic Context Discovery artifact tools
- Current source path:
src/praisonai/praisonai/context/queue.py - Artifact store path:
src/praisonai/praisonai/context/artifact_store.py - Latest PyPI version validated:
4.6.58 - Current
origin/mainvalidated:1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e - Current
origin/maintag validated:v4.6.58
Suggested affected range:
pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58
Representative local sweep:
3.8.1: vulnerable4.0.0: vulnerable4.5.113: vulnerable4.6.33: vulnerable4.6.34: vulnerable4.6.40: vulnerable4.6.50: vulnerable4.6.58: vulnerable
Root Cause
create_artifact_tools() creates an artifact store bound to base_dir, but the
read tools do not use base_dir for containment.
For example, artifact_head() accepts artifact_path and immediately creates
an ArtifactRef with that path:
def artifact_head(artifact_path: str, lines: int = 50) -> str:
ref = ArtifactRef(path=artifact_path, summary="", size_bytes=0)
try:
return artifact_store.head(ref, lines=lines)
except FileNotFoundError:
return f"Error: Artifact not found: {artifact_path}"
artifact_tail(), artifact_grep(), and artifact_chunk() have the same
pattern. They trust the caller-supplied path rather than resolving it through
an artifact identifier, store lookup, manifest, or base-directory containment
check.
The store methods then read that path directly:
def head(self, ref: ArtifactRef, lines: int = 50) -> str:
file_path = Path(ref.path)
if not file_path.exists():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Artifact not found: {ref.path}")
result_lines = []
with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
...
There is no check equivalent to:
resolved = Path(ref.path).resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)
There is also no check that the file has a valid .meta sidecar or appears in
artifact_list().
Local PoV
Run against the latest PyPI package:
uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
python poc/pov_prai_cand_026_artifact_tools_arbitrary_file_read.py --json
The PoV:
- Creates a temporary artifact base directory.
- Creates a separate
outside-secret.txtfile outside that base directory. - Stores one legitimate artifact through
FileSystemArtifactStore.store(). - Calls
artifact_head()on the legitimate artifact as a positive control. - Calls
artifact_head(),artifact_grep(), andartifact_chunk()on the outside file path. - Confirms
artifact_list()does not list the outside file.
Observed output summary from evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json:
{
"package": "praisonai",
"package_version": "4.6.58",
"controls": {
"outside_file_not_listed": true,
"outside_file_outside_base_dir": true,
"valid_artifact_read_works": true
},
"outside_head": "PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET",
"outside_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET\\n second line",
"outside_chunk": "PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET",
"outside_file_listed_by_artifact_list": false,
"vulnerable": true
}
The PoV was rerun successfully after a fresh origin/main fetch; see
evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58-rerun.json.
The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party target, or use real credentials.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
This report does not claim that every file-reading tool is automatically a vulnerability. The issue is narrower: tools documented and named as artifact helpers accept arbitrary host file paths.
The controls show the intended boundary:
- a valid artifact stored under
base_diris readable; - an outside file is not returned by
artifact_list(); - the outside file is outside
base_dir; and - the read helpers still disclose the outside file when handed its absolute path.
PraisonAI's own context-security documentation recommends relative paths and reviewing ignore rules to avoid sensitive-file exposure. Those controls are bypassed when artifact tools can be pointed directly at any readable host path.
Impact
If a PraisonAI application exposes an agent with ctx.get_tools() to
untrusted or lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can request artifact
tools against arbitrary local paths. This can disclose sensitive host files
readable by the PraisonAI process, including:
- project
.envfiles; - cloud or service credentials;
- SSH keys;
- local application configuration;
- source files and private data; and
- terminal/history artifacts from other runs if the path is known or guessed.
The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and availability are not claimed for this report.
Duplicate Posture
I checked visible PraisonAI advisories and local prior PraisonAI submissions. This is distinct from nearby file-read/file-write issues:
GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj/CVE-2026-47394covers MCP CLIworkflow.show,workflow.validate, anddeploy.validatepath handling. This report covers Dynamic Context Discovery artifact tools incontext/queue.py.GHSA-hvhp-v2gc-268q/CVE-2026-47397coverswrite_filearbitrary file write whenworkspace=None. This report is a read-only disclosure issue in artifact helper tools.- Public recipe registry path traversal advisories cover recipe publish/pull storage and extraction. This report does not involve the recipe registry.
- Local prior submissions in this harness do not cover
artifact_head,artifact_tail,artifact_grep,artifact_chunk, orFileSystemArtifactStorepath containment.
Severity
Suggested severity: High.
Suggested CVSS v3.1:
Rationale:
AV: applies when an application exposes a PraisonAI agent over a network chat/API surface, which is a documented PraisonAI deployment pattern.AC: no race, special environment, or complex path manipulation is required; an absolute readable path is sufficient.PR: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited without an account. Deployments that require authenticated chat/API access may score this asPR:L.UI: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the exposed agent surface.C: arbitrary readable host files can contain secrets or private data.I/A: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.
Remediation
Do not let artifact tools open arbitrary paths. Prefer stable artifact IDs over raw filesystem paths in tool arguments.
Recommended fixes:
- Change tool schemas to accept
artifact_idplus optionalrun_idandagent_id, then resolve those through the artifact store's metadata/index. - If path arguments must remain for compatibility, resolve the path with
Path(path).resolve()and reject it unless it is underartifact_store.base_dir.resolve(). - Require a valid artifact metadata sidecar for read helpers. Files not
created by
FileSystemArtifactStore.store()should not be readable through artifact tools. - Apply the same containment check to
load(),head(),tail(),grep(),chunk(), anddelete(). - Avoid returning absolute host paths in prompt-visible artifact references when an opaque artifact ID would suffice.
Minimal containment helper:
def _resolve_artifact_path(self, path: str) -> Path:
resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError as exc:
raise PermissionError("Artifact path is outside artifact storage") from exc
return resolved
This helper should be paired with metadata-sidecar validation so arbitrary non-artifact files placed under the base directory are not automatically treated as valid artifacts.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.8.1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56834"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s Dynamic Context Discovery feature exposes artifact helper tools\nthrough `ctx.get_tools()`:\n\n```python\nctx = setup_dynamic_context()\n\nagent = Agent(\n instructions=\"You are a data analyst.\",\n tools=ctx.get_tools(),\n hooks=[ctx.get_middleware()],\n)\n```\n\nThe official documentation describes these helpers as a way for the agent to\nexplore large tool-output artifacts that were queued by the middleware:\n\n- large tool outputs are saved as artifacts;\n- the agent receives compact artifact references; and\n- the agent uses `artifact_tail` and `artifact_grep` to explore that data.\n\nThe implemented artifact tools do not enforce that the supplied\n`artifact_path` is an artifact created by the configured store or that it lives\nunder the configured artifact base directory. Instead, `artifact_head`,\n`artifact_tail`, `artifact_grep`, and `artifact_chunk` wrap the caller-supplied\npath directly into an `ArtifactRef` and then read it from the host filesystem.\n\nAs a result, any prompt/user/tool-caller that can influence those tool\narguments can read files readable by the PraisonAI process, such as project\n`.env` files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, source files, or other local data.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Ecosystem: `pip`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: Dynamic Context Discovery artifact tools\n- Current source path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/queue.py`\n- Artifact store path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/artifact_store.py`\n- Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`\n- Current `origin/main` validated:\n `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\npip:praisonai \u003e= 3.8.1, \u003c= 4.6.58\n```\n\nRepresentative local sweep:\n\n- `3.8.1`: vulnerable\n- `4.0.0`: vulnerable\n- `4.5.113`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.33`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.34`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.40`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.50`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.58`: vulnerable\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`create_artifact_tools()` creates an artifact store bound to `base_dir`, but the\nread tools do not use `base_dir` for containment.\n\nFor example, `artifact_head()` accepts `artifact_path` and immediately creates\nan `ArtifactRef` with that path:\n\n```python\ndef artifact_head(artifact_path: str, lines: int = 50) -\u003e str:\n ref = ArtifactRef(path=artifact_path, summary=\"\", size_bytes=0)\n try:\n return artifact_store.head(ref, lines=lines)\n except FileNotFoundError:\n return f\"Error: Artifact not found: {artifact_path}\"\n```\n\n`artifact_tail()`, `artifact_grep()`, and `artifact_chunk()` have the same\npattern. They trust the caller-supplied path rather than resolving it through\nan artifact identifier, store lookup, manifest, or base-directory containment\ncheck.\n\nThe store methods then read that path directly:\n\n```python\ndef head(self, ref: ArtifactRef, lines: int = 50) -\u003e str:\n file_path = Path(ref.path)\n if not file_path.exists():\n raise FileNotFoundError(f\"Artifact not found: {ref.path}\")\n\n result_lines = []\n with open(file_path, \"r\", encoding=\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\") as f:\n ...\n```\n\nThere is no check equivalent to:\n\n```python\nresolved = Path(ref.path).resolve()\nbase = self.base_dir.resolve()\nresolved.relative_to(base)\n```\n\nThere is also no check that the file has a valid `.meta` sidecar or appears in\n`artifact_list()`.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun against the latest PyPI package:\n\n```bash\nuv run --with \u0027praisonai==4.6.58\u0027 \\\n python poc/pov_prai_cand_026_artifact_tools_arbitrary_file_read.py --json\n```\n\nThe PoV:\n\n1. Creates a temporary artifact base directory.\n2. Creates a separate `outside-secret.txt` file outside that base directory.\n3. Stores one legitimate artifact through `FileSystemArtifactStore.store()`.\n4. Calls `artifact_head()` on the legitimate artifact as a positive control.\n5. Calls `artifact_head()`, `artifact_grep()`, and `artifact_chunk()` on the\n outside file path.\n6. Confirms `artifact_list()` does not list the outside file.\n\nObserved output summary from `evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"package\": \"praisonai\",\n \"package_version\": \"4.6.58\",\n \"controls\": {\n \"outside_file_not_listed\": true,\n \"outside_file_outside_base_dir\": true,\n \"valid_artifact_read_works\": true\n },\n \"outside_head\": \"PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET\",\n \"outside_grep\": \"Found 1 matches:\\\\n\\\\n--- Line 1 ---\\\\n\u003e PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET\\\\n second line\",\n \"outside_chunk\": \"PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET\",\n \"outside_file_listed_by_artifact_list\": false,\n \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe PoV was rerun successfully after a fresh `origin/main` fetch; see\n`evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58-rerun.json`.\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party\ntarget, or use real credentials.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThis report does not claim that every file-reading tool is automatically a\nvulnerability. The issue is narrower: tools documented and named as artifact\nhelpers accept arbitrary host file paths.\n\nThe controls show the intended boundary:\n\n- a valid artifact stored under `base_dir` is readable;\n- an outside file is not returned by `artifact_list()`;\n- the outside file is outside `base_dir`; and\n- the read helpers still disclose the outside file when handed its absolute\n path.\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s own context-security documentation recommends relative paths and\nreviewing ignore rules to avoid sensitive-file exposure. Those controls are\nbypassed when artifact tools can be pointed directly at any readable host path.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a PraisonAI application exposes an agent with `ctx.get_tools()` to\nuntrusted or lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can request artifact\ntools against arbitrary local paths. This can disclose sensitive host files\nreadable by the PraisonAI process, including:\n\n- project `.env` files;\n- cloud or service credentials;\n- SSH keys;\n- local application configuration;\n- source files and private data; and\n- terminal/history artifacts from other runs if the path is known or guessed.\n\nThe impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and\navailability are not claimed for this report.\n\n## Duplicate Posture\n\nI checked visible PraisonAI advisories and local prior PraisonAI submissions.\nThis is distinct from nearby file-read/file-write issues:\n\n- `GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj` / `CVE-2026-47394` covers MCP CLI\n `workflow.show`, `workflow.validate`, and `deploy.validate` path handling.\n This report covers Dynamic Context Discovery artifact tools in\n `context/queue.py`.\n- `GHSA-hvhp-v2gc-268q` / `CVE-2026-47397` covers `write_file` arbitrary file\n write when `workspace=None`. This report is a read-only disclosure issue in\n artifact helper tools.\n- Public recipe registry path traversal advisories cover recipe publish/pull\n storage and extraction. This report does not involve the recipe registry.\n- Local prior submissions in this harness do not cover `artifact_head`,\n `artifact_tail`, `artifact_grep`, `artifact_chunk`, or\n `FileSystemArtifactStore` path containment.\n\n## Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nSuggested CVSS v3.1:\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: applies when an application exposes a PraisonAI agent over a network\n chat/API surface, which is a documented PraisonAI deployment pattern.\n- `AC`: no race, special environment, or complex path manipulation is\n required; an absolute readable path is sufficient.\n- `PR`: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited\n without an account. Deployments that require authenticated chat/API access\n may score this as `PR:L`.\n- `UI`: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the\n exposed agent surface.\n- `C`: arbitrary readable host files can contain secrets or private data.\n- `I/A`: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.\n\n## Remediation\n\nDo not let artifact tools open arbitrary paths. Prefer stable artifact IDs over\nraw filesystem paths in tool arguments.\n\nRecommended fixes:\n\n1. Change tool schemas to accept `artifact_id` plus optional `run_id` and\n `agent_id`, then resolve those through the artifact store\u0027s metadata/index.\n2. If path arguments must remain for compatibility, resolve the path with\n `Path(path).resolve()` and reject it unless it is under\n `artifact_store.base_dir.resolve()`.\n3. Require a valid artifact metadata sidecar for read helpers. Files not\n created by `FileSystemArtifactStore.store()` should not be readable through\n artifact tools.\n4. Apply the same containment check to `load()`, `head()`, `tail()`, `grep()`,\n `chunk()`, and `delete()`.\n5. Avoid returning absolute host paths in prompt-visible artifact references\n when an opaque artifact ID would suffice.\n\nMinimal containment helper:\n\n```python\ndef _resolve_artifact_path(self, path: str) -\u003e Path:\n resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()\n base = self.base_dir.resolve()\n try:\n resolved.relative_to(base)\n except ValueError as exc:\n raise PermissionError(\"Artifact path is outside artifact storage\") from exc\n return resolved\n```\n\nThis helper should be paired with metadata-sidecar validation so arbitrary\nnon-artifact files placed under the base directory are not automatically\ntreated as valid artifacts.",
"id": "GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:23:24Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:52:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.