Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

15153 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-HR2Q-XF62-R4HC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:57 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:57

Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in dodosmail.php in DodosMail 2.5 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the dodosmail_header_file parameter. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-3163"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-07-14T23:41:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in dodosmail.php in DodosMail 2.5 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the dodosmail_header_file parameter.  NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr2q-xf62-r4hc",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T23:57:15Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T23:57:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-3163"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43625"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30112"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-HR2V-4R36-88HR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-04-10 15:33

Summary

Helm Chart extraction output directory collapse via `Chart.yaml` name dot-segment

Details

Helm is a package manager for Charts for Kubernetes. In Helm versions <=3.20.1 and <=4.1.3, a specially crafted Chart will cause helm pull --untar [chart URL | repo/chartname] to write the Chart's contents to the immediate output directory (as defaulted to the current working directory; or as given by the --destination and --untardir flags), rather than the expected output directory suffixed by the chart's name.

Impact

The bug enables writing the Chart's contents (unpackaged/untar'ed) to the output directory <output dir>/, instead of the expected <output dir>/<chart name>/, potentially overwriting the contents of the targeted directory.

Note: a chart name containing POSIX dot-dot, or dot-dot and slashes (as if to refer to parent directories) do not resolve beyond the output directory as designed.

Patches

This issue has been resolved in Helm v3.20.2 and v4.1.3

A Chart with an unexpected name (those specified to be "." or ".."), or a Chart name which results in a non-unique directory will be rejected.

Workarounds

Ensure the the name of the Chart does not comprise/contain POSIX pathname special directory references ie. dot-dot ("..") or dot ("."). In addition, ensuring that the pull --untar flag (or equivalent SDK option) refers to a unique/empty output directory prevents chart extraction from inadvertently overwriting existing files within the specified directory.

Credits

Oleh Konko @1seal

Severity

4.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "helm.sh/helm/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.20.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "helm.sh/helm/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.20.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T21:16:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Helm is a package manager for Charts for Kubernetes. In Helm versions \u003c=3.20.1 and \u003c=4.1.3, a specially crafted Chart will cause `helm pull --untar  [chart URL | repo/chartname]` to write the Chart\u0027s contents to the immediate output directory (as defaulted to the current working directory; or as given by the `--destination` and `--untardir` flags), rather than the expected output directory suffixed by the chart\u0027s name.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe bug enables writing the Chart\u0027s contents (unpackaged/untar\u0027ed) to the output directory `\u003coutput dir\u003e/`, instead of the expected `\u003coutput dir\u003e/\u003cchart name\u003e/`, potentially overwriting the contents of the targeted directory.\n\nNote: a chart name containing POSIX dot-dot, or dot-dot and slashes (as if to refer to parent directories) do not resolve beyond the output directory as designed.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been resolved in Helm v3.20.2 and v4.1.3\n\nA Chart with an unexpected name (those specified to be \".\" or \"..\"), or a Chart name which results in a non-unique directory will be rejected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nEnsure the the name of the Chart does not comprise/contain POSIX pathname special directory references ie. dot-dot (\"..\") or dot (\".\"). In addition, ensuring that the `pull --untar` flag (or equivalent SDK option) refers to a unique/empty output directory prevents chart extraction from inadvertently overwriting existing files within the specified directory.\n\n### Credits\n\nOleh Konko\n@1seal",
  "id": "GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/4e7994d4467182f535b6797c94b5b0e994a91436"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/helm/helm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/releases/tag/v4.1.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Helm Chart extraction output directory collapse via `Chart.yaml` name dot-segment"
}

GHSA-HR35-82JP-J7RC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-17 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-17 06:30

Details

The Eventer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.7 via the eventer_woo_download_tickets() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10799"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-17T06:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Eventer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.7 via the eventer_woo_download_tickets() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr35-82jp-j7rc",
  "modified": "2025-01-17T06:30:54Z",
  "published": "2025-01-17T06:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10799"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://codecanyon.net/item/eventer-wordpress-event-manager-plugin/20972534"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aea5f970-243f-4642-83e1-34db11c4ca63?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HR3M-4QWQ-3MGC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 18:00 – Updated: 2026-09-09 18:00

Summary

GitHacker: Path traversal in ref/hash parsing enables existence oracle and hex-fragment exfiltration via malicious .git server

Details

Summary

GitHacker through 1.1.7 did not validate path segments parsed from attacker-controlled .git/HEAD before joining them onto its output directory. A malicious server could coerce GitHacker into reading arbitrary local files. Contents do not stream back wholesale, but the recovery loop turns any 40-character hex substring into an outbound HTTP GET — an existence oracle for arbitrary paths plus hex-fragment exfiltration of file contents.

Details

Vulnerability

GitHacker rebuilds a remote .git/ by fetching files into temp_dst. Two functions derived filesystem paths from server-controlled content:

add_head_file_tasks reads the downloaded .git/HEAD, parses ref: <ref-path>, and joins the raw ref-path onto temp_dst/.git/logs/ before reading the resulting file.
add_hashes_parsed scans any file it reads for 40-character hex substrings and emits GET .git/objects/<sha[0:2]>/<sha[2:]> for each one — onto the attacker's server and into the local output tree.

Pre-fix, add_head_file_tasks did not validate the ref segments. A malicious .git/HEAD of

ref: ../../../../../../etc/passwd

caused add_head_file_tasks to traverse out of temp_dst and read /etc/passwd. The bytes flowed into add_hashes_parsed, which emitted one outbound HTTP request per 40-char-hex match — observable on the attacker's logs.

Impact

PR #65 originally classified this as arbitrary local file read. Joint analysis during coordinated disclosure narrowed the primitive: file contents do not stream back wholesale because the only egress channel is the 40-char-hex regex. In practice an attacker can:

Existence oracle for any path on the GitHacker host (/etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, /home/<user>/.git-credentials, build artifacts under /tmp/).
Hex-fragment exfiltration when the targeted file contains 40-char hex sequences: other git repos' refs / pack filenames, password hashes, HMAC-SHA1 outputs, some session tokens.

Not exploitable without victim action: the attacker must persuade the victim to run GitHacker against a URL they control. Project guidance has always been to run GitHacker inside a disposable container.

Scoping note: no write-side primitive in 1.1.7

A working write-side primitive (attacker drops content outside temp_dst via add_folder / add_task) does not reproduce against the shipped 1.1.7 source. Empirical testing by the reporter against GitHacker-1.1.7.tar.gz (25 traversal-style payloads including ....//, %2e%2e%2f, layered foo/../../, NUL bytes, backslash variants, absolute paths) yielded 0/25 escapes. Two structural reasons:

add_folder anchors every derived path on self.url + '.git/', so the first path component after the url_length strip is always .git. os.path.join's absolute-path short-circuit never fires.
Python's str.replace("..", "") is greedy non-overlapping; ....// collapses to //, ......// to ///, etc. No literal .. survives into add_task.

5f2a8ba is still the correct fix for the read-side primitive and additionally hardens add_task as defense in depth against future regressions — for example, if a later caller removes the .git/ anchor in add_folder or wires a new server-controlled segment source into add_task.

Fix

Commit 5f2a8ba introduces _is_safe_path_segment as a single trust boundary: every segment about to be joined onto temp_dst or appended to an outgoing URL is validated against an allowlist before add_task accepts it. Empty / . / .. / separators / NUL / control characters are rejected; the brittle replace("..", "") filter is removed.

The fix also tightens adjacent surfaces preemptively:

add_folder switches to urlparse-based scheme + netloc + path comparison.
construct_url_from_path_components percent-encodes every segment.

PR #65's two-layer defense (allowlist regex + os.path.realpath() confinement) was consolidated onto the allowlist applied at queue-time, removing the TOCTOU window an after-the-fact realpath() check leaves open and the per-call-site drift risk. PR #65 was closed in favour of the broader fix.

Regression tests in tests/test_ref_validation.py (commit 16fcd81) pin the PoC and six bypass variants (extra-depth, mid-path, NUL, absolute path, leading-dot, .lock-suffix).

Credit

Reported and patched-prototyped by Zac Wang (@7a6163) in #65. Zac refined the impact framing from "arbitrary file read" to "existence oracle + hex-fragment exfiltration" and verified the absence of a write-side primitive against the shipped 1.1.7 sdist with a 25-payload harness.

Patches

Patched in 1.1.8 (commit 5f2a8ba; tests 16fcd81).

Workarounds

Run GitHacker inside a disposable container. Do not point GitHacker at any URL whose contents are not under your control.

Resources

https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/pull/65
https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/5f2a8ba
https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/blob/main/tests/test_ref_validation.py
https://githacker.pages.dev/security
https://github.com/justinsteven/advisories
https://drivertom.blogspot.com/2021/08/git.html

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "githacker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50024"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-09T18:00:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nGitHacker through 1.1.7 did not validate path segments parsed from attacker-controlled `.git/HEAD` before joining them onto its output directory. A malicious server could coerce GitHacker into reading arbitrary local files. Contents do not stream back wholesale, but the recovery loop turns any 40-character hex substring into an outbound HTTP `GET` \u2014 an existence oracle for arbitrary paths plus hex-fragment exfiltration of file contents.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability\n\nGitHacker rebuilds a remote `.git/` by fetching files into `temp_dst`. Two functions derived filesystem paths from server-controlled content:\n\n- `add_head_file_tasks` reads the downloaded `.git/HEAD`, parses `ref: \u003cref-path\u003e`, and joins the raw ref-path onto `temp_dst/.git/logs/` before reading the resulting file.\n- `add_hashes_parsed` scans any file it reads for 40-character hex substrings and emits `GET .git/objects/\u003csha[0:2]\u003e/\u003csha[2:]\u003e` for each one \u2014 onto the attacker\u0027s server and into the local output tree.\n\nPre-fix, `add_head_file_tasks` did not validate the ref segments. A malicious `.git/HEAD` of\n\n```\nref: ../../../../../../etc/passwd\n```\n\ncaused `add_head_file_tasks` to traverse out of `temp_dst` and read `/etc/passwd`. The bytes flowed into `add_hashes_parsed`, which emitted one outbound HTTP request per 40-char-hex match \u2014 observable on the attacker\u0027s logs.\n\n### Impact\n\nPR #65 originally classified this as arbitrary local file read. Joint analysis during coordinated disclosure narrowed the primitive: file contents do not stream back wholesale because the only egress channel is the 40-char-hex regex. In practice an attacker can:\n\n- **Existence oracle** for any path on the GitHacker host (`/etc/shadow`, `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/home/\u003cuser\u003e/.git-credentials`, build artifacts under `/tmp/`).\n- **Hex-fragment exfiltration** when the targeted file contains 40-char hex sequences: other git repos\u0027 refs / pack filenames, password hashes, HMAC-SHA1 outputs, some session tokens.\n\nNot exploitable without victim action: the attacker must persuade the victim to run GitHacker against a URL they control. Project guidance has always been to run GitHacker inside a disposable container.\n\n### Scoping note: no write-side primitive in 1.1.7\n\nA working write-side primitive (attacker drops content outside `temp_dst` via `add_folder` / `add_task`) does **not** reproduce against the shipped 1.1.7 source. Empirical testing by the reporter against `GitHacker-1.1.7.tar.gz` (25 traversal-style payloads including `....//`, `%2e%2e%2f`, layered `foo/../../`, NUL bytes, backslash variants, absolute paths) yielded 0/25 escapes. Two structural reasons:\n\n1. `add_folder` anchors every derived path on `self.url + \u0027.git/\u0027`, so the first path component after the `url_length` strip is always `.git`. `os.path.join`\u0027s absolute-path short-circuit never fires.\n2. Python\u0027s `str.replace(\"..\", \"\")` is greedy non-overlapping; `....//` collapses to `//`, `......//` to `///`, etc. No literal `..` survives into `add_task`.\n\n`5f2a8ba` is still the correct fix for the read-side primitive and additionally hardens `add_task` as defense in depth against future regressions \u2014 for example, if a later caller removes the `.git/` anchor in `add_folder` or wires a new server-controlled segment source into `add_task`.\n\n### Fix\n\nCommit [`5f2a8ba`](https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/5f2a8ba) introduces `_is_safe_path_segment` as a single trust boundary: every segment about to be joined onto `temp_dst` or appended to an outgoing URL is validated against an allowlist before `add_task` accepts it. Empty / `.` / `..` / separators / NUL / control characters are rejected; the brittle `replace(\"..\", \"\")` filter is removed.\n\nThe fix also tightens adjacent surfaces preemptively:\n\n- `add_folder` switches to `urlparse`-based scheme + netloc + path comparison.\n- `construct_url_from_path_components` percent-encodes every segment.\n\nPR #65\u0027s two-layer defense (allowlist regex + `os.path.realpath()` confinement) was consolidated onto the allowlist applied at queue-time, removing the TOCTOU window an after-the-fact `realpath()` check leaves open and the per-call-site drift risk. PR #65 was closed in favour of the broader fix.\n\nRegression tests in [`tests/test_ref_validation.py`](https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/blob/main/tests/test_ref_validation.py) (commit [`16fcd81`](https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/16fcd81)) pin the PoC and six bypass variants (extra-depth, mid-path, NUL, absolute path, leading-dot, `.lock`-suffix).\n\n### Credit\n\nReported and patched-prototyped by **Zac Wang** ([@7a6163](https://github.com/7a6163)) in [#65](https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/pull/65). Zac refined the impact framing from \"arbitrary file read\" to \"existence oracle + hex-fragment exfiltration\" and verified the absence of a write-side primitive against the shipped 1.1.7 sdist with a 25-payload harness.\n\n## Patches\n\nPatched in 1.1.8 (commit [`5f2a8ba`](https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/5f2a8ba); tests [`16fcd81`](https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/16fcd81)).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRun GitHacker inside a disposable container. Do not point GitHacker at any URL whose contents are not under your control.\n\n## Resources\n\n- https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/pull/65\n- https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/5f2a8ba\n- https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/blob/main/tests/test_ref_validation.py\n- https://githacker.pages.dev/security\n- https://github.com/justinsteven/advisories\n- https://drivertom.blogspot.com/2021/08/git.html",
  "id": "GHSA-hr3m-4qwq-3mgc",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T18:00:32Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T18:00:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/security/advisories/GHSA-hr3m-4qwq-3mgc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker/commit/5f2a8ba"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WangYihang/GitHacker"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitHacker: Path traversal in ref/hash parsing enables existence oracle and hex-fragment exfiltration via malicious .git server"
}

GHSA-HR3X-C6GR-97W4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:27 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:27

Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in download2.php in AGENCY4NET WEBFTP 1 allows remote attackers to read and delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-0091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-01-04T01:46:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in download2.php in AGENCY4NET WEBFTP 1 allows remote attackers to read and delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr3x-c6gr-97w4",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T23:27:34Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T23:27:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0091"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39343"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4828"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/28309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2008-January/001865.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/0051"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-HR5V-J9H9-XJHG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-10 17:29

Summary

OpenClaw has Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)

Details

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Advisory Details

Title: Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized mediaUrl / fileUrl Parameter Keys (CWE-22)

Description:

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in the agent sandbox enforcement allows a sandboxed agent to read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces by using the mediaUrl or fileUrl parameter key in message tool calls. The normalizeSandboxMediaParams function only checks ["media", "path", "filePath"] keys, while mediaUrl and fileUrl escape normalization entirely. Combined with handlePluginAction dropping mediaLocalRoots from the dispatch context, this enables a full sandbox escape where any agent can read files outside its designated sandbox root.

Details

The vulnerability exists in two files within the messaging pipeline:

1. Incomplete parameter key coverage in normalizeSandboxMediaParams:

In src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts, the function iterates over a hardcoded allowlist of parameter keys to validate:

// Line 212
const mediaKeys: Array<"media" | "path" | "filePath"> = ["media", "path", "filePath"];

The mediaUrl and fileUrl parameter keys are not included in this array. These keys are actively used by multiple channel extensions (Discord, Telegram, Slack, Matrix, Twitch) for media attachment handling, but they completely bypass the sandbox path validation performed by resolveSandboxedMediaSource.

2. Dropped mediaLocalRoots in handlePluginAction:

In src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts, the handlePluginAction function dispatches actions to channel plugins but omits mediaLocalRoots from the context:

// Lines 684-697
const handled = await dispatchChannelMessageAction({
    channel,
    action,
    cfg,
    params,
    accountId: accountId ?? undefined,
    requesterSenderId: input.requesterSenderId ?? undefined,
    sessionKey: input.sessionKey,
    sessionId: input.sessionId,
    agentId,
    gateway,
    toolContext: input.toolContext,
    dryRun,
    // mediaLocalRoots is MISSING here
});

Despite ChannelMessageActionContext defining mediaLocalRoots?: readonly string[] (in src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts line 478), plugins receive undefined and fall back to getDefaultMediaLocalRoots(), which permits reads of the entire ~/.openclaw/ directory tree — including all agents' workspaces.

Attack chain: 1. A sandboxed agent (Agent-A at ~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a/) calls the message tool with { mediaUrl: "~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret.txt" } 2. normalizeSandboxMediaParams skips the mediaUrl key (not in allowlist) 3. handlePluginAction dispatches without mediaLocalRoots 4. Plugin calls loadWebMedia with default roots, which allows ~/.openclaw/workspace/** 5. Agent-B's secret file content is read and sent as a channel attachment

PoC

Prerequisites: - Docker installed - OpenClaw Docker image built (openclaw-gateway:latest)

Steps:

Start the vulnerable gateway container:

cd llm-enhance/cve-finding/Path_Traversal/CVE-2026-27522-Media_Root_Bypass-variant-exp/
docker compose up -d
sleep 5

Run the exploit:

python3 poc_exploit.py

The exploit writes a secret file to ~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt inside the container, then invokes normalizeSandboxMediaParams with Agent-A's sandbox policy and { mediaUrl: <agent-b-secret-path> }. The mediaUrl key bypasses normalization, and loadWebMedia reads the file successfully.
Run the control experiment to confirm sandbox works for checked keys:

python3 control-sandbox_enforced.py

Log of Evidence

Exploit output:

=== CVE-2026-27522 Variant: Sandbox Media Root Bypass ===

[*] Container 'openclaw-media-bypass-test' is running
[*] Running exploit script with Bun...

[VULNERABLE] mediaUrl bypassed normalizeSandboxMediaParams!
  Agent-A sandboxRoot: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a
  mediaUrl targets Agent-B: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt
  args after normalization: {"mediaUrl":"/root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt"}
[EXPLOITED] Agent-B secret file content: AGENT-B-SECRET-API-KEY-sk-12345abcdef

=== EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===
Agent-A read Agent-B's secret file via mediaUrl, bypassing sandbox.

[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE — mediaUrl bypasses sandbox enforcement

Control experiment output:

=== Control Experiment: Sandbox Enforcement for 'media' Key ===

[*] Container 'openclaw-media-bypass-test' is running
[*] Running control script with Bun...

[SAFE] normalizeSandboxMediaParams blocked 'media' key as expected!
  Error: Path escapes sandbox root (/tmp/sandbox-ZKvGQX): /tmp/victim-2cuAOO/secret.txt

=== CONTROL EXPERIMENT PASSED ===
The 'media' parameter IS correctly checked by sandbox enforcement.
Only unchecked keys (mediaUrl, fileUrl) bypass the sandbox.

[+] CONTROL PASSED: 'media' key is correctly enforced by sandbox

Impact

This is a sandbox escape vulnerability. An attacker who can influence an agent's tool calls (via prompt injection, multi-agent interaction, or malicious plugin instruction) can read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces. This includes: - API keys and secrets stored in other agents' sandboxes - Session data and conversation logs - Configuration files with sensitive credentials - Any file within the ~/.openclaw/ directory tree

This completely defeats the purpose of the multi-agent sandbox isolation feature, which is documented as a security boundary in the project's Docker and sandboxing documentation.

Affected products

Ecosystem: npm
Package name: openclaw
Affected versions: <= 2026.3.14 (current latest)
Patched versions:

Severity

Severity: High
Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Weaknesses

CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Occurrences

Permalink	Description
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227	The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function with incomplete `mediaKeys` allowlist — `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` are not checked.
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697	The `handlePluginAction` dispatch call that omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context passed to `dispatchChannelMessageAction`.
https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478	The `ChannelMessageActionContext` type that defines `mediaLocalRoots` but never receives it from `handlePluginAction`.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35668"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T18:31:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n### Advisory Details\n**Title**: Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)\n\n**Description**:\n### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in the agent sandbox enforcement allows a sandboxed agent to read arbitrary files from other agents\u0027 workspaces by using the `mediaUrl` or `fileUrl` parameter key in message tool calls. The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function only checks `[\"media\", \"path\", \"filePath\"]` keys, while `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` escape normalization entirely. Combined with `handlePluginAction` dropping `mediaLocalRoots` from the dispatch context, this enables a full sandbox escape where any agent can read files outside its designated sandbox root.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in two files within the messaging pipeline:\n\n**1. Incomplete parameter key coverage in `normalizeSandboxMediaParams`:**\n\nIn `src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts`, the function iterates over a hardcoded allowlist of parameter keys to validate:\n\n```typescript\n// Line 212\nconst mediaKeys: Array\u003c\"media\" | \"path\" | \"filePath\"\u003e = [\"media\", \"path\", \"filePath\"];\n```\n\nThe `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` parameter keys are not included in this array. These keys are actively used by multiple channel extensions (Discord, Telegram, Slack, Matrix, Twitch) for media attachment handling, but they completely bypass the sandbox path validation performed by `resolveSandboxedMediaSource`.\n\n**2. Dropped `mediaLocalRoots` in `handlePluginAction`:**\n\nIn `src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts`, the `handlePluginAction` function dispatches actions to channel plugins but omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context:\n\n```typescript\n// Lines 684-697\nconst handled = await dispatchChannelMessageAction({\n    channel,\n    action,\n    cfg,\n    params,\n    accountId: accountId ?? undefined,\n    requesterSenderId: input.requesterSenderId ?? undefined,\n    sessionKey: input.sessionKey,\n    sessionId: input.sessionId,\n    agentId,\n    gateway,\n    toolContext: input.toolContext,\n    dryRun,\n    // mediaLocalRoots is MISSING here\n});\n```\n\nDespite `ChannelMessageActionContext` defining `mediaLocalRoots?: readonly string[]` (in `src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts` line 478), plugins receive `undefined` and fall back to `getDefaultMediaLocalRoots()`, which permits reads of the entire `~/.openclaw/` directory tree \u2014 including all agents\u0027 workspaces.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n1. A sandboxed agent (Agent-A at `~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a/`) calls the message tool with `{ mediaUrl: \"~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret.txt\" }`\n2. `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` skips the `mediaUrl` key (not in allowlist)\n3. `handlePluginAction` dispatches without `mediaLocalRoots`\n4. Plugin calls `loadWebMedia` with default roots, which allows `~/.openclaw/workspace/**`\n5. Agent-B\u0027s secret file content is read and sent as a channel attachment\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Docker installed\n- OpenClaw Docker image built (`openclaw-gateway:latest`)\n\n**Steps:**\n\n1. Start the vulnerable gateway container:\n\n```bash\ncd llm-enhance/cve-finding/Path_Traversal/CVE-2026-27522-Media_Root_Bypass-variant-exp/\ndocker compose up -d\nsleep 5\n```\n\n2. Run the exploit:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc_exploit.py\n```\n\n3. The exploit writes a secret file to `~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt` inside the container, then invokes `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` with Agent-A\u0027s sandbox policy and `{ mediaUrl: \u003cagent-b-secret-path\u003e }`. The `mediaUrl` key bypasses normalization, and `loadWebMedia` reads the file successfully.\n\n4. Run the control experiment to confirm sandbox works for checked keys:\n\n```bash\npython3 control-sandbox_enforced.py\n```\n\n### Log of Evidence\n\n**Exploit output:**\n```\n=== CVE-2026-27522 Variant: Sandbox Media Root Bypass ===\n\n[*] Container \u0027openclaw-media-bypass-test\u0027 is running\n[*] Running exploit script with Bun...\n\n[VULNERABLE] mediaUrl bypassed normalizeSandboxMediaParams!\n  Agent-A sandboxRoot: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a\n  mediaUrl targets Agent-B: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt\n  args after normalization: {\"mediaUrl\":\"/root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt\"}\n[EXPLOITED] Agent-B secret file content: AGENT-B-SECRET-API-KEY-sk-12345abcdef\n\n=== EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===\nAgent-A read Agent-B\u0027s secret file via mediaUrl, bypassing sandbox.\n\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE \u2014 mediaUrl bypasses sandbox enforcement\n```\n\n**Control experiment output:**\n```\n=== Control Experiment: Sandbox Enforcement for \u0027media\u0027 Key ===\n\n[*] Container \u0027openclaw-media-bypass-test\u0027 is running\n[*] Running control script with Bun...\n\n[SAFE] normalizeSandboxMediaParams blocked \u0027media\u0027 key as expected!\n  Error: Path escapes sandbox root (/tmp/sandbox-ZKvGQX): /tmp/victim-2cuAOO/secret.txt\n\n=== CONTROL EXPERIMENT PASSED ===\nThe \u0027media\u0027 parameter IS correctly checked by sandbox enforcement.\nOnly unchecked keys (mediaUrl, fileUrl) bypass the sandbox.\n\n[+] CONTROL PASSED: \u0027media\u0027 key is correctly enforced by sandbox\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a **sandbox escape** vulnerability. An attacker who can influence an agent\u0027s tool calls (via prompt injection, multi-agent interaction, or malicious plugin instruction) can read arbitrary files from other agents\u0027 workspaces. This includes:\n- API keys and secrets stored in other agents\u0027 sandboxes\n- Session data and conversation logs\n- Configuration files with sensitive credentials\n- Any file within the `~/.openclaw/` directory tree\n\nThis completely defeats the purpose of the multi-agent sandbox isolation feature, which is documented as a security boundary in the project\u0027s Docker and sandboxing documentation.\n\n### Affected products\n- **Ecosystem**: npm\n- **Package name**: openclaw\n- **Affected versions**: \u003c= 2026.3.14 (current latest)\n- **Patched versions**: \u003cNone\u003e\n\n### Severity\n- **Severity**: High\n- **Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N\n\n### Weaknesses\n- **CWE**: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\n\n### Occurrences\n\n| Permalink | Description |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227) | The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function with incomplete `mediaKeys` allowlist \u2014 `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` are not checked. |\n| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697) | The `handlePluginAction` dispatch call that omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context passed to `dispatchChannelMessageAction`. |\n| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478) | The `ChannelMessageActionContext` type that defines `mediaLocalRoots` but never receives it from `handlePluginAction`. |",
  "id": "GHSA-hr5v-j9h9-xjhg",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T17:29:38Z",
  "published": "2026-03-30T18:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hr5v-j9h9-xjhg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)"
}

GHSA-HR63-37XG-3W68

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 17:57 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:42

Details

mod_jk in Apache Tomcat JK Web Server Connector 1.2.x before 1.2.23 decodes request URLs within the Apache HTTP Server before passing the URL to Tomcat, which allows remote attackers to access protected pages via a crafted prefix JkMount, possibly involving double-encoded .. (dot dot) sequences and directory traversal, a related issue to CVE-2007-0450.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2007-1860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2007-05-25T18:30:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "mod_jk in Apache Tomcat JK Web Server Connector 1.2.x before 1.2.23 decodes request URLs within the Apache HTTP Server before passing the URL to Tomcat, which allows remote attackers to access protected pages via a crafted prefix JkMount, possibly involving double-encoded .. (dot dot) sequences and directory traversal, a related issue to CVE-2007-0450.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr63-37xg-3w68",
  "modified": "2025-04-09T03:42:02Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T17:57:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-1860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A6002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf8e8c091182b45daa50d3557cad9b10bb4198e3f08cf8f1c66a1b08d@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf8e8c091182b45daa50d3557cad9b10bb4198e3f08cf8f1c66a1b08d%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb71997f506c6cc8b530dd845c084995a9878098846c7b4eacfae8db3@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb71997f506c6cc8b530dd845c084995a9878098846c7b4eacfae8db3%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r5c616dfc49156e4b06ffab842800c80f4425924d0f20c452c127a53c@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r5c616dfc49156e4b06ffab842800c80f4425924d0f20c452c127a53c%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/c62b0e3a7bf23342352a5810c640a94b6db69957c5c19db507004d74@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/c62b0e3a7bf23342352a5810c640a94b6db69957c5c19db507004d74%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/ba661b0edd913b39ff129a32d855620dd861883ade05fd88a8ce517d@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/ba661b0edd913b39ff129a32d855620dd861883ade05fd88a8ce517d%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/8d2a579bbd977c225c70cb23b0ec54865fb0dab5da3eff1e060c9935@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/8d2a579bbd977c225c70cb23b0ec54865fb0dab5da3eff1e060c9935%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/5b7a23e245c93235c503900da854a143596d901bf1a1f67e851a5de4@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/5b7a23e245c93235c503900da854a143596d901bf1a1f67e851a5de4%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/29dc6c2b625789e70a9c4756b5a327e6547273ff8bde7e0327af48c5@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/29dc6c2b625789e70a9c4756b5a327e6547273ff8bde7e0327af48c5%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/277d42b48b6e9aef50949c0dcc79ce21693091d73da246b3c1981925@%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/277d42b48b6e9aef50949c0dcc79ce21693091d73da246b3c1981925%40%3Cdev.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/34496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=306172"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://h20000.www2.hp.com/bizsupport/TechSupport/Document.jsp?objectID=c01178795"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce//2007/Jul/msg00004.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2008-03/msg00001.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25383"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25701"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/26235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/26512"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/27037"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/29242"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200708-15.xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/news/20070301.html#20070518.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://tomcat.apache.org/security-jk.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2007/dsa-1312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/34877"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2007-0379.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2008-0261.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24147"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25159"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1018138"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/1941"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/2732"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/3386"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-HR66-RV65-F5R4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-28 21:31

Details

An improper validation of the search parameter of the com_media files API endpoint leads to a path traversal vulnerability.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

5.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40384"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T17:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An improper validation of the search parameter of the com_media files API endpoint leads to a path traversal vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr66-rv65-f5r4",
  "modified": "2026-05-28T21:31:56Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T18:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.joomla.org/security-centre/1042-20260510-core-path-traversal-in-com-media-webservice-endpoint.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HR6C-84VF-JF53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 00:31

Details

Path Traversal in BOSH-Ecosystem / BOSH allows an IaaS-metadata attacker to make the agent write a root-owned file with partially attacker-controlled body to any path ending in .network, and create any missing parent directories with mode 0777 via network Alias on Ubuntu.

Affected versions: BOSH agent < v2.847.0 (jammy <= v1.1202, or noble <= v1.364). Lower bound unspecified in advisory ("All bosh agent versions").

Severity

4.2 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41861"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T22:17:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Path Traversal in BOSH-Ecosystem / BOSH allows an IaaS-metadata attacker to make the agent write a root-owned file with partially attacker-controlled body to any path ending in .network, and create any missing parent directories with mode 0777 via network Alias on Ubuntu.\n\n\n\nAffected versions: BOSH agent \u003c v2.847.0 (jammy \u003c= v1.1202, or noble \u003c= v1.364). Lower bound unspecified in advisory (\"All bosh agent versions\").",
  "id": "GHSA-hr6c-84vf-jf53",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T00:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T00:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41861"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cloudfoundry.org/blog/cve-2026-41861-arbitrary-root-file-write-via-path-traversal-in-bosh-agent"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HR7C-PW36-W99G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-15 15:30

Details

Diagram's export module is vulnerable to Path Traversal in src attribute due to lack of HTML sanitization. An unauthenticated user could craft the html payload which could include local files from the server and display them in the generated pdf.

This issue was fixed in version 1.1.1.

Severity

9.2 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7182"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T13:16:19Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Diagram\u0027s export module is vulnerable to Path Traversal in src attribute due to lack of HTML sanitization.\u00a0An unauthenticated user could craft the html payload which could include\n local files from the server and display them in the generated pdf.  \n\nThis issue was fixed in version 1.1.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-hr7c-pw36-w99g",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T15:30:44Z",
  "published": "2026-05-15T15:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/05/CVE-2026-7182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://dhtmlx.com/docs/products/dhtmlxDiagram"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.dhtmlx.com/diagram/whats_new/#version-612"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Mitigation MIT-15

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
realpath() in C
getCanonicalPath() in Java
GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
realpath() in PHP

Mitigation MIT-4

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29

Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17

Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.

Mitigation MIT-22

Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation MIT-34

Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.

Mitigation MIT-39

Implementation

Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.

Mitigation MIT-16

Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

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