CWE-129
AllowedImproper Validation of Array Index
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.
841 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P6R2-36R4-M6VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-17 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: Fix array-index-out-of-bounds in diFree
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-17T10:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njfs: Fix array-index-out-of-bounds in diFree",
"id": "GHSA-p6r2-36r4-m6vj",
"modified": "2026-05-12T12:32:04Z",
"published": "2024-08-17T12:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/538a27c8048f081a5ddd286f886eb986fbbc7f80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55b732c8b09b41148eaab2fa8e31b0af47671e00"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63f7fdf733add82f126ea00e2e48f6eba15ac4b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aa6892a90a5a7fabffe5692ab9f06a7a46c6e42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d8f9a477de0d7962342eedf2a599215b7c63d28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b3a4345957f5372041bc4f59de322f62653e862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f73f969b2eb39ad8056f6c7f3a295fa2f85e313a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff14eadc278663cac69d57d3ca7fb2f394e1f8a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/10/msg00003.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P6XG-GJ77-6VPG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-24 00:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Bail out early if the request AUX area is out of bound
When perf-record with a large AUX area, e.g 4GB, it fails with:
#perf record -C 0 -m ,4G -e arm_spe_0// -- sleep 1
failed to mmap with 12 (Cannot allocate memory)
and it reveals a WARNING with __alloc_pages():
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 44 PID: 17573 at mm/page_alloc.c:5568 __alloc_pages+0x1ec/0x248
Call trace:
__alloc_pages+0x1ec/0x248
__kmalloc_large_node+0xc0/0x1f8
__kmalloc_node+0x134/0x1e8
rb_alloc_aux+0xe0/0x298
perf_mmap+0x440/0x660
mmap_region+0x308/0x8a8
do_mmap+0x3c0/0x528
vm_mmap_pgoff+0xf4/0x1b8
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x18c/0x218
__arm64_sys_mmap+0x38/0x58
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x58/0x188
do_el0_svc+0x34/0x50
el0_svc+0x34/0x108
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
'rb->aux_pages' allocated by kcalloc() is a pointer array which is used to maintains AUX trace pages. The allocated page for this array is physically contiguous (and virtually contiguous) with an order of 0..MAX_ORDER. If the size of pointer array crosses the limitation set by MAX_ORDER, it reveals a WARNING.
So bail out early with -ENOMEM if the request AUX area is out of bound, e.g.:
#perf record -C 0 -m ,4G -e arm_spe_0// -- sleep 1
failed to mmap with 12 (Cannot allocate memory)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52835"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T16:15:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/core: Bail out early if the request AUX area is out of bound\n\nWhen perf-record with a large AUX area, e.g 4GB, it fails with:\n\n #perf record -C 0 -m ,4G -e arm_spe_0// -- sleep 1\n failed to mmap with 12 (Cannot allocate memory)\n\nand it reveals a WARNING with __alloc_pages():\n\n\t------------[ cut here ]------------\n\tWARNING: CPU: 44 PID: 17573 at mm/page_alloc.c:5568 __alloc_pages+0x1ec/0x248\n\tCall trace:\n\t __alloc_pages+0x1ec/0x248\n\t __kmalloc_large_node+0xc0/0x1f8\n\t __kmalloc_node+0x134/0x1e8\n\t rb_alloc_aux+0xe0/0x298\n\t perf_mmap+0x440/0x660\n\t mmap_region+0x308/0x8a8\n\t do_mmap+0x3c0/0x528\n\t vm_mmap_pgoff+0xf4/0x1b8\n\t ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x18c/0x218\n\t __arm64_sys_mmap+0x38/0x58\n\t invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128\n\t el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x58/0x188\n\t do_el0_svc+0x34/0x50\n\t el0_svc+0x34/0x108\n\t el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0\n\t el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8\n\n\u0027rb-\u003eaux_pages\u0027 allocated by kcalloc() is a pointer array which is used to\nmaintains AUX trace pages. The allocated page for this array is physically\ncontiguous (and virtually contiguous) with an order of 0..MAX_ORDER. If the\nsize of pointer array crosses the limitation set by MAX_ORDER, it reveals a\nWARNING.\n\nSo bail out early with -ENOMEM if the request AUX area is out of bound,\ne.g.:\n\n #perf record -C 0 -m ,4G -e arm_spe_0// -- sleep 1\n failed to mmap with 12 (Cannot allocate memory)",
"id": "GHSA-p6xg-gj77-6vpg",
"modified": "2025-09-24T00:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T18:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a2a4202c60fcdffbf04f259002ce9bff39edece"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2424410f94a94d91230ced094062d859714c984a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e905e608e38cf7f8dcddcf8a6036e91a78444cb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54aee5f15b83437f23b2b2469bcf21bdd9823916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/788c0b3442ead737008934947730a6d1ff703734"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c504f615d7ed60ae035c51d0c789137ced6797f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ce4e87a8efd37c85766ec08b15e885cab08553a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd0df3f8719201dbe61a4d39083d5aecd705399a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P7MV-53F2-4CWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-06 15:33 – Updated: 2026-09-02 22:06Name: ASA-2024-011: Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data
Component: CometBFT
Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per ACMv1.2)
Affected versions: >= 0.38.x, unreleased v1.x and main development branches
Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators
Impact
A CometBFT node running in a network with vote extensions enabled could produce an invalid Vote message and send it to its peers. The invalid field of the Vote message is the ValidatorIndex, which identifies the sender in the ValidatorSet running that height of consensus. This field is ordinarily verified in the processing of Vote messages, but it turns out that in the case of a Vote message of type Precommit and for a non-nil BlockID, a logic was introduced before this ordinary verification to handle the attached vote extension. This introduced logic (not present in releases prior to 0.38.x) does not double-check the validity of the ValidatorIndex field. The result is a panic in the execution of the node receiving and processing such message.
Impact Qualification
This condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node sending this Vote message to its peers. Namely, nodes running upstream code cannot produce invalid Vote messages, with non-existing ValidatorIndex. Moreover, networks utilizing default behavior, where vote extensions are not enabled, are not affected by this issue.
Patches
The new CometBFT release v0.38.15 fixes this issue.
Unreleased code in the main and v1.x branches, and experimental code in the v0.38-experimental and v1.x-experimental branches are patched as well.
Workarounds
When the consensus code panics after receiving an invalid Vote message, the operator can identify the peer from which that message was received. This may require increasing the logging level of the consensus module. This peer can then be subsequently banned at the p2p layer as a temporary mitigation.
References
- ABCI spec, in particular the operation of vote extensions
- Patched v0.38 release
Timeline
- October 21, 2024, 3:26pm PST: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program
- October 21, 2024, 3:41pm PST: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team
- October 29, 2024, 11:35pm PST: Core team completes validation of issue
- October 30, 2024, 3:33am PST: Core team completes patch for issue
- October 30, 2024, 5:09am PST: Amulet creates coordination plan; schedule for distribution
- November 4, 2024, 8:00pm GMT: Pre-notification delivered
- November 6, 2024, 8:00am GMT: Patch made available
This issue was reported by corverroos to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 21, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.
If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at security@interchain.io. For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.
A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT repository. For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cometbft/cometbft"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.38.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.38.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-06T15:33:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Name: ASA-2024-011: Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data\nComponent: CometBFT\nCriticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md))\nAffected versions: `\u003e= 0.38.x`, unreleased `v1.x` and `main` development branches\nAffected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators\n\n### Impact\n\nA CometBFT node running in a network with [vote extensions][abci-spec] enabled could produce an invalid `Vote` message and send it to its peers. The invalid field of the `Vote` message is the `ValidatorIndex`, which identifies the sender in the `ValidatorSet` running that height of consensus. This field is ordinarily verified in the processing of `Vote` messages, but it turns out that in the case of a `Vote` message of type `Precommit` and for a non-`nil` `BlockID`, [a logic was introduced](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blame/46621a87064b2ae235e122e66d9b22417b3aa35e/internal/consensus/state.go#L2357-L2364) before this ordinary verification to handle the attached vote extension. This introduced logic (not present in releases prior to `0.38.x`) does not double-check the validity of the `ValidatorIndex` field. The result is a panic in the execution of the node receiving and processing such message.\n\n#### Impact Qualification\nThis condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node sending this `Vote` message to its peers. Namely, nodes running upstream code cannot produce invalid `Vote` messages, with non-existing `ValidatorIndex`. Moreover, networks utilizing default behavior, where vote extensions are not enabled, are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe new CometBFT release [`v0.38.15`][v0.38.15] fixes this issue.\n\nUnreleased code in the `main` and `v1.x` branches, and experimental code in the `v0.38-experimental` and `v1.x-experimental` branches are patched as well.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhen the consensus code panics after receiving an invalid `Vote` message, the operator can identify the peer from which that message was received. This may require increasing the logging level of the `consensus` module. This peer can then be subsequently banned at the p2p layer as a temporary mitigation. \n\n### References\n\n- [ABCI spec][abci-spec], in particular the operation of vote extensions\n- [Patched v0.38 release][v0.38.15]\n\n[abci-spec]: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/spec/abci/abci++_basic_concepts\n[v0.38.15]: https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.15\n\n### Timeline\n\n* October 21, 2024, 3:26pm PST: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program\n* October 21, 2024, 3:41pm PST: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team\n* October 29, 2024, 11:35pm PST: Core team completes validation of issue\n* October 30, 2024, 3:33am PST: Core team completes patch for issue\n* October 30, 2024, 5:09am PST: Amulet creates coordination plan; schedule for distribution\n* November 4, 2024, 8:00pm GMT: Pre-notification delivered\n* November 6, 2024, 8:00am GMT: Patch made available\n\n\nThis issue was reported by [corverroos](https://github.com/corverroos) to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 21, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.\n\nIf you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about the Interchain Foundation\u2019s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security. \n\nA Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT [repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-p7mv-53f2-4cwj). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.",
"id": "GHSA-p7mv-53f2-4cwj",
"modified": "2026-09-02T22:06:23Z",
"published": "2024-11-06T15:33:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-p7mv-53f2-4cwj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/commit/17d3bb66664cab6d6798c17e27198e15bbac1905"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/spec/abci/abci++_basic_concepts"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nrdax.com/techniques/NRDAX-T0211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3259"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "CometBFT Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data"
}
GHSA-P8MF-QGVP-6754
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42Possible out of bounds while accessing global control elements due to race condition in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice & Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-22T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Possible out of bounds while accessing global control elements due to race condition in Snapdragon Auto, Snapdragon Compute, Snapdragon Connectivity, Snapdragon Consumer IOT, Snapdragon Industrial IOT, Snapdragon Mobile, Snapdragon Voice \u0026 Music, Snapdragon Wearables, Snapdragon Wired Infrastructure and Networking",
"id": "GHSA-p8mf-qgvp-6754",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:46Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/february-2021-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-P8QX-H547-FJW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 23:27 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:27Summary
SshBlockCipher implementations (AES-CBC, AES-CTR, 3DES-CBC, etc.) report needs_mac() == true, meaning they are documented/intended to always be paired with a separate integrity MAC. However, key-exchange negotiation only checks needs_mac() inside the fallback branch of MAC algorithm selection (used when no common MAC algorithm exists). If both peers' preferred MAC lists simply contain none and it is successfully negotiated through the normal selection path, nothing rejects pairing none with a cipher that requires a MAC. Once negotiated, a single crafted packet from either peer causes cipher::read() to shrink an already-allocated buffer below the number of bytes it is about to index, causing a Rust slice-index-out-of-range panic and killing that connection's task.
Details
In russh/src/cipher/mod.rs, read() for a block cipher:
1. Reads packet_length_to_read_for_block_length() bytes up front (16 bytes for any SshBlockCipher) into buffer.buffer.
2. Decrypts the first block to recover the plaintext packet-length field len.
3. Computes buffer.len = len + cipher.tag_len().
4. Calls buffer.buffer.resize(buffer.len + 4, 0).
5. Immediately indexes buffer.buffer[16..] (via the constant used for the first block read) to continue decrypting/reading the rest of the packet.
When the negotiated MAC is none, tag_len() == 0. If the attacker (or a MITM holding the session key, or simply the accepting peer testing a hostile client) sends a packet whose decrypted length field is 0, then buffer.len = 0 and resize(0 + 4, 0) shrinks the buffer that was already grown to 16 bytes in step 1 down to 4 bytes. The subsequent slice operation buffer.buffer[16..] then panics with range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4.
The file already defines a MINIMUM_PACKET_LEN constant, but it is only consulted on the write/padding side, never on the read path — so nothing prevents an incoming packet from declaring a length shorter than the bytes already buffered.
Negotiation gap: negotiation.rs's Select MAC-selection logic only special-cases needs_mac() when negotiation would otherwise fail (no common MAC), substituting none only if the cipher does not need one. It never re-validates the case where none is a common/successfully-negotiated MAC on both sides regardless of what the chosen cipher requires. So an application (or a malicious peer, since negotiation is attacker-influenced on one side) that includes none in its own preferred MAC list — while still allowing the default CTR/CBC cipher suite — ends up with an invalid, panic-inducing combination that the library itself should refuse.
PoC
- Configure one side's
Preferredconfig to includemac::NONEin the MAC list (this is a supported, non-default configuration exposed by the crate's publicPreferredAPI — used e.g. for legacy/interop compatibility), while leaving the default cipher list (which includesaes256-ctr/aes256-cbc) untouched. - Complete a normal key exchange; negotiation lands on
{cipher: aes*-ctr (or -cbc), mac: none}becausenoneis present and preferred/common on both sides, and nothing during negotiation rejects this pairing. - From the peer, send one transport packet whose decrypted packet-length field is
0(trivial to construct once the session keys are known to that peer, or for the peer that legitimately owns the connection to simply hand-craft, e.g. a modified client for testing). cipher::read()on the receiving side panics:range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4.- Because each connection is handled in its own
tokio::spawn'ed task (see the per-connectionselect!loop that calls intocipher::read()), the panic unwinds only that task by default, but it unconditionally terminates that SSH connection/session — a working, currently-unauthenticated, already-established connection is killed with no attacker interaction beyond the one crafted packet, and the check runs on every inbound packet including pre-auth ones.
Impact
Denial of service: a remote peer that can influence MAC preference negotiation (or a MITM in possession of the session key) can crash any individual SSH connection/session that ends up negotiating a block cipher together with mac=none, with a single crafted packet, pre-authentication. This does not affect the process as a whole (panic is scoped to that connection's task under panic=unwind), and does require a non-default configuration that permits none as a preferred MAC — hence Low severity.
Suggested fix
In the MAC-selection logic in negotiation.rs, reject (or force substitution of) mac::NONE whenever the negotiated cipher's needs_mac() is true, regardless of how none came to be selected — not only in the "no common MAC" fallback branch. Defensively, cipher::read() could also refuse to shrink a buffer below the number of bytes already consumed for the length-field block, returning a protocol error instead of resizing blindly.
For credit/changelog purposes, please use: Yazan Balawneh, Cystack.ps
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.63.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "russh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.63.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-102822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T23:27:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T19:17:24Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`SshBlockCipher` implementations (AES-CBC, AES-CTR, 3DES-CBC, etc.) report `needs_mac() == true`, meaning they are documented/intended to always be paired with a separate integrity MAC. However, key-exchange negotiation only checks `needs_mac()` inside the *fallback* branch of MAC algorithm selection (used when no common MAC algorithm exists). If both peers\u0027 preferred MAC lists simply contain `none` and it is successfully negotiated through the normal selection path, nothing rejects pairing `none` with a cipher that requires a MAC. Once negotiated, a single crafted packet from either peer causes `cipher::read()` to shrink an already-allocated buffer below the number of bytes it is about to index, causing a Rust slice-index-out-of-range panic and killing that connection\u0027s task.\n\n### Details\nIn `russh/src/cipher/mod.rs`, `read()` for a block cipher:\n1. Reads `packet_length_to_read_for_block_length()` bytes up front (16 bytes for any `SshBlockCipher`) into `buffer.buffer`.\n2. Decrypts the first block to recover the plaintext packet-length field `len`.\n3. Computes `buffer.len = len + cipher.tag_len()`.\n4. Calls `buffer.buffer.resize(buffer.len + 4, 0)`.\n5. Immediately indexes `buffer.buffer[16..]` (via the constant used for the first block read) to continue decrypting/reading the rest of the packet.\n\nWhen the negotiated MAC is `none`, `tag_len() == 0`. If the attacker (or a MITM holding the session key, or simply the accepting peer testing a hostile client) sends a packet whose *decrypted* length field is `0`, then `buffer.len = 0` and `resize(0 + 4, 0)` **shrinks** the buffer that was already grown to 16 bytes in step 1 down to 4 bytes. The subsequent slice operation `buffer.buffer[16..]` then panics with `range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4`.\n\nThe file already defines a `MINIMUM_PACKET_LEN` constant, but it is only consulted on the *write*/padding side, never on the read path \u2014 so nothing prevents an incoming packet from declaring a length shorter than the bytes already buffered.\n\nNegotiation gap: `negotiation.rs`\u0027s `Select` MAC-selection logic only special-cases `needs_mac()` when negotiation would otherwise *fail* (no common MAC), substituting `none` only if the cipher does not need one. It never re-validates the case where `none` is a common/successfully-negotiated MAC on both sides regardless of what the chosen cipher requires. So an application (or a malicious peer, since negotiation is attacker-influenced on one side) that includes `none` in its own preferred MAC list \u2014 while still allowing the default CTR/CBC cipher suite \u2014 ends up with an invalid, panic-inducing combination that the library itself should refuse.\n\n### PoC\n1. Configure one side\u0027s `Preferred` config to include `mac::NONE` in the MAC list (this is a supported, non-default configuration exposed by the crate\u0027s public `Preferred` API \u2014 used e.g. for legacy/interop compatibility), while leaving the default cipher list (which includes `aes256-ctr`/`aes256-cbc`) untouched.\n2. Complete a normal key exchange; negotiation lands on `{cipher: aes*-ctr (or -cbc), mac: none}` because `none` is present and preferred/common on both sides, and nothing during negotiation rejects this pairing.\n3. From the peer, send one transport packet whose decrypted packet-length field is `0` (trivial to construct once the session keys are known to that peer, or for the peer that legitimately owns the connection to simply hand-craft, e.g. a modified client for testing).\n4. `cipher::read()` on the receiving side panics: `range start index 16 out of range for slice of length 4`.\n5. Because each connection is handled in its own `tokio::spawn`\u0027ed task (see the per-connection `select!` loop that calls into `cipher::read()`), the panic unwinds only that task by default, but it unconditionally terminates that SSH connection/session \u2014 a working, currently-unauthenticated, already-established connection is killed with no attacker interaction beyond the one crafted packet, and the check runs on every inbound packet including pre-auth ones.\n\n\n### Impact\nDenial of service: a remote peer that can influence MAC preference negotiation (or a MITM in possession of the session key) can crash any individual SSH connection/session that ends up negotiating a block cipher together with `mac=none`, with a single crafted packet, pre-authentication. This does not affect the process as a whole (panic is scoped to that connection\u0027s task under `panic=unwind`), and does require a non-default configuration that permits `none` as a preferred MAC \u2014 hence Low severity.\n\n### Suggested fix\nIn the MAC-selection logic in `negotiation.rs`, reject (or force substitution of) `mac::NONE` whenever the negotiated cipher\u0027s `needs_mac()` is `true`, regardless of *how* `none` came to be selected \u2014 not only in the \"no common MAC\" fallback branch. Defensively, `cipher::read()` could also refuse to shrink a buffer below the number of bytes already consumed for the length-field block, returning a protocol error instead of resizing blindly.\n\nFor credit/changelog purposes, please use: Yazan Balawneh, Cystack.ps",
"id": "GHSA-p8qx-h547-fjw9",
"modified": "2026-09-30T23:27:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T23:27:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-p8qx-h547-fjw9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/2885385abfee279092a41d80c6cb6ac367353159"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.63.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "russh: negotiating a MAC-requiring block cipher (CTR/CBC) with mac=none causes a slice-index-out-of-range panic"
}
GHSA-P94H-62MP-HVFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:11 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:11improper validation of array index in WiFi driver function sapInterferenceRssiCount() leads to array out-of-bounds access in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-3576"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-12T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "improper validation of array index in WiFi driver function sapInterferenceRssiCount() leads to array out-of-bounds access in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.",
"id": "GHSA-p94h-62mp-hvfr",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:11:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:11:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2018-05-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2018/05/11/may-2018-code-aurora-security-bulletin-2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P9JJ-JRC5-WM74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:14 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:14An issue was discovered in Adobe Acrobat and Reader: 2017.012.20098 and earlier versions, 2017.011.30066 and earlier versions, 2015.006.30355 and earlier versions, and 11.0.22 and earlier versions. The vulnerability is a result of untrusted input that is used to calculate an array index; the calculation occurs in the printing functionality. The vulnerability leads to an operation that can write to a memory location that is outside of the memory addresses allocated for the data structure. The specific scenario leads to a write access to a memory location that does not belong to the relevant process address space.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16391"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-09T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Adobe Acrobat and Reader: 2017.012.20098 and earlier versions, 2017.011.30066 and earlier versions, 2015.006.30355 and earlier versions, and 11.0.22 and earlier versions. The vulnerability is a result of untrusted input that is used to calculate an array index; the calculation occurs in the printing functionality. The vulnerability leads to an operation that can write to a memory location that is outside of the memory addresses allocated for the data structure. The specific scenario leads to a write access to a memory location that does not belong to the relevant process address space.",
"id": "GHSA-p9jj-jrc5-wm74",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:14:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:14:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb17-36.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039791"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P9VM-X975-JQJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:11 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:11In the camera driver, an out-of-bounds access can occur due to an error in copying region params from user space in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-15857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-12T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the camera driver, an out-of-bounds access can occur due to an error in copying region params from user space in all Android releases from CAF (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) using the Linux Kernel.",
"id": "GHSA-p9vm-x975-jqjv",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:11:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:11:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2018-05-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeaurora.org/security-bulletin/2018/05/11/may-2018-code-aurora-security-bulletin-2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PC36-946P-693J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 06:34 – Updated: 2026-07-02 06:34GeoWebPlayer (also called "Web Plugin" in the GV-VMS documentation and "WS Player" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly.
The Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. Many of the commands will take an index value that is then used to access various arrays to enter critical sections, perform various actions via function calls, etc. However the index value is usually not checked for valid range, and as such it can be used to access multiple arrays out-of-bound.
snapshot command index-out-of-bound
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T04:17:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "GeoWebPlayer (also called \"Web Plugin\" in the GV-VMS documentation and \"WS Player\" for VMS-Cloud) is an addon that can be installed with various GeoVision software (GV-VMS, GV-Cloud, ...). It creates a websocket server that expands the capabilities of the various web-interfaces provided by the GeoVision software and may be necessary for them to function properly.\n\nThe Websocket server can accept various commands coming from localhost. Many of the commands will take an `index` value that is then used to access various arrays to enter critical sections, perform various actions via function calls, etc. However the `index` value is usually not checked for valid range, and as such it can be used to access multiple arrays out-of-bound.\n\n\n\n#### snapshot command index-out-of-bound",
"id": "GHSA-pc36-946p-693j",
"modified": "2026-07-02T06:34:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T06:34:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2026-2373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.geovision.com.tw/cyber_security.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PC5Q-2X89-W436
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-20 00:30 – Updated: 2026-09-20 00:30vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly validate bad_words token indices against the model's generation output width in SamplingParams.update_from_tokenizer(). Attackers can supply out-of-bounds token indices that corrupt logits memory of concurrent requests, causing different in-flight HTTP requests to return incorrect tokens.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-19T23:17:10Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly validate bad_words token indices against the model\u0027s generation output width in SamplingParams.update_from_tokenizer(). Attackers can supply out-of-bounds token indices that corrupt logits memory of concurrent requests, causing different in-flight HTTP requests to return incorrect tokens.",
"id": "GHSA-pc5q-2x89-w436",
"modified": "2026-09-20T00:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-09-20T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/48824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/98dff2a81d747d1dba01a47f939f48c3526d4206/vllm/sampling_params.py#L694-L753"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/98dff2a81d747d1dba01a47f939f48c3526d4206/vllm/v1/worker/gpu/sample/bad_words.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-cross-request-logits-corruption-via-bad-words"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-7
Strategy: Input Validation
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Mitigation MIT-15
- For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Mitigation MIT-3
Strategy: Language Selection
- Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.
Mitigation MIT-11
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
- Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as "rebasing" (for Windows) and "prelinking" (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Mitigation MIT-12
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
- For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.
Mitigation MIT-35
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers
Buffer Overflow attacks target improper or missing bounds checking on buffer operations, typically triggered by input injected by an adversary. As a consequence, an adversary is able to write past the boundaries of allocated buffer regions in memory, causing a program crash or potentially redirection of execution as per the adversaries' choice.