Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2024-03-06 10:58
Modified
2026-09-08 08:34
Summary
MITM modification of request bodies in MinIO
Details

MinIO is an open-source high performance object storage service and it is API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service. In MinIO before version RELEASE.2021-03-17T02-33-02Z, there is a vulnerability which enables MITM modification of request bodies that are meant to have integrity guaranteed by chunk signatures. In a PUT request using aws-chunked encoding, MinIO ordinarily verifies signatures at the end of a chunk. This check can be skipped if the client sends a false chunk size that is much greater than the actual data sent: the server accepts and completes the request without ever reaching the end of the chunk + thereby without ever checking the chunk signature. This is fixed in version RELEASE.2021-03-17T02-33-02Z. As a workaround one can avoid using "aws-chunked" encoding-based chunk signature upload requests instead use TLS. MinIO SDKs automatically disable chunked encoding signature when the server endpoint is configured with TLS.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "minio",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/minio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2021.03.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21390"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:minio:minio:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "MinIO is an open-source high performance object storage service and it is API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service. In MinIO before version RELEASE.2021-03-17T02-33-02Z, there is a vulnerability which enables MITM modification of request bodies that are meant to have integrity guaranteed by chunk signatures. In a PUT request using aws-chunked encoding, MinIO ordinarily verifies signatures at the end of a chunk. This check can be skipped if the client sends a false chunk size that is much greater than the actual data sent: the server accepts and completes the request without ever reaching the end of the chunk + thereby without ever checking the chunk signature. This is fixed in version RELEASE.2021-03-17T02-33-02Z. As a workaround one can avoid using \"aws-chunked\" encoding-based chunk signature upload requests instead use TLS. MinIO SDKs automatically disable chunked encoding signature when the server endpoint is configured with TLS.",
  "id": "BIT-minio-2021-21390",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T08:34:36.952Z",
  "published": "2024-03-06T10:58:02.168Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/e197800f9055489415b53cf137e31e194aaf7ba0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/11801"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/minio/minio/security/advisories/GHSA-xr7r-7gpj-5pgp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21390"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.5.0",
  "summary": "MITM modification of request bodies in MinIO"
}



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