GHSA-GCWF-C25F-P9RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 23:24 – Updated: 2026-11-09 23:24Summary
In Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated next parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses startswith("/") to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like //evil.com which start with / but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1’s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation.
Vulnerable Code
In tcms/kiwi_auth/views.py, the Confirm view (line ~113):
def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
self.url = self.request.GET.get("next", reverse("core-views-index"))
if not self.url.startswith("/"):
self.url = reverse("core-views-index")
The check startswith("/") passes for //evil.com because it begins with /, but browsers interpret //evil.com as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to https://evil.com (or http://evil.com depending on the current page's protocol).
Proof of Concept
GET /confirm/<activation_key>/?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1
Host: kiwi.example.com
Response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: //evil.com/phishing
The browser follows the redirect to https://evil.com/phishing.
Verification:
>>> url = "//evil.com/phishing"
>>> url.startswith("/")
True # passes the check!
Impact
An attacker can craft a confirmation link that, after the user confirms their account, redirects them to a phishing page. This is useful for:
- Credential phishing (fake login page on attacker domain)
- Malware delivery after trusted action
- Social engineering (user trusts the link because it's from the legitimate Kiwi TCMS instance)
The attack requires sending a crafted activation link to a user who is registering, or intercepting/predicting the activation key.
Suggested Fix
Use Django's url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme() utility instead of a simple startswith check:
from django.utils.http import url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme
def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):
self.url = self.request.GET.get("next", reverse("core-views-index"))
if not url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(
self.url,
allowed_hosts={self.request.get_host()},
require_https=self.request.is_secure(),
):
self.url = reverse("core-views-index")
This properly rejects protocol-relative URLs, absolute URLs to other hosts, and other bypass patterns.
Fixed in Version 16.2
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "kiwitcms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "12.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77433"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T23:24:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated `next` parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses `startswith(\"/\")` to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like `//evil.com` which start with `/` but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1\u2019s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nIn `tcms/kiwi_auth/views.py`, the `Confirm` view (line ~113):\n\n def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n self.url = self.request.GET.get(\"next\", reverse(\"core-views-index\"))\n if not self.url.startswith(\"/\"):\n self.url = reverse(\"core-views-index\")\n\nThe check `startswith(\"/\")` passes for `//evil.com` because it begins with `/`, but browsers interpret `//evil.com` as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to `https://evil.com` (or `http://evil.com` depending on the current page\u0027s protocol).\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n GET /confirm/\u003cactivation_key\u003e/?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1\n Host: kiwi.example.com\n\nResponse:\n\n HTTP/1.1 302 Found\n Location: //evil.com/phishing\n\nThe browser follows the redirect to `https://evil.com/phishing`.\n\nVerification:\n\n \u003e\u003e\u003e url = \"//evil.com/phishing\"\n \u003e\u003e\u003e url.startswith(\"/\")\n True # passes the check!\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can craft a confirmation link that, after the user confirms their account, redirects them to a phishing page. This is useful for:\n\n- Credential phishing (fake login page on attacker domain)\n- Malware delivery after trusted action\n- Social engineering (user trusts the link because it\u0027s from the legitimate Kiwi TCMS instance)\n\nThe attack requires sending a crafted activation link to a user who is registering, or intercepting/predicting the activation key.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nUse Django\u0027s `url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme()` utility instead of a simple `startswith` check:\n\n from django.utils.http import url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme\n\n def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs):\n self.url = self.request.GET.get(\"next\", reverse(\"core-views-index\"))\n if not url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme(\n self.url,\n allowed_hosts={self.request.get_host()},\n require_https=self.request.is_secure(),\n ):\n self.url = reverse(\"core-views-index\")\n\nThis properly rejects protocol-relative URLs, absolute URLs to other hosts, and other bypass patterns.\n\nFixed in Version 16.2",
"id": "GHSA-gcwf-c25f-p9rv",
"modified": "2026-11-09T23:24:14Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T23:24:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/security/advisories/GHSA-gcwf-c25f-p9rv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/security/advisories/GHSA-hmj5-jm8h-h9fh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/pull/4458"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/commit/65d8f7c2743d7f06a4fca77c060b9d561f02f948"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/releases/tag/v16.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kiwi TCMS account confirmation open redirect through protocol-relative URLs"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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