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    4 vulnerabilities found for sealed-secrets by Bitnami

    CVE-2026-59341 (GCVE-0-2026-59341)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-09-15 09:16 – Updated: 2026-09-16 11:53
    VLAI
    Title
    Sealed Secrets: decryption oracle via Go template injection in unauthenticated controller endpoints
    Summary
    A security vulnerability exists in the Sealed Secrets controller's unauthenticated POST endpoints. By submitting a modified payload containing custom Go template logic in spec.template.data, an attacker with internal network access can abuse the handler as a decryption oracle to recover the full plaintext of any sealed secret. The POST /v1/verify and /v1/rotate handlers call Unseal() to decrypt target secrets, then render any Go templates found in spec.template.data.* using the decrypted payload as the evaluation context (pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go). Errors encountered during template execution are directly reflected in the resulting HTTP response status codes. Missing AEAD label binding: the spec.template.data field is omitted from the AEAD authenticated-data label binding ciphertext to metadata. As a result, an attacker can copy a target's valid metadata and encryptedData verbatim, satisfying AEAD decryption and label validation, while freely replacing spec.template.data with arbitrary template logic. Side-channel oracle: template execution errors map directly to HTTP response codes. HTTP 200 (OK) indicates template execution succeeded; HTTP 409 (Conflict) indicates template execution failed (e.g. via {{ fail "..." }}). By injecting conditional statements such as {{ if eq (substr 0 1 .password) "S" }}ok{{ else }}{{ fail "x" }}{{ end }}, an attacker receives an HTTP 200 status when a character guess is correct and an HTTP 409 when it is incorrect. This differential response leaks one character-equality bit per request, allowing full secret extraction over successive queries. Attack vector & prerequisites: unauthenticated; requires network access to the controller's internal service port (:8080). Although this service is not exposed to the public internet by default, it is accessible to any pod within the Kubernetes cluster or via a kubectl port-forward connection.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-09-15 17:27 UTC
    CWE
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    Bitnami sealed-secrets Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.38.4 (semver)
    Unaffected: 0.40.0 (semver)
    Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website

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                  "value": "\u003cp\u003eA security vulnerability exists in the Sealed Secrets controller\u0027s unauthenticated POST endpoints. By submitting a modified payload containing custom Go template logic in spec.template.data, an attacker with internal network access can abuse the handler as a decryption oracle to recover the full plaintext of any sealed secret.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe POST /v1/verify and /v1/rotate handlers call Unseal() to decrypt target secrets, then render any Go templates found in spec.template.data.* using the decrypted payload as the evaluation context (pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go). Errors encountered during template execution are directly reflected in the resulting HTTP response status codes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMissing AEAD label binding: the spec.template.data field is omitted from the AEAD authenticated-data label binding ciphertext to metadata. As a result, an attacker can copy a target\u0027s valid metadata and encryptedData verbatim, satisfying AEAD decryption and label validation, while freely replacing spec.template.data with arbitrary template logic.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSide-channel oracle: template execution errors map directly to HTTP response codes. HTTP 200 (OK) indicates template execution succeeded; HTTP 409 (Conflict) indicates template execution failed (e.g. via {{ fail \"...\" }}).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBy injecting conditional statements such as {{ if eq (substr 0 1 .password) \"S\" }}ok{{ else }}{{ fail \"x\" }}{{ end }}, an attacker receives an HTTP 200 status when a character guess is correct and an HTTP 409 when it is incorrect. This differential response leaks one character-equality bit per request, allowing full secret extraction over successive queries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAttack vector \u0026amp; prerequisites: unauthenticated; requires network access to the controller\u0027s internal service port (:8080). Although this service is not exposed to the public internet by default, it is accessible to any pod within the Kubernetes cluster or via a kubectl port-forward connection.\u003c/p\u003e"
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    CVE-2026-22728 (GCVE-0-2026-22728)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-02-26 00:50 – Updated: 2026-02-26 15:58
    VLAI
    Title
    sealed-secrets /v1/rotate can widen sealing scope to cluster-wide via attacker-controlled template annotations
    Summary
    Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-02-26 15:58 UTC
    CWE
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    Bitnami sealed-secrets Affected: 0.35.0 , < <0.36.0 (custom)
    Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-59341 (GCVE-0-2026-59341)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 09:16 – Updated: 2026-09-16 11:53
    VLAI
    Title
    Sealed Secrets: decryption oracle via Go template injection in unauthenticated controller endpoints
    Summary
    A security vulnerability exists in the Sealed Secrets controller's unauthenticated POST endpoints. By submitting a modified payload containing custom Go template logic in spec.template.data, an attacker with internal network access can abuse the handler as a decryption oracle to recover the full plaintext of any sealed secret. The POST /v1/verify and /v1/rotate handlers call Unseal() to decrypt target secrets, then render any Go templates found in spec.template.data.* using the decrypted payload as the evaluation context (pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go). Errors encountered during template execution are directly reflected in the resulting HTTP response status codes. Missing AEAD label binding: the spec.template.data field is omitted from the AEAD authenticated-data label binding ciphertext to metadata. As a result, an attacker can copy a target's valid metadata and encryptedData verbatim, satisfying AEAD decryption and label validation, while freely replacing spec.template.data with arbitrary template logic. Side-channel oracle: template execution errors map directly to HTTP response codes. HTTP 200 (OK) indicates template execution succeeded; HTTP 409 (Conflict) indicates template execution failed (e.g. via {{ fail "..." }}). By injecting conditional statements such as {{ if eq (substr 0 1 .password) "S" }}ok{{ else }}{{ fail "x" }}{{ end }}, an attacker receives an HTTP 200 status when a character guess is correct and an HTTP 409 when it is incorrect. This differential response leaks one character-equality bit per request, allowing full secret extraction over successive queries. Attack vector & prerequisites: unauthenticated; requires network access to the controller's internal service port (:8080). Although this service is not exposed to the public internet by default, it is accessible to any pod within the Kubernetes cluster or via a kubectl port-forward connection.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-09-15 17:27 UTC
    CWE
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    Bitnami sealed-secrets Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.38.4 (semver)
    Unaffected: 0.40.0 (semver)
    Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-22728 (GCVE-0-2026-22728)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-26 00:50 – Updated: 2026-02-26 15:58
    VLAI
    Title
    sealed-secrets /v1/rotate can widen sealing scope to cluster-wide via attacker-controlled template annotations
    Summary
    Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
    Decision recorded 2026-02-26 15:58 UTC
    CWE
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    Bitnami sealed-secrets Affected: 0.35.0 , < <0.36.0 (custom)
    Create a notification for this product.
    Show details on NVD website

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