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2 vulnerabilities found for a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx by a2a-java
CVE-2026-130627 (GCVE-0-2026-130627)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-17 14:21 – Updated: 2026-11-17 18:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)
Summary
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-17 18:04 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| a2a-java | a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx |
Affected:
1.3.2.Final , ≤ 1.4.0.Final
(custom)
|
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CVE-2026-130627 (GCVE-0-2026-130627)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-17 14:21 – Updated: 2026-11-17 18:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)
Summary
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Severity
7.5 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-17 18:04 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
1 reference
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| a2a-java | a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx |
Affected:
1.3.2.Final , ≤ 1.4.0.Final
(custom)
|
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