Search
Find a vulnerability
Search criteria
2 vulnerabilities found for Platform by Rapid7
CVE-2026-97228 (GCVE-0-2026-97228)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-09-25 10:25 – Updated: 2026-09-25 11:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP — GraphQL Query Injection in Export Status Lookup
Summary
Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: "...")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.
Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-25 10:53 UTC
CWE
- CWE-943 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
Assigner
References
1 reference
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-97228",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-25T10:53:09.339314Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T11:21:15.908Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP"
],
"product": "Platform",
"repo": "http://github.com/rapid7/rapid7-bulk-export-mcp",
"vendor": "Rapid7",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Syed Anas Mohiuddin, Independent Researcher"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value \u2014 an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools \u2014 is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: \"...\")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator\u0027s own API key.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNotably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator\u0027s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator\u0027s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`)."
}
],
"value": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value \u2014 an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools \u2014 is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: \"...\")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator\u0027s own API key.\n\nNotably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator\u0027s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator\u0027s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`)."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-676",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-676 NoSQL Injection"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.7,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-943",
"description": "CWE-943: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T10:25:43.159Z",
"orgId": "9974b330-7714-4307-a722-5648477acda7",
"shortName": "rapid7"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/rapid7-bulk-export-mcp/releases/tag/v0.6.2"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP \u2014 GraphQL Query Injection in Export Status Lookup",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "9974b330-7714-4307-a722-5648477acda7",
"assignerShortName": "rapid7",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-97228",
"datePublished": "2026-09-25T10:25:43.159Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-24T10:00:04.695Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T11:21:15.908Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-97228 (GCVE-0-2026-97228)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-25 10:25 – Updated: 2026-09-25 11:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP — GraphQL Query Injection in Export Status Lookup
Summary
Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: "...")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.
Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-25 10:53 UTC
CWE
- CWE-943 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
Assigner
References
1 reference
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-97228",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-25T10:53:09.339314Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T11:21:15.908Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP"
],
"product": "Platform",
"repo": "http://github.com/rapid7/rapid7-bulk-export-mcp",
"vendor": "Rapid7",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.6.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Syed Anas Mohiuddin, Independent Researcher"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value \u2014 an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools \u2014 is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: \"...\")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator\u0027s own API key.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eNotably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator\u0027s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator\u0027s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`)."
}
],
"value": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value \u2014 an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools \u2014 is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: \"...\")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator\u0027s own API key.\n\nNotably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator\u0027s own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator\u0027s own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`)."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-676",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-676 NoSQL Injection"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 2.7,
"baseSeverity": "LOW",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-943",
"description": "CWE-943: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T10:25:43.159Z",
"orgId": "9974b330-7714-4307-a722-5648477acda7",
"shortName": "rapid7"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/rapid7-bulk-export-mcp/releases/tag/v0.6.2"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP \u2014 GraphQL Query Injection in Export Status Lookup",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "9974b330-7714-4307-a722-5648477acda7",
"assignerShortName": "rapid7",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-97228",
"datePublished": "2026-09-25T10:25:43.159Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-24T10:00:04.695Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T11:21:15.908Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}