Most recent entries from github

GHSA-x4q3-gcj3-m6cf — gitea-runner: workflow container.options passes host namespaces and capability flags to job container when privileged m…

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:18:12 +0000

Affected: Go: gitea.com/gitea/runner

### Summary act_runner appends workflow-controlled `jobs.<job>.container.options` directly to the Docker HostConfig for the job container. When runner privileged mode is disabled, only `Privileged` is forced false. Host namespace flags, capability expansion, and security profile overrides from workflow YAML are preserved in the final HostConfig. A workflow author can enter host PID/IPC namespaces and execute commands on the runner host as root.

### Details Source-to-sink path in act_runner:

- `ContainerSpec.Options` accepts workflow YAML `container.options` - `RunContext.options()` appends workflow options to runner-level container options - Job container is created with `Privileged: rc.Config.Privileged` but also with `Options: rc.options(ctx)` - `mergeContainerConfigs()` parses Docker CLI-style options into HostConfig - When privileged mode is disabled, only `copts.privileged` is forced false - `sanitizeConfig()` only filters `Binds` and `Mounts` - Preserved dangerous HostConfig fields:

```text Privileged=false PidMode=host IpcMode=host CapAdd=["ALL"] SecurityOpt=["seccomp=unconfined","apparmor=unconfined"] ```

Attacker workflow YAML: ```yaml jobs: breakout: runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: image: ubuntu:22.04 options: >- --pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL --security-opt seccomp=unconfined --security-opt apparmor=unconfined steps: - name: host namespace marker run: | nsenter -t 1 -m -…

GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrc — probe-image-size: Quadratic-time Denial of Service in the SVG Parser

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:18:02 +0000

Affected: npm: probe-image-size

## Overview

`probe-image-size` scans the SVG header with a searching regular expression, `/<[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^>]*>/`. On input that contains many `<` characters but no `>`, the engine restarts the `[^>]*` scan at every `<` position and runs to end of input each time, giving quadratic time complexity.

Both the synchronous and the streaming parser are affected.

## Impact

Every entry point that reaches the SVG parser is affected: `probe.sync()`, `probe(stream)` and `probe(url)`. The URL form is the most exposed one — the input is fetched from a remote host, so an attacker only needs to supply a link.

Processing a crafted buffer blocks the Node.js event loop at 100% CPU for the whole duration. In production environments such as upload validators, image proxies or link unfurl services, a small number of concurrent requests is enough to deny service.

## Root Cause Analysis

Two independent problems.

1. **Absence of input size cap in the sync path.** `lib/parse_sync/svg.js` copied the entire buffer into a string and matched against it. There was no size limit at all, so cost scaled with the size of the attacker-supplied buffer.

2. **Repeated rescanning in the stream path.** `lib/parse_stream/svg.js` did cap accumulated data at 64 KB, but called `parseSvg(str)` on the whole accumulated string on *every* chunk, giving `O(chunks × N²)`. The cap does not help here: the more chunks the input is split into, the more times the quadratic scan is repeated.

Chunk size is influence…

GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj — SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of CheckHostSSRF)

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:17:16 +0000

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

# Security Advisory — SiYuan Agent Tools SSRF via DNS-Rebinding TOCTOU (Bypass of `CheckHostSSRF`)

| Field | Value | |---|---| | **Disclosed by** | joysinleung (`joysinleung@gmail.com`) | | **Report date** | 2026-08-13 | | **Product** | SiYuan (思源笔记) — `siyuan-note/siyuan` | | **Go module** | `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel` | | **Affected versions** | `<= 3.8.0` (latest release at report time; dynamically verified on v3.8.0) | | **Patched versions** | 3.8.1 | | **Component** | `kernel/util/httprequest.go` (`CheckHostSSRF`), `kernel/mcp/tools/http_request.go`, `kernel/util/webfetch.go`, `kernel/util/net.go` (`SSRFSafeDialer`) | | **Relationship to prior advisory** | **Incomplete-fix variant of GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p** (SSRF main-vector remediation). See §Relationship. | | **EPSS (exploitation probability)** | Low–Moderate. Requires the attacker to influence an AI Agent / MCP client into fetching an attacker-controlled domain (prompt-injection scenario documented by the tool itself). | | **KEV (CISA Known Exploited)** | No (not listed in CISA KEV at report time). | | **Default-config reachable** | **Yes** — exploitable under *both* `SafeMode` on and off; only requires the agent `http_request` / `web_fetch` tool to be reachable (default AI tooling). |

---

## Summary

SiYuan's AI Agent tools `http_request` (`util.HTTPRequest`) and `web_fetch` (`util.WebFetch`) are the only SSRF gate for outbound requests from the kernel. That gate is `CheckHostSSRF`, which performs a **si…

GHSA-p23f-cm6q-2qp8 — SiYuan MCP asset.upload Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass)

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:16:56 +0000

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

# Security Advisory — SiYuan MCP `asset.upload` Reads Arbitrary Absolute File Paths (Workspace Boundary Bypass)

| Field | Value | |---|---| | **Disclosed by** | joysinleung (`joysinleung@gmail.com`) | | **Report date** | 2026-08-13 | | **Product** | SiYuan (思源笔记) — `siyuan-note/siyuan` | | **Go module** | `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel` | | **Affected versions** | `<= 3.8.0` (latest release at report time; statically confirmed on v3.8.0) | | **Patched versions** | 3.8.1 | | **Component** | `kernel/mcp/tools/asset.go` (`assetUpload`), `kernel/model/upload.go` (`InsertLocalAssets`) | | **Relationship to prior advisory** | **Residual of CVE-2026-66012** (GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8) MCP remediation. See §Relationship. | | **EPSS (exploitation probability)** | Low. Requires the AI Agent to invoke `asset.upload` and the user to approve the (category-level) confirmation; reachable via prompt-injection of the agent. | | **KEV (CISA Known Exploited)** | No (not listed in CISA KEV at report time). | | **Default-config reachable** | **Partial** — requires the Agent/MCP surface to be configured (admin) and a user approval click; the boundary check itself is entirely absent, so any approved upload reads outside the workspace. |

---

## Summary

SiYuan exposes a native MCP tool `asset` → `asset.upload`. Its `files` argument is documented as a **comma-separated list of absolute file paths**. The handler (`kernel/mcp/tools/asset.go:195`) only normalizes each entry with `filepath.Abs(...)`…

GHSA-x8mw-p69m-v3mx — @fastify/busboy vulnerable to Denial of Service via prototype-named multipart part header

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:16:36 +0000

Affected: npm: @fastify/busboy

### Impact

Versions of `@fastify/busboy` from 1.0.0 and prior to 3.2.1 are vulnerable to a Denial of Service. The multipart header parser stores part-header names on a plain JavaScript object, so a part header named `__proto__` or `constructor` resolves to an inherited value that is not an array, and the parser throws `TypeError: this.header[h].push is not a function`. Through the documented `req.pipe(busboy)` integration this surfaces as an `error` event, while direct `write()`/`end()` usage throws synchronously and can terminate the Node.js process if uncaught. The parser runs before application middleware, so any unauthenticated client that can submit multipart/form-data is affected.

### Patches

Fixed in version 3.2.1.

### Workarounds

Attach an `error` listener to the Busboy stream so the parser failure is handled rather than crashing the process, and wrap direct `write()`/`end()` calls in a try/catch. Upgrading to 3.2.1 removes the failure entirely.

GHSA-xjh9-v7x6-24jw — @fastify/busboy vulnerable to Denial of Service via oversized multipart boundary

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:16:17 +0000

Affected: npm: @fastify/busboy

### Impact

Versions of `@fastify/busboy` from 3.1.0 and prior to 3.2.1 are vulnerable to a Denial of Service. The vendored streaming multipart search stores its default skip distance in a `Uint8Array(256)`. A multipart boundary of exactly 252 bytes makes the search needle 256 bytes, and the table entry wraps to zero, so a crafted request keeps the search in a CPU-bound loop and stalls the Node.js event loop. An unauthenticated client can trigger this with a single small request. Applications that use `@fastify/busboy` to parse multipart/form-data, directly or through `@fastify/multipart`, are affected.

### Patches

Fixed in version 3.2.1.

### Workarounds

Validate the multipart boundary before parsing and reject any boundary longer than the RFC 2046 limit of 70 characters (for example at a reverse proxy or in an onRequest hook). Upgrading to 3.2.1 removes the issue.

GHSA-mwm8-39rw-8826 — sqlite3-ruby: Use-After-Free in SQLite Aggregate Arguments in Heap-Allocated Argument Array

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:11:51 +0000

Affected: RubyGems: sqlite3

## Summary

Using `Database#create_aggregate`, `#create_aggregate_handler`, or `Database#define_aggregator` to define an aggregate function that takes two or more arguments, and then evaluating it over TEXT or BLOB column values, can free the Ruby objects holding those arguments while a later argument is still being converted, during ordinary garbage collection. The aggregate's `step` method then receives an incorrect object, or the process crashes with a segmentation fault.

## Mitigation

Upgrade to sqlite3 gem v2.9.6 or later.

There is no reliable workaround. If you cannot upgrade, avoid defining aggregate functions that take two or more arguments. Restricting column value sizes is not a mitigation: smaller values make the defect fire less often but do not prevent it.

## Severity

The sqlite3-ruby maintainers assess this as Medium severity (CVSS 4.0 score 6.3). It is reached through ordinary garbage collection without any unusual code structuring: an application is exposed whenever it evaluates a multi-argument aggregate over TEXT or BLOB values whose size an attacker can influence. The demonstrated impact is an incorrect value passed to the aggregate's `step` method, or a process crash; no controlled memory write or general denial-of-service exploit has been demonstrated.

## Credits

Reported by Jeremy Daer ([@jeremy](https://github.com/jeremy)).

GHSA-cjcg-cxmh-9wcr — Praxis affected by HTTP/2 Bomb

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:09:37 +0000

Affected: crates.io: praxis-proxy

### Summary

Multiple denial-of-service vulnerabilities have been discovered in HTTP/2 server implementations. All have been rated with a severity impact of [Important](https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification). The vulnerabilities target HPACK, the header compression scheme in HTTP/2, where a small request can trigger large memory allocations on the server.

### Details

Credit to the original researcher, I'm mostly just run their tool against the code base.

[Security Bulletins](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-007): https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-007 Exploit details: https://blog.calif.io/p/codex-discovered-a-hidden-http2-bomb

This bug was fixed in upstream pingora v0.8.1, but our fork (v0.8.2) is missing this important [PR](https://github.com/praxis-proxy/pingora/commit/d193c8d49b8b7c1c1ede93183759caa4f6906bbd) to set the default h2 options. (edited)

### PoC

* Generate certificates ``` openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 -keyout server.key -out server.crt -days 3650 -nodes -subj "/CN=localhost" ```

* Create praxis config as follow

``` listeners: - name: web address: "0.0.0.0:8443" tls: certificates: - cert_path: /etc/praxis/server.crt key_path: /etc/praxis/server.key filter_chains: [main]

filter_chains: - name: main filters: - filter: router routes: - path_prefix: "/" host: "examp…

GHSA-h46j-26q3-rggf — Headroom vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:09:15 +0000

Affected: PyPI: headroom-ai

### Summary The Headroom WebSocket server does not validate the `Origin` header of incoming client WebSocket requests before forwarding the request to the upstream server, allowing malicious WebSocket clients to perform arbitrary LLM requests without authentication. This can be exploited by a malicious WebSocket client executed in a traditional or headless browser such as lightpanda, if the browser has access to the Headroom proxy and the OpenAI API key is stored in the `OPENAI_API_KEY` environment variable.

### Details The Headroom server defines a WebSocket handler at `ws://<headroom_host>:8787/v1/responses` in `headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py`: ```python @app.websocket("/v1/responses") async def openai_responses_ws(websocket: WebSocket): await proxy.handle_openai_responses_ws(websocket) ``` In the `handle_openai_responses_ws()` method of the `OpenAIHandlerMixin` class, the `Origin` header of the WebSocket client handshake is not checked or verified before calling `websocket.accept()`, which grants any WebSocket client (including malicious clients) access to the server: ```python async def handle_openai_responses_ws(self, websocket: WebSocket) -> None: """WebSocket proxy for /v1/responses (Codex gpt-5.4+).

Newer Codex versions use WebSocket instead of HTTP POST for the Responses API. This handler: 1. Accepts the client WebSocket 2. Receives the first message (``response.create`` request) 3. Opens an…

GHSA-4vpg-gwqq-w44c — SiYuan: 17 block metadata/content endpoints in kernel/api/block.go have zero publish-access filtering, reachable by ano…

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:05:33 +0000

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Same CWE-862 family, found via an automated bulk sweep of every `/api/block/*` handler in `kernel/api/block.go` for the presence of any access-check reference (`IsReadOnlyRoleContext`, `checkBlockPublishAccess`, `GetPublishAccess`) anywhere in the function body. 17 of 28 candidate endpoints have none. Cross-checked against the file's own sibling functions (`getBlockInfo`, `getBlockDOM`, `getRefIDs`, etc.), which correctly implement the check, confirming this is a real, uneven gap rather than a deliberate design choice for the whole file.

### Summary 17 handlers in `kernel/api/block.go`, all gated only by `model.CheckAuth` with no admin-role requirement, return block content-derived text, structural metadata, or existence information for any block ID supplied, with no access check anywhere in the handler or, for the ones checked in detail, the model functions they call. This is CWE-862 (Missing Authorization), the same class as the companion advisories from this review round, found in a different file via a systematic bulk check rather than manual inspection of each function individually.

### Details Confirmed via automated extraction of every function body between `func NAME(c *gin.Context) {` and the next such declaration, then searching each for any of `IsReadOnlyRoleContext`, `checkBlockPublishAccess`, `GetPublishAccess`, or `PublishAccess`. The following contain none of these, at all:

| Endpoint | What it discloses | |---|---| | `getRefText` | The block's actual refe…