<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:49:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-86861 — pgAdmin 4: File Manager save_file writes through a symbolic link planted after the containment check</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-86861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pgAdmin 4&amp;#39;s File Manager save_file endpoint, which backs saving from the Query Tool and ERD, validated the requested path with Filemanager.check_access_permission() and then opened the file for writing with a plain open() call. CVE-2026-7819 had previously hardened the separate file upload path by opening its target with O_NOFOLLOW, so that the kernel refuses to follow a symbolic link at the final path component, but save_file was left on an unprotected open(). A symbolic link already present when the check ran was rejected by the check itself; the remaining exposure was a link substituted at the final path component in the interval between the check and the write, at which point the write followed the link and landed outside the user&amp;#39;s storage directory, creating or overwriting an arbitrary file as the operating-system account running pgAdmin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires the ability to create or replace a symbolic link inside the requesting user&amp;#39;s storage directory. pgAdmin exposes no interface that creates symbolic links, so this requires filesystem access to the pgAdmin host or to a shared or network-mounted storage backend, together with winning the timing window. The reporter did not achieve a write against a released version, having attempted approximately 63,000 racing requests without success; the reported defect is the uncovered write path rather than a demonstrated sandbox escape.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix routes save_file&amp;#39;s write through the same O_NOFOLLOW-protected helper already use…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pgAdmin 4&amp;#39;s File Manager save_file endpoint, which backs saving from the Query Tool and ERD, validated the requested path with Filemanager.check_access_permission() and then opened the file for writing with a plain open() call. CVE-2026-7819 had previously hardened the separate file upload path by opening its target with O_NOFOLLOW, so that the kernel refuses to follow a symbolic link at the final path component, but save_file was left on an unprotected open(). A symbolic link already present when the check ran was rejected by the check itself; the remaining exposure was a link substituted at the final path component in the interval between the check and the write, at which point the write followed the link and landed outside the user&amp;#39;s storage directory, creating or overwriting an arbitrary file as the operating-system account running pgAdmin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires the ability to create or replace a symbolic link inside the requesting user&amp;#39;s storage directory. pgAdmin exposes no interface that creates symbolic links, so this requires filesystem access to the pgAdmin host or to a shared or network-mounted storage backend, together with winning the timing window. The reporter did not achieve a write against a released version, having attempted approximately 63,000 racing requests without success; the reported defect is the uncovered write path rather than a demonstrated sandbox escape.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix routes save_file&amp;#39;s write through the same O_NOFOLLOW-protected helper already use…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-86861</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
