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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 18:12:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64527 — drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-64527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host
wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs
memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on
msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bound…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host
wrote into hv-&amp;gt;recv_buf. The completion path then runs
memcpy(hv-&amp;gt;init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on
msg-&amp;gt;vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bound…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-64527</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>USN-8618-1 — linux-aws, linux-raspi vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/usn-8618-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-raspi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It was discovered that some AMD Zen 2 processors did not properly isolate
shared resources in the operation cache. A local attacker could possibly
use this issue to corrupt instructions executed at a higher privilege
level, resulting in privilege escalation. (CVE-2025-54518)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - x86 platform drivers;
  - Cryptographic API;
  - PSP security protocol;
  - ARM32 architecture;
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - User-Mode Linux (UML);
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Intel NPU Driver;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Auxiliary display drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - DRBD Distributed Replicated Block Device drivers;
  - Rados block device (RBD) driver;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Compressed RAM block device driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Bus devices;
  - Character device driver;
  - Clock framework and drivers;
  - CPU frequency scaling framework;
  - Hardware crypto device drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - Arm Firmware Framework for ARMv8-A(FFA);
  - EFI core;
  - FWCTL subsystem;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - Hardware monitoring drivers;
  - I2C subsystem;
  - I…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-raspi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It was discovered that some AMD Zen 2 processors did not properly isolate
shared resources in the operation cache. A local attacker could possibly
use this issue to corrupt instructions executed at a higher privilege
level, resulting in privilege escalation. (CVE-2025-54518)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - x86 platform drivers;
  - Cryptographic API;
  - PSP security protocol;
  - ARM32 architecture;
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - User-Mode Linux (UML);
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Intel NPU Driver;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Auxiliary display drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - DRBD Distributed Replicated Block Device drivers;
  - Rados block device (RBD) driver;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Compressed RAM block device driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Bus devices;
  - Character device driver;
  - Clock framework and drivers;
  - CPU frequency scaling framework;
  - Hardware crypto device drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - Arm Firmware Framework for ARMv8-A(FFA);
  - EFI core;
  - FWCTL subsystem;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - Hardware monitoring drivers;
  - I2C subsystem;
  - I…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/usn-8618-1</guid>
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