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      <title>GHSA-vfvv-c25p-m7mm — rkyv: Panic safety bugs in `InlineVec::clear` and `SerVec::clear` enable arbitrary code execution</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vfvv-c25p-m7mm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rkyv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element&amp;#39;s `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`&amp;#39;s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped.
- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the  user closure returns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** Heap corruption when element type holds `Box&amp;lt;T&amp;gt;`  
- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** Memory corruption when element reads from heap during `Drop`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via `std::panic::catch_unwind` and require no special privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rkyv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`InlineVec::clear()` and `SerVec::clear()` in `rkyv` were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call `drop_in_place` on each, updating `self.len` only *after* the loop. If an element&amp;#39;s `Drop` implementation panics during the loop, `self.len` is left at its original value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A subsequent invocation of `clear()` on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `InlineVec::clear()` is called again from `InlineVec`&amp;#39;s own `Drop` implementation when the value is later dropped.
- `SerVec::clear()` is called again by `SerVec::with_capacity()` after the  user closure returns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **CWE-415 (Double Free):** Heap corruption when element type holds `Box&amp;lt;T&amp;gt;`  
- **CWE-416 (Use-After-Free):** Memory corruption when element reads from heap during `Drop`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both vulnerabilities are triggerable entirely from safe Rust via `std::panic::catch_unwind` and require no special privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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