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      <title>GHSA-j3px-q95c-9683 — zlib-rs stack overflow during decompression with malicious input</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j3px-q95c-9683</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: zlib-rs, crates.io: libz-rs-sys, crates.io: libz-rs-sys-cdylib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A denial of service vulnerability was found in zlib-rs, triggered by specially constructed input. This input causes a stack overflow, resulting in the process using zlib-rs to crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Due to the way LLVM handles the zlib-rs codebase, tail calls were not guaranteed. This caused certain input patterns to result in a large number of stack frames being required, quickly resulting in a stack overflow. These are unlikely to occur in practice, but a dedicated attacker can construct malicious input files.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After stack overflows were found by @inahga with a fuzzer, we dove into the assembly, and found some cases where the stack grew&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```asm
.LBB109_326:
    mov rdi, rbx
    call zlib_rs::inflate::State::type_do
    jmp .LBB109_311&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;.LBB109_311:
    lea rsp, [rbp - 40]
    pop rbx
    pop r12
    pop r13
    pop r14
    pop r15
    pop rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa rsp, 8
    ret
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LLVM wants to centralize the cleanup before the return (many other blocks jump to `LBB109_311`), thereby invalidating a tail call to `type_do`. We were not able to get rid of this call without introducing one elsewhere: we just don&amp;#39;t currently have the power to tell LLVM what we want it to do.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, we switch back to loop+match waiting for changes to rust to make a more efficient implementation possible. Performance-wise, the damage is relatively minimal: we&amp;#39;re just slower in cases where we already were slower than C. We are faster in cases where the relevant code is barely touched (in these cases the…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: zlib-rs, crates.io: libz-rs-sys, crates.io: libz-rs-sys-cdylib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A denial of service vulnerability was found in zlib-rs, triggered by specially constructed input. This input causes a stack overflow, resulting in the process using zlib-rs to crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Due to the way LLVM handles the zlib-rs codebase, tail calls were not guaranteed. This caused certain input patterns to result in a large number of stack frames being required, quickly resulting in a stack overflow. These are unlikely to occur in practice, but a dedicated attacker can construct malicious input files.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;After stack overflows were found by @inahga with a fuzzer, we dove into the assembly, and found some cases where the stack grew&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```asm
.LBB109_326:
    mov rdi, rbx
    call zlib_rs::inflate::State::type_do
    jmp .LBB109_311&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;.LBB109_311:
    lea rsp, [rbp - 40]
    pop rbx
    pop r12
    pop r13
    pop r14
    pop r15
    pop rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa rsp, 8
    ret
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LLVM wants to centralize the cleanup before the return (many other blocks jump to `LBB109_311`), thereby invalidating a tail call to `type_do`. We were not able to get rid of this call without introducing one elsewhere: we just don&amp;#39;t currently have the power to tell LLVM what we want it to do.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, we switch back to loop+match waiting for changes to rust to make a more efficient implementation possible. Performance-wise, the damage is relatively minimal: we&amp;#39;re just slower in cases where we already were slower than C. We are faster in cases where the relevant code is barely touched (in these cases the…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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