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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 22:55:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-40644 — gitoxide's gix-path can use a fake program files location</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-40644</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Byron gitoxide&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gitoxide An idiomatic, lean, fast &amp;amp; safe pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-path` can be tricked into running another `git.exe` placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account on Windows systems. Windows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While `gix-path` first looks for `git` using a `PATH` search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories. Existing functions, as well as the newly introduced `exe_invocation` function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in `gix_path::env` to directly execute `git.exe` in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it. Although unusual setups where the system drive is not `C:`, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory. A limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other user accounts including administrators will execute it if they run an application that uses `gix-path` and do not have `git…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Byron gitoxide&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gitoxide An idiomatic, lean, fast &amp;amp; safe pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-path` can be tricked into running another `git.exe` placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account on Windows systems. Windows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While `gix-path` first looks for `git` using a `PATH` search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories. Existing functions, as well as the newly introduced `exe_invocation` function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in `gix_path::env` to directly execute `git.exe` in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it. Although unusual setups where the system drive is not `C:`, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory. A limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other user accounts including administrators will execute it if they run an application that uses `gix-path` and do not have `git…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-40644</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4 — gix-path can use a fake program files location</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: gix-path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When looking for Git for Windows so it can run it to report its paths, `gix-path` can be tricked into running another `git.exe` placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Windows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While `gix-path` first looks for `git` using a `PATH` search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Existing functions, as well as the newly introduced `exe_invocation` function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in `gix_path::env` to directly execute `git.exe` in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although unusual setups where the system drive is not `C:`, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other use…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: gix-path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When looking for Git for Windows so it can run it to report its paths, `gix-path` can be tricked into running another `git.exe` placed in an untrusted location by a limited user account.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Windows permits limited user accounts without administrative privileges to create new directories in the root of the system drive. While `gix-path` first looks for `git` using a `PATH` search, in version 0.10.8 it also has a fallback strategy on Windows of checking two hard-coded paths intended to be the 64-bit and 32-bit Program Files directories:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/6cd8b4665bb7582f744c3244abaef812be39ec35/gix-path/src/env/git.rs#L9-L14&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Existing functions, as well as the newly introduced `exe_invocation` function, were updated to make use of these alternative locations. This causes facilities in `gix_path::env` to directly execute `git.exe` in those locations, as well as to return its path or whatever configuration it reports to callers who rely on it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although unusual setups where the system drive is not `C:`, or even where Program Files directories have non-default names, are technically possible, the main problem arises on a 32-bit Windows system. Such a system has no `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A limited user on a 32-bit Windows system can therefore create the `C:\Program Files (x86)` directory and populate it with arbitrary contents. Once a payload has been placed at the second of the two hard-coded paths in this way, other use…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mgvv-9p9g-3jv4</guid>
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