https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 21:13:28 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-35186 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Byron gitoxide</p> <p>gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Byron gitoxide</p> <p>gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-35186 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7w47-3wg8-547c <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: gix-worktree-state, crates.io: gitoxide, crates.io: gix-fs, crates.io: gix-worktree, crates.io: gix, crates.io: gitoxide-core, crates.io: gix-index</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule&#39;s `.git` directory. The simplest cases are:</p> <p>- A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed.</p> <p>A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past:</p> <p>- A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or b…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: gix-worktree-state, crates.io: gitoxide, crates.io: gix-fs, crates.io: gix-worktree, crates.io: gix, crates.io: gitoxide-core, crates.io: gix-index</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule&#39;s `.git` directory. The simplest cases are:</p> <p>- A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed.</p> <p>A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past:</p> <p>- A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or b…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7w47-3wg8-547c