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      <title>CVE-2023-42811 — AEADs/aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-42811</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RustCrypto AEADs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to version 0.10.3, in the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails. If a program using the `aes-gcm` crate&amp;#39;s `decrypt_in_place*` APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery. Version 0.10.3 contains a fix for this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RustCrypto AEADs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. Starting in version 0.10.0 and prior to version 0.10.3, in the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails. If a program using the `aes-gcm` crate&amp;#39;s `decrypt_in_place*` APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery. Version 0.10.3 contains a fix for this issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-42811</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-423w-p2w9-r7vq — AEADs/aes-gcm: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-423w-p2w9-r7vq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: aes-gcm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
If a program using the `aes-gcm` crate&amp;#39;s `decrypt_in_place*` APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
As seen in the implementation of [decrypt_in_place_detached](https://docs.rs/aes-gcm/latest/src/aes_gcm/lib.rs.html#309) for AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned. Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place, the plaintext contents are now exposed via `buffer`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of[ NIST&amp;#39;s publication _Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC_](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf): 
_In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the authentication tag that was received as an input: if they are identical, then the plaintext is returned; otherwise,FAIL is returned._&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is seems correctly addressed in the [AES GCM SIV implementation](https://docs.rs/aes-gcm-siv/latest/src/aes_gcm_siv/lib.rs.html#307), where the decrypted buffer is encrypted again before the error is r…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: aes-gcm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is exposed even if tag verification fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
If a program using the `aes-gcm` crate&amp;#39;s `decrypt_in_place*` APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending on the specific nature of the program this may enable Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full plaintext recovery.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
As seen in the implementation of [decrypt_in_place_detached](https://docs.rs/aes-gcm/latest/src/aes_gcm/lib.rs.html#309) for AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned. Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place, the plaintext contents are now exposed via `buffer`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of[ NIST&amp;#39;s publication _Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC_](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf): 
_In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the authentication tag that was received as an input: if they are identical, then the plaintext is returned; otherwise,FAIL is returned._&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is seems correctly addressed in the [AES GCM SIV implementation](https://docs.rs/aes-gcm-siv/latest/src/aes_gcm_siv/lib.rs.html#307), where the decrypted buffer is encrypted again before the error is r…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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