CVE-2021-32714 — Integer Overflow in Chunked Transfer-Encoding

Affected: hyperium hyper

hyper is an HTTP library for Rust. In versions prior to 0.14.10, hyper's HTTP server and client code had a flaw that could trigger an integer overflow when decoding chunk sizes that are too big. This allows possible data loss, or if combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that allows chunk sizes larger than hyper does, can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks." The vulnerability is patched in version 0.14.10. Two possible workarounds exist. One may reject requests manually that contain a `Transfer-Encoding` header or ensure any upstream proxy rejects `Transfer-Encoding` chunk sizes greater than what fits in 64-bit unsigned integers.

GHSA-5h46-h7hh-c6x9 — Integer Overflow in Chunked Transfer-Encoding

Affected: crates.io: hyper

### Summary

hyper's HTTP server and client code had a flaw that could trigger an integer overflow when decoding chunk sizes that are too big. This allows possible data loss, or if combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that allows chunk sizes larger than hyper does, can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks".

### Vulnerability

Example:

``` GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com Transfer-Encoding: chunked

f0000000000000003 abc 0

```

hyper only reads the rightmost 64-bit integer as the chunk size. So it reads `f0000000000000003` as `3`. A loss of data can occur since hyper would then read only 3 bytes of the body. Additionally, an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability would occur if using a proxy which instead has prefix truncation in the chunk size, or that understands larger than 64-bit chunk sizes.

Read more about desync attacks: https://portswigger.net/research/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn

### Impact

To determine if vulnerable to _data loss_, these things must be true:

- **Using HTTP/1.1.** Since HTTP/2 does not use chunked encoding, it is not vulnerable. - **Using hyper as a server or client.** The body would be improperly truncated in either case. - **Users send requests or responses with chunk sizes greater than 18 exabytes**.

To determine if vulnerable to _desync attacks_, these things must be true:

- **Using an upstream proxy that allows chunks sizes larger than 64-bit.** If the proxy rejects chunk sizes that are too large, that request…

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CVE-2021-32714 — Integer Overflow in Chunked Transfer-Encoding

GHSA-5h46-h7hh-c6x9 — Integer Overflow in Chunked Transfer-Encoding