https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:10:00 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33497 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> langflow-ai langflow</p> <p>Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> langflow-ai langflow</p> <p>Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33497 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ph9w-r52h-28p7 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langflow</p> <p>## Vulnerability</p> <p>### Path Traversal in `GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}`</p> <p>The `download_profile_picture` function in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py` constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied `folder_name` and `file_name` path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.</p> <p>An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. `../secret_key`) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.</p> <p>This exposed the server to:</p> <p>- **Sensitive file disclosure** — any file readable by the application process could be retrieved - **Secret key exfiltration** — the application&#39;s `secret_key` file, used as JWT signing material, could be read directly via `../secret_key` - **Authentication bypass** — with the `secret_key` in hand, an attacker can forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate as any user, including administrators</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Proof of Concept</p> <p>```bash curl --path-as-is &#39;http://&lt;host&gt;:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key&#39; ```</p> <p>A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Fix</p> <p>The fix was applied in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py` (PR #12263).</p> <p>Two layers of defense were introduced:</p> <p>**1. Typed path validation** — the `folder_name` and `fi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langflow</p> <p>## Vulnerability</p> <p>### Path Traversal in `GET /api/v1/files/profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name}`</p> <p>The `download_profile_picture` function in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py` constructed file paths by directly concatenating the user-supplied `folder_name` and `file_name` path parameters without sanitization or boundary validation. The resulting path was passed to the filesystem without verifying it remained within the intended directory.</p> <p>An unauthenticated attacker could supply traversal sequences (e.g. `../secret_key`) to navigate outside the profile pictures directory and read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.</p> <p>This exposed the server to:</p> <p>- **Sensitive file disclosure** — any file readable by the application process could be retrieved - **Secret key exfiltration** — the application&#39;s `secret_key` file, used as JWT signing material, could be read directly via `../secret_key` - **Authentication bypass** — with the `secret_key` in hand, an attacker can forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate as any user, including administrators</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Proof of Concept</p> <p>```bash curl --path-as-is &#39;http://&lt;host&gt;:7860/api/v1/files/profile_pictures/../secret_key&#39; ```</p> <p>A successful response returns the raw secret key value used to sign all JWT authentication tokens in the instance.</p> <p>---</p> <p>## Fix</p> <p>The fix was applied in `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/files.py` (PR #12263).</p> <p>Two layers of defense were introduced:</p> <p>**1. Typed path validation** — the `folder_name` and `fi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ph9w-r52h-28p7