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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 22:17:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-28416 — Gradio has SSRF via Malicious `proxy_url` Injection in `gr.load()` Config Processing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-28416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gradio-app gradio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gradio is an open-source Python package designed for quick prototyping. Prior to version 6.6.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Gradio allows an attacker to make arbitrary HTTP requests from a victim&amp;#39;s server by hosting a malicious Gradio Space. When a victim application uses `gr.load()` to load an attacker-controlled Space, the malicious `proxy_url` from the config is trusted and added to the allowlist, enabling the attacker to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private networks through the victim&amp;#39;s infrastructure. Version 6.6.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gradio-app gradio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gradio is an open-source Python package designed for quick prototyping. Prior to version 6.6.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Gradio allows an attacker to make arbitrary HTTP requests from a victim&amp;#39;s server by hosting a malicious Gradio Space. When a victim application uses `gr.load()` to load an attacker-controlled Space, the malicious `proxy_url` from the config is trusted and added to the allowlist, enabling the attacker to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private networks through the victim&amp;#39;s infrastructure. Version 6.6.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-28416</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jmh7-g254-2cq9 — Gradio has SSRF via Malicious `proxy_url` Injection in `gr.load()` Config Processing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jmh7-g254-2cq9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gradio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Gradio allows an attacker to make arbitrary HTTP requests from a victim&amp;#39;s server by hosting a malicious Gradio Space. When a victim application uses `gr.load()` to load an attacker-controlled Space, the malicious `proxy_url` from the config is trusted and added to the allowlist, enabling the attacker to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private networks through the victim&amp;#39;s infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in Gradio&amp;#39;s config processing flow when loading external Spaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Config Fetching** (`gradio/external.py:630`): `gr.load()` calls `Blocks.from_config()` which fetches and processes the remote Space&amp;#39;s configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Proxy URL Trust** (`gradio/blocks.py:1231-1233`): The `proxy_url` from the untrusted config is added directly to `self.proxy_urls`:
   ```python
   if config.get(&amp;#34;proxy_url&amp;#34;):
       self.proxy_urls.add(config[&amp;#34;proxy_url&amp;#34;])
   ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. **Built-in Proxy Route** (`gradio/routes.py:1029-1031`): Every Gradio app automatically exposes a `/proxy={url_path}` endpoint:
   ```python
   @router.get(&amp;#34;/proxy={url_path:path}&amp;#34;, dependencies=[Depends(login_check)])
   async def reverse_proxy(url_path: str):
   ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4. **Host-based Validation** (`gradio/routes.py:365-368`): The validation only checks if the URL&amp;#39;s host matches any trusted `proxy_url` host:
   ```python
   is_safe_url = any(
       url.host == httpx.URL(root).host for root in self.blocks.proxy_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gradio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Gradio allows an attacker to make arbitrary HTTP requests from a victim&amp;#39;s server by hosting a malicious Gradio Space. When a victim application uses `gr.load()` to load an attacker-controlled Space, the malicious `proxy_url` from the config is trusted and added to the allowlist, enabling the attacker to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private networks through the victim&amp;#39;s infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability exists in Gradio&amp;#39;s config processing flow when loading external Spaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Config Fetching** (`gradio/external.py:630`): `gr.load()` calls `Blocks.from_config()` which fetches and processes the remote Space&amp;#39;s configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Proxy URL Trust** (`gradio/blocks.py:1231-1233`): The `proxy_url` from the untrusted config is added directly to `self.proxy_urls`:
   ```python
   if config.get(&amp;#34;proxy_url&amp;#34;):
       self.proxy_urls.add(config[&amp;#34;proxy_url&amp;#34;])
   ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. **Built-in Proxy Route** (`gradio/routes.py:1029-1031`): Every Gradio app automatically exposes a `/proxy={url_path}` endpoint:
   ```python
   @router.get(&amp;#34;/proxy={url_path:path}&amp;#34;, dependencies=[Depends(login_check)])
   async def reverse_proxy(url_path: str):
   ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4. **Host-based Validation** (`gradio/routes.py:365-368`): The validation only checks if the URL&amp;#39;s host matches any trusted `proxy_url` host:
   ```python
   is_safe_url = any(
       url.host == httpx.URL(root).host for root in self.blocks.proxy_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jmh7-g254-2cq9</guid>
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