https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 12:00:37 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-56266 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Crawl4AI</p> <p>Crawl4AI before 0.8.7 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the /crawl, /crawl/stream, /md, and /llm endpoints that fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs without validation. Unauthenticated attackers can bypass the internal-address blocklist using IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Crawl4AI</p> <p>Crawl4AI before 0.8.7 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the /crawl, /crawl/stream, /md, and /llm endpoints that fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs without validation. Unauthenticated attackers can bypass the internal-address blocklist using IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses to reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-56266 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-365w-hqf6-vxfg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: crawl4ai</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.</p> <p>### Vulnerabilities</p> <p>#### 1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)</p> <p>The `output_path` parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.</p> <p>**Fix:** Added `validate_output_path()` restricting writes to `CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR` (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic `field_validator` rejecting `..` traversal sequences.</p> <p>#### 2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)</p> <p>Webhook URLs in `/crawl/job` and `/llm/job` accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.</p> <p>**Fix:** Added `validate_webhook_url()` with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit `follow_redirects=False`.</p> <p>#### 3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)</p> <p>The monitor router was mounted without `token_dep` dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like `/monitor/actions/cleanup`) accessible without authentication.</p> <p>**Fix:** Added `dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)]` to monitor router. Add…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: crawl4ai</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Multiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.</p> <p>### Vulnerabilities</p> <p>#### 1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)</p> <p>The `output_path` parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.</p> <p>**Fix:** Added `validate_output_path()` restricting writes to `CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR` (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic `field_validator` rejecting `..` traversal sequences.</p> <p>#### 2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)</p> <p>Webhook URLs in `/crawl/job` and `/llm/job` accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.</p> <p>**Fix:** Added `validate_webhook_url()` with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit `follow_redirects=False`.</p> <p>#### 3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)</p> <p>The monitor router was mounted without `token_dep` dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like `/monitor/actions/cleanup`) accessible without authentication.</p> <p>**Fix:** Added `dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)]` to monitor router. Add…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-365w-hqf6-vxfg