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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:24:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-53754 — Crawl4AI: SSRF filter bypass in Docker server via IPv6 transition forms (NAT64 / 6to4 / unspecified / v4-mapped)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53754</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; unclecode crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM friendly web crawler &amp;amp; scraper. Prior to 0.8.8, the Docker API server&amp;#39;s SSRF protection (validate_webhook_url / validate_url_destination in deploy/docker/utils.py) used an explicit IPv4/IPv6 CIDR blocklist that missed several address families. An attacker could reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) despite the filter by encoding an internal IPv4 address inside an IPv6 transition form, or by using the IPv6 unspecified address. Because the Docker API is unauthenticated by default (jwt_enabled: false), no credentials are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; unclecode crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crawl4AI is an open-source LLM friendly web crawler &amp;amp; scraper. Prior to 0.8.8, the Docker API server&amp;#39;s SSRF protection (validate_webhook_url / validate_url_destination in deploy/docker/utils.py) used an explicit IPv4/IPv6 CIDR blocklist that missed several address families. An attacker could reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) despite the filter by encoding an internal IPv4 address inside an IPv6 transition form, or by using the IPv6 unspecified address. Because the Docker API is unauthenticated by default (jwt_enabled: false), no credentials are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53754</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4qqr-vv2q-cmr5 — Crawl4AI: SSRF filter bypass in Docker server via IPv6 transition forms (NAT64 / 6to4 / unspecified / v4-mapped)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4qqr-vv2q-cmr5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Docker API server&amp;#39;s SSRF protection (`validate_webhook_url` / `validate_url_destination` in `deploy/docker/utils.py`) used an explicit IPv4/IPv6 CIDR blocklist that missed several address families. An attacker could reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) despite the filter by encoding an internal IPv4 address inside an IPv6 transition form, or by using the IPv6 unspecified address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the Docker API is unauthenticated by default (`jwt_enabled: false`), no credentials are required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocklist was applied to crawl URLs (`POST /crawl`, `/md`, `/html`, `/screenshot`, `/pdf`, `/execute_js`) and webhook URLs (`/crawl/job`, `/llm/job`). All shared the same incomplete check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Bypasses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following all resolve to (or route to) blocked internal addresses but were NOT caught:
- IPv6 unspecified `::`
- NAT64 `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` (embeds `169.254.169.254`)
- 6to4 `2002:a9fe:a9fe::` (embeds `169.254.169.254`)
- IPv4-mapped `::ffff:169.254.169.254`
- IPv4-compatible `::a9fe:a9fe`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The error message also echoed the resolved internal IP, acting as a minor DNS/oracle leak.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Server-Side Request Forgery: an unauthenticated attacker can make the server fetch internal-network URLs and cloud instance-metadata endpoints, potentially exposing internal services and cloud credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocklist is replaced by a single rule: reject any resolved IP where `not ip.is_global`, evaluated on…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Docker API server&amp;#39;s SSRF protection (`validate_webhook_url` / `validate_url_destination` in `deploy/docker/utils.py`) used an explicit IPv4/IPv6 CIDR blocklist that missed several address families. An attacker could reach internal services and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) despite the filter by encoding an internal IPv4 address inside an IPv6 transition form, or by using the IPv6 unspecified address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the Docker API is unauthenticated by default (`jwt_enabled: false`), no credentials are required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected paths&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocklist was applied to crawl URLs (`POST /crawl`, `/md`, `/html`, `/screenshot`, `/pdf`, `/execute_js`) and webhook URLs (`/crawl/job`, `/llm/job`). All shared the same incomplete check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Bypasses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following all resolve to (or route to) blocked internal addresses but were NOT caught:
- IPv6 unspecified `::`
- NAT64 `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` (embeds `169.254.169.254`)
- 6to4 `2002:a9fe:a9fe::` (embeds `169.254.169.254`)
- IPv4-mapped `::ffff:169.254.169.254`
- IPv4-compatible `::a9fe:a9fe`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The error message also echoed the resolved internal IP, acting as a minor DNS/oracle leak.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Server-Side Request Forgery: an unauthenticated attacker can make the server fetch internal-network URLs and cloud instance-metadata endpoints, potentially exposing internal services and cloud credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blocklist is replaced by a single rule: reject any resolved IP where `not ip.is_global`, evaluated on…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4qqr-vv2q-cmr5</guid>
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