https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 05:39:52 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-29080 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> rucio</p> <p>A SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query()` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/&lt;scope&gt;/dids/search`). On Oracle deployments attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text()` via Python `.format()`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. This affects versions 1.27.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.</p> <p>The vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting. Both `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The `text()` function creates a raw SQL fragment — it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents.</p> <p>Any authenticated Rucio user can exploit this through the DID search API to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database. This can expose all managed data identifiers and sensitive tables such as identities, tokens, accounts, rse_settings, and rules, and may allow modification of database contents. The issue affects Oracle deployments using the default json_meta plugin and does not affect PostgreSQL or MySQ…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> rucio</p> <p>A SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query()` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/&lt;scope&gt;/dids/search`). On Oracle deployments attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text()` via Python `.format()`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. This affects versions 1.27.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.</p> <p>The vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting. Both `key` and `value` are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The `text()` function creates a raw SQL fragment — it does **not** escape or parameterize its contents.</p> <p>Any authenticated Rucio user can exploit this through the DID search API to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database. This can expose all managed data identifiers and sensitive tables such as identities, tokens, accounts, rse_settings, and rules, and may allow modification of database contents. The issue affects Oracle deployments using the default json_meta plugin and does not affect PostgreSQL or MySQ…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-29080 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: rucio</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/&lt;scope&gt;/dids/search`). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text` via Python `str.format`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration `json_meta` with Oracle database backends.</p> <p>---</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting:</p> <p>**filter_engine.py:552** (string equality — default branch): ```python expression = text(&#34;json_exists({},&#39;$?(@.{} {} \&#34;{}\&#34;)&#39;)&#34;.format( json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value)) ```</p> <p>**filter_engine.py:548** (boolean branch): ```python expression = text(&#34;json_exists({},&#39;$?(@.{}.boolean() {} \&#34;{}\&#34;)&#39;)&#34;.format( json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value)) ```</p> <p>**filter_engine.py:550** (numeric branch — value unquoted): ```python expression = text(&#34;json_exists({},&#39;$?(@.{} {} {})&#39;)&#34;.format( json_column.key…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: rucio</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/&lt;scope&gt;/dids/search`). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text` via Python `str.format`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration `json_meta` with Oracle database backends.</p> <p>---</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerability exists in `lib/rucio/core/did_meta_plugins/filter_engine.py` within the `create_sqla_query()` method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using `text()` with Python string formatting:</p> <p>**filter_engine.py:552** (string equality — default branch): ```python expression = text(&#34;json_exists({},&#39;$?(@.{} {} \&#34;{}\&#34;)&#39;)&#34;.format( json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value)) ```</p> <p>**filter_engine.py:548** (boolean branch): ```python expression = text(&#34;json_exists({},&#39;$?(@.{}.boolean() {} \&#34;{}\&#34;)&#39;)&#34;.format( json_column.key, key, ORACLE_OP_MAP[oper], value)) ```</p> <p>**filter_engine.py:550** (numeric branch — value unquoted): ```python expression = text(&#34;json_exists({},&#39;$?(@.{} {} {})&#39;)&#34;.format( json_column.key…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3