https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:41:50 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40289 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI, MervinPraison praisonaiagents</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the browser bridge (praisonai browser start) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote session hijacking due to missing authentication and a bypassable origin check on its /ws WebSocket endpoint. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and only validates the Origin header when one is present, meaning any non-browser client that omits the header is accepted without restriction. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect, send a start_session message, and the server will route it to the first idle browser-extension WebSocket (effectively hijacking that session) and then broadcast all resulting automation actions and outputs back to the attacker. This enables unauthorized remote control of connected browser automation sessions, leakage of sensitive page context and automation results, and misuse of model-backed browser actions in any environment where the bridge is network-reachable. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI, MervinPraison praisonaiagents</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions below 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents, the browser bridge (praisonai browser start) is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote session hijacking due to missing authentication and a bypassable origin check on its /ws WebSocket endpoint. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and only validates the Origin header when one is present, meaning any non-browser client that omits the header is accepted without restriction. An unauthenticated network attacker can connect, send a start_session message, and the server will route it to the first idle browser-extension WebSocket (effectively hijacking that session) and then broadcast all resulting automation actions and outputs back to the attacker. This enables unauthorized remote control of connected browser automation sessions, leakage of sensitive page context and automation results, and misuse of model-backed browser actions in any environment where the bridge is network-reachable. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.5.139 of PraisonAI and 1.5.140 of praisonaiagents.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40289 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8x8f-54wf-vv92 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents, PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary `praisonai browser start` exposes the browser bridge on `0.0.0.0` by default, and its `/ws` endpoint accepts websocket clients that omit the `Origin` header entirely. An unauthenticated network client can connect as a fake controller, send `start_session`, cause the server to forward `start_automation` to another connected browser-extension websocket, and receive the resulting action/status stream back over that hijacked session. This allows unauthorized remote use of a connected browser automation session without any credentials.</p> <p>### Details The issue is in the browser bridge trust model. The code assumes that websocket peers are trusted local components, but that assumption is not enforced.</p> <p>Relevant code paths:</p> <p>- Default network exposure: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:38-44` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/cli.py:25-30` - Optional-only origin validation: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:156-173` - Unauthenticated `start_session` routing: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:237-240` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:289-302` - Cross-connection forwarding to any other idle websocket: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:344-356` - Broadcast of action output back to the initiating unauthenticated client: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:412-423` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:462-476`</p> <p>The handshake logic only checks origin when an `Origin` header is present:</p> <p>```python origin = web…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents, PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary `praisonai browser start` exposes the browser bridge on `0.0.0.0` by default, and its `/ws` endpoint accepts websocket clients that omit the `Origin` header entirely. An unauthenticated network client can connect as a fake controller, send `start_session`, cause the server to forward `start_automation` to another connected browser-extension websocket, and receive the resulting action/status stream back over that hijacked session. This allows unauthorized remote use of a connected browser automation session without any credentials.</p> <p>### Details The issue is in the browser bridge trust model. The code assumes that websocket peers are trusted local components, but that assumption is not enforced.</p> <p>Relevant code paths:</p> <p>- Default network exposure: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:38-44` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/cli.py:25-30` - Optional-only origin validation: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:156-173` - Unauthenticated `start_session` routing: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:237-240` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:289-302` - Cross-connection forwarding to any other idle websocket: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:344-356` - Broadcast of action output back to the initiating unauthenticated client: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:412-423` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:462-476`</p> <p>The handshake logic only checks origin when an `Origin` header is present:</p> <p>```python origin = web…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8x8f-54wf-vv92