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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-7813 — pgAdmin 4: Cross-user data access and shared-server privilege escalation in server mode</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-7813</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 server mode affecting Server Groups, Servers, Shared Servers, Background Processes, and Debugger modules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints fetched user-owned objects without filtering by the requesting user&amp;#39;s identity. An authenticated user could access another user&amp;#39;s private servers, server groups, background processes, and debugger function arguments by guessing object IDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the Shared Servers feature contained multiple issues including credential leakage (passexec_cmd, passfile, SSL keys), privilege escalation via writable passexec_cmd (a shell command executed when establishing the connection) allowing arbitrary command execution in the owner&amp;#39;s process context, and owner-data corruption via SQLAlchemy session mutations. Several owner-only fields (passexec_cmd, passexec_expiration, db_res, db_res_type) were writable by non-owners through the API, and additional fields (kerberos_conn, tags, post_connection_sql) lacked per-user persistence so non-owner edits mutated the owner&amp;#39;s record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix centralises access control via a new server_access module, scopes all user-owned models with a UserScopedMixin, returns HTTP 410 from connection_manager when access is denied in server mode, suppresses owner-only fields for non-owners across the merge / API response / ServerManager paths, and adds an explicit owner-only write guard. The remediation landed in two pull requests; both are referenced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 server mode affecting Server Groups, Servers, Shared Servers, Background Processes, and Debugger modules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints fetched user-owned objects without filtering by the requesting user&amp;#39;s identity. An authenticated user could access another user&amp;#39;s private servers, server groups, background processes, and debugger function arguments by guessing object IDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the Shared Servers feature contained multiple issues including credential leakage (passexec_cmd, passfile, SSL keys), privilege escalation via writable passexec_cmd (a shell command executed when establishing the connection) allowing arbitrary command execution in the owner&amp;#39;s process context, and owner-data corruption via SQLAlchemy session mutations. Several owner-only fields (passexec_cmd, passexec_expiration, db_res, db_res_type) were writable by non-owners through the API, and additional fields (kerberos_conn, tags, post_connection_sql) lacked per-user persistence so non-owner edits mutated the owner&amp;#39;s record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix centralises access control via a new server_access module, scopes all user-owned models with a UserScopedMixin, returns HTTP 410 from connection_manager when access is denied in server mode, suppresses owner-only fields for non-owners across the merge / API response / ServerManager paths, and adds an explicit owner-only write guard. The remediation landed in two pull requests; both are referenced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-7813</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h2x2-q2mc-24gw — pgAdmin 4 server mode has an authorization vulnerability affecting Server Groups, Servers, Shared Servers, Background P…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2x2-q2mc-24gw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pgadmin4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 server mode affecting Server Groups, Servers, Shared Servers, Background Processes, and Debugger modules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints fetched user-owned objects without filtering by the requesting user&amp;#39;s identity. An authenticated user could access another user&amp;#39;s private servers, server groups, background processes, and debugger function arguments by guessing object IDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the Shared Servers feature contained multiple issues including credential leakage (passexec_cmd, passfile, SSL keys), privilege escalation via writable passexec_cmd (a shell command executed when establishing the connection) allowing arbitrary command execution in the owner&amp;#39;s process context, and owner-data corruption via SQLAlchemy session mutations. Several owner-only fields (passexec_cmd, passexec_expiration, db_res, db_res_type) were writable by non-owners through the API, and additional fields (kerberos_conn, tags, post_connection_sql) lacked per-user persistence so non-owner edits mutated the owner&amp;#39;s record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix centralises access control via a new server_access module, scopes all user-owned models with a UserScopedMixin, returns HTTP 410 from connection_manager when access is denied in server mode, suppresses owner-only fields for non-owners across the merge / API response / ServerManager paths, and adds an explicit owner-only write guard. The remediation landed in two pull requests; both are referenced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: pgadmin4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authorization vulnerability in pgAdmin 4 server mode affecting Server Groups, Servers, Shared Servers, Background Processes, and Debugger modules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple endpoints fetched user-owned objects without filtering by the requesting user&amp;#39;s identity. An authenticated user could access another user&amp;#39;s private servers, server groups, background processes, and debugger function arguments by guessing object IDs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the Shared Servers feature contained multiple issues including credential leakage (passexec_cmd, passfile, SSL keys), privilege escalation via writable passexec_cmd (a shell command executed when establishing the connection) allowing arbitrary command execution in the owner&amp;#39;s process context, and owner-data corruption via SQLAlchemy session mutations. Several owner-only fields (passexec_cmd, passexec_expiration, db_res, db_res_type) were writable by non-owners through the API, and additional fields (kerberos_conn, tags, post_connection_sql) lacked per-user persistence so non-owner edits mutated the owner&amp;#39;s record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix centralises access control via a new server_access module, scopes all user-owned models with a UserScopedMixin, returns HTTP 410 from connection_manager when access is denied in server mode, suppresses owner-only fields for non-owners across the merge / API response / ServerManager paths, and adds an explicit owner-only write guard. The remediation landed in two pull requests; both are referenced.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2x2-q2mc-24gw</guid>
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