https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 09:31:05 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33054 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mesop-dev mesop</p> <p>Mesop is a Python-based UI framework that allows users to build web applications. Versions 1.2.2 and below contain a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows any user supplying an untrusted state_token through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation. This vulnerability heavily exposes systems hosted utilizing FileStateSessionBackend. Unauthorized malicious actors could interact with arbitrary payloads overwriting or explicitly removing underlying service resources natively outside the application bounds. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.3.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mesop-dev mesop</p> <p>Mesop is a Python-based UI framework that allows users to build web applications. Versions 1.2.2 and below contain a Path Traversal vulnerability that allows any user supplying an untrusted state_token through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation. This vulnerability heavily exposes systems hosted utilizing FileStateSessionBackend. Unauthorized malicious actors could interact with arbitrary payloads overwriting or explicitly removing underlying service resources natively outside the application bounds. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.3.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-33054 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mesop</p> <p>#### Summary A Path Traversal vulnerability allows any user (or attacker) supplying an untrusted `state_token` through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation.</p> <p>#### Details When the framework is configured to use the disk-based session backend (`FileStateSessionBackend`), the user&#39;s `state_token` actively dictates where the runtime session state is physically saved or queried natively on disk. In `mesop/server/server.py`, specifically the `ui_stream` endpoint, the `event.state_token` is collected directly from the untrusted incoming protobuf message struct: `mesop.protos.ui_pb2.UserEvent`. Because this is unconditionally passed to `FileStateSessionBackend._make_file_path(self, token)`, it evaluates standard path operators (e.g. `../../../`).</p> <p>```python # mesop/server/state_session.py def _make_file_path(self, token: str) -&gt; Path: return self.base_dir / (self.prefix + token) ``` Python&#39;s standard library natively resolves OS traversal semantics allowing full escape from the `base_dir` destination intent.</p> <p>#### PoC An attacker can utilize Python to craft and send a malicious Protobuf payload to the `/ui` stream.</p> <p>```python import requests import mesop.protos.ui_pb2 as pb # Assuming mesop protos are compiled</p> <p># 1. Craft the malicious protobuf messag…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mesop</p> <p>#### Summary A Path Traversal vulnerability allows any user (or attacker) supplying an untrusted `state_token` through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation.</p> <p>#### Details When the framework is configured to use the disk-based session backend (`FileStateSessionBackend`), the user&#39;s `state_token` actively dictates where the runtime session state is physically saved or queried natively on disk. In `mesop/server/server.py`, specifically the `ui_stream` endpoint, the `event.state_token` is collected directly from the untrusted incoming protobuf message struct: `mesop.protos.ui_pb2.UserEvent`. Because this is unconditionally passed to `FileStateSessionBackend._make_file_path(self, token)`, it evaluates standard path operators (e.g. `../../../`).</p> <p>```python # mesop/server/state_session.py def _make_file_path(self, token: str) -&gt; Path: return self.base_dir / (self.prefix + token) ``` Python&#39;s standard library natively resolves OS traversal semantics allowing full escape from the `base_dir` destination intent.</p> <p>#### PoC An attacker can utilize Python to craft and send a malicious Protobuf payload to the `/ui` stream.</p> <p>```python import requests import mesop.protos.ui_pb2 as pb # Assuming mesop protos are compiled</p> <p># 1. Craft the malicious protobuf messag…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8qvf-mr4w-9x2c