https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 19:27:33 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44513 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> huggingface diffusers, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat AI Inference Server, Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)</p> <p>Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA&#39;s file list rather than repoB&#39;s, so repoB&#39;s pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> huggingface diffusers, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat AI Inference Server, Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)</p> <p>Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, a trust_remote_code bypass in DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing trust_remote_code=False (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the trust_remote_code gate was implemented inside DiffusionPipeline.download() rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited download() also bypassed the security check. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the gate evaluated against repoA&#39;s file list rather than repoB&#39;s, so repoB&#39;s pipeline.py was loaded and executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) — the local-path branch never invoked download(), so the gate was never reached and remote code from repoB executed. DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False) where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. unet/my_unet_model.py) referenced from model_index.json — same root cause; the local path skipped download() and custom component code executed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.38.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44513 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98h9-4798-4q5v <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: diffusers</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>A `trust_remote_code` bypass in `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained` allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing `trust_remote_code=False` (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the `trust_remote_code` gate was implemented inside `DiffusionPipeline.download()` rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited `download()` also bypassed the security check:</p> <p>1. **Cross-repo `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the gate evaluated against `repoA`&#39;s file list rather than `repoB`&#39;s, so `repoB`&#39;s `pipeline.py` was loaded and executed. 2. **Local snapshot + Hub `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the local-path branch never invoked `download()`, so the gate was never reached and remote code from `repoB` executed. 3. **Local snapshot with custom components.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. `unet/my_unet_model.py`) referenced from `model_index.json` — same root cause; the local path skipped `download()` and custom component code executed.</p> <p>Silent remote code execution on the victim&#39;s machine. Anyone calling `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretraine…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: diffusers</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>A `trust_remote_code` bypass in `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained` allows arbitrary remote code execution despite the user passing `trust_remote_code=False` (or omitting it, which is the default). The vulnerability has three variants, all sharing the same root cause — the `trust_remote_code` gate was implemented inside `DiffusionPipeline.download()` rather than at the actual dynamic-module load site, so any code path that bypassed or short-circuited `download()` also bypassed the security check:</p> <p>1. **Cross-repo `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;repoA&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the gate evaluated against `repoA`&#39;s file list rather than `repoB`&#39;s, so `repoB`&#39;s `pipeline.py` was loaded and executed. 2. **Local snapshot + Hub `custom_pipeline`.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, custom_pipeline=&#39;attacker/repoB&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` — the local-path branch never invoked `download()`, so the gate was never reached and remote code from `repoB` executed. 3. **Local snapshot with custom components.** `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained(&#39;/local/snapshot&#39;, trust_remote_code=False)` where the snapshot contains custom component files (e.g. `unet/my_unet_model.py`) referenced from `model_index.json` — same root cause; the local path skipped `download()` and custom component code executed.</p> <p>Silent remote code execution on the victim&#39;s machine. Anyone calling `DiffusionPipeline.from_pretraine…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98h9-4798-4q5v